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Novagraf A/S  
 New Latin American Development Strategies in a Changing International Economic and 
Political Context 
 
Introduction 
Vibeke Andersson & Steen Fryba Christensen 
 
After a shift to neoliberal development strategies in the first Post Cold War period, 
Latin American development strategies are now substantially more heterogeneous. Changing 
international economic and political dynamics such as the economic rise of China and India, as well 
as the development crises in a number of Latin American countries after a decade of neoliberal 
reforms, are relevant contextual factors behind this tendency. As a consequence, development 
strategies have come to vary widely in Latin America both in terms of economic policy and foreign 
policy choices. Some countries have opted for strong nationalist policies such as the nationalization 
of energy resources and strong state intervention in the economy, while others maintain more 
market-driven approaches, while an emphasis on socially oriented policies seems to be on the rise 
across this divide. 
Along with this change in economic and social policy orientation a major shift in US-
Latin American relations is occurring. This is particularly the case with regard to US-South 
American relations. After some two decades of alignment following the demise of the Cold War, 
there are signs that the United States and parts of South America are drifting apart and that U.S. 
influence in the region has diminished.  
At the same time, Mexico and Central America are increasingly being integrated with 
the US economy through economic ties and free trade agreements along neoliberal lines. In South 
America, several countries are departing from neoliberal development strategies as U.S. influence 
declines in the region. These trends may mean that the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) as 
envisioned by the United States will never become a reality.  
Relations between the US and its Latin American neighbours have historically 
fluctuated between close cooperation and open confrontation. After the Cuban Revolution, Cuba 
has been most consistently at odds with the US, while different US initiatives have been successful 
in keeping the relationship to Latin American countries relatively friendly. This has particularly 
been the case in the Post Cold War period. Mexico has joined the United States and Canada in 
NAFTA and several Latin American countries including the Central American regional grouping 
3
 have subscribed bilateral free trade and investment treaties with the US. When George Bush Sr. 
launched his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) in 1990 and Clinton invited to the First 
Summit of the Americas in 1994 to discuss inter alia the idea of a Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) which envisioned creating a free trade area in all of the Western Hemisphere, from Alaska 
to Tierra del Fuego, with the exception of Cuba that was not invited, Latin American governments 
were quick to embrace the idea. Only Brazil was somewhat cool to the idea and pursued a tactic of 
drawing out negotiations, but the feeling was that the Pan-American initiative would be successful 
in creating one large free trade area in the Western Hemisphere largely according to the principles 
proposed by the United States. The general assumption was that it would be dangerous for 
individual nations to stand outside such an area since they would be at a disadvantage in terms of 
access to the huge US market and in terms of attracting foreign investments.  
Today, the political landscape is quite different in the Western Hemisphere. Several 
South American countries have experienced severe economic and development crises in spite of, or 
perhaps due to, the embrace of neo-liberal reforms of free trade, deregulation and privatization. As a 
consequence the political tide has turned. Several countries have turned against the US and/or 
against a neo-liberal agenda largely associated with the United States. As a consequence, the FTAA 
is stalled and a number of South American countries are moving towards South American regional 
integration. Brazil and Mercosur form the backbone in this movement. While Brazil is not openly 
hostile towards the United States, it pursues an independent course in international and regional 
affairs. Other countries, notably Venezuela are openly hostile towards the current US government 
of George W. Bush, and completely against negotiating the FTAA which the Venezuelan 
government of Chávez sees as an imperialist strategy of domination and subordination of all of 
Latin America. In Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina privatization reforms have been 
rolled back with nationalizations and changes in contracts and Argentina has defaulted on its large 
foreign state debt. Thus, the US strategy of making Latin America safe for business has not been 
completely successful. South American nations are resisting the move towards an FTAA that would 
reduce their autonomy through legal disciplines protecting business interests and reducing the room 
of manoeuvre for democratically elected governments. This kind of disciplines has been introduced 
in NAFTA and in bilateral agreements between the United States and different Latin American 
governments. So Latin America is responding in different ways to US initiatives. Some countries 
are further integrating their economies with the US, notably Mexico and Central America while 
others are charting a more independent course and stepping out of the shadows of the Eagle. 
4
 This collection of papers from the conference: “New Latin American Development 
Strategies in a Changing International Economic and Political Context”, held at Aalborg University 
in May 2008 deals with a wide range of topics concerning Latin American development strategies. 
The collection is divided into three chapters each treating different topics under a common headline.  
 
State and Economic Actors 
In Latin America the state articulates itself differently in different countries. The three case studies 
in this chapter deal with different actors within the state in three different countries: Chile, Brazil 
and Mexico. The contributions address the topics of State and actors from different angles but 
common for the papers is that they show different strategies in state-actor relations in different 
countries. 
Gonzalo Fallabella discusses the character and capacity of the “Tripartite 
Agreements” between government, unions and employers associations in Chile. He especially 
examines what the impact has been on economic liberalization and political transition since 1990. 
One of the findings in the paper is that progressive results in Chile are a consequence of full 
democratization and collective bargaining rights for unions allowing political and social actors to 
participate in the country’s development. The special conditions in Chile’s post dictatorship period 
has somewhat obstructed he possibilities for participation. Tripartism seems to have played a role in 
establishing an effective framework for transition: a liberal export economy lead by private business 
and an inclusive social agenda termed growth with equity. But on the other hand Tripartism has not 
solved the problems in relation to introducing labor and democratic reforms. 
Ana Margarida Esteves takes the debate on labour and democratic reforms to Brazil, 
where she discusses bottom-up resistance to neo-liberalism by looking at the Brazilian Forum of 
Solidarity Economy. The forum is created by social movements working with the “peripheral 
economy” with the purpose of facilitating access to resources, providing technical support to 
enterprises, networking with potential partners and clients and deliberating with the state on policies 
and policy proposals concerning this sector of the economy. She argues that resistance to neo-
liberalism and state policies is often played out in a multiplication of experiences, in different parts 
of the world, which combine political struggle with the development of economic activities based 
on alternative forms of production. These activities are based on the very same system of principles 
which their developers aim to see generalized into the mainstream. In Brazil an emerging coalition 
of movements is going beyond a protest-based strategy, by turning grassroots experiences of non-
5
 capitalist production into a form of politics that presents itself as the rationale for a rethinking of the 
country’s development model. 
Carlos Chavez Becker and Alejandro Natal Martinez discuss an example of an 
alternative economic model. Their paper is a presentation of a local fair trade grass root 
organisation in the region of Oaxaca, Mexico. Their findings suggest that excluded groups within 
the population – in this case poor peasants in Southern Mexico – can find alternative ways out of 
poverty by collaborating locally and establishing ties to western NGOs. In Mexico, as elsewhere, 
the consolidation of the globalization process, and very specially the regional integration, has 
resulted in groups of the population being excluded from this process. Therefore, in the past two 
decades, fair-trade emerged as a socially constructed alternative to market and state failures. More 
and more fair trade organizations are acting as an economic alternative for non-competitive small 
poor peasants that otherwise would not have any possibilities to participate in the market. Moreover 
it is an opportunity for local bottom-up indigenous development. Public opinion in Mexico has 
welcomed fair trade, since evidence indicates that it is also serving communities by launching 
empowering processes, by rearticulating local social capital; and by forcing public officers in 
charge of local development to interact with grassroots organizations, NGOs and activists, and other 
civil society local groups. 
 
Development Strategies 
This chapter is composed of papers that address development strategies from different angles. A 
number of papers are discussing the Mercosur. One is analysing a specific case of cash transfer for 
extremely poor people in Mexico, and one is discussing development strategies after the 
Washington consensus exemplified with the case of Argentina.  
Pia Riggirozzi discusses on an overall level what governance after the Washington 
Consensus means in Latin America and, in particular, the articulation of a post-neoliberal project in 
the case of Argentina.  
Given the acute socio-political and economic turmoil surrounding the recent crisis in Argentina, it 
would have been commonly expected for the state to have little or no bargaining position, especially 
in facing international financial actors’ conditions to reopening financial channels of support. 
However, it is argued that the collapse prompted audacious and well-targeted reforms aimed at 
reverting the neoliberal model and with it a more complete re-evaluation of the role of the state in 
development. As such, the paper explores the conditions that helped the post-crisis government to 
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 reconcile state interventionism and globalisation and how it managed to balance sovereign authority 
and externally-driven economic demands.  
Laura Casola analyses Mercosur in a historical perspective from its start in 1991 to present 
day. Mercosur emerged as a process of integration with objectives that go far beyond the mere 
cooperation in economic and political issues, also embracing matters like justice, human rights, 
environment, work and culture. As a project of south-south integration, Mercosur has tried to 
stimulate internal solidarity in order to fortify the region, becoming, gradually, the third largest 
trading bloc in the world. Therefore, the strategies followed by Mercosur have changed during the 
two decades of its existence. In the 1990’s the regional policy was devised under the ideology of the 
Washington Consensus, oriented to economic aspects and applying a neo-liberal scheme. Yet, the 
regional crisis that took place since 1999 – as a result of the open regionalism – imposed a post-
liberal model of integration whose axes are the human rights and democracy as conditions for 
development, reviving, in this way, the spirit of the Treaty of Asunción, whose preamble states that 
the aim of Mercosur is the economic development with social justice for its people. 
Ana Patricia Silva discusses a specific instrument to curbing extreme poverty in Mexico; the 
conditional cash transfer programmes (CCT). During the last three decades, Latin America has gone 
through different economic development periods which have affected its political and social 
dynamics. As a response to these challenging conditions, the state, sometimes as well in 
coordination with the civil society, has undertaken diverse social policy measures in order to protect 
the most vulnerable groups of population. One of the new strategies in order to fight poverty, to 
foster social inclusion and to overcome inequalities is the conditional cash transfer programmes. 
The paper analyses to which extend CCT programmes in Latin America are achieving their 
objective of helping people living in extreme poverty to get out of the intergenerational poverty 
circle and to develop their own capacities. Using as case studies the El Salvador CCT programme 
“Red Solidaria” and comparing it to the “Oportunidades” CCT programme in Mexico, the paper 
argues that CCT is a useful tool in the anti-poverty efforts.  
Raúl Bernal-Meza and Gustavo Alberto Masera discuss Brazil’s regional policy as part of a 
strategy of accumulation of power on the part of Brazil; accumulation of power as a regional power 
and as a global player. They also discuss Argentina’s foreign policy and compares it to Brazil’s, in 
part to see the degree of agreement or disagreement that would have importance for the constitution 
of a common voice in international politics. Furthermore, Argentina’s view of Brazil is analyzed 
together with bilateral relations between the two countries and Brazil’s view of Argentina and 
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 Venezuela. Also development problems and energy issues are taken up. All in all this discussion 
gives a sense of regional integration in Mercosur and South America, the problems that the major 
countries are facing and how their foreign policy orientations are. This is important in terms of the 
likely future directions of South American regionalism and foreign policy orientation. 
Steen Fryba Christensen discusses the importance of regional integration in Mercosur and in 
South America from the perspective of Brazil’s strategy of international insertion and development. 
It proposes that Brazil seeks regional leadership as a way to aggregate political power and become a 
stronger global political player and as a way to aggregate economic power. In this strategy Brazil is 
depicted as competing with the US for influence in the region of South America. The conclusion is 
that Brazil is the most serious candidate for South American leadership, that in spite of difficult 
challenges emanating particularly from national-oriented priorities in other South American 
countries, regional integration is being strengthened. However, some countries are hard to get into 
Brazil’s sphere of influence. The strategy employed towards these countries (Chile, Colombia and 
Peru) is to increase economic and political cooperation as much as possible with them as part of the 
strategy of accumulation of power. Free trade agreements, integration processes and energy and 
infrastructure projects are the means used for this purpose.  
 
Identity Formation and Social Movements 
Common for the contributions in this chapter is the interest in identity formation. Identity formation 
is constructed and de-constructed on many levels in different social settings in the case studies from 
Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. Identity formation is here discussed a ‘memory-work’ approach in 
studying Peruvian women and their organizations, and as peasants approaches to land reforms in 
Mexico. The community is seen as a primary setting for identity formation in the work from 
indigenous communities in Peru, and in Bolivia the state has created parallel institutions to 
indigenous organization, with the consequence that the state institution have no ‘meaning’ for 
indigenous peasants.  
Christina Hee Pedersen discusses identity formation within feminism and social 
movements in Peru and she argues for seeing identity as a site of narrative constructions and 
reconstructions. Her approach to feminism and social movements is focusing on exploring the 
intersection between individual or collective identities. Memory Work and Reconstructions and 
Confrontation open up for interweaving research positions, methodological approaches and 
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 personal life stories and thus produce insights about the political longings of the Peruvian feminist 
movement and insights about the meaning of the institutional belongings  
Isabel Clemente examines the Uruguayan resistance to a political project for a free  
trade agreement with the US and the eventual failure of this project, focusing on both state and 
societal actors. She addresses the challenge to the continuity of said policy arising out of the US 
initiative for a bilateral agreement of free trade that would affect Uruguayan belonging to Mercosur. 
Her paper examines the contrasting responses from various state bodies and political actors and 
studies the resistance of civil society actors: the labour movement, the students’ movement, 
industrial corporations, academics, intellectuals, and left-wing media. A key aspect in the paper is 
the balance between ideological, strategic and pragmatic arguments in the domestic political debate 
in Uruguay. 
Kirsten Appendini and Søren Hvalkof participate in a research project centred on 
agrarian reforms in a comparative perspective. Central for Kirsten Appendini’s research is that 
current changes of agrarian laws in Mexico resulted in a major impact on the peasantry, including 
the indigenous population. For over seventy years, land distribution had been at the core of agrarian 
policy and though the agrarian discourse had weakened by the 1980’s,  peasants’ demand for land 
was still vibrant in some regions, such as the Chiapas EZL revolt reminded the country –and the 
world- on the same day NAFTA was enforced the 1st of January, 1994. The indigenous peasants 
have stressed that common property over land and other natural resources is an important issue in 
the property rights debate and in development policy issues. On the ground, this also links to the 
discussion of indigenous rights and the role of local institutions in managing common resources. 
Søren Hvalkof elaborates on this discussion of indigenous rights stressing that for the 
peasants in highland Peru, where his work takes its point of departure, the community is a central 
entity for peasants’ life. Community equals social security. And this is where the short circuit of the 
conventional land reform rationale is to be found: equating communal tenure with the community. 
This is also why individualizing and privatizing tenure in rural areas does not make the communal 
control system disappear and consequently the free market relations develop as a prerequisite for 
the expected investment capitalization and growth. As long as the State is not capable of 
establishing and guaranteeing sufficient social security for its people - social security in the most 
inclusive and multifaceted sense of the term – these people will establish alternative systems to the 
State, and here the indigenous community is one of the oldest, most renowned and well-tested 
institutions, with all the required functions and instruments at hand. 
9
 Vibeke Andersson’s work focuses on the notion of ‘space’ at the local level in a rural 
area in southern Bolivia which is populated by a majority of indigenous peasants. The paper 
explores the institutions set up by the State in order to include the indigenous population in State 
administration. Much in line with the conclusions from Søren Hvalkof’s paper the preliminary 
conclusion of this work is that the State does not establish institutions of use for the indigenous 
population, who have relied on the community in most aspects for centuries. The ‘invited’ space 
which the State opens up for the indigenous population can not be filled out by original 
organisations and structures. Therefore parallel structures are seen at the local level where NGOs 
have an increasing role in securing a form of participation from civil society and as a mediator 
between State, municipalities and communities. 
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Entrepreneurship as Activism: 
 The emergence of the Brazilian Forum of Solidarity Economy 
 
Author: Ana Margarida Esteves 
 Department of Sociology, Brown University 
E-mail: Ana_Margarida_Esteves@brown.edu 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the factors which have enabled and constrained the emergence of FBES - 
the Brazilian Forum of Solidarity Economy as a "participatory public" (Avritzer, 2002) out of a 
convergence between movements working with sectors of what Laguerre (1994) calls the "peripheral 
economy", in this case cooperatives, workers' associations and microenterprises both in the urban and 
rural areas, as well as agricultural settlements created by land rights movements. FBES was created by 
social movements working with the “peripheral economy” with the purpose of deliberating with the state 
on policies and policy proposals concerning this sector of the economy, as well as facilitating access to 
know-how, resources, networking and potential partners and clients. There are other similar networks in 
Latin America. However, FBES managed to reach a higher level of geographical reach and involvement in 
the political process due to favorable political opportunities. This paper pays attention to the way in which 
the resource facilitation and the political/deliberative functions relate to each other. It also analyses the 
way in which structural inequalities in terms of class, gender and education reflect themselves in the 
realtionship between members of the social movements composing FBES, and between these and the state. 
Besides, it analyses the way in which such inequalities reflect themselves in processes of knowledge 
creation and deliberation within FBES, namely in what regards the attribution of "voice" to different 
categories of participants. The analysis is based on ethnographic research, historical process-tracing and 
network analysis.   
 
Introduction 
One of the most concrete aspects of worldwide resistance to neo-liberalism is the 
multiplication of experiences, in different parts of the world, which combine political 
struggle with the development of economic activities based on alternative forms of 
production. These activities are based on the very same system of principles which their 
developers aim to see generalized into the mainstream. Among them one can include 
cases as diverse as the Tamil Nadu Women’s Collective1 or even the Zapatista movement 
in Mexico. However, the most politically impacting, but least documented case can be 
found nowadays in Brazil, where an emerging coalition of movements is going beyond a 
protest-based strategy, by turning grassroots experiences of non-capitalist production into 
a form of prefigurative politics that presents itself as the rationale for a rethinking of the 
country’s development model.  
 
This paper is part of an ongoing Ph.D. dissertation project aimed at understanding 
under which conditions are worker-managed enterprises within what Laguerre (1994) 
calls the “periphery” of the economic system able to create public spaces and interact 
with the state so as to promote the creation of economic and political conditions that 
favor their inclusion in the formal economy. Its case study is FBES - the Brazilian Forum 
of Solidarity Economy, a forum created by social movements working with the 
“peripheral economy” with the purpose of facilitating access to resources, providing 
                                                 
1 https://bases.alliance21.org/alliance/d/v/?numero=7392&public=ENG&type=2  
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 technical support to enterprises, networking with potential partners and clients and 
deliberating with the state on policies and policy proposals concerning this sector of the 
economy. There are other similar networks elsewhere in Latin America. However, FBES 
managed to reach a higher level of geographical reach and involvement in the political 
process due to favorable political opportunities.  
 
This paper presents FBES as a public space whose emergence owes much to the 
existence of networks that cut across: 
 
1) clusters of entrepreneurs within the economy of the popular sectors; 
2) social movement organizations and NGOs; 
4) national and international civil society networks; 
3) the state. 
 
It specifically analyses the way in which the engagement of leading Brazilian scholars in 
the provision of capacity-building to social movements led to a reinterpretation of the 
concept of solidarity Economy (SE), as initially proposed in Francophone academic 
circles, and its transformation into a theory grounded in the experiences of social 
movements in Brazil. It is based on data collected during five months of fieldwork (June 
to August 2006, July and August 2007). During the Summer of 2006, I was a visiting 
scholar at PACS – Instituto Politicas Alternativas para o Cone Sul2, research center 
based in Rio de Janeiro and one of the main actors in the emergence of FBES.  During 
this period, I had the chance to interview leading activist scholars, NGO staff and 
grassroots activists working within the movement, as well as collect related bibliography 
not yet published outside Latin America and Francophone academic circles. I also 
observed meetings of the FBES state-level forum of Rio de Janeiro, as well as of “Casa 
da Confiança”, a microcredit system for urban cooperatives managed by PACS. During 
the summer of 2007, I had the chance of observing some meetings of the Rio de Janeiro 
state-level forum, as well as make more semi-structured interviews to entrepreneurs and 
activists. From August 2008 to August 2009, I will be carrying out ethnographic 
fieldwork in Brazil, with the purpose of collecting data for my dissertation. 
 
What the overall project aims to achieve, in theoretical terms, is the development 
of Avritzer’s (2002) theory of “participatory” publics in a way that: 
 
1) Explains the conditions which enable and constrain the formation of 
participatory publics composed by enterprises, instead of individual 
citizens/consumers of public goods; 
2) Accounts for the impact of economic and regulatory contexts in the 
emergence of participatory publics; 
3) Accounts for the role of SMOs and NGOs in mediating between 
members of the public and between these and the state; 
4) Accounts for the impact of the structural and human resource frames of 
NGOs and SMOs on their mediating role; 
                                                 
2 http://www.pacs.org.br  
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 5) Explains how such mediation shapes the cognitive, normative and 
regulatory frames created by interactions between members of the 
public; 
6) Understands how the organizational support provided by the 
participating SMOs and NGOs (facilitating access to resources, 
providing technical support to enterprises, networking with potential 
partners and clients) informs deliberation within publics and the way in 
which they interact with the state. 
 
The general motivation to research this subject comes from the realization that, 
within the social scientific literature, there is a lack of a comprehensive understanding of 
the dynamics of collective action and interest representation of entrepreneurs within the 
peripheral sectors of the economy. Specifically, there is a lack of analysis of the internal 
dynamics of participatory publics formed by enterprises and how such processes 
determine the boundaries of these publics: the criteria of “insidership” and “outsidership” 
that, on one hand, determine which actors are “in” and “out” in terms of access to 
participation in deliberative settings, and on the other hand determine how agreement is 
managed in a deliberative forum, meaning which standpoints predominate in the 
construction of frames and determination of collective action strategies. In order to reach 
that understanding, this project proposes the concept of “multi-level power dynamics” as 
an approach that analyses the dynamics of collective action from three dimensions: 
 
1) the internal organizational dynamics of social movements, with a particular 
emphasis on the processes of knowledge production underlying the definition 
of frames and collective action strategies; 
2) the way in which the power disparities in the interactions between social 
movement participants reflect structural inequalities in the society at large; 
3) the way in which the two previous factors determine the way in which 
movements interact with each other and with the state within participatory 
publics.  
 
The emphasis on processes of knowledge production comes from the fact that, 
among social movements which achieved a sufficient level of institutionalization so as to 
create a bureaucratic structure, what French and Raven (2008 [1959]) call “Expert 
Power” (p. 352) becomes a central resource and source influence, since it is a central tool 
in the definition of frames, claims and strategies, as well as in the internal organization of 
the movement and the raising and management of resources. That is especially the case 
of movements which engage in activities of capacity building among their members, as in 
the case of Latin American movements which promote activities of popular education 
and technical training (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Kane, 2001; Conway, 2006). Besides, 
the increasing blurring of the analytical and empirical separation between state and civil 
society, resulting from what Bang and Sørensen (2001) refer to as the transition between 
“democratic government” and “democratic governance” (p. 148) is leading to an 
increasing involvement of civil society networks in societal governance. As a result, the 
dynamics of civil society networks tend to be structured around “multi-leveled relations 
of strategic capacity and knowledge” which are “based more on a norm of expertise 
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 regarding the ‘necessary politics’ than one of creating a fabric of social trust and 
cooperation” (p. 148, 151).  
 
This approach assumes that the social and institutional networks that support the 
existence of social movements are structured by the power dynamics that are intrinsic to 
their own organizational processes. One may consider that the main factors that are at 
play in such power dynamics are:  
 
- differences between actors in terms of endowment with, and access to, 
distinct forms of knowledge with different degrees of institutionalized 
social legitimacy;  
- the division of labor between actors diversely endowed with, or enjoying 
differentiated access to, different forms of knowledge; 
- the method used for structuring the interactions between participants and 
their deliberative practices within processes of knowledge production; 
- the type of leadership orientation followed by leaders, the 
communicative skills (elaboration of ideas and deliberation) and the 
dominant mode of communication that predominate in their relationship 
with other members (Volosinov, 1986 [1929]; Freire, 1970; Bourdieu, 
1977, 1991; Mische, 2008).  
 
This operationalization of the concept of multi-level power dynamics is partially 
based on an understanding of processes of knowledge production within social 
movements as the intentional activities by which movements produce, process and 
diffuse information about their participants, their own socio-economic context and the 
ruling relations which structure their lives. Such processes include activities of collection, 
treatment and sharing of information such as research, education and training and 
networking with the specific purpose of debating and diffusing knowledge. This concept 
includes educational and training initiatives, as well as exchange of information and 
deliberation within activist networks, as these activities imply a development of 
previously gathered knowledge, which very often implies the addition of new 
information. That is the case, for example, of critical education programs following the 
pedagogy of Paulo Freire, which rely heavily on information brought by the student on 
her or his experience and the context in which it is embedded.  
 
Table 1  
Multi-level power dynamics 
- Within movements, as a reflection of structural inequalities. 
- Between movements, as a result of differentials in terms of access to resources and 
allies within other movements and the state. 
- Between publics and external actors: 
- The state; 
- National and international activist networks. 
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 Expanding the boundaries of social movement research 
According to Baiocchi (2005), it is necessary to reformulate what is necessarily 
conceived as social movement activism in a way that includes other forms of challenging 
of the “status quo” than that made possible by protest and advocacy. Recent 
developments in the context of the democratic deepening brought by institutional reforms 
carried out in the context of the “Pink Tide” in Latin America, namely the emergence of 
social movement-led participatory democracy and forms of comitology involving 
advocacy networks, show that one must go beyond the prevailing concept of social 
movement activism as something that happens “at the gates of the state” (Baiocchi, 
2005). It becomes necessary to develop a concept that takes into account forms of 
engagement of with state that, by their goals and dynamics, challenge the existing 
structures of power within society. One step towards this concept is to consider the multi-
level power dynamics that structure organizational processes within social movements 
and participatory publics as involving not only movement participants, but also actors 
within the state structure, as well as national and international advocacy networks that 
they may be part of. Such multi-level approach implies the inclusion of two other factors 
in the study of such power dynamics, which are: 
 
- the positioning of social movement actors in relation to or within 
regional, national and/or transnational networks promoting the 
circulation of frames and strategies among social movements; 
- the impact of structural inequalities on deliberative abilities and access 
to forms of knowledge with different degrees of institutionalized social 
legitimacy (Volosinov, 1986 [1929]; Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca & 
Reiter, 2006). 
-  
The analysis of FBES in its multiple dimensions as multi-level power dynamics 
aims to contribute to the filling of three major gaps in the literature on participatory 
publics in the following manner: 
 
Structural factors influencing the emergence of participatory publics: Such 
understanding requires an historical analysis that will contextualize the process of 
emergence of a participatory public composed by enterprises within the peripheral 
economy that led to the setting up of FBES within the structural inequalities, regulatory 
frameworks and processes of economic change that affect this sector of the economy.  
 
Leadership and institutional mediation: It is necessary to understand how SMOs 
and NGOs contribute to the emergence of participatory publics through the development 
of networks of production, commercialization and political mobilization among 
enterprises by: 
 
1) Promoting capacity-building through educational, training and 
networking activities; 
2) Acting as brokers between enterprises, between them and social 
movements, and between them and the state, therefore promoting the 
circulation of information and resources; 
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 3) Developing a common frame for the whole public by influencing the 
discursive practices of members of the public by: 
a.  promoting the “translation” by generalizing from the particular 
experiences of participating enterprises, therefore contributing to the 
development of the frames of the participating movements 
(Wainwright, 1994; Sousa Santos 2005); 
b. aligning the frames of the different movements within the public 
(Benford & Snow, 2000); 
c. promoting consensual decision-making between members of the public 
and state representatives through the promotion of the circulation of 
knowledge from different sources and with different forms between 
both parts and the “translation” between movement frames and state 
discourse (Sousa Santos, 2005; Baiocchi, 2005; Fishman, 2008). 
 
It is also necessary to understand the impact of the type of leadership and the 
dominant mode of communication practiced within participating SMOs and NGOs on the 
reshaping of the discursive practices of participants in the public, and how it affects their 
capacity to participate in democratic public life (Fishman, 2008). Such effects can be 
assessed through the impact of the leadership and institutional mediation of SMOs and 
NGOs on:  
 
1) the awareness that participants have of their own abilities and capacity for 
autonomous action;  
2) their technical and management ability;  
3) their understanding of the social structures and dynamics in which their 
economic and political activities are embedded;  
4) their capacity to engage in collective action 
5) their capacity to present and promote their claims within FBES. 
 
Knowledge production - In order to properly analyze processes of deliberation 
around frame construction and strategy definition within participatory publics and their 
participants, it is necessary to transcend the dichotomy between notions of “practical” 
and “objectivist” knowledge by analyzing the ways in which members of the subaltern 
classes (in this specific case, producers within the “peripheral economy”) appropriate 
“socially legitimate knowledge” and transform it through their own understanding of 
their everyday practices.  
 
One must recognize that the dichotomy between “practical” and “technical” or 
“objective” knowledge does not apply to processes of knowledge production in the real 
world. According to Nilsen (2006), the knowledge produced by “grassroots” actors and 
“cadres” within social movements will always have elements of both “practical” and 
“technical” knowledge. Subaltern classes also produce forms of “expert” or “technical” 
knowledge related with their own activities, which can be codified in the form of “hard 
data” and generalized beyond the context in which it was produced. Besides, “movement 
intellectuals”, “technical cadres” and other “technicians” also produce forms of non-
generalized knowledge that is based on “testimony”. Such form of knowledge is very 
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 often the support of the systematized knowledge they produce within their intellectual 
and technical activities. In order to overcome this dichotomy, it is necessary to analyze 
the ways in which members of the subaltern classes appropriate “socially legitimate 
knowledge” and transform it through their own understanding of their everyday practices 
(Wainwright, 1994: 132). It is also necessary to understand the process by which 
“cadres” within social movement organizations use the knowledge produced by members 
within their knowledge-making, educational and institution-building activities. Besides, 
one has to overcome the dichotomy between “professional” and “non-professional” 
activists (e.g. Mische, 2008) and create typologies which account for different roles, 
forms of involvement and use of knowledge within social movements. Such typology 
should include different forms of “expertise” and “counter-expertise” and involvement by 
categories of participants such as “movement intellectuals”, “technicians” “grassroots 
organizers” and different types of volunteers and beneficiaries, among others (e.g. 
Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Nilsen, 2006). Such processes of knowledge production shall 
be contextualized so as to account for the way in which they are impacted by structural 
inequalities in terms of class, gender and ethnicity between members of the participating 
movements.  
 
This project will also add two additional dimensions to these processes of 
knowledge production: 
 
1) the way in which the state uses the knowledge produced by different 
categories of participants within FBES and its participating social 
movements to build knowledge about “Solidarity Economy”; 
2) the way in which, in its turn, the knowledge produced by the state 
influences knowledge production among members of FBES and 
deliberation within the Forum.  
 
It is also necessary to analyze the result of such processes of knowledge creation in terms 
of the internal and external coherence of the resulting frame and strategies, as well as the 
way in which it affects processes of mediation and participation within the public and 
collective action vis-à-vis the state. From exploratory research and reading on the work of 
activist intellectuals connected with the movements participating within FBES, I realized 
that “Solidarity Economy”, the theory that supports the activities of these movements and 
of FBES itself, cannot yet be considered an inherently coherent system of socio-
economic thought. Based on the theory of “the gift economy” developed by Marcell 
Mauss and his followers, it considers that the peripheral economy constitutes a distinct 
economic system from the capitalist economy. According to theorists such as Arruda 
(2003, 2006) and Mance (2002), its distinctiveness comes from the fact that it supposedly 
functions according to principles of community solidarity, and that, instead of being 
based on the accumulation of financial capital, it is based upon the accumulation of social 
capital in the form of resolution of common problems at the level of subsistence and 
provision of services to the community. However, the existing body of theory does not 
yet make it clear whether or not it accounts for the supposed ability of “Solidarity 
Economy” to sustain and reproduce itself autonomously in relation to the capitalist 
economy and the state. This project will analyze how such inner contradictions impacted 
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 the process of emergence of FBES and impact nowadays the deliberative processes 
within this organization. 
 
Table 2  
Preliminary account of factors influencing the emergence and current deliberative 
processes within FBES 
Structural inequalities, regulatory frameworks and processes of economic change that 
affect the peripheral economy. 
Ways in which members of the subaltern classes appropriate “socially legitimate 
knowledge” and transform it through their own understanding of their everyday practices.
Processes by which “cadres” within social movement organizations use the knowledge 
produced by members within their knowledge-making, educational and institution-
building activities. 
Ways in which SMOs and NGOs participating within FBES promote the circulation and 
“translation” of knowledge by generalizing from the context in which each participating 
movement is embedded. 
How structural inequalities in terms of class, gender and ethnicity impact processes of 
leadership, mediation and knowledge production.  
Impact of the type of leadership and the dominant mode of communication practiced 
within participating SMOs and NGOs. 
The way in which the state uses the knowledge produced by different categories of 
participants within FBES and its participating social movements to build knowledge 
about “Solidarity Economy”. 
The way in which, in its turn, the knowledge produced by the state influences knowledge 
production among members of FBES and deliberation within the Forum.  
 
 
On the concepts of “peripheral economy and “participatory publics” 
Contemporary left-of-center critics of liberal democracy claim that pressures 
towards worldwide market deregulation led to the capturing of the political process by a 
“neoliberal governmentality”, resulting from the extension to the state itself of the cost-
benefit and efficiency rationale implied in the neoliberal economic governance (Brown, 
2005: 41). Such rationality ties state legitimacy to the ability to sustain and foster the 
market. Its results are twofold: On one hand, it strengthens the capacity to leverage 
influence on the state and compete in the market of the structurally more powerful sectors 
of capital – large corporations, financial groups and capital-intensive small and medium 
enterprises. On the other hand, it weakens the capacity of labor and what Laguerre (1994: 
3-4) calls the “periphery” of the economic system to influence the political process and 
survive in a market whose institutionally-set rules favor those actors enjoying a higher 
capacity to exert political influence. Laguerre identifies as the “periphery” that part of the 
economic system composed by smaller, labor-intensive enterprises functioning according 
to simpler forms of technology. This is also the area where the formal and informal 
economy tend to coexists and where the differences between these two categories of 
economic practices are less pronounced. The boundary between these two sectors 
becomes whether they are regulated by state-sanctioned laws or by customary practices 
(Laguerre, 1994: 5). The outcome of neoliberal economic governance for the politically 
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 weaker actors is an increasing instability in terms of employment and organizational 
sustainability. It leads to increasing pressures for informalization, as a growing number of 
workers and labor-intensive firms are excluded from the formal economy by market 
regulations that threaten their employability or organizational survival.  
 
This project aims to explore the conditions which promote and constrain the 
emergence of participatory publics composed by organizations within peripheral sectors 
of the economy, given their progressive alienation from the state and the formal market 
as a result of neoliberal governance. Avritzer (2002: 52-3) conceives the emergence of 
participatory publics as a process whose elements can be summarized in the following 
three phases: 
 
1) The formation within the public sphere of mechanisms of face-to-face 
deliberation, free expression and association. These mechanisms play 
the role of addressing specific elements in the dominant culture by 
making them problematic issues to be politically addressed; 
2) The problematization, by voluntary associations and social movements, 
of contentious issues by introducing alternative practices within the 
public sphere; 
3) The search for institutional formats capable of addressing at the 
institutional level the issues made contentious within the public sphere, 
in a way that challenges the exclusive access of technicians to decision-
making forums and ensures the monitoring of the implementation of 
their decisions by the participatory public themselves. 
 
Despite the methodological usefulness of Avritzer’s concept of participatory 
publics, it is necessary to take into account that it is based on the analysis of examples of 
civil society mobilization which represent the interests of citizens as individual voters and 
consumers of public goods. Besides, as pointed out by Mische (2008: 344), it is lacking 
in the sense that it elides the extent to which participatory publics are permeated by 
partisan interests. It also does not show the mechanisms by which such publics ensure 
their cohesion and sustainability by conciliating common goals with the interests and 
projects of the different organizations that take part in them. 
 
Further research and conceptual development is necessary to adapt this model to 
forms of civil society mobilization and participatory institutional designs that represent 
the interests of organizations within the peripheral sector of the economy, such as small 
firms and workers’ collectives, instead of that of collectively organized individual 
citizens. The development and adaptation of Avritzer’s model is particularly important 
given the diversity of organizational forms and interests that coexist within the peripheral 
economy, as well as the complexity, ambiguousness and uncertainty that characterizes 
this context. Such types of analysis will more generally contribute to understand the 
process through which members of emerging participatory publics negotiate 
understandings and decide on action given the cognitive, normative and regulatory 
frames created by their own interactions, as well as complexity and uncertainty within the 
environment(s) in which they evolve (Scott, 1995; Perrow, 1996).  
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Table 3 
Elements of participatory publics 
 
Avrtizer’s model What needs to be developed 
Formation within the public sphere of 
mechanisms of face-to-face deliberation, 
free expression and association. 
Impact of economic and regulatory context.
 
Impact of structural and human resource 
frames of SMOs and NGOs on efforts 
aimed at ensuring cohesion and 
sustainability within participatory publics 
by conciliating common goals with 
partisan interests. 
Problematization of contentious issues by 
introducing alternative practices within the 
public sphere 
Cognitive, normative and regulatory 
frames created by interactions between 
members of the public. 
Search for institutional formats capable of 
addressing at the institutional level the 
issues made contentious within the public 
sphere 
Role of NGOs and SMOs in mediating 
between members of the public and 
between these and the state. 
 
 
Choice of case study 
New forms of collective action are emerging that, on one hand, challenge 
economic policies and regulations that are forcing the growth of the informal economy, 
and on the other hand promote the organizational sustainability and integration within the 
formal economy of enterprises which are either in an informal situation or at risk of 
disintegrating within the formal market (Singer & De Sousa, 2000; Mance, 2003; 
Magnani, 2005, Pinto, 2006). These forms of collective action also tend to promote the 
organization of workers within the informal economy, or who cannot earn enough to 
make a living within the formal market, into cooperatives and workers associations (Lara 
et al, 2002; Mance, 2002, 2004, Coraggio 2005, 2006, 2007). Such promotion is 
generally accompanied by institution-building measures in the form of knowledge 
production and its dissemination through education and training, as well as promotion of 
access to credit, public resources and markets, so as to promote their integration and 
sustainability within the formal economy.  
 
A volume edited by Douglas Chalmers et al (1997) identifies a series of cases of 
new forms of popular interest representation, based on principles of “associational 
governance”, and calls attention to the inadequacy of mainstream definitions of 
corporatism as an explanatory framework. It proposes the tentative concept of 
“associative networks” as an alternative analytical model and points out the need for 
further research on the subject. Despite the inclusiveness of this model, it must be noted 
that Chalmers’ volume does not include cases of networks that combine the role of 
“structure of representation” with that of promoter of institution-building and networking 
initiatives aimed at supporting economic activity. Keck & Sikkink’s (1998) analysis of 
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 transnational advocacy networks provides a conceptual structure for the analysis of 
communicate processes that can be applied to networks including a range of 
organizational types within a single country. Once again, it does not take into account 
networks which play the double role of structure of deliberation/interest representation 
and support to economic activity.  
 
These advocacy networks do not exactly fit the model proposed by Chalmers et al 
(1997) and Keck and Sikkink (1998). On one hand, they provide a communicative 
structure for political exchange between these actors, as well as between them and the 
state, by providing a venue in which participants can deliberate on legal and policy 
proposals and organize their efforts so as to lobby the state in their favor. On the other 
hand, their activities within the public sphere go beyond deliberation. They promote a 
series of information-gathering, educational, institution-building and market networking 
initiatives that are not predicted in the model proposed by the aforementioned authors. In 
that sense, their activities partake in what Wainwright (2002, 2005) calls “prefigurative 
politics”, since they support the development of the reality which they aim to see 
endorsed in the form of adequate policies and regulations. 
 
Latin America has witnessed, since the mid 1990’s, the emergence of several 
networks of this kind. That is the case of FBES - the Brazilian Forum of Solidarity 
Economy (Forum Brasileiro de Economia Solidária), RCES – Chilean Network of 
Solidarity Economy (Red Chilena de Economia Solidária) and GRESP – Network of 
Solidarity Economy of Peru (Grupo Red de Economia Solidária de Perú), among others. 
They result from the collaboration between producers within the peripheral economy, 
NGOs, labor unions and urban and rural social movements such as neighborhood 
associations and land rights movements (Lara et al, 2002; Mance, 2002). These networks 
seem to combine the role of “incubators” of enterprises, social movements and “structure 
of representation”3 of sectoral interests vis-à-vis the state, as they play multiple roles:4  
 
- supporting the development of enterprises within the peripheral 
economy, through the diffusion of management knowledge and their 
organization in chains of production and commercialization; 
- promoting the mobilization of entrepreneurs regarding issues of 
economic and social policy through educational actions aimed at 
improving their knowledge of political economy; 
- representing them vis-à-vis the state and other institutions; 
- proposing changes in economic policy that benefit them and promoting 
popular participation in political decision-making; 
- engaging in “politics of recognition”, in the sense that they aim to 
promote, within the public sphere, the idea that the practices and values 
of the economy of popular sectors are more than “an economy of the 
poor and for the poor”, representing a viable alternative to the 
proletarianization of the popular classes. 
                                                 
3 Concept proposed by Chalmers et al, 1997: 564-7. 
4 The webpages of GRESP and FBES make an explicit mention to these functions in the mission 
statements of the networks. 
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All these networks advocate a closer participation in the political process through 
the implementation of participatory designs in the state institutions. FBES is one step 
beyond, as it results from political opportunities for the emergence of institutional 
designs allowing for a more direct participation of advocacy networks in political 
decision-making that that allowed by mere advocacy and lobbying. These opportunities 
were brought about by the victory of the Workers’ Party in the Brazilian general elections 
of 2002. FBES emerged in 2003 from the RBSES – the Brazilian Network of Solidarity 
Socio-Economy (Rede Brasileira de Socio-economia Solidária), which has been in 
existence since 1998. The creation of FBES coincided with that of SENAES – National 
Secretariat of Solidarity Economy (Secretaria Nacional de Economia Solidária), a 
department of the Brazilian Ministry of Labor and Employment aimed at promoting a 
dialogue with organized civil society, as represented in FBES, on issues concerning the 
informal economy, labor-intensive small firms, land rights movements and the 
cooperative sector.  
 
FBES’ structure is similar to that of other of similar networks in Latin America, in 
the sense that it combines the role of communicative structure for political exchange with 
that of promoter of capacity building and networking initiatives. However, it differs from 
that of its peers in the sense that its communicative engagement with the state goes 
beyond a non-compulsory dialogue in the form of lobbying and advocacy. The creation 
of FBES and SENAES is an institutional design resulting from an agreement between the 
state and civil society that makes it compulsory for SENAES to consult FBES on any 
regulatory and policy proposal put forward by any sector within the executive or 
legislative power that might concern the sectors of civil society represented within this 
network.  
 
FBES and SENAES challenge existing paradigms of associational democracy and 
interest representation. Their institutional design does not fit the classical tripartite 
corporatist model bringing together labor, capital and the state, as defined by Schmitter 
(1974). It also cannot be considered a scheme of participatory decision-making, as those 
analyzed by Wainwright (2003) and Baiocchi (2005). First, although consultation of 
FBES by SENAES is binding, the results of such deliberation are not binding for the 
following stages of the political process. Second, FBES is a civil society network and as 
such is not part of the state structure, unlike the budgetary councils created within the 
participatory budgeting schemes implemented in several Brazilian municipalities.  
 
FBES is a national-level institution comprised by deliberative forums at the 
federal and state levels, aimed at influencing policy-making through the debate of policy 
proposals aimed at promoting the integration within the formal market of enterprises 
created within the informal economy. All forums, including that at the federal level, are 
composed by a 50% of representatives from enterprises, 25% of civil servants and 25% 
from NGOs and social movement organizations. Among the types of NGOs present at the 
forums, one can find organizations created by labor unions and social movements within 
the Catholic Church with the purpose of promoting education and the development of 
technical skills among the popular sectors. One will also find “incubators of 
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 cooperatives” created by universities, as well as neighborhood community development 
organizations developed within urban settings. These NGOs provide knowledge 
production, skill development, networking and institution-building support to social 
movements and individual enterprises. As verified during fieldwork carried out during 
the summers of 2006 and 2007, these NGOs often represent enterprises that haven’t yet 
achieved formal status vis-à-vis the state. Among the SMOs, one will find representatives 
of the organizational structures of the following types of associations: 
 
- Rural movements (Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) and the family 
farming movement); 
- Labor unions supporting urban cooperatives and workers’ associations 
through skills training and accompanying the development of workers’ 
associations; 
- The movement of worker-managed factories, represented by ANTEAG – 
Associação Nacional de Trabalhadores de Empresas em Auto-gestão 
(National Association of Workers in Worker-managed Enterprises); 
- Neighborhood associations; 
- Identity-based movements (feminist, Afro-Brazilian and indigenous 
movements); 
- OCB – the Brazilian Cooperatives’ Association (Associação das 
Cooperativas do Brasil).  
 
FBES is the ideal case study for the analysis of the factors that promote and 
constrain the emergence of participatory publics among organizations among politically 
marginal sectors of the economy, since it is one step beyond other similar networks in 
Latin America in terms of promotion of participatory designs and involvement in the 
political process. Besides, it is the most inclusive, both in terms of the sectors it 
aggregates, as well as of geographical reach, as it include a national-level forum, as well 
as forums at the state and municipal level in every state in Brazil. It is the only network 
of this kind that brings together representatives of all sectors of the peripheral economy, 
as well social movement organizations, NGOs and civil servants involved in relevant 
policy areas. Therefore, it is the one that most fully encompasses the dynamics that are of 
interest for the elaboration of grounded theory upon which one can develop further 
knowledge on similar networks.  
 
What is Solidarity Economy? 
According to an NGO staff member, Solidarity Economy (SE) integrates the 
discourse of rights of work and income into a larger “rethinking of work as a human 
activity, with the aim of transforming the socio-economic environment in a way that 
improves the quality of life of workers.”5 Based on the conceptualization proposed by 
Laville (1999) and França (2003) one can define SE as a category of social innovations, 
built upon economic activities, which aim to achieve social goals based on the ideals of 
citizenship. SSE includes a highly diversified set of practices, from workers’ cooperatives 
to associations of consumers, alternative currencies, microcredit associations and 
                                                 
5 Cited at the 6th State-level Meeting on Adult Education and Solidarity Socio-economy, State University of 
Rio de Janeiro, 31st of July – 1st of August 2006  
25
 microenterprises. These practices have in common the fact of being based on relations of 
solidarity and reciprocity rooted in the social ties of communities (Arruda, 2003, 2006; 
Singer 2005; Eme & Laville, 2005).  What gives coherence to SE and distinguishes it 
from other sub-fields of the non-capitalist economy6, is the underlying moral and political 
rationality (Gaiger, 2005). Marcos Arruda, a leading Brazilian activist scholar of SE, 
identifies such rationality as the promotion of a post-capitalist economy, centered on the 
integral development of human beings and communities (2003). This perspective is 
shared by the original Francophone approach to SSE and its Brazilian derivation.  
 
Early contributions to the theory 
Both “schools” of SE see as the main aim of this theory that of supporting a re-
embedment of the economy in social and cultural relations, leading to a “democratization 
of the economy trough civic engagement (Laville 1999). They also share a common 
origin, which can be traced back to the socialist intellectual context of 19th and early 20th 
century Europe (Laville, 1994). Singer (2005) argues that SE started to emerge as a 
theory and as a social movement in the last two decades of the 20th century as a result of 
the worldwide increase in poverty and social exclusion brought by the structural 
adjustment of national political economies to trade liberalization. A good example is the 
experiences in alternative currencies that multiplied in Argentina in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis in 2001 (Hintze, 2003), or the cooperatives of trash collectors that have 
been multiplying in the shantytowns of Brazil in the latest years7. 
 
The emergence of this theory is the result of a reinterpretation of the Utopian 
Socialist, Libertarian and Gramscian doctrines in the light of experiences of economic 
self-organization from the part of subaltern groups (Gaiger, 2003). One of the greatest 
intellectual contributions to such reinterpretation came from France, in the form of the 
Anti-utilitarianism Movement in the Social Sciences8. Such movement, started by Marcel 
Mauss in the 1920’s with the “Gift Theory”, currently gathers around the Recherches 
magazine and research centers such as C.R.I.D.A.- Centre de Recherche et de Formation 
sur la Démocratie et l’Autonomie9. It situates SSE in the framework of a paradigm shift 
in the social sciences. At the heart of the conceptualizations of SSE is a challenging of 
rational choice theory, present in the assumption that, at the core of economics and 
politics, lays a far more complex combination of social and moral motivations that often 
forego the maximization of the satisfaction of the immediate interests of individuals and 
organizations.  
 
More recently, a new perspective has been emerging that gives Latin American 
scholars a growing prominence in this field. This perspective is being developed in 
continental networks of labor unionists and activist scholars such as COLACOT – 
Confederacion Latinoamericana de Mutuales de Trabajadores10 and RILESS – Red de 
                                                 
6 In this case, the concepts of “social economy” and “popular economy”, as defined by Defourny (2005) 
and Icaza & Tiriba (2005). 
7 http://www.lixoecidadania.org.br/lixoecidadania/  
8 http://www.revuedumauss.com.fr/Pages/APROP.html#Anchor-47857  
9 http://www.crida-fr.org/  
10 http://www.colacot.com/index.php?acc=5  
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 Investigaciones Latinoamericana de Economia Social y Solidaria11. These networks 
include prominent figures such as Jose Luis Coraggio, from Argentina, and the Brazilians 
Paul Singer, Euclides André Mance, Luis Inacio Gaiger and Marcos Arruda.  
 
The added value of the contribution of Latin American scholars to the emerging 
theory of SE is that they are in contact with many of the oldest, most sustainable and 
politically better organized experiences of SE in the developing world. The labour 
movement in Latin America has a long tradition of supporting cooperative finance and 
the establishment of mutualist associations to cater for the consumption needs of workers. 
In Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, trade unions have adopted the development of workers’ 
cooperatives as one of the axis of their strategy12. Most Central American countries have 
public policies aimed at developing workers’ cooperatives and microenterprises. They are 
generally included in strategies of fight against unemployment or local development13. 
These experiences are often closely articulated with trade unionism, movements of 
protest against the policies of multilateral organizations, for the cancellation of foreign 
debt or for the reform of agrarian and urban property. SE is often the point in which these 
movements establish alliances and learn with each other (Bouillane, Fraisse and Ortiz, 
2003). Many of these Latin American scholars act as organic intellectuals and “social 
movement brokers”, contributing with know-know to the development of many projects 
in the area and articulating them with social movements and the state. 
 
“institutionalist” versus “antropocentric” perspectives 
What distinguishes the Francophone perspective on SE from that of its Brazilian 
“offshoot”? One may consider that, while the first is more “institutionalist” and 
“systemic”, the second is more “anthropocentric” and oriented towards social dynamics 
within small and medium-sized communities. Such perspectives are the result of the 
different social contexts from which they emerged.  
 
SSE theory, as it was first proposed in the 1980’s by scholars gathering at 
C.R.I.D.A., such as Bernard Eme and Jean-Louis Laville, is closely related to the increase 
in social exclusion resulting from the retreat in the welfare state and the crisis in 
industrial relations that marked the French political economy in that period. It is 
presented as a mechanism of social and economic regulation, aimed at compensating the 
limitations of the state and the market in ensuring social cohesion. One of the main 
principles of the French approach to SSE is the central role of the state as a subsidizer of 
cooperative enterprises and credit unions. The work of these authors is influenced not 
only by the heavily state-centered approaches that have marked French social science 
throughout its history, but also by their collaborative ties with policy-makers, being 
therefore heavily centered on public policy.  It has been influenced by, and contributing 
to, the strong level of institutionalization of SE in France in the form of public measures 
aimed at facilitating social inclusion. Among such measures, one can count the 
facilitation of access to credit cooperatives, as well as the subsidization of cooperatives 
and microenteprises.  
                                                 
11 www.riles.org  
12 & 14 http://www.ilo.org/public/spanish/employment/ent/papers/latiname.htm 
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While the French approach to SE evolved in a context of crisis of the welfare state 
and the market, the Brazilian one emerged from a reality of systemic, endemic poverty. It 
results from the fact that, in Brazil, neither the state nor the market has ever managed to 
regulate the whole of society and ensure social cohesion.  As a result, a large share of the 
population is prevented from fully exercising its citizenship. It is also excluded from 
formal circuits of employment, ensuring their survival thanks to informal economic 
practices embedded in networks of mutual support within their communities. Among 
such share of the population, one may find the inhabitants of urban shantytowns, 
“quilombos” (self-sustaining communities of former African Slave descendents), 
indigenous communities and rural collectives of landless workers. At the contrary of the 
French approach to SE, which is framed as a reaction to a structural crisis, the Brazilian 
version emerges from a long-term tendency affecting popular groups in rural and urban 
areas. SE initiatives in Brazil tend to emerge with little or no support from the part of the 
state, and tend to have a very low level of institutionalization, taking the form of 
networks of small producers or workers’ cooperatives. As a result, the Brazilian approach 
regards SE not as much as an instrument of social regulation, as in France, but as an 
instrument of promotion of the citizenship of subaltern groups. Such instrument, although 
being part of the lives of subaltern groups, must be fully recognized and supported by the 
state and other social institutions, in order to effectively promote the social rights of these 
groups and the sustainability of their communities.    
 
Brazilian Activist Scholars and their Approach to Solidarity Socio-economy 
 The Brazilian perspective of SE owes a lot to the civic engagement of many of its 
theorists, who draw most of their thought from their experience as activists and social 
educators in the provision of literacy and capacity-building programs to social 
movements. During their careers, they have been at the forefront of projects which aim to 
democratize academic knowledge and make it contribute to the promotion of popular 
classes. Paul Singer and Luis Inácio Gaiger are professors at the University of São Paulo 
and UNISINOS respectively. During their academic career, they have collaborated in the 
development of a Unitrabalho14, national network of incubators of cooperatives and 
workers associations in urban slums and impoverished rural areas. Mance is a professor 
at the Federal University of Paraná and president of Instituto de Filosofia da Libertação15 
(Institute of Liberation Philosophy). Among other activities, he has been supporting the 
diffusion of Liberation Theology and supporting the Brazilian branch of Caritas in 
developing non-capitalist productive units among rural and urban communities.  
 
Paul Singer approaches SE from the point of view of its organization as the 
convergence between social movements that led to the emergence of FBES, and the role 
of national political economy in impacting such form of collective action (e. g. 2003). 
Gaiger and Mance approach SE from a macro and meso perspectives, studying the role of 
culture, ideology and community dynamics in the development of non-capitalist 
production and its politicization as a social movement. Gaiger in particular has been 
studying the role of Liberation Theology, as well as mediating agents such as universities 
                                                 
14 http://www.unitrabalho.org.br/  
15 Translation: Institute of Liberation Philosophy (http://www.ifil.org/ ). 
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 and NGOs, in the development of ethical codes and the promotion of the sustainable 
social ties that ensure the success of non-capitalist production (e.g. 2000, 2004, 2005). 
Mance has been developing theory on the organization of non-capitalist units of 
production into networks, and the way in which economic dynamics at the local level 
impact such form of collective action (e.g. 2001, 2003). 
 
Marcos Arruda is the general coordinator of PACS and has been gaining 
prominence through his interpretation of SSE as part of a larger paradigm shift in culture 
and social organization. The author, who for many years worked with Paulo Freire and 
gave institutional support to the MST16 and CUT17, integrates SE in the shift from what 
Arroyo (2001) calls a positivist view of knowledge to one which values the processes of 
symbolic production that are intrinsic to the everyday practices of grassroots 
communities. Such shift from a technicist view of knowledge to one based on what 
Wainwright (1993) calls “tacit knowledge” has far-reaching consequences to the social 
and political structures of contemporary societies, since it compromises the monopoly of 
technicians on political decision-making and justifies more direct forms of participation 
of the grassroots in democratic deliberation. It therefore puts into question representative 
democracy and the underlying “social engineering state” (Wainwright, 1993), justifying 
participatory democracy, decentralization of public power and networked forms of 
political communication. Arruda also integrates the ethos of solidarity and reciprocity 
that supports SE in a larger paradigm shift in science and spirituality. That is especially 
the case of the work of the Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana (Maturana & Verden-
Zöller, 1997) on cooperation and affection as the natural foundations of human behavior, 
as well as contemporary spiritual currents, such as Liberation Theology and the work of 
Sri Aurobindo, which connect spirituality with human emancipation and progressive 
social change (Arruda, 2003). Arruda also includes in his analysis of this paradigm shift 
inputs from concrete experiences of SE that integrate economics with spirituality, such as 
the “Bayanihan” movement in the Philippines18. 
 
Main principles of the Brazilian Perspective on Solidarity Economy 
The Brazilian perspective on SE can be defined as part of a socio-political 
movement, since it emerged in a dialectic relationship with the emergence of FBES.  It 
proposes a holistic model of economic development, with goals that range from the 
conditions of the individuals human being to those of the international economic system. 
Its goals can be summarized as follows: 
 
 
 
 
- At the micro level:  
                                                 
16 Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra (Landless Workers’ Movement). 
17 Central Única dos Trabalhadores, the main labor union in Brazil. 
18 https://bases.alliance21.org/alliance/d/v/?numero=7260&public=ENG&type=2  
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 • Emancipation of members of subaltern groups from situations of economic 
and political servitude through reliance on their own capacities and the social 
ties of their communities. 
•  Promotion of their material and psychological well-being of through un-
alienated labor. Establishment of working conditions that allow for the full 
development and application of human abilities (Arruda, 2003). 
•  Demystification of the competitive ethos of capitalism and development of 
habits of reciprocity and solidarity. 
•  Improvement of the political awareness and participation of the individual in 
his/her workplace, as well as in the public sphere. 
• Education of consumers for the ethical, social and environmental 
consequences of their choices of consumption. 
 
- At the meso level:  
• Allow subaltern communities to become the subjects of their own 
development by creating the conditions for the improvement of their socio-
economic welfare through practices based on their native knowledge, as 
gathered in their collective memory (Arroyo, 2001; Arruda, 2003, 2006).  
• Promotion of organizational alternatives to corporate capitalism based on 
common property and self-management by workers, embedded in horizontal 
relationships of reciprocity and solidarity (Singer, 2005: 243).  
• Distribution of wealth as a function of people rather than capital.  
• Full and equal participation of men and women in the economy (Arruda, 2003, 
2006). 
 
- At the macro level:  
- Democratization of the economy from the grassroots through participatory 
democracy. 
- Establishment of a postcapitalist hegemony based on associational-type 
networks of production and consumption at the local, regional, national and 
international levels.  
- Emancipation of national economies from transnational corporate capitalism 
through the maximization of the use of native resources in the national 
economy, as well as the establishment of international fair trade networks. 
 
The specificity of the Brazilian case 
Without underestimating other experiences of SSE around the world, one may 
consider Brazil as the developing country in which the convergence of interests that 
constitutes SEE is more diverse and institutionalized as a coalition of social movements 
and other civil society organizations. The most visible face of the BMSEE in the public 
sphere is that of a nation-wide network of federal, state and local level forums 
congregating productive units, social movements and NGOs. This network of forums 
culminates in a federal organization called FBES – Forum Brasileiro de Economia 
Solidaria19. The purpose of these forums is to create and strengthen productive chains, as 
                                                 
19 Brazilian Fórum of Solidarity Sócio-Economy. 
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well as to influence policy-making through the debate of national and local government 
proposals concerning their interests. The government counterpart of the BMSEE is 
SENAES – Secretaria Nacional de Economia Solidaria20, founded with the purpose of 
developing a national policy for the sector. This government body is associated with the 
Ministry of Labor. Some Brazilian states and municipalities already had specific policies 
for the sector before the foundation of SENAES in 2003. 
 
The emergence of the Brazilian Movement of Solidarity Socio-economy 
 
Institutional roots 
 The roots of the Brazilian MSSE can be traced back to the 1970’s and ‘80’s, 
particularly to the work of progressive sectors of the Catholic Church engaged with the 
resistance to the military dictatorship and the social emancipation of subaltern groups. 
Among their most prominent efforts is the rural mobilization for land reform that led to 
the Landless Worker’s Movement (MST), as well as similar movements in the 
Amazonian region21. Another mobilization coming out of progressive Catholicism was 
the “Projetos Alternativos Comunitarios”22 (PACs), a network of community income 
generation projects cutting across the rural/urban divide, developed by the Brazilian 
branch of Caritas (Bertucci & Silva, orgs., 2003). Another root of the Brazilian MSSE 
can be trace back to the trade-union led movement of occupation of bankrupting 
industries by workers, which still coalesces around ANTEAG – Agência Nacional de 
Trabalhadores de Empresas em Autogestão23. 
 The 1990’s sees the appearance of new actors. In 1996, the Federal Universities 
of Rio de Janeiro and Ceará created the first incubators of “cooperativas populares”, 
meaning workers’ cooperatives created by grassroots communities. These incubators 
were created by the “Committees of Promotion of Citizenship against Famine and 
Misery”, operated within these universities as part of a national campaign initiated by the 
late “Betinho”, a prominent Brazilian sociologist and founder of IBase, one the major 
NGOs in Brazil (Cruz, 2005). The action of these committees led to a national debate 
about the role universities should play in social transformation, which soon led to the 
creation of Unitrabalho, one of the two existing national networks of university-run 
incubators of “cooperativas populares”. This network counts nowadays with 92 
incubators across the country.  
 In 1999, CUT, the main Brazilian labor union, created together with Unitrabalho 
and a series of NGOs an organization dedicated to the promotion of SSE. This 
organization, called ADS – Agência de Desenvolvimento Solidario24. This organization 
provides a series of services to SSE, including the incubation of new initiatives, training, 
credit and the formation of networks of production and commercialization. One of the 
major initiatives of ADS was the creation of Unisol25, a trade union for members of SSE 
                                                 
20 National Secretariat of Solidarity Socio-economy 
21 These movements coalesce around the “Conselho Nacional dos Seringueiros” 
(http://www.chicomendes.org/seringueiros01.php ), created to continue the legacy of Chico Mendes, leader 
of the movement of Amazonian agricultural laborers, murdered in December 1988 in Xapuri, state of Acre.  
22 Translation: “Alternative Community Projects”. 
23 Translation: National Organization of Workers in Worker-managed Enterprises.  
24 http://www.ads.org.br/  
25 http://www.ads.org.br/unisol.asp  
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 initiatives that aims to play a role of articulation among productive units and political 
bargaining with the state.  
 In the late 1990’s there was also the creation of CRESOL26, a credit association 
for family farms and agricultural cooperatives, acting mainly in the southern states of the 
country. In 2004 and 2005, the CRESOL system evolves into ANCOSOL – Associação 
Nacional de Cooperativismo de Crédito de Economia Familiar e Solidaria27 and 
UNICAFES – União Nacional das Cooperativas da Agricultura Familiar e Economia 
Solidaria28. The aim of this system is to provide a financial and political support to the 
development of SSE in the agricultural field. 
 
Earlier Convergence of Interests 
According to a staff member of a Brazilian NGO, the convergence of interests that 
led to the national MSSE started to emerge in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Growing 
unemployment, government corruption and the exhaustion of protest-based forms of 
grassroots political action due to insufficient results and political violence led to an 
exponential growth of the “popular economy” sector in the country. The motivation 
behind such growth was the urgency that disadvantaged groups had to find means for 
income generation in face of a stagnant economy and government inaction. The frailty of 
these economic initiatives, due to lack of institutional capacity, difficulties in creating 
productive chains and lack of penetration in a market dominated by capitalist enterprises 
encouraged their aggregation in networks of reciprocal help and political intervention 
(Ministério do Trabalho e do Emprego, 2005). One example was the decision, taken by 
the MST in 1987, of organizing its squats in cooperatives, since the agricultural policy of 
the Brazilian government and the mainstream structures of commercialization made it 
extremely difficult for small family farms to survive economically (Cruz, 2005). Such 
decision led to the creation of CONCRAB29, the MST’s federation of cooperatives. 
Besides, the difficulty that the “popular economy” has in having access to credit, as well 
as the precariousness of its employment structure, created the demand for a legal 
framework that increases the viability of these initiatives and the quality of life of the 
people involved in them.  
 
Earlier articulations 
 The articulation and politicization of SSE units in Brazil became visible in the 
1990’s with public debates on the concepts of “popular cooperativism”:  
 
• In 1994, three NGOs, Asplande30, Cooperação and FASE31 started publishing a 
series of joint publications on “popular cooperativism” which led to a series of 
public debates on the subject32.  
                                                 
26 http://www.cresol.org.br  
27 National Association of Credit for Family and Solidarity Economy 
http://www.cresol.com.br/site/publicidade/ancosol.php  
28 National Association of Cooperatives of Family Agriculture and Solidarity Economy 
http://www.cresol.com.br/site/publicidade/unicafes.php  
29 http://www.mst.org.br/setores/concrab/concrabsementes.htm  
30 http://www.asplande.org.br/  
31 Translation: Federação de Orgãos para a Assistência Social e Educacional (www.fase.org.br ). 
32 This cronological information was taken from the webpage of FCP-RJ. 
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 • In 1995 and 1996, a series of large-scale public meetings in the state of Rio de 
Janeiro, coordinated by the previous NGOs as well as others such as PACS, 
CAPINA33 and CEDAC34 led to the creation of FCP-RJ.  
• In 1998, PACS and CASA – Coletivo Autônomo de Solidariedade 
Autogestionaria, an NGO from Rio Grande do Sul, coordinated the “Iberian and 
Latin American Gathering of Solidarity Socio-economy”, which took place in 
Porto Alegre from between the 2nd and 9th of August of that year. 
 
The 1998 meeting established the articulations that led to the creation of RBSES35 – 
Rede Brasileira de Socio-economia Solidária. The creation happened soon after the 
“Brazilian Encounter of Culture and Solidarity Socio-economy”, the second major 
national gathering on the subject, which happened in Rio de Janeiro between the 11th and 
the 18th of June 2000. This meeting was organized by FCP-RJ, together with the same 
team that led the previous meetings.  
 
The World Social Forum and the Creation of SENAES and FBES 
The articulation that led to FBES and the network of state forums of SSE started in 
2001, with the creation of GT-Brazil, the Brazilian working group of the World Social 
Forum36.  
The beginning of Lula da Silva’s mandate in 2003 was the right opportunity for GT-
Brazil to push for the creation of a public policy aimed at promoting the growth and 
sustainability of SE. This group, led by activist scholars such as Marcos Arruda, Paul 
Singer and Euclides Mance, negotiated with the new government the creation of 
SENAES, a department of the Ministry of Labour aimed at proposing and implementing 
policies for non-capitalist forms of production. The creation of SENAES is announced at 
the 3rd WSF in January 2003. At the same time, the RBSES mobilized its grassroots 
members for the creation of FBES. The purpose was to establish a representative body 
that could not only provide a ground for reciprocal help among units of SSE, but also 
debate, together with representatives from SENAES, policy proposals for the sector37.  
 
The multi-level power dynamics of knowledge production within social movements 
This paper is based on an understanding of processes of knowledge production 
within social movements as the intentional activities by which movements produce, 
process and diffuse information about their participants, their own socio-economic 
context and the ruling relations which structure their lives. Such processes include 
activities of collection, treatment and diffusion of information such as research, education 
and training and networking with the specific purpose of debating and diffusing 
knowledge. This concept includes educational and training initiatives, as well as 
                                                 
33 Translation: Cooperação e Apoio a Projetos de Inspiração Alternativa (www.capina.org.br ). 
34 Translation: Centro de Educação e Documentação para a Acção Comunitária (www.cedac.org.br ).  
35 Translation: Brazilian Network of Solidarity Socio-economy. 
36 http://www.fbes.org.br/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=64&Itemid=58  
This group included the RBSES, PACS, FASE, ANTEAG, IBase, the Brazilian branch of Caritas, the 
MST, ADS-CUT, Unitrabalho, ICTP - the Brazilian network of university-run incubators of cooperatives, 
the Brazilian network of managers of public policies related with SSE and ABCRED – Brazilian 
Association of Micro-credit Institutions. 
37 Check FBES’ webpage for information in its structure and composition. 
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 exchange of information and deliberation within activist networks, as these activities 
imply a treatment of previously gathered knowledge, which very often implies the 
addition of new information. That is the case, for example, of critical education programs 
following the pedagogy of Paulo Freire, which rely heavily on information brought by the 
student on her or his experience and the context in which it is embedded.  
 
Social scientific research on processes of knowledge production by social 
movements has so far focused on four aspects: its content, the processes by which it is 
produced, the context of its production and its function as a support to mobilization, 
protest and advocacy (i.e. Thompson, 1978; Wainwright, 1994, 2003). It has so far 
neglected the power relations between actors experiencing different roles and forms of 
involvement that are inherent to processes of knowledge production within social 
movements. Such lack is a direct result of the political process approach that has been 
dominating social movement research in the past decades. This perspective is centered on 
the political opportunities provided by the state, as well as on the social networks and 
symbolic mechanisms that structure the emergence of frames, the mobilization of 
adherents and material resources, and the gaining of political influence (McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald, 1996; Della Porta & Diani, 1999; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001; 
Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca & Reiter, 2006). This structuralist approach has neglected 
the intra-movement dynamics that shape the processes which define movement frames. In 
their turn, these processes of frame definition determine what kind of members and other 
allies movements look for, as well as the strategies used for their mobilization (Benford 
& Snow, 2000; Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002).  
 
The best known empirical research in this area, at least in North American 
academic circles, has been made in the area of health and environment-related activism, 
and has drawn more directly from theoretical areas such as medical sociology, science 
studies and feminist thought, rather than theories on framing (e.g. Lindenbaum & Lock, 
1993; Epstein, 1996; Frickel, 2004; Fischer, 2000; Kroll-Smith, Brown & Gunter, 2000; 
Morgen, 2002). Much of the literature produced on knowledge production processes 
within movements that focuses on other areas, particularly political economy, has been 
done in the area of critical education and long-term historical processes of change within 
mainly labor and land rights movements (Thompson, 1963; Freire, 1970; Wainwright, 
1994; Kane, 2001; Caldart, 2004). 
 
Benford & Snow (2000) point out that framing literature has been paying 
attention to the interaction processes that support the building of knowledge and ideology 
within these organizations. From a review of existing literature, the authors identified 
three types of social processes related to knowledge-building: discursive, strategic and 
contested. Discursive processes refer to the “talks and conversations – the speech acts – 
and written communications of movement members that occur in the context of, or in 
relation to, movement activities (p. 623). Strategic processes are those related to the 
development of frames aimed at achieving purposes that are central to the sustainability 
of the movement, such as the mobilization of members and the capitation of resources (p. 
624). Contested processes are those that related to the “politics of signification”, meaning 
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 the competition between frames elaborated within different factions of the movement, as 
well between the main frame of the movement and those of other actors (p. 625).  
 
There is an abundant body of literature dealing with critical education and 
knowledge production in the framework of educational and mobilization activities carried 
out by social movements from the popular classes (i. e. Thompson, 1963; Freire, 1970; 
Williams, 1989; Horton & Freire, 1990; Elderidge & Elderidge, 1994; Naples, 1998; 
Mayo 1999; Allman, 2001; Kane, 2001; Rose, 2001; Souza (ed), 2001; Caldart, 2004; 
Russo & Linkon (ed.), 2005). However, this literature tends to focus on the methods and 
processes used in knowledge production, education and training activities, as well as on 
their impact in terms of skill development, political empowerment and social movement 
participation. Despite the attention given to the socio-economic context of participants in 
critical education projects (i.e. Kane, 2001; Rose, 2001), this body of literature tends to 
neglect the way in which structural inequalities reproduce themselves in the relationship 
between educators and students.  
 
Despite the wealth of literature on how frames and collective identity are 
constructed within social movements and other civil society organizations, there is scant 
systematized knowledge on the interaction processes that underlie the negotiation of 
meaning, discourse and strategy upon which they are built. To be more specific, the 
existing social scientific literature tends to neglect how the degree of legitimacy 
attributed by society to different forms of knowledge can be used in these organizations 
as a power asset that creates and reproduces hierarchies among the participants. To which 
extent are movement participants less endowed with socially legitimized forms of 
knowledge granted the opportunity to contribute, on equal terms with those of the 
“experts”, to the definition of the movement’s frame, its discourse and the collective 
action strategy it supports? Which forms of knowledge, which systems of meaning, and 
which perspectives on the cause that brings the movement together end up predominating 
in its frame? Despite the empowerment claims of the movement’s frame, to which extent 
does it correspond to the perspective that the people it aims to emancipate have of the 
cause it is promoting? 
 
One of the most direct approaches to the subject was made by Tsing (2005) in an 
ethnographic analysis of the scheme of collaboration underlying the struggle for the 
conservation of native forests in the region of Kalimatan, Indonesia. The author contrasts 
“the freedom of middle-class students to roam in wild nature” with the struggle of mainly 
urban, highly educated environmental activists to empower forest communities. Such 
perspectives, in their turn, are “barely in dialogue with the lives of forest residents” (p. 
245). The author argues that, although such heterogeneity invigorates social 
mobilizations by appealing to diverse social groups, the frame that ended up 
predominating in this particular case was that of the middle-class students and activists. 
The framing of the movement suffered from a “reification of forest, communities and 
conservation”. The author also argued that the sustainability of such coalition was due to 
the fact that “no one stopped to realize the depth of their disagreements”, creating a 
situation in which “collaboration was not consensus making but rather an opening or 
productive confusion” (p. 247). In practice, the frame and knowledge produced by the 
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 movement ended up neglecting aspects of the everyday functioning of the communities, 
which had to do with the fact that their economy was not self-sustaining but at least 
partially dependent on external connections. The frame was also marked by an 
idealization of nature as something separate from culture and of local community life as 
“non-contaminated” by inter-dependence with external actors and their social dynamics. 
Therefore, it failed to acknowledge fundamental issues related to the survival of the 
communities it aims to empower. Such issues come out of the embedment of local 
communities in economic and cultural exchanges with national and international actors. 
Despite the thoroughness of Tsing’s ethnography, it doesn’t give the necessary attention 
to the role that the power relations associated with the encounter of different forms of 
knowledge within activist groups might play in the production of such outcomes. 
 
The current literature makes a dichotomous distinction between the kind of 
knowledge on social and economic processes that enjoys social legitimacy granted by 
mainstream social institutions and that which doesn’t. The first type of knowledge is 
generally identified as being of the “technical” or “expert” type. Bourdieu calls this type 
of knowledge “objectivist”, since it “constructs the objective relations (…) which 
structure practice and representations of practice” (Bourdieu, 1977: 3). Its most defining 
characteristic is the fact that it is built upon a process which aims to identify regularities 
upon its object(s) that are not bound to specific circumstances of time, place and culture 
(Wainwright, 1994; Scott, 1998). It tends to be created by a class of “experts” (either 
“intellectuals” or “technicians”), professionals whose training granted them with certain 
intellectual representations that allow them to treat cognitive questions symbolically, 
according to the general problem-solving strategies of their knowledge domain (Geisler, 
1994: 55). It also grants them skills and methods of collecting and treating information 
that allows them to create “cognitive abstractions” by “extracting” generalities from 
beings and facts bound by historical and geographical constraints (Geisler, 1994: 55-7). 
Such abstractions tend to take the form of “categories”, meaning rational constructions 
aimed at creating “self-contained systems of reasoning” that make reality predictable, 
structurable, calculable, and therefore technically controllable (Bourdieu, 1977: 2-3; 
Mitchell, 1992: 1-3, Scott, 1998: 320). The capacities needed to create such abstractions 
are recognized as being the right ones for producing socially legitimized knowledge. That 
happens because they are generally developed within the Academy, which is recognized 
by the mainstream culture within industrialized and post-colonial societies as the 
institution that defines the boundaries of “legitimate” knowledge on social and economic 
processes, as well as of the group of “experts” that has the legitimacy to produce it 
(Geisler, 1994: 72-4; Good & Good, 1993).  
 
The second type of knowledge has been given different denominations. Bourdieu 
called it “phenomenological”, since it aims to “make explicit the truth of primary 
experience of the social world”, meaning that experience “that is inscribed in the 
relationship of familiarity with the familiar environment” (Bourdieu, 1977: 3). 
Wainwright calls it “tacit knowledge” and argues that it is non-codifiable, since is based 
on the accumulated experience of specific groups, built upon insights that cannot be fully 
understood outside their particular circumstances of time and place (Wainwright, 1993). 
Given this, many authors have called it “local knowledge” (e.g. Geertz, 1983; Pearce, 
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 1993; Fischer, 2000). Scott (1998) refers to it as “practical knowledge” or “Métis”, and 
argues that it is not “merely the specification of local values (such as the local mean 
temperature and rainfall) made in order to successfully apply a generic formula to a local 
case” (p. 319). It is a kind of “non-expert” knowledge that is based on the 
contextualization of facts according to empirical perception, while scientific reasoning 
relies on de-contextualization, abstraction and generalization. The author partially 
disagrees with Wainwright in that he believes that “practical knowledge” or “Métis” is 
based on the codification of practical, contextualized experience (p. 330). The main point 
that differentiates it from “technical” or “expert” knowledge (“Techné, according to 
Scott) is that it cannot be generalized outside its context. Still, the author points that that 
this is the right kind of knowledge to rely on to deal with social and material tasks of a 
high degree of complexity and uncertainty (p. 327). Depending on the degree to which 
such tasks are unique to their context, “practical knowledge” or “Métis” can either 
complement or substitute “technical” or “objectivist” knowledge in their resolution.  
 
According to Keck & Sikkink (1998) and Dryzek (2001: 66-7), “practical 
knowledge”, being experientially based, tends to be expressed in the form of testimony 
and storytelling, while “technical” knowledge is normally presented in the form of 
“hard”, systematized data. An important point that Scott (1998) makes is that “practical 
knowledge” can only be preserved in the context of a relatively stable “multigenerational 
community of interest” engaged in a lifelong process of observation, accumulation and 
routine exchange of information that transforms testimony into systematized data (p. 
334). Scott’s train of thought implies that, in order to be preserved and built upon, 
“practical knowledge” must undergo a process of codification, which according to Keck 
& Sikkink (1998:227) implies several layers of “translation”. Do such codification and 
the underlying process of “translation” always have to imply the subordination of the 
knowledge of actors less endowed with “expertise”? To the extent do the “authors” of 
experientially-based knowledge lose control of their “testimonies” in the process by 
seeing its meaning be distorted by actors which did not take part in the events that 
produced them, or do not share their own standpoint on the meaning of such events? 
 
In order to properly answer this question, it is necessary to recognize that the 
dichotomy between “practical” and “technical” or “objective” knowledge does not apply 
to processes of knowledge production in the real world. According to Nilsen (2006), the 
knowledge produced by “grassroots” actors and “cadres” within social movements will 
always have elements of both “Métis” and “Techné”. Subaltern classes also produce 
forms of “expert” or “technical” knowledge related with their own activities, which can 
be codified in the form of “hard data” and generalized beyond the context in which it was 
produced. Besides, “cadres” and other “technicians” also produce forms of non-
generalized knowledge that is based on “testimony”. Such form of knowledge is very 
often the support of the systematized knowledge they produce within their intellectual 
and technical activities. In order to overcome this dichotomy, it is necessary to analyze 
the ways in which members of the subaltern classes appropriate “socially legitimate 
knowledge” and transform it through their own understanding of their everyday practices. 
It is also necessary to understand the process by which “cadres” within social movement 
organizations use the knowledge produced by members within their knowledge-making, 
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 educational and institution-building activities. Besides, one has to overcome the 
dichotomy between “professional” and “non-professional” activists (i.e. Mische, 2008) 
and create typologies which account for different roles, forms of involvement and use of 
knowledge within social movements.  
 
Several theorists of democratic communication have been exploring how publics 
composed by subaltern social movements construct identities, build networks and 
regulate communication between members (i.e. Mainsbridge, 1983; Young, 1990; Cohen 
& Arato, 1992; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Elster, 1997; Cohen, 1997; Offe, 1997). 
Mische (2008), in her study of Brazilian youth activist networks, analyzed mechanisms of 
mediation and cross-sectoral communication that are inherent to knowledge production 
and framing processes within multi-sectoral fields composed by networks of related 
social movements. She made a connection between the role of overlapping cross-
movement networks in the political socialization of activists and the development of 
different leadership orientations. In their turn, these different leadership orientation 
determined the style of institutional mediation and the type of communicative 
performance the predominated within multisectoral fields. However, she did not take into 
account the role of key aspects of structural and human resources frames of these 
organizations in the legitimization of the leaders’ position, communicative style and 
vision of group identity. Among such aspects are the internal division of labor of labor 
between groups, the degree of centralization of power by key members and the power 
dynamics between leaders and other members within organizations (Bolman & Deal, 
2003). She also did not take into account the role of economic and regulatory conditions 
in the shaping of the structure and dynamics of publics, as well as in the enabling and 
constraining of deliberative choices. 
 
There is an emerging body of literature dealing with transnational advocacy 
networks promoting the cross-national diffusion of ideas and organizational forms among 
counter-hegemonic social movements and associations. Some of this literature is starting 
to take into account the impact of knowledge in boundary-setting, as well as in the 
structuring of power relations between movement participants. However, little has been 
written about the way in which such power relations in their turn structure processes of 
knowledge production. 
 
On her analysis of the deliberative practices of feminist movements within the 
European Social Forum, Doerr (2007) pointed out the “voicelessness” of Eastern and 
South-eastern European feminists, and the way in which fellow activists from Western 
European countries claimed to speak “in their name”. The author claims that the 
hegemony of Western European and North American feminist theories, the precarious 
access of Eastern and South-eastern European feminists to such theories and their 
deficient domain of the English, French and German languages led to the loss of 
ownership of their own claims and to their silencing during ESF deliberations.  
 
Several authors have been documenting the results of the World Social Forum 
(WSF) process. Some of them, such as Bello (2007) and Sen (2007) have been critical of 
the inability of the WSF to include the most disadvantaged groups, since participation in 
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 this process requires an availability of material and knowledge resources that is generally 
only available to professionalized activists of middle-class background. As a result, many 
groups end up being represented by activists who do not share their experiences or their 
class background, risking therefore having their standpoint distorted. Other groups end up 
being altogether excluded from the process, since they lack the connections with 
intellectuals, NGOS or professionalized activists which may represent them “by proxy”. 
Other authors such as Sousa Santos (2005, 2007, 2007a) and Whitaker (2007, 2008), 
have been praising the very process of “translation” whereby participating movements 
are able to extract generalities out of a disparity of socio-cultural backgrounds, strategies 
and ideologies.  
 
Sousa Santos (2005) defines “translation” as the process of identifying and 
codifying generalities from the different socio-cultural environments, goals and activist 
experience of the participating social movements, with the aim of reaching mutual 
intelligibility among different epistemic realities. The author argues that the future 
success of the WSF will depend on its ability to further develop this process, in order to 
make it an instrument to build up aggregation, articulation and coalitions among the 
participating actors. Years before Sousa Santos made his statement about the future of the 
WSF as a space of “translation”, Spivak (1999) claimed that such process is “necessary 
but impossible”. That happens because the process of “translation” is rarely based on a 
“relationship between equivalents” (quoted in Leonard, 2005). The unequal relationship 
of power which generally underlies every process of “translation” always leads to a 
distortion and loss of meaning of the experience of the least powerful actors. Such 
unequal relationship is based on the fact that there will always be a “translator” and a 
“translated” actor, being the former in a position of power over the later that comes from 
the fact that it possesses the “technical knowledge” necessary to initiate and control the 
process. However, to which extent is Spivak’s claim generalizeable? Does a process of 
“translation” always have to imply the subordination of the knowledge of actors less 
endowed with forms of knowledge that enjoy higher levels of social legitimacy? Which 
circumstances lead to the predominance of the experientially-based knowledge created by 
the actors it claims to emancipate?  
 
 Answering the above questions requires the adoption of a critical ethnographic 
approach to the dynamics underlying processes of knowledge production within social 
movements. Baiocchi & Conor (2008) claim that one of the advantages of the use of 
ethnography for the study of political activity is that it allows a “thick description” of the 
mundane details by which individuals negotiate their actions regarding political issues in 
their everyday lives. Therefore, it provides deep insights on the processes, causes and 
effects of political activity underlying the mechanisms of boundary construction that 
determine who gets involved in politics and how and who doesn’t (Eliasoph, 1998; 
Ayuero, 2003; Tilly, 2006). In that sense, how can we identify the practices that are 
relevant to the ethnographic tracing of processes of knowledge production within social 
movements and the underlying power relations that shape them? Based on the agency-
oriented Marxist and Feminist perspective offered by Burawoy (1998), Cox (1999a, 
1999b) and Smith (2005, 2006), one can identify such practices as the contextualized 
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 experience of human subjects, in the form of interactions with other humans, texts and 
objects, witnessing of events, and personal reflections upon such experiences.  
 
“Casa da Confiança”: Personal Experience as a key source of knowledge 
 “Casa da Confiança” is a concrete example of process of knowledge production 
within a social movement supported by a “multi-level power game” that empowers 
participants whose knowledge base is mainly experiential. Such outcome is possible due 
to the adoption of a method that promotes a proactive approach on the part of 
beneficiaries, as well as a facilitating role by the “experts” working at PACS. Such 
method is supported by a leadership style based on a combination between focused 
activism and a bridging approach. This project, which started in 2005, is a capacity-
building mechanism for SSE units developed by FCP-RJ and coordinated by PACS. It 
combines a micro-credit system for microenteprises with a series of meetings aimed at 
facilitating the building up of knowledge on management strategies.  Such exercise is 
based on the exchange of information among members on the results of strategies 
themselves or someone else in a project they know of has followed. The meetings take 
place every two weeks. In the meantime, participants keep in touch through regular 
exchanges over the telephone or meetings in person when necessary. This project is open 
to all members of FCP-RJ, although it has been counting with the regular participation of 
about 20 members of SSE units. Most of them are also active members of neighborhood 
associations. 
Applying the “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” to capacity-building 
According to staff members from PACS, the meetings coordinated within “Casa 
da Confiança” are based on a methodology akin to what Paulo Freire called “Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed” (1970). This methodology is based on the demystification of “expert” 
knowledge through its “translation” to the everyday language of popular groups. Such 
process is made through a deductive process in which a correspondence is made between 
the experiential, non-codified knowledge they develop in the management of SSE units 
and the terms normally used by management “experts”. The aim is to empower members 
of SSE units by deconstructing the logic behind the power relation between “experts” and 
“non-experts” which often leads to the co-optation of grassroots projects by the dominant 
interests. The purpose is to make them realise that they already have the knowledge they 
need to dialogue with “experts”, as well as manage their projects without becoming 
dependent on them. The following testimony from one of PACS’ staff members 
illustrates the vision behind such effort, as well as of the facilitating role adopted by the 
“experts” working at this NGO: 
“These people don’t ‘know’ what is generally understood as ‘economics’, but 
they live it in their everyday life. They don’t know the concepts, but they ‘live’ their 
content. (…) We help them realise that they already know what those concepts are about. 
All we need to do is to organize their knowledge in such a way that the ‘fancy words’ 
become intelligible to them. We also help them realise that knowing own to manage a 
productive unit does not depend on knowing or using such ‘fancy words’, but knowing 
what they are about (…) and that deep down, such concepts are not different from what 
they experience in their everyday struggle. (…) We help them realise all this by 
stimulating them to lead the discussions, to take ‘Casa da Confiança’ in their own hands. 
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 (…) They know what’s going on in their lives and work better than us or anyone else and 
we do our best to make that clear to them all the time.” 
 
The staff made a visible effort during meetings to make the participants conscious 
of how important it is for them to lead discussions. Each time the participants doubted 
their own ability to understand what is happening in their environment and tried to rely 
on the “expert” knowledge of the staff, thinking that they “know better”, the staff made 
them realize their ability to understand and act upon their reality by asking them about 
specific aspects of it and stimulating participants to learn by sharing testimonies with 
each other. The staff claims that there has been a linear progression in terms of the 
willingness and ability of participants to lead the meetings. Such progression was also 
visible during the meetings observed, as participants took a more proactive role and 
shared more information from their own experience each passing meeting. 
 
Another aspect of this methodology is the use of “translated knowledge” as a tool 
for these groups to contextualize their experience within larger socio-economic dynamics 
and develop a critical, pro-active way of exercising their citizenship (Freire, 1970; 
Arroyo, 2001). It contributes to raise consciousness among members of subaltern groups 
of the problems affecting themselves and their communities, assert their aspirations and 
their own capacity to achieve them without entering in relationships of dependence with 
dominant groups or institutions. 
 
Data from the participant observation of meetings of “Casa da Confiança” and 
semi-structured interviews with some of its members provides an illustration of the 
empowering effects of the method of “translation”, when in conjunction with the 
adoption of a pro-active attitude from the part of beneficiaries and a facilitating role from 
the part of “experts”.  Such empowerment is visible at the moral, political and economic 
dimensions of agency in the form of improvements at four levels:  
• awareness that participants have of their own abilities and capacity for 
autonomous action; 
• their technical and management ability; 
• their understanding of social dynamics; 
• their capacity to intervene politically. 
 Such data indicates that the vast majority of members has been benefiting from 
significant improvements at the four levels of empowerment described above. However, 
a thorough analysis of the way in which each regular participant is experiencing such 
process would compromise the depth of analysis in a paper of this kind. Such task will be 
reserved for a larger essay aimed at publication. Therefore, this paper will concentrate on 
the experience of one participant, which is illustrative of the way in which participants 
experience empowerment and are mobilized into social movement activism, as a result of 
their participation in “Casa da Confiança”. 
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 Becoming aware of one’s abilities: The case of C.  
 
C., an Afro-Brazilian woman from a housing cooperative in a shantytown on the 
western part of Rio de Janeiro, is a good example of the empowering and mobilizing 
impact of the process of knowledge construction taking place at “Casa da Confiança”. 
After some difficult experiences in the informal economy and with previous NGOs 
whose attitude she described as “humiliating”, she founded “Cativare”, an association of 
trash collectors and recyclers, together with relatives and neighbours from her 
community. Such project was made possible to a great extent due to her participation in 
the local neighbourhood association and the support given by PACS and other NGOs in 
connecting her with RICAMARE38, the association of trash collectors and recyclers of 
Rio de Janeiro. The following quote illustrates the difference in attitudes she noticed 
between PACS and the other organizations she worked with before: 
 
“My experience at that other place where I went for help before coming here was 
really hurtful. Everything was decided by the people who worked there and we had no 
say whatsoever in the way things were done. If we openly acknowledged that they made 
mistakes or that they know what was going on as well as we did, they would ignore us or 
act in a condescending manner. (…) I got tired of being treated as a retard or a little kid. 
(…) Thing here are so different! The people here at PACS really motivate us to take the 
lead in “Casa da Confiança”. They show us that we know better than anyone else what is 
going on in our lives, that we have what it takes to improve them, and that we should 
never let anyone make us think otherwise.” 
 
In one of the meetings, everyone commented that she went through a very 
positive transformation since she became a member of FCP-RJ and a collaborator of 
“Casa da Confiança”. The following comment from a fellow member is illustrative of 
such process: 
 
“I remember how shy and insecure this lady was when we first met her (…) She 
wouldn’t say a word and was afraid she wouldn’t be able to achieve anything with her 
own efforts (…) Look at her now … She is really making ‘Cativare’ grow… It is 
becoming a success …She is speaking on our behalf, she even went twice to the World 
Social Forum to talk about her work and that of other recyclers (…).” 
 
 C. agrees with such assessment. She recognizes that such change in her 
subjectivity increased her capacity to manage “Cativare” and make it more productive 
and sustainable: 
  
“I am very grateful for everything I am learning here (…) the most important of 
all being that I should not do everything at ‘Cativare’ myself, that everyone in the 
association has to collaborate as much as anyone else. (…) One day, on  the way back 
home, I thought about everything I learned here, about the way to divide work and that 
everyone at ‘Cativare’ should have the same rights and obligations in a project like this. 
(…) When I arrived home, I called everyone and had a good chat with them. I told them 
                                                 
38 http://www.ibase.br/pubibase/media/dv27_artigo1_ibasenet.pdf  
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 that if all the responsibilities are put on my shoulder we will all lose and that we will all 
gain a lot if we divide the efforts properly and assume our responsibilities. (…). We are 
also beginning to create a source of income by selling the material to recycling 
companies (…) We have more plans (…) I invited a woman I know who is a good artisan 
to teach us how use recyclable material to make tapestry (…) Soon we will be able to 
produce and sell hand-made carpets (…) We will also be able to sell fruits and 
vegetables from our collective orchard. (…)” 
 
The whole process also increased her awareness of the way in which “Cativare” 
and the Movement of Solidarity Socio-economy fit in a larger project of social 
transformation. The training sessions at PACS often included long discussions on 
political economy, the impact of the neo-liberal model of development on everyday 
forms of oppression, and the way in which the political mobilization of non-capitalist 
forms of production can contribute to promote a viable alternative. Such discussions 
gave her motivation and skills to become politically active within the Movement of 
Solidarity Socio-economy, as well as a spokesperson for the trash collectors’ movement: 
 
“Through my work at “Cativare” and conversations with the people here at 
PACS, I am realising the importance of our project and of my own involvement in society 
(…) Businesses and politicians are keeping people down and destroying the 
environment. (…) If we don’t do anything about it we only contribute to make it worse. 
(…) I am now participating at meetings of the FCP-RJ (…) I went twice to the World 
Social Forum to talk about the contribution that we, recyclers, give to the betterment of 
the environment (…).” 
 
Sharing knowledge on oppression in everyday life 
 One of the most significant aspects of the meetings at “Casa da Confiança” was 
the sharing of knowledge among members on how to avoid being caught in oppressive 
relations of power in the everyday life. In one of the meetings, C. shared with the rest of 
the group that a local politician insisted on offering Cativare an oven for free, at the same 
time that he was trying to impose his own view on how to divide labour within the 
association. Other members of “Casa da Confiança” informed C. that such move is 
typical of strategies aimed at “locking” such projects in relationships of clientelism that 
co-opt them for political purposes, therefore stripping them of their potential for 
promoting empowerment. Some of the participants even gave examples of similar 
situations that happened to them or their acquaintances. They advised C. on strategies to 
either get out of such relationship or, if “Cativare” ends up accepting the help of such 
politician, make it in such a way that he will not have any interference in the internal 
affairs of the association. In one of the following meetings, C. told everyone that she 
ended up giving back the oven and refusing any further help, in order to ensure the 
independence of “Cativare” from political interests.  
 
 Another factor of oppression that is widely discussed among the members of 
“Casa da Confiança” is that of the “street bankers”. These informal bankers make 
themselves known by distributing publicity on the street, in which they advertise loans 
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 for people who have been refused by the regular banking system. These loans are 
attached to interest rates that can go as high as 41%. Many of these bankers are connected 
with the organized crime and often use death squadrons to take revenge of those who do 
not pay back their loans in due time. This informal banking system was the subject of a 
workshop in the August meeting of the FCP-RJ, in which some members of “Casa da 
Confiança” made a theatrical representation of the tactics used by “street bankers” and 
the dangers that their “clients” face. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
This paper makes an exploratory analysis of the emergence of a participatory 
public composed by enterprises. Within such process, it underlines the importance of 
transversal networks that include entrepreneurs, scholar-activists, social movement 
intellectuals, technicians within NGOs and SMOs, and state officials. It emphasizes the 
role of mediating actors in making possible its use to promote civil society initiatives and 
leverage political influence.  
 
It also shows how the transnational diffusion of ideas and localized processes of 
capacity-building interact in processes of translation that underlie the building of a 
common frame for FBES, therefore promoting a synergy between the diffusion and re-
elaboration of theory, and its use as an instrument for collective action. In this specific 
case, the Brazilian approach to SE and the creation of SENAES and FBSES would have 
not been possible without the mediation of a tightly-kit network of progressive scholar-
activists who shared experiences of militancy and exile in Europe during the military 
dictatorship in Brazil. Their contacts with the Francophone academic world familiarized 
them with the concept of SE and led to its posterior introduction and re-interpretation in 
the “praxis” of the social movements in Brazil within which they circulate and to whom 
they provide capacity-building. Such reinterpretation led to the emergence of a specific 
approach to SSE, deeply ground in the social and cultural realities of the country and in 
the experiences of its subaltern groups. At the contrary of the original French approach, 
centered in institutions and social regulation, the Brazilian approach is centered on the 
role of culture and social ties in the development of non-capitalist forms of production.  
 
The central role of scholar-activists and their close ties to social movements and 
NGOs facilitated the articulation of interests and resources that culminated in the creation 
of FBES and SENAES. This articulation was made through two fronts. One of them 
operated at the macro level, congregating non-capitalist production and institutional 
actors at the state and federal levels for a series of conferences that led to the 
development of RBSES and culminated with the foundation of FBES in 2003, following 
the creation of SENAES. The other one operated at the micro-level, working on the 
technical support to productive units of the “popular economy”, as well as the political 
mobilization of their members through educational activities and their articulation with 
other productive units and social movements. 
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 Studying the power dynamics and mechanisms of boundary construction that are 
implicit in processes of knowledge production leading to the emergence of social 
movement frames might give new and deeper insights on why certain movements 
succeed in sustaining mobilization and leveraging influence on the state and the public 
sphere, while others fail. Such insights are especially relevant to the emerging 
“relational” approach to social movement activity, based on the study of experiences of 
activism within participatory decision-making processes, as well as within national and 
cross-border activist networks. This article proposes an approach to the power dynamics 
that structure such processes as “multi-level power games”. This concept contextualizes 
such processes within structural inequalities. Besides, it takes into account the 
relationship between movement participants and other actors, such state officials and 
members from other movements within the context of activist networks. Therefore, it 
provides a framework upon which to analyse the role of networks and the circulation of 
frames on processes of knowledge production by movements.  
 
“Casa da Confiança” offers a significant example of a “multi-level power game” 
in which a process of “translation” can be built upon a form of interaction between 
“experts” and “non-experts” that empowers the later, by promoting their moral, economic 
and political agency. The ethnographic data collected during a three month voluntary 
work experience at PACS indicates that the main factors that bracket the cognitive 
inequalities between technicians and entrepreneurs and make such process empowering 
for the later are: 1) the method followed by the organization and the agency of the 
participants; 2) a leadership style based on a combination between focused activism and a 
bridging approach.  The method used is inspired on Paulo Freire’s “The Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed”.  It consists of a process of demystification of “technical knowledge”, 
through a deductive process in which a correspondence is made between the experiential, 
non-codified knowledge of popular groups and concepts normally used in “expert” kinds 
of knowledge. PACS staff members turned this methodology into a powerful tool of 
empowerment and mobilization by adopting a facilitating role, and stimulating 
participants to be proactive and take the process in their own hands.  
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 Chile. Tripartism, economic-democratic reforms and socio-economic results, 1990-2007. 
     Gonzalo Falabella.1 
 
 
I. Introduction.  
 
What has been the character and scope of Chile´s Tripartite Agreements between Government, 
Unions and Employers Associations and what was their impact on economic liberalization and 
political transition since 1990? These are the main questions addressed in this research.  
 
Six dimensions have been selected in  the theoretical discussion on the particular context of 
relations between tripartism (for long term country development and policies, reforms and 
socio-economic, democratic results --agreements signed in 1990 and 1995--) policy, reforms 
and outcomes. They are presented next, graphed and bracket numbered accordingly:  
-   uneven weight between actors of agreements. (1) 
- two structural determinants: a) historical revolutionary changes since 1964 (i. Copper 
Nationalization bringing government savings to 26 Billion dollars by 2007 and Land Reform 
freeing the country’s rural backward enclave, as did France, the US, Japan and both Chinas 
years ago, ii. market economics multiplying many times investments and capital flows, iii. and 
reforms outlined in this chapter) b) but also of socio-economic political bottlenecks introduced 
by military legislation, particularly restrictions on parliamentary democracy and union 
bargaining. (2) and (5) 
-   new political-development culture permeating the transition from dictatorship: persistent neo-
liberal ideology under strong oligopolistic markets, fear, prudence before correlation of forces 
and low political willingness for change beyond it by Concertation centre-left leadership, as 
well as unions and people at large jobs and retirement  social insecurity (Messner and Scholz, 
1999, Falabella, in Valdes and Foster, 2005, Lechner, 2002). They result in labor-capital 
mistrust and the government cautious policies under a delicate transition. (3) 
-   the importance of bipartite political agreements between Concertación Government and the 
right wing Alianza in reforms and outcomes, with unions backing the Concertación and 
employers the Alianza. These political agreements are a direct result of Chile´s permanently 
drawn Parliamentary electoral system inherited from Pinochet Constitution and likewise for any 
reform and policy to be undertaken. (6) 
-   union symbolic power lent to the governing coalition in crucial presidential elections --by a 
key actor in bringing down dictatorial rule and keeping the Governing Coalition in power now 
for 20 years-- and at the political bargaining table.1  It refers to a cultural dimension of power 
(analogous to that of the Catholic Church in Chile --although much more extended than that of 
unions!) beyond union’s limited formal organization and bargaining power derived from 
dictatorial rule. (8) 
 
All together, these dimensions should help further explain the specific character of Chilean 
Tripartite Agreements and, with it, variances in policies, reforms and outcomes. They stress 
progressive results are finally a consequence of full democratization and collective bargaining 
rights for unions, thus allowing political and social actors to fully unfold and participate in the 
country´s development and benefits, as they rid themselves of the straight jacket still framing a 
20 years transition. 
 
                                                 
1 Professor of  Sociology, University of Chile.This paper and another on Uruguay by Lydia Fraile make 
up a chapter in a book by that same author. Chapters  have a common design regarding the role of 
Tripartism nowaday, ILO´s raison détre, in 4 continents, also including Korea, Singapur, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Poland and Eslovenia. It will be published by Polgrave/ILO London, 2008. 
My appreciation for comments by Guillermo Campero, Patricio Frias, Jerry Hage, Cynthia McClintock, 
Oscar Muñoz, Joe Ramos, Ian Roxborough, Veronica Oxman and, particularly, Lydia Fraile. Also to 
Gabriela Morales for assisting in data collection at the Dirección del Trabajo, (Ministry-Labor Authority). 
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 Graphed Theory. Dimensions explaining relations between Tripartism, Policies, Results.  
 
As derived form this framework, the main argument of this Chapter is as follows: 
 
Tripartism in Chile in the 1990-2007 period has been weak, with only punctual and limited 
agreements and limited impact on economic reforms --which started under the authoritarian 
military regime, 1973-1989, but more so on socio-economic results and democratization. 
Nonetheless, these agreements were important for social, economic and political stability 
during a delicate democratic transition period and because they underlined certain strategic 
lines of long term fiscal policy, social spending and education for the development of the 
country. But unions obtained very little in terms of labor legislation, which today still inhibits 
the extension of collective bargaining and, thus, the distribution of economic achievements, as 
Gini figures below underline. 
A majority of analyzes about the Chilean transition up to these days tend to underestimate the 
political limitations imposed by Pinochet´s Labor Plan and electoral legislation which leads to 
a drawn parliament composition --whatever the electoral results--, who still remained Army 
Commander until 1998 further framing the transition, plus the control exercised by a few 
families on an economy still based on natural resources. Likewise, they underestimate and leave 
unexplained why union symbolic and  legitimizing power  --as they are the only national mass 
organization of a socially low organized civil society such as Chile is still today---  has 
consistently supported the Concertación Government Coalition2  --which will soon complete a 
20 year rule--  in every election since the 1988 plebiscite which ousted Pinochet. Consequently, 
they have not explained how and why unions have successfully influenced voting results beyond 
their rank and file (Epstein,1993, Barret, 2001, Haagh, 2002, Scully, Sapelli, 2002, Weyland, 
1999, Volker, 2002, Scully). Government union policies, however, have been moderate while 
they have repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to reform labor legislation on behalf of unions 
under a blocked parliament.     
+
+
3 Autonomous socio-
political actors but very 
different weight (1) 
New political culture: 
extended neo-liberal          
ideology, social and 
political fear, 
Concertación unwilling-
ness to push change 
beyond correlation of 
forces, labor-capital 
mistrust (3)                      
Limited TRIPARTITE 
AGREEMENTS in Chile 1990-
2007 (4)   
 2 Revolutions 1 Reform 
(1964-2007) (5) 
Limited Bipartite Consensus Policies: labor 
rights, competitiveness, equity, poverty reduction 
(6)  
Mixed Results (2007):  +/- labour rights,  +/-  democratization, + productivity,  
– equity,  + poverty reduction (7)  
+/- 
+/- 
 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
- 
 
(1) High Government & Business, Low Labor; (2) Pinochet´s 1980 Constitution & Regime; (3) New 
political culture (4) A consequence of multi-constraints; (5) Land Reform, Nationalization of Copper 
with increased social budget, market economics, reform of reforms; (6) Limited by former but 
facilitated by space opened by (5); (7) Limited by (6) but increased by (8); (8) Unions´ cultural strength  
 
+ 
Electoral 
system 
permanently 
drawn between 
two blocks, anti-
democratic 
constitutional 
laws, 
authoritarian 
heritage (ec, 
soc, inst, cult)  
(2) 
Union Symbolic  Power (8) 
 
 
++ 
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 Socio-economic results are uneven and include a growth in p/c GNP from US $2.500 to $8.900 
and a decrease in poverty from 38.6 to 13.7 % in 1990-2006 and a double increase in real 
minimum salary and social spending, with over 1% annual fiscal saving and a Gini inequality 
index during the period just slightly, but down .57-.54. Also, a wide set of  secondary reforms 
were introduced, more in line with people needs than previous to 1990 (education, health, 
pensions, state reform, fiscal and social policies, labor market and taxes).   
 
Thus, punctual, with long term perspective but low Peak level Tripartism should explain --
together with the six dimensions underlined above on its specific context-- economic and 
political reforms as well as socio-economic results, in a case study combining class analysis 
and the state. 
 
The research strategy will now analyze the Character and Scope of Chile´s weak but long term 
aimed Tripartism: Agreements and their context (II); Reforms, Policies, 1990-2007 and 
antecedents (III); Impact of Tripartism on specific Sectoral Reforms and Policies (IV); 
Conclusions (V). 
 
 
II. Chile’s weak but long termed Tripartism. Agreements and their context.   
 
A. The Tripartite Agreements (1990, 1995).  The 1990 Tripartite Agreement is framed by 17 
years of widespread repression under Pinochet, which has been documented by National 
Committees at 3,000 killed, over 30,000 tortured and over 300,000 exiled3 and the cultural 
consequences of such rule of terror (Lechner, 2002). In addition, there were the privatized free 
market economy, a Constitution and Labor Plan institutionalizing it with a “protected” 
democracy that precluded majority rule, a military supervisory role over the State and Pinochet 
himself, who remained Army Commander in Chief until 1998 and thereafter senator for life.   
 
1) Thus, a few days after the beginning of the democratic Concertación Coalition transition 
Government of President Patricio Aylwin, Chile’s central union, CUT, the main business 
association, CPC, and the Government signed what was called a Marco or Framework 
Agreement. It represented an overall economic and political agenda regarding the need to build 
a transition to democracy, with support for an open export economy, union rights, democracy 
and the combination of Growth and Equity. Thus, the name Marco or Framework Agreement, 
which had long term projections, above and beyond other specific accords.  
 
Paramount to this national agreement was the recognition of Business’ leading role in 
Development, “a bitter drink to swallow by signing unions”, according to Martinez, the head of 
CUT, after 17 years of unrestricted economic and political repression. The Marco Agreement 
also included the classic employers prerogatives of “running their business”, the role of the 
market “in assigning resources”, fiscal austerity, macroeconomic equilibrium and an export 
economy. However, it voiced “protection for the neediest” and the state’s “leading, overseeing 
and superior role in the economy”. It also included a clear call to build a developed country with 
the participation and benefit for all, by means of basic government employer-worker consensus 
to promote investment, innovation, value added  primary exports, “investments in the people” 
and a legitimizing role for unions and business organizations (Cortázar, 1993, Annex II). CUT´s 
own transition platform covered all dimensions of an economic social and political transition, in 
accordance with the political role it had played under the dictatorship. (Falabella 1981, 1991, 
Campero and Cuevas. 1991) However, unions never imagined, before the signing, they had to 
go so far to obtain so little in actual union terms, on behalf of a peaceful transition to 
Democracy.4  
 
The legislation which followed combined a reform of the Labor Code regarding union rights for 
national and sectoral representation (but not for collective bargaining), increased redundancy 
payments from 5 to 11 months per year worked, raised the minimum wage by 24%, as well as 
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 establishing minimum pensions and subsidies for families and the neediest. It was, thus, a strong 
Agreement on socio-economic terms but mostly limited on political union terms, as national 
unions won the right of representation but not of bargaining. This has maintained to now --
except for government employees and minimum wages-- an atomized collective bargaining 
coverage of less than ten percent and strike of under 1%. 
 
In order to finance these raises in pensions and social allowances as well as other social 
spending needs in education, health and housing, a fiscal reform that increased VAT by 2% and 
rescinded corporate tax cuts made by Pinochet during the 1988-89 elections was passed by 
Congress  with the support of all political parties following the Framework Agreement. Both the 
minimum wage and VAT increase were renewed during the next 3 years of the Aylwin 
Government by signed Tripartite Agreements, as reported by the new Labor Minister himself 
(Cortazar, 1993), but solely by the Government and Congress thereafter.  
 
Why is this so? Business felt secured under the marco agreement reached and a rightwing 
political opposition which, with only 1/3 of vote support, could legally block any non-
consensual reform of Pinochet labor laws and Constitution in parliament. Do employers 
recognize unions as a “legitimate other”   --as understood by neuroscience?  Yes and no. Yes 
formally, according to the unquestioned macro-agreement; no, whenever possible in the private 
sector (the historical case of US unions --Tronti, 1976) as is the case with unions signing 
“agreements” but only if employers are willing to do so. 
 
The Concertación Governments which followed and the opposition have continued to renew 
minimum wages increases in Congress up to this day. This is the strong political base which 
allows the present analysis to call the Marco Agreement an “all embracing accord permeating 
the whole transition period” in terms of political stability, economic growth and social spending. 
In fact, the increase in real minimum wages went from 103% in 1990 to 194% in 2003 (179% in 
2000), while total real wages varied from 93.3% to 134.4% in 1990-2000 (INE, National 
Statistics Institute). See Table 2. 
 
 But unions have consistently but unsuccessfully demanded since the Acuerdo Nacional signing 
the right, first, to bargain at sectoral levels, thus ending union dispersion and the very low 
coverage of collective bargaining (22.74% organized, but only 8.5% actually bargaining, Table 
2) and, second, the elimination of the right of employers to replace striking workers. All 
Concertación Governments have introduced legislative proposals in this respect at presidential 
election times, 1994 and 1999 to extend collective bargaining rights beyond permanent workers 
(Dirección del Trabajo 2000), 2000 sectoral bargaining (Frias 2002) and in 2005 rights for 
subcontracted workers similar to those of the permanently employed, which was recently passed 
into law.5 The 2006 parliament has, for the first time, a (slight) government majority in both 
chambers because of 2005 election time approved constitutional reforms imposed on Alianza by 
Concertación backed by Unions´ legitimacy. It eliminated Pinochet designated Senators and 
resulted in a Government majority in Congress and the immediate passage of a government-
union agreed law, making employers co-responsible when subcontracting labor services. 
 
However, unions generally obtained only minor changes such as the right to engage in national 
collective bargaining if plant unions agree to give up their own bargaining rights (law 19.069 
under Aylwin 1991) and a fine of $150 US paid by employers for every striking worker 
replaced (law 19.759 under Lagos, 2001). An important change in workers de facto rights to 
organize and bargain took place as a result of President Frei signing an ILO convention on the 
right of state workers to organize --which was pending since the Aylwin Government-- and the 
passage of an unemployment benefit funding law in 2001, mostly paid for by employers´, with 
the eleven months redundancy benefits still in effect.  
 
Thus, while all three actors had significantly different bargaining power and weight, they all 
needed a political accord --more so than many specific negotiated demands-- that would assure 
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 them room to govern, continue doing Business and engage in collective bargaining, particularly 
given unions´ strongly diminished status vis-a-vis employers by the end of dictatorial rule. In 
fact:  
A.  there  was a fear by highly concentrated big business --within only three families-- the right 
wing and the military, of seeing their enormous political accomplishments obtained during 
dictatorial years (restricted democracy and the Labor Plan) overturned and their strength 
weakened;  
B. the need for reconciled left of centre coalition leaders from the Frei and Allende 
Governments (1964-1973) to govern together under a framed economy, Constitution and 
Pinochet-lead military;  
C. and, thus, the political threat of business, the right and the military,  
D.  plus weakened unions (Table 2 in V Conclusions) hoping to overturn their inherited military 
fate and strongly increase organizing and collective bargaining levels. Added to this were the 
legitimate demands of a repressed and impoverished mass of people who had ousted Pinochet at 
the poles and had then won the 1989 Presidential election.  
 
Therefore, a strong and concentrated economic and political employers´ class (3 family groups) 
with low democratic credentials and a strongly assimilated neo-liberal ideology (Campero, 
1984), a weakened pro-socialist, communist and christian democratic oriented unions lead by a 
united national board and a new strong (given Pinochet´s Presidential Constitution) centre-left 
Government of the same parties were the main transition actors of the 1990 framework 
agreement.    
 
2) The second  National Agreement accomplished during the Concertación transition 
Governments is the overall and sectoral Education Framework, signed by the National 
Teachers Unions, the Government and all other stakeholders during the mid 1990´s. Called the 
Brünner Plan, it was signed early in the Frei government and paved the way for a consensual 
long term plan that included Teachers Unions, the Education Ministry and right wing think 
tanks to upgrade education, including private, catholic , state subsidized and Municipal schools. 
This has maintained VAT at 19%, though this was reluctantly supported by right wing parties in 
Congress. For the Teachers Union this policy has meant accepting evaluation of its members 
according to international standards, which erased some of the benefits from their hard won 
1990 Statutory removal from the Labor Plan. Despite strong objections from the Communist 
Party, which included the expulsion of their President from the party, a rank and file referendum 
vote supported the evaluation. This was carried out after a Tripartite visit to Ireland, Scotland 
and Cuba to study their evaluation system. The Government-Union alliance has given 
governability during 17 years of the so called “reforms of reforms” to correct or fine-tune some 
of the market-oriented reforms inherited from Pinochet. 
 
A new and similar national agreement to upgrade the quality of Chilean Education has now 
been under discussion throughout 2006 by a Government nominated 80 member pannel, 
representing all parties, after national widespread mobilizations by high school students took 
place at the beginning of the Bachelet Government. Main but only non consensual agreements 
were which the Government turned into a bill on its own terms-- to end Pinochet’s Education 
Constitutional Amendment (LOCE) which institutionalized the State’s wholly subsidiary and 
only economic role vis-à-vis private education. It was finally turned into law in 2007 under a 
mid-way Government/Opposition agreement which reformed LOCE but maintained economic 
incentives for private education and a government supervisory role. A Government-Coalition 
Parties agreement thereafter reaffirms their willingness to continue pursuing the de-
municipalization of public education and its transfer to a regional public entity in-between 
County and National level administration. 
 
The two main national tripartite agreements previously analyzed --the Marco Agreement for 
inclusive development lead by private business investments and the Agreement to foster 
Education as the main development axis of the country-- were no minor events in the transition 
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 period from military rule. They represent strategic and long term objectives which have in fact 
permeated, according to their declared purpose, the élan of the period and its political ethos. In 
this sense, tripartism has had an important long lasting policy effect. Despite their conflictive 
relations, at no point in time have these two agreements been discharged by any of the signing 
partners, and unions have backed the ruling centre-left coalition in all presidential elections.  
 
B. Other agreement attempts: the “dialogical” approach. Given the Alianza’s opposition 
ability to use the Pinochet inherited Constitution to boycott advances in labor union legislation 
and socio-economic benefits, Concertación Governments have turned to different forms of 
“tripartite conversational strategies” to unloose the class blockage of Chilean Society by means 
of presenting limited enforceable agendas which brought together “actors historically far apart” 
(García 2006), under supposedly  common objectives:  
1)  the 1995 Frei government, business, unions Development Forum at national, regional and 
then territorial level dismissed by 1999, as CUT rather felt “why discuss the future if at present 
there is a total disagreement on main labor issues”6 and large employers thought there were “too 
many state officials” participating7;  
2) under Lagos Government, similar Tripartite Regional User Committees were set up in order 
to arrive at consensual labor relations, diagnosis bottlenecks and advance solutions but, again, 
without any success;  
3) and the 2007 call by President Bachelet encouraging CUT and CPC to consider 
Danish “flexsecurity” model which, in the case of Chile considered: national collective 
bargaining, as demanded by unions, flexible labor  relations as demanded by big business, plus 
the Government proposed midway model. Although by international standards Chile is 
considered one of the most flexible labor  relations systems in world terms, leading Chilean 
newspapers, employers and neo-liberal economists blame labor market “rigidity” as responsible 
for Chile’s 5-6% (qualified “poor”) projected growth and 6% (qualified “high”) unemployment 
rate and criticize the flexisecurity project as too expensive. The head of CUT is now more 
optimistic with the new CPC leader, who comes from the mining sector and has more 
experience dealing with unions, unlike the previous leader who came from banking “and had 
more expertise in folding peso notes than in dealing with unions”, as Martinez put it to El 
Mercurio (3/15/07, p. B10). 
 
Chile policy scope, continuing practice, number of agreements and scope is therefore Low. 
However, both main Agreements have long term perspectives to build a developed country 
among and benefiting all citizens. Perhaps, this is a sufficiently abstract and uncompromising 
statement meaning everything and nothing particularly binding. But the net result is nobody is 
willing to renounce the agreement and everybody seems quite proud Chile has been invited in 
2007 to join the OECD team of 30 most developed countries.  
 
 
III. Chile’s political economy: Main policies under Pinochet and later by democratic 
governments.  
 
Unlike other experiences, liberal economic reforms started early in Chile, in the aftermath of the 
1973 coup d’état. This section will provide an overview of the main policies implemented under 
authoritarian rule (1973-1989) and by left of centre democratic governments in power since 
1990. 
 
A. The first Pinochet period, 1973-1981. With the coup, Parties were outlawed and Congress 
was suspended “until new indications”. As mentioned previously, union bargaining was 
suspended, first by government named sectoral tripartite salary committees, and later replaced 
by salaries indexed to inflation levels. By 1979 inflation had reached 36% after having been 
first reduced to 370% during the 1975 shock treatment policies which dramatically reduced 
public spending and brought the economy into a drastic recession.  Other main policies during 
this period were market and financial liberalization, the reduction of tariffs from over 300% to 
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 10% by 1979, returning businesses expropriated by the socialist government to previous 
owners, privatization of other public enterprises and reduction of the state apparatus and taxes 
(Ffrench-Davis, 2001). 
 
The 1979 and 1980 Labor Plan  and new Constitution, both of which have framed the 1990-
2007 period following military rule, are clear examples of abortive negotiation8 which, although 
strongly restrictive and authoritarian, nonetheless allowed immediate legal organizing and 
collective bargaining for unions and a democratization agenda for the country at large. This 
started in 1988 with a plebiscite on the continuation of Pinochet´s rule, which he eventually lost. 
This unexpected opportunity for unions was the result of widespread pro-human rights pressure 
from abroad, including the US Carter Administration (who Senate approved arms sales embargo 
to Chile), Europe and the UN, plus the “Group of Ten” of moderate union leaders who called 
for an international boycott on Chilean exports. The political moment was used accordingly by 
different union groups to extensively reorganize as collective bargaining, although limited, was 
reinstated after 7 years. Two years later, during a deep economic crisis, it turned into massive 6 
year “national protests” calling for democratization, a finish to restrictions on unions and an end 
to the liberal economic model.  
 
There is now enough evidence from within the Government at the time (Piñera, 1990) which 
indicates that the 1979 Labor Plan paved the way for the 1980 Constitution which brought an 
end to direct military rule. It did so by showing the ruling elite that is was possible to combine 
free market economics and both limited union rights and limited democratic rights. The Labor 
Plan returned some union rights that had been totally suppressed, although severely constraining 
these at the same time through inbuilt legal and market restraints, such as multiple collective 
and individual bargaining units and employer rights to replace striking workers who, anyway, 
could not go on strike for over 60 days. 
 
B. The second Pinochet period, 1982-1989. The 1981-1982 world crisis affected Chile 
dramatically as the Government had to finally devalue the peso due to a high private foreign 
debt which brought the financial and most of the productive system down, resulting yet again in 
a  negative production cycle (minus 14%). The government had to protect the financial system 
as well as most of the productive sector in order to avoid further bankruptcies. The salary level 
achieved by unions in their previous collective bargaining, with which they started in the next 
negotiation round by law, was eliminated as part of the new economic adjustment which 
followed the crisis. Unemployment reached 30%. The net consequence was a mixture of 
massive street (but not strike) night protests calling for democracy, a larger business role in 
policy formulation than during the previous period, and a less dogmatic and more practical 
economic policy to ensure governability. The period ended with a strong economic recuperation 
of 10%  in 1989 and included an over heated economy under the effects of huge government 
earnings from new privatizations of public services (power and electricity, communications) 
that resulted in government overspending and tax decreases during the 1988-89 election period. 
The 1970 real salary levels were recuperated only in 1992. (Ffrench-Davis 2001).  
 
C. Concertación Governments, 1990-2007. 
 
There were certainly advances in all reforms and policies researched and analyzed throughout 
the period (Democracy, Macroeconomics, Income policy, Labor law & Labor market policy, 
Tax policy, Social policy, Second Generation reforms, Trade liberalization, Privatization) all of 
which are analyzed in the next section (IV). But most significant changes took place in the post 
Asian crises years, on the bases of “good government” legitimacy accumulated from 1990 to 
early 2000. In fact, new government-business relations finally occurred during the last 3 years 
of the Lagos Government.  
 
Free Trade Agreements with the US, Europe, Central America, Perú, South Korea, New 
Zealand-Brunei-Singapore were signed by the Lagos administration. The Bachelet government 
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 has continued, by advancing and/or signing treaties with China, India, Japan and Australia. It 
also developed a strong digital agenda, making Chile the most advanced in Latin America. At 
the macroeconomic level, aside from liberalizing capital flows, it inbuilt a 1% structural budget 
surplus average over the economic cycle and thus the ability to enact countercyclical economic 
policies whenever necessary. It has now been passed into law under President Bachelet, after 
having de facto implemented fiscal austerity policies and a financed budget since 1990.  A 
subcontracting law, long called for by unions, was finally enacted.  
 
At the political level, the Concertación also managed to bargain with the opposition successfully 
in 2005 to eliminate all the institutionalized authoritarian bottlenecks of the 1980 Constitution. 
The electoral system was removed from the Constitution, but remained reformable only under a 
2/3 majority. The Bachelet Government has instituted an open policy discussion in order to 
change Congress’ drawn political system into one combining a mix of proportional 
representation with the continuing of the present two blocks majority system. It even introduced 
an even milder law proposal before Congress in 2007 on the representation of the Communist 
Party whenever it obtained 5% of votes cast, which the right wing opposition first said would 
consider and then aborted.  
 
Second Generation Reforms.  Also significant was  the Concertación’s ability to negotiate 
with the opposition and/or sectoral unions advanced second generation reforms regarding State, 
Education and Health. Moreover, the Bachelet Government has established open advisory 
consulting committees to reform the binominal electoral system, Education, pension funds, end 
high income inequality, reduce crime levels and has passed legislation on subcontracted work, 
most met with success or the discredit of the Opposition. Basic secondary reforms undertaken 
have complemented or reformed those made under the military and will be presented next 
because of their strategic impact on the country development. 
 
1) Education Reform.  
 
A. Aylwin Government. Its first priority was national reconciliation and in this case, Government 
reconciliation with the Teachers Union, by proposing and  passing a special Statute law which 
freed them from the Labor Plan and gave them minimum rights and stability (tenure). But it 
decided to avoid repealing decentralization, as it had modern and democratic elements. 
B. Frei Government. Two main reforms were passed: a full day school education law, replacing 
the half day instituted by the military government, and the strengthening of teachers´ curricula 
in 1966-2001 through a 20 million dollar support budget. And as mentioned previously, a main 
Tripartite Education Agreement was signed by all national strata and institutions early his 
government (called the Brünner Plan), which paved the way for a consensual long term plan to 
upgrade primary education, maintaining the VAT at 19. 
 
C. Lagos Government. It instituted two basic reforms: an extension of obligatory education from 
8 to 12 years and the classroom reform, by introducing new modern teaching methodologies: 
teachers´ training by universities and ad hoc training by specialized tutors. However, few such 
tutors are to be found and thus the impact on education should be long term. The system has 
managed to maintain 98% of upper strata children in school and as many as 87% of those in the 
lowest 5% rank. The budget has doubled from 4% to 8.6% of Government spending from 1990-
2006, university students have multiplied by 4 and OECD achievement measurements are 
annually administered to monitor reforms (Cox 2003, 2005, 2006).  
 
D. As noted, President Bachelet has called forth a National Advisory Panel of over 80 experts, 
including university and high school students in order to upgrade the quality of education. A 
main purpose was to change Pinochet´s LOCE (Market ruled Education-Constitutional Law,  
which can only be changed under a 2/3 parliamentary vote). This renewed reform process has 
resulted again in an unanimous agreement to increase the quality of education and a yearly 
increase of funds ($650 US M transferred from half of annual 1% fiscal saving to the education 
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 budget) during the next 4 years and, more permanently, by using profits of copper export 
savings, deposited in foreign funds, to train teachers abroad and increasing by 50% government 
scholarships for student programs abroad.9  A bargained Government-Opposition law resulting 
from this discussion finally agreed to reform LOCE but guaranteed private education as well the 
State supervisory role. Municipal Education for the poor is till under debate and Concertation 
has agreed on a proposal to put it under an  intermediate education body in between the 
Municipal Government and the Education Ministry.  
  
2) Health Refom. 
 
As in Education, the Concertación Health transition program accepted Pinochet decentralization 
policies. It did so despite strong opposition from national and local doctors´ unions as well as 
the Health Workers Confederation. One key reason for maintaining decentralization was 
evidence coming from the only regional Hospital which was kept under state control, that in no 
way  reflected a more efficient or equitable administration.  
 
Even though the final outcome was opposed by doctors and workers of all kind and resolved 
none of the three issues, it has gradually been accepted. In fact the law which created AUGE, 
the National System Guaranteeing Sickness Coverage for all citizens was passed by the right 
wing Alianza and the Christian Democratic Party, with the opposition of the left coalition 
parties to which President Lagos himself belonged and of the Health Workers Federation. It 
guarantees by now all 56 most frequent Chilean sickness patterns for all its citizens, private or 
public insured. 
 
3) Pension Reform. 
 
Pinochet’s star reform was promoted by international agencies (WB, IMF) as a model to follow 
and was actually copied in many countries. When President Bachelet won on a landside election 
based on the promise precisely to change this reform, international interest was attracted. 
However, as in the case of health and education, there are no proposals opposing an individual 
savings account today. Rather, they attempt to complement it by building into it state supported 
solidarity institutions, membership participation, overall transparency of private savings 
administration and, for the first time, employers´ contributions. It should be soon become law. 
 
4) Government Reform.      
           
The process of Government Reform in Chile has come to recognize the major accomplishments 
on these matters under Pinochet´s rule. These have been maintained and expanded by the 
Concertación Governments because they have demonstrated modernizing effects. Examples 
include: 1) the law on state financing which created a national system to evaluate budget 
proposals, 2)  an administrative statute separating the state apparatus from its planning one, 3) 
policy proposals presenting these on universal terms as differentiated from specific proposals, 4) 
decentralization, both regional and municipal, giving explicit and specific roles, 5) privatization 
of state enterprises which were not considered strategic for the country’s development, and 6) 
the state’s regulatory role.  
 
The Aylwin Government had two distinct policy accents, seldom mentioned in the literature, but 
crucial to the peculiar transition of Chile from military to a civilian rule. First, there was a clear 
agenda on behalf of the poor, the needy, the marginal and the indigenous population, by 
focusing on specific budget agreements with the Alianza opposition. Thus, per capita spending 
in health and education increased from 83.9 in 1990 (base 1970=100) to 108.3 by 1994 and 
164.5 in 2002. Second, there was a focus on regional and local democratization, by creating 
elected municipal governments. 
 
64
 President Frei concentrated his modernizing agenda on two aspects: 1) the quality of state 
administration, conceived as management in parallel terms to those of private business 
administration, and 2) reforming the state’s regulatory role by engaging in new privatizations, 
such as those in energy and water services. 
 
President Lagos, on his part, developed an overall view on state modernization, creating a 
special program in this respect. In addition, his administration promoted an agenda of 
transparency, regulation of election financing, the creation of a High Government Public Office 
to recruit top government officials from the open labor market, among others. These actions 
followed a government-opposition agreement after charges were brought against high state 
officials in the Public Construction Ministry and similarly transparency agreements were 
reached under President Bachelet after charges were again brought in. 
 
President Bachelet, on her part, has innovated so far in four respects: First, she has adopted as a 
main government policy the above mentioned pension reform. Second, she has undertaken the 
reform of the binominal electoral system which inhibits democratic rule in Congress. Third, for 
the first time her coalition’s electoral proposals have turned into policies. In all previous 
governments, policies depended on the will of the Minister chosen, whatever the electoral 
program read. Fourth, a subcontracting law was passed which makes employers co-responsible 
for unpaid labor salaries.  
  
 
IV. Impacts of Tripartism on specific Sectoral Policies and Reforms.  
 
As Table 1 indicates, the impact of Tripartism is limited (LM) in Chile’s democratization and 
the economic “reforms of reforms” previously enacted under Pinochet. These reforms have been 
enthusiastically supported by the main employer confederation, but less so by unions. Reforms 
will be presented in order of importance according to the impact of Tripartism on them. 
 
Table 1. Impact of Tripartism on Reforms, Policies.  
Reform, Policies  Impact of Tripartism  
Democracy M 
Macroeconomic, incomes policy L 
Labor law and active labor market policy L 
Tax reform M 
Social policy M 
Second Generation reforms L 
Trade liberalization  N 
Privatization N 
TOTAL IMPACT LM 
N= none, L= low, M= medium, H= high. 
 
Democracy. 
 
The impact of Tripartism on Democratization is evident, to the extent that not only has there 
been democratic stability in Chile since 1990, but it has enabled the country to fully advance in 
institutionalizing a new role and status for the military in Chilean society (2005 Constitutional 
Reform ending their supervisory role). But a reform of the electoral system is still pending, 
which indicates the limits of democratization. Unions have fully supported the negotiations of 
the government coalition and the Communist Party with opposition parties to end this binominal 
electoral system.  
 
Above and beyond costs paid by unions for signing the Acuerdo Marco, Democracy is certainly 
the great gift they have offered their country, a fact which is widely acknowledged and large 
employers who had bought the country’s large companies during military rule at bargain prices 
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 and had subversively helped overthrow the Allende Government, overcame their fear of 
expropriation and invested.  
 
Tax reform. 
 
This was an essential element of the Marco Agreement as documented earlier: the increase in 
VAT to finance social spending and the reinstatement of business taxes eliminated by Pinochet 
during the plebiscite and 1989 presidential elections. Also significant was the decrease in tax 
evasion through computerization and control, particularly the creation of a special unit to 
monitor big business tax evasion. But what was even more important was the establishment of 
responsible fiscal policy, as discussed elsewhere, first as a practice and then instituted by law. It 
maintained not only a balanced yearly budget and savings to be spent during depressive years, 
as during the 1998 Asian crisis. Unlike all other countries in the region, it also increased the 
minimum salary by 25% even though growth reached a -0.8 bottom (UNDP, 2004). It also 
institutionalized a long term state income (savings) policy of copper reserves, well beyond the 
annual 1% structural fiscal saving, in order to reach the longer perspective of a “Socially 
Responsible State” which should cover basic needs regarding education, health, universal 
retirement and housing by 2010. 
 
Social Policy.  
 
Pinochet enacted key social policy reforms, such as the establishment of a “Map of Extreme 
Poverty” in order to target anti-poverty measures to needy families and local communities --a 
trend continued by the Concertación.   
 
The Aylwin Government created FOSIS, a Program focused directly on the poor and enhanced 
the role of INDAP, a program in rural areas focused similarly, increasing social spending as part 
of a common agenda agreed with the opposition as documented in the analysis of the Acuerdo 
Macro agreement signed with unions and business organizations. President Frei disengaged 
from the Committee on Poverty proposals feeling Chile had finally entered a self fulfilling 
growth route leading to its development, which in fact ended in crisis during his government 
under the effect of the Asian depression of 1998.10 President Lagos innovated by establishing 
the bridge program Chile Solidario concentrating on the poorest in policies agreed on with the 
opposition, which built into it many proposals of right wing parties such as personalized 
counseling for this segment of hard poverty. President Bachelet has already innovated on a key 
issue, focusing poverty level analysis not on behalf of goods owned (TV, radio, etc.) but on real 
family income levels. 
 
Unions generally added their social legitimacy to Government policies but remained totally 
absent of focusing their support on issues --including general social policy-- beyond strict union 
interests (i.e. minimum salary). However they have now fully supported the government 
pension reform initiative. 
 
Labor law and active labor market policy. 
 
The Acuerdo Marco secured a democratic transition with a relatively high mean growth level of 
5.6% in 15 years compared to 2.9% under Pinochet. However, unionized workers increased 
from 10% of those employed by 1983 to 15.4% in 1991 (22% among salaried workers) but 
decreased again to 10.9% in 200111 and then went slightly beyond that figure,12 with never more 
than 8.5% (of salaried workers) engaging in collective bargaining. In synthesis, Concertación 
governments have consistently put forward during presidential elections in 1990, 1993, 1999, 
2005, CUT’s two basic demands: First, an extension of collective bargaining, particularly at the 
national and sectoral level and for non-permanently employed workers (temporary, 
subcontracted and others). The second demand was for an end to the employers’ right to replace 
workers under strike. The Concertación’s support for their demands has shown unions these are 
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 not being met because of an Alianza’s boycott. In 2006, after designated senators were finally 
eliminated, the Concertación has been able, for the first time, to have a slight majority in both 
Congressional Houses and approve a pro-union sub-contracting law, a re4sult of a Union-
Bachelet presidential election pact. 
 
Macro, fiscal and income policy.  
 
Pinochet’s first monetarist adjustment program, the 1975 so called “shock treatment”, was the 
start of a policy designed to bring government spending in line with the reduced earnings which 
followed tax reductions and inflation control. However the 1981-1982 crisis and the massive 
protests that followed lead to a more flexible and less monetarist economic policy, which started 
a new capital accumulation cycle. However, by the end of that decade an unbalanced fiscal 
trend once again emerged as a result of the huge government spending carried out during the 
electoral years of 1988-1989 (plebiscite and presidential elections). A new wave of 
privatizations had increased government revenues and spending at the same time taxes were 
reduced. (Ffrench-Davis, 2001)  
 
Budget responsibility has been passed into law unde Presdeint Bachelet, strangely enough with 
a strong opposition from neo-liberal economists!13 Chile is now a creditor country that invests 
its surplus abroad to avoid internal economic distortions. This allows the possibility of financing 
programs, such as pension funds, to rebuild a “Socially Responsible State”.  
 
 
Second Generation Reforms (see Section III), Trade liberalization and Privatization. 
 
On these last two matters there have been no tripartite agreements and hardly any union effort at 
negotiations except to oppose, through public statements, the privatization of water facilities 
under President Frei. This lack of negotiations on such key policies and the development of a 
politico-technical approach by unions have been detrimental in extending their legitimacy, their 
symbolic power, before the country at large. 
 
 
V. Conclusions.  
 
A. Tripartism was largely “weak but with long term effects” since 1990. Weak, because there 
were only two agreements with limited immediate results, but all embracing as referred to 
“strategic lines of long term” fiscal policy, social spending and education for the “development 
of the country” which have permeated the whole transition and the actual path followed 
throughout these year. And it is still taking place today. In fact, none of the signing actors has 
ever dismissed the agreements. Why? Because they were based on strong interests and needs 
and thus backed by all three actors signing: a) a Government needing to rule under a delicate 
transition, b) (large and concentrated in few families) employers who had obtained enormous 
benefits under military rule and wanted to just go along with their business as usual without 
anybody questioning their legitimacy, and c) unions who wanted to increase their most limited 
breathing space under their inherited Pinochet Labor Plan and a  “restricted democracy” which 
block reforms. As interested were probably the military, still strongly in command and in 
control through their hand made Constitution, but afraid of an uncertain future where they could 
be judged for human rights violation.   
B. Tripartite impact has been mild (low-medium, Table 1 Section IV) restricted to the 
consolidation of Democracy, taxes and social policy and --except for Education-- has been low 
or nil, as documented in the preceding section, on Macro Fiscal and Income Policy, Labor 
Market and Labor Reform, in Trade Liberalization and Privatization and in Second Generation 
Reforms.  
C.  Socio-economic outcomes, however, are mixed, a medium mean value according to Table 2 
below: a) labor rights have increased but many paramount rights, such as sectoral unions and 
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 temporary workers collective bargaining --a majority in the seasonal food and retail economy 
and present in most other sectors-- are still withheld, although those salaried employed workers   
 
Table 2. Socio-Economic Achievements. 
Variable Mean/variation 1990-2000´s High-Low 
Growth  5,4% 1 MH 
Unemployment 6.5% 2 ML 
Job security Mean 7 tables 3 L 
Poverty reduction 38.6-13.7% 4 H(very) 
Minimum Salary  103-194 5 H 
Real Salaries 93,3-134,4 6 MH 
Inequality 0.57-0.54% 7 H 
Union Organization 21.3%-22.7% 8 M 
Union Negotiations 3.2%-8.5(29)% 9 L 
Workers on strike 1.6%- 0.3%  10 L (very) 
Mean TOTAL   M 
Sources: 1 Central Bank, 2004; it reached a p/c GNP of $8.900 in 2006 and $12.5000 in parity purchasing power (El Mercurio, 
27/6/07, p. B.3) ;  2 National Statistics Institute, INE,2004; 3 Subcontracting, type contract, temporary labor, pensions & health 
coverage  (Economic 2004 Labor 2004 Planning  Ministry CASEN 1990, 1993, 1998, 2003 & Industrial Employers-SOFOFA 
2003); 4 Planning Ministry 2003 (15% projections 2006); 5 Central Bank, 1990-2003; 6 Central Bank 1990-2000; 7 Planning 
Ministry 2006;  8 Labor Ministry. Includes Central Government 151.841 workers organized in Associations in 2004;  Labor 
Ministry 2004. Includes Central Government Association-ANEF which did not bargain in 1990 (Footnote 16). Figures are actually 3 
times larger for those who benefit from ANEF bargaining (455.523) not only those organized (151.841). Similarly Finance-
Ministry-CUT minimum salary negotiations benefit all workers, racing the figure from 29% to over 40% of occupied salaried 
workers benefiting from collective bargaining in private/public sector. Public, Municipal Health/ Teachers are not included. But 
private sector workers bargaining (apart from minimum salary) is 5% (4,2% considering only contracts) and all workers 8.5%; 10 
Striking workers/salaried occupied workers, 1991-2004: 45.910 / 2.833590-11.209 / 3.729230. Labor Ministry, 2005. 
 
 
“benefiting” from collective bargaining where government is involved (state employees and 
minimum salary) have resulted in an overall increase to 40% (Table 2 ): thus, distribution wise, 
the bottleneck clearly points to very low collective bargaining levels in the private sector, even 
if including non-union bargaining (Dirección del Trabajo, 2006); b) a coalition, always winning 
a majority vote as Concertación, needs to negotiate with the opposition in parliament in order to 
enact socio-economic benefit laws, indicating Chile’s democratic limitations; c) GNP, 
productivity and social spending doubled or increased 3 times, poverty was reduced 3 times 
while income inequality has remained stable. 
  
What is the final evaluation and which are the prospects of this unfolding process? 
 
1) A study of 15 years of Concertación Governments regarding the equity and efficiency 
question was entrusted to a team of 100 academics and experts (Meller, 2005). Topics included 
the Neo-liberal vs. Concertación ideological approach, macroeconomics, integration into the 
world economy, employment and salaries, social development, health, education, income 
inequality, business regulatory frameworks, technological innovation and environment policies. 
In each case a counterfactual argument and results were added, based on simulated data drawn 
from presidential election proposals by right wing coalition candidates. Although employment 
is the main difficulty found in the results of the Concertación Governments (a 7,8% mean-
medium  unemployment in 2006, but particularly high among women and the young, according 
to an ILO study)14, the net benefit in terms of employment and salaries is plus 10% under the 
Concertación vis a vis counterfactual Neo-liberal Governments. 
 
In addition, the high economic inequality present in Chile today would have been most probably 
greater under strict neo-liberal rule. In fact, today Chile, comparatively, is a country where 
inequality has slightly decreased (Gini 0.57-0.54 1990-2006 index, MIDEPLAN, Planning 
Ministry) compared with Latin America at large, according to UNDP figures, where it has 
increased under orthodox Washington Consensus policies have been applied (UNDP, 2004). 
Thus the country under Alianza rule would have had even poorer results in housing, health and 
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 education (Valdes and Hicks, 2002)15. Chile is in fact the country with the highest human 
development level in Latin America (36 in world terms) after Argentina (34). (UNDP, 2005) 
Moreover, the poor have reduced by almost 3 (38.6%-13.7%, 1990-2006)16, while mean growth 
doubled Pinochet years.  
 
2) Guillermo Larrain (2005) notes in a recent book the challenges Chile has actually been able 
to meet during the past 33 years. His conclusion is that, as political constraints from the 
Pinochet era are being lifted, it is society which is lagging behind in inequality relative to the 
present state of good health and performance of the economy, Chile´s historic bottleneck. 
Moreover, in this respect there is strong research evidence indicating it is good business for 
employers to support unions, as unionization sets the conditions for the establishment of 
strategic alliances with labor to compete in open world markets (Muñoz, 2001). The role of 
unions is not only conflictive but also legitimizing: they represent both class interests as well as 
help organize production for capital (Zeitlin, 1980). In the case of Chilean food production for 
exports, for example, it could include the exchange of union bargaining rights, which is lacking 
today, for quality products on which employers returns are based. However, salaries are still 
being paid today per quantity produced and the unions´ role in development (of quality 
products) is totally ignored by employers and export companies.  
 
3) The question is if redistribution is obtained by the trickle down effect of economic growth and 
export achievements (primarily mining and forestry natural resources), as a 2007 Manifesto 
signed by 20 Chicago Boys proclaimed, or by incorporating the country into a joint, tripartite 
development path, plus also increasing small business producers´ return from export companies. 
This implies an ability to negotiate their intra export chain relations or, alternatively, 
government support for the development of associated small producer Export Boards. This is 
the case of New Zealand milk producers, who have become the most productive in the world 
(Falabella, in Valdes and Foster, 2005). In terms of workers, it implies their incorporation into a 
development strategy in which they become part of their enterprise success. Thus, not only 
general management, but every member of the company and supplying small business, would 
start feeling, thinking and behaving proactively, within a common export country agenda. 
(Falabella, 1997) Perhaps the reediting of the mid 1990´s Foros de Desarollo Productivo at 
national and territorial/chain cluster levels could be the most adequate mechanism to tackle this 
political-economic quest for a participative Chilean development, a government style President 
Bachelet has declared paramount. 
 
Two factors could inhibit this progressive advance. One is the permanent threat of  “the state 
being captured” by large (family) economic groups17 at east maintained their permanent access 
to State decision making, as Larraín puts it in his book, turning the country even further away 
from Tripartite Agreements. Larraín, responsible for the office supervising finances and security 
companies, is a well informed and a reliable source on these matters,18 as is Felipe Lamarca, ex-
President of industrial employers, SOFOFA and general manager of one of the 3 main economic 
groups in Chile. He has plainly stated that, in order for Chile to become developed, big capital 
“must learn to give up eating the whole pie” (tienen que aprender a soltar la teta!).19  President 
Bachelet has presented a law regulating economic groups lobbying the State, as cautioned by 
Larrain. b) The second obstacle to advancing the progressive agenda is the “fear of people 
participation” which, in terms of the present research, simply means increased collective 
bargaining.  
 
4) Thus, the theoretical corollary argument of this research concludes that the impact of 
Tripartism depends on the extent to which actors have a proportional socio-political weight 
and, second, it also depends on how they interact within a fully democratic political framework, 
both limited by the Pinochet hand made Constitution and Labor Plan still in place today, a direct 
consequence of which is probably the country’s persistent, although only slightly decreasing  
but still high inequality index. Tripartism has indeed played a role to the extent it established an 
effective and overall transition economic and political framework permeating the whole 17 year 
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 process, which has been implemented successfully: a liberal export economy lead by private 
business and an inclusive social agenda termed growth with equity. But tripartism has been 
weak and thus its impact low, because labor is weak, a result of collective bargaining being 
limited, within a permanently drawn government-opposition parliament which inhibits 
introducing labor and democratic reforms. 
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Footnotes. 
                                                 
1 Likewise, West German unions acknowledged that the threat of communism (referring to a split 
Germany under cold war) was a third invisible actor not-called-upon partner during labor negotiations.   
2 Joe Ramos, ex CEPAL Division head, Dean Economic Faculty University of Chile and main economic 
advisor to the first transition Government informs that, in order to control inflation in 1990, Government 
was reluctant to give unions sectoral bargaining rights while state union ANEF was willing to restrain 
demands, an enormous political responsibility to be found in no other country –paper comments. 
3 Rettig and Valech Chilean Human Rights Commissions which operated in the early 1990´s and 2000´s.   
4 Manuel Bustos and Arturo Martinez, the two main leaders signing the 1990 Acuerdo Marco, actually 
returned to their union office, just across the Presidential Palace, when they were on their way to sign the 
Agreement. But they came back and signed, as recalled by Bustos. Interview with Guillermo Campero. 
Martinez acknowledges that they were strongly pressured by the incoming Government Coalition to sign: 
“the military are moving into this transition with their full team.” From the side of (large) employers 
signing the agreement, Manuel Feliu, President of the Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio, 
CPC, later acknowledged that they had accepted economic concessions to unions they strongly opposed, 
in order to maintain the overall economic and Labor Plan reforms they had obtained under Pinochet.  
5 It was then questioned  by right wing opposition before the National Constitutional Tribune.  
6 Martinez actually acknowledged, in a recent interview for this research, that unions used the occasion to 
tell them in their very faces all what they were actually inhibited from saying when signing the Acuerdo. 
7 Discussion with Ricardo Aristía.  
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8 Changes in the 1979 labor law were negotiated among the new Chilean Labor Minister, the American 
AFL-CIO and two main business leaders from Chile and the US, Manuel Cruzat and Peter Grace head of 
United Fruit Co. (See Cruzat´s total support for Piñera´s Labor Plan at the time in El Mercurio, 
23/4/2006, p. B9). Grace was a good friend of George Meany, head of the US unions and his partner on 
the board of the anti-communist American Institute for Free Labor Development which operated abroad. 
Meany retired from the AFL-CIO shortly after these events, which strongly damaged relations with the 
The Group of Ten. They were renewed under the new leadership of Lane Kirkland , which took a strong 
stand, as unions throughout, to oppose Pinochet´s Labor Reform. Interview with Hernol Flores. 
9 Congress address by President Bachelet, May 21, 2006.  
10 According to Ffrench-Davis, this was a consequence of  government overconfidence, felt after having 
successfully overcome a similar crisis coming from Mexico (the so called 1994-1995 Tequila crisis), by 
having forced 30% of foreign capital flows to remain a minimum of 2 years in the country (the “encaje”). 
It was then lifted and the country was affected by the later Asian crisis.     
11 “Las reformas Laborales, op. cit , p. 91 
12 Dirección del Trabajo statistics.  
13 The Chicago Boys opposition is probably explained because the fiscal principal in this case not only 
allows for responsible budget spending but also for the creation of a Socially Responsible State, which 
they oppose as it includes a permanent and strong state savings and spending. Thus, moneys run out of 
the control of the economic elite. 
14 Study by Gerhard Reinecke for ILO, cited in El Mercurio May 7, 2007, p. B2. 
15 Even neoliberal analyses recognize Concertación´s impressive performance, although success is 
attributed to growth more than to social spending, 
16 Ibid. and “Del neoliberalismo”, op. cit.  
17 They increased their concentration throughout Concertation rule --FAO study by Budnick cited in 
Valdes and Foster 2005. 
18 A UNDP study of the Chilean economic and political elite relations document high levels of 
networking among them (PNUD, 2004, Part 5 Chapter 4).  
19 Interview in La Tercera, which produced a strong business and, more over, national discussion.  
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 Fair Trade in Mexico: New opportunities for local and political development. 
 
Carlos Chávez Becker and Alejandro Natal Martínez 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, we intend to analyze the impact of a fair-trade grassroot organization, 
Union de Comunidades Indígenas de la Region del Istmo (UCIRI) in the 
development of the communities where it operates. Cases are drawn from the Sierra 
region and the Tehuantepec Isthmus in Oaxaca, Mexico. 
 
In Mexico, as elsewhere, the consolidation of the globalization process, and very 
specially the regional integration, has revealed that important groups of the 
population are to become excluded from it. Therefore, in the past two decades, fair-
trade (FT) emerged as a socially constructed alternative to market and state failures.  
Since then, public recognition has systematically increased, since more and more 
FT is understood as an economic alternative for non-competitive small poor 
peasants that otherwise would not have any form to participate in the market; but 
also because it is an opportunity for local bottom-up indigenous development, that 
otherwise would be exposed to market fluctuations and trap, without remedy, in 
poverty and marginalization. Moreover, public opinion has welcomed FT, since 
evidence indicates that it is also serving communities by launching empowering 
processes, by rearticulating local social capital; and by forcing public officers in 
charge of local development to interact with grassroots organizations, NGOs and 
activists, and other civil society local groups. All these factors that have definitively 
started to build an alternative development strategy that may better serve the poor 
in a changing international economic and political environment. However, this 
process has not being accompanied by sufficient academic evaluation that could 
help us to better understand and learn the lessons that this movement has for local 
development and for the study of civil society. This paper intends to contribute to 
reduce this gap. To do so, we will here give a brief overview of the FT movement. 
 
We are particularly interested in better understanding the role of grassroots 
organizations in FT dynamics at the local level. We are therefore interested in 
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 questions like, how they integrate themselves and how they gain strength and 
legitimacy at the local level.  
 
To answer these questions, we will dive this paper in three parts. First we will 
briefly state some of the basic premises of FT and see how UCIRI became part of 
this movement. In a second part we will present a general overview of UCIRI, with 
special emphasis in the two main explanations we give to her success, (a) the 
diverse successful projects of development that the organization has launched; and 
(b) a democratic governance structure, here we will present evidence on aspects 
like decision making, representation mechanisms or leaderships. Finally, based on 
the concrete experience of UCIRI, we will brief some conclusions as a departure 
point for a much needed theoretical discussion on community development. 
 
THE FAIR TRADE MOVEMENT AND UCIRI 
 
Since the eighties the Fair Trade movement revealed itself as an innovative 
alternative of income generation for poor, small, rural producers from 
underdeveloped countries. The Fair Trade movement has, as main objective, to 
diminish marginalization and poverty of rural producers from developing countries 
by paying them a fair price for their products, a price that allowed them to cover the 
basic necessities for a worthy life: foods, clothes, health services, education, etc. 
The fundamental premise of this movement is that by diminishing the number of 
intermediaries is possible to make primary producers receive a better price for their 
products, among other things by reducing intermediaries which may capture up to 
80 per cent of product revenues1. Thus, under the motto “Trade not aid”, this 
                                                 
1 Oxfam (2002) made a research on the price structure of a kilo of soluble coffee produced in 
Uganda and sold in the United Kingdom in 2001. This NGO examined each stage between the first 
step of the chain, the rural producer that sells a kilo of coffee (grains without toasting), and the final 
one, the consumer that buys it in a retail store. The study examines the intermediate points of the 
chain, that includes the packer in Uganda’s capital city Kampala, who exports the coffee, the 
importer that deliver it to the toaster and the distributor, that finally sell it to the last consumer. This 
study demonstrated that de biggest part of the price belongs to the transporter and the toaster and the 
final distributor. They retain 80% of the incomes. The chain starts with 14 cents of United States 
Dollars (USD) that receive the primary producer, then the price raises to 45 cents when the coffee is 
delivered in the seaport, then goes to 1.64 USD when arriving at the factory where it is toasted and 
packed (mainly in the Nestle and Kraft plants, holdings that control one half of the global market of 
soluble coffee), and ends in 26.40 USD when the consumer buys it in a supermarket (Oxfam 
2002:24-25). The jump between 1.64 and 26.40 USD happens in the last two steps of the chain, the 
toast process and the commercialization. Although soluble coffee elaboration requires more than a 
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 initiative experimented a huge growth in the last decades involving a number of 
importers, exporters, retail and wholesale distributors, NGO’s, activists, consumers, 
diverse companies, as well as governmental and intergovernmental agencies in  
unique commercial chains. 
 
Year after year, fair trade figures have systematically improved, and at the end of 
2006, for instance, the sales of FT products impressively reached the 1.6 billion of 
Euros. This, must have meant an enhancement in the living conditions of the 632 
primary producer organizations that represents to 1.4 millions of poor peasants and 
their families (FLO 2007: 11).   
 
The impressive growth and the increasing strength of the FT movement has largely 
been possible, because using capitalist market mechanisms, it has been able to 
construct connectivity between poor small producers from developing countries and 
common consumers from developed countries. This it does in two ways, first, it 
builds community action, but one that does not implies a radical transformation of 
the political sphere, which is captured by mechanisms of classical territorial 
representation and the partisan competition; second, it does not have to take the 
State or the reinvent global order, to look for fairer production relations. For these 
reasons, the FT movement has been catalogued as postmarxist, postliberal and 
postrevolutionary (Arditi and Chávez 2006: 77). FT, however is also a post-
capitalist understanding of trade, which by introducing a minor modification of the 
mechanisms of commercial interchange between poor producers in developing 
countries and consumers in developed ones, is actually fundamentally opening up 
the possibilities for a substantially different understanding of capital accumulation.   
 
In this alliance, the role that grassroots peasant organizations have played has been 
crucial, not just because they are integrated by the direct beneficiaries of FT and 
therefore represent the voice and action of those excluded by economic integration 
and development strategies; but also because, almost generally, these grassroots 
organizations have exhibited a proposal capacity that very much have gave the 
                                                                                                                                        
kilo of coffee in grains, we must remember that the peasant in Uganda sold the kilo of green grains 
of coffee in just 14 cents of USD. 
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 movement, a strong bottom-up component. This is the case of a Mexican 
organization UCIRI. 
 
The Union of Comunidades Indígenas de la Región del Itsmo (UCIRI), or Union of 
Indigenous Communities of the Isthmus Region in English, is an indigenous 
organization that has played a very significant role within the Fair Trade 
movement, because it was the first peasant organization located in a developing 
country that exported part of it’s production (of coffee) to markets to developed 
countries. Indeed, this organization was the first in the globe that looked for and 
made reality commercial efforts that allowed them to receive a better pay for their 
products. From this perspective, UCIRI must be seen as one of the pioneer and 
founders organizations of the movement (Aranda and Morales 2002). Furthermore, 
the organization also has played a significant role in the movement direction in the 
last three decades, by becoming an example to follow by the other peasant 
organizations involved in the Fair Trade movement (Simpson and Rapone 2000), 
and consequently becoming a paradigmatic peasant organization since its opinions 
and strategies are very much considered by other producer organizations involved 
with FT. The question is, how a peasant and indigenous organization conformed by 
little primary producers in Mexico could contribute in such significant way that 
now a days has global possibilities?  
 
We believe that the answer to this question may be rooted in how the UCIRI built 
up organizational strength and legitimacy at the local level. We argue that this 
strength and legitimacy are the result of two fundamental elements, internal 
governance mechanisms and effective project management. We thus, in the next 
section, will focus on the internal governance mechanisms of the organization and 
in how its projects have impacted local development.  
 
OVERVIEW AND ANALISYS OF UCIRI 
 
Thus, UCIRI was born as an organization to improve the living conditions of its 
members in a context of persistent fall of the coffee international prices, 
particularly negative to the little producers of development countries, mainly as a 
consequence of the lack of productive technology and machinery. Since it was 
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 born, the organization has observed an intense growth, both in membership as well 
as geographically. Today, UCIRI is an independent peasant organization composed 
by 2,800 little producers (all of them communal owners) from 58 communities 
from 20 different municipalities of the north and center zone of the Tehuantepec 
Isthmus in the Oaxaca State in Mexico; all of them are indigenous of the zapoteca, 
mixe chontal, chatina and mazateca ethnic groups. This reflects a very live and 
active organization that offers attractive incentives to the local producers, mainly a 
systematic raise in the buying price of the products, but also service delivery and a 
well governed organization.  
 
UCIRI success may be, to a large extent the result of a number of converging 
elements, in one hand, the consistency and growing strength of the organization; on 
the other, the net of global allies that it has developed. As discussed before we will 
focus on endogenous factors and especially in two of them we discuss in our next 
section. Hereafter, we will present the core evidence of our argument, that UCIRI 
success is the result of efficient project management, in the form of productive 
projects developed at the local level and that have meant an important mooring for 
the communities; and second that, the internal governance structures of UCIRI have 
helped her to acquire local basis and legitimacy as a solid and democratic 
organization and have projected it as a global organization in a complex movement 
as is the Fair Trade one. 
 
UCIRI Development Projects 
 
Here will make a brief review of UCIRI’s life to almost 25 years from its 
foundation, identifying five phases that allowed us distinguish the creation and 
consolidation of productive projects, local development projects and the growing 
local, regional, national and global links that the organization has built in the frame 
of Fair Trade movement. 
 
The first phase, which we have called of Formation, runs since the summer of 
1981, when it happened the first meetings between missionaries of the Tehuantepec 
Parish and some indigenous coffee producers, and ends until the formal creation of 
UCIRI in 1993. The second one, Growing and Consolidation, starts in this date and 
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 goes until 1988 when it was sold (by the first time) a Fair Trade certified coffee in 
the Dutch market. From this date until 1997, the third phase, Expansion 1. In this 
year was created the Certificadora Mexicana de Productos y Procesos Ecológicos 
(CERTIMEX) and the Fair Trade Labelling Organizations International (FLO). 
From 1997 until 2003, the fourth phase, Expansion 2, in which UCIRI launches a 
deep work of internal reorganization that lasts until today. This fifth phase is the 
Restructuring one and goes from 2003 onwards. 
 
The first years, UCIRI’s formation 
 
According to Mazariegos (2006:255), cultivation of coffee in Oaxaca State started 
from the beginning of the XX century, practically with no technical assistance and a 
low productivity level. Even though the Mexican government made some efforts to 
improve the production conditions of the indigenous coffee producers of the region, 
like the creation of the Instituto Mexicano del Café (INMECAFE) and the Banco 
Nacional de Crédito Rural (BANRURAL) en 19732, their living conditions 
remained highly depressed, putting them below the poverty line and commonly in 
the segment of people in extreme poverty3. 
 
Because of this, in the harvest of 1981-1982, some indigenous peasants of Guevea 
de Humboldt and Santa María Guienagati decided to sell directly a portion of their 
coffee production to the Asociación Rural de Interés Colectivo (ARIC) of Misantla 
Veracruz, with the main objective to avoid making business with the “coyotes”4 of 
the Ixtepec City, to whom they habitually have sold their coffee at ridiculous prices. 
To make the deal, the organized peasants had to rent a truck that took their coffee to 
the Veracruz Dock, what generated additional costs that very much limited the final 
                                                 
2 Both instruments used to “diminish or mitigate the problem of cacicazgo in the region (Mazariegos 
2006: 256).  
3 We don’t have accurate data that directly allowed us to confirm this. According to UNDP (2004), 
the per capita average of the township where UCIRI has presence barely exceeded 33 pesos per day 
in 2004. However, this is just an average, because if we consider the inequality, marginality and 
poverty historical conditions of indigenous groups in Mexico, we suspect that the indigenous coffee 
producers of the region hardly could reach that amount of money in the daily income. In this respect, 
García (2007: 20) points out that some estimations suggests that the “non-organized indigenous in 
the Sierra has to maintain their families with just 6 pesos per day”. 
4 The Misantla ARIC (that belongs to the Confederación Nacional Campesina –CNC–), has an 
exportation license, which made easier to Oaxacan coffee producers the exportation of a part of their 
production. 
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 revenue. Even so, the difference between the price that pay to them the ARIC (95 
USD cents per pound) and the money that they would received from the profiteers 
in Oaxaca (25 cents of dollar per pound) was very high. This situation generated a 
great expectative among them and among other coffee producers from adjoining 
communities. Thus, at the end of 1982, seven communities of the region were 
already included in the collective search for better prices for their coffee. These 
peasants, in 1983 decided to create the Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la 
Región del Istmo (UCIRI), that was formally registered in the Secretaría de la 
Reforma Agraria form the Federal Government in the same year. In the constituent 
assembly participated primary peasants form 17 communities of the Tehuantepec 
Isthmus region. 
 
Growing and Consolidation phase 
 
Once it was created, the organization quickly gained presence in the region and 
looked for diverse alternatives to improve its member’s coffee sales, which by the 
way, constantly grew in number those days. In 1984, throughout the collective 
work (called tequio) UCIRI started the construction of its own infrastructure, which 
could let them to depend in minor scale to the “coyotes” and local profiteers. Thus, 
they built the first coffee warehouse and were installed the Beneficio Seco5. In the 
same year, it started the first efforts to turn to organic production; process in which 
the visit of the members of the German Alternative Trade Organization (OCA) 
Gesellshaft und Partnershaft (GEPA) and the representative of the Simon Levelt 
firm (Hans Levelt owner of the familiar company) was determinant. Indeed, 
interested in the organic, agricultural production6, they were accompanied by a 
German agronomist, who discovered, after some inspections, that UCIRI coffee 
production was organic by “negligence” (VanderHoff 2002: 5). To continue with 
this process and with the objective to better understand the organic production, a 
representative group of UCIRI went to the Finca Irlanda, in Chiapas State of 
Mexico on June of 1984. In that place they obtained the necessary knowledge to 
                                                 
5 This is the process that allowed them to make an important part of the coffee processing that, until 
those days, was made by “coyotes”, which remained the biggest part of the revenues. 
6 The advantage of organic production is that, for some years ago, is paid a better price for products 
free of transgenic, herbicides, fungicides, pesticides, fertilizers and other agrochemicals that 
presumably could put in risk consumer’s health in the long term. 
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 adjust their production to the international standards of the organic certification 
agencies in developed countries. The first organic certification to UCIRI was made 
in 1986; in that process participated Naturland7, a German certification agency that 
inspected, verified and certified UCIRI to export their products to the European 
Union an the US (VanderHoff 2002: 5). 
 
One of the events that gave a great impulse to UCIRI in their search to look for the 
amplification of the “alternative” market was when in 1985; the organization 
obtained the import-export license. Some authors (VanderHoff 2002, García 2007, 
Jurado et al. 2007, among others), stress the importance of this event, because it 
opened up the opportunity to interconnect with a great number of organizations that 
in those times were starting to open possibilities for alternatives markets in the 
developed countries. In this aspect it is important to say that this process was really 
tortuous and very complex because the exportation chance to peasant groups in 
Mexico was, in fact, an expression of the authoritarian rule.  
 
Once they obtained the exportation license and the organic certification, UCIRI 
started to sell coffee (processed and packed) directly to Simon Levelt (in Holland) 
and GEPA (in Germany) firms in the harvest of 1986-1987. Thus, with the 
remnants of the first Fair Trade sales UCIRI could launch some local development 
projects like The Centro de Educación Campesina (CEC), a transportation 
cooperative (UPZIMI) and a community health initiative. It is worth to mention that 
the organization received serious aggressions from the “coyotes”, which saw how 
diminished their business (VanderHoff and Roozen 2002). In this point Mazariegos 
(2006) explains that, 
 
“… UCIRI, as a small coffee producer’s organization, generated big 
changes in the region. These changes were not seen very well by the 
“coyotes”. The transportation cooperative was the point that generated 
more anger from them, because they controlled the transportation 
business in the region long time ago. UCIRI members were victims of 
several violent acts, including the death of some leaders between 1985 
                                                 
7 Naturland it is accredited by US and EU authorities as well as the IFOAM (International 
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements). 
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 and 1992. In total 37 UCIRI members died in that period…” (2006: 
259) 
 
The year of 1987 is particularly important in the global Fair Trade movement 
development. It was in that year when conversations between UCIRI and 
Solidaridad started to explore possibilities to extend the Fair Trade market. In order 
to expand that project some Mexican peasants went to Holland to create the first 
seal of Fair Trade, the label Max Havelaar (VanderHoff and Roozen 2002). For 
Arditi and Chávez (2006: 58) the importance of this agreement is that it is “the first 
organic relationship between a a peasant organization in a developing country 
(Mexico) and an activist group in a developed one (Holland) in order to establish a 
new commercial mechanism, essentially firer”. Furthermore, it is the first 
relationship that established a Fair Trade certification mechanism in the world. 
Once it was signed the commercialization agreement, they started to sell Fair Trade 
certified coffee in Holland from UCIRI’s members. Since that moment, this 
organization has accompanied and has been part of the explosion that has 
experienced the Fair Trade initiative in the world. 
 
In this point it is important to say that the creation of certification mechanisms 
opened a new and innovative door for Fair Trade. However, the scheme of direct 
work between OCA’s and primary producers organizations was not abandoned 
when Fair Trade labels were created and with the further formation of FLO. Direct 
relationships between peasant’s organizations and shared in common enterprises in 
developed countries (in the UCIRI-GEPA kind) still operates, at the same time that 
operates the labeling system and the Fair Trade national seals. In few words, 
following VanderHoff (2002), we must say that since the end of the eighties, the 
“new” scenery of Fair Trade was divided in the market that OCA’s opened and the 
market opened by FLO. 
 
The first expansion 
 
After the creation of the first Fair Trade certification label UCIRI lived a big 
expansion, in part because of the new commercial chances that were opened in the 
alternative market opened by the Max Havelaar label. Since this moment, UCIRI 
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 looked for to grow internally and externally. To do this, it became an organic 
productive organization, after negotiations with international certify agencies in 
which several NGO’s support were determinant. The important point in this case 
were it is not just the fact that as an organization guaranteed an organic production 
but it was the first peasant organization that gained the status of organic production 
organization8. This certification allowed them to increase the coffee offer and 
ensured growing revenues that were traduced in more resources to its members and 
to the investment in local, community development projects. 
 
With growing revenues and the solid production organization, some companies 
accepted to pay in advance because of the trust that UCIRI have gained. In previous 
year none bank or enterprise would give credit to UCIRI, but, in the nineties, after 
more that ten years operating, the things have changed. Thus, UCIRI would 
impulse another expansion of their commercial horizons: to diversify their crop 
buyers. In order to do that, they signed agreements with Equal Exchange and they 
started to sell coffee in the United States in 1990. 
 
During the 1988-1997 period, which we have called the first expansion, UCIRI 
supported, organized or impelled the creation of several Fair Trade and primary 
producers organizations or related with aspects like certification or production 
improvement in the local or in the global arena. In the first case, in 1989 with other 
organizations created the Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras 
(CNOC)9 and the Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de Café de Oaxaca10. In 
1993, participated in the formation of the Asociación Mexicana de Inspectores 
Orgánicos, of which immediately became a member: This organization has the 
objective to make easier the organic certification process. One year later, in 1994, 
participated in the creation of ECOMEX, organization related with the ecological 
certification. Finally, in 1997, was a member of the group of organizations that 
conformed the Certificadora Mexicana de Productos y Procesos Ecológicos 
(CERTIMEX) that was temporally under IMO Control (from Swiss) and KRAV (a 
                                                 
8 Again, UCIRI (now in the organic issue) innovated and gained space that afterward other 
organizations would exploit. In this case, until UCIRI’s organi certification, certifications were 
made by single producers and not by organizations. 
9 An umbrella organization that have more than 80,000 members independently organized. 
10 Both organizations were created in the context of a dramatic fallen of the coffee prices in those 
years. 
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 Swedish enterprise), that finally, became autonomous some years later. In the 
international level, in 1990 UCIRI became a member of International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), became a member too of the Directive 
Council of Max Havelaar seal (from 1989 to 1992) and in 1997 played a significant 
role in the creation of FLO. 
 
In the local sphere, UCIRI continued the expansion, construction or creation of 
communitarian services in benefit not just of its members but in benefit of the 
whole communities. Thus, in 1989 it was launched, the radio communication 
services to improve communications among communities with UCIRI membership, 
a hardware store were installed and the savings fund was created. In 1994, was 
finalized the construction of the Health Clinic in Lachivizá and in 1996 it were 
started some projects to reduce gender inequality. 
Finally, in this period of growth and expansion, the organization started to support 
and to advise to other little primary producers in Mexico, particularly independent 
organizations of coffee producers. This was the case of technical support in 
exportation and organic production that UCIRI gave to the Unión Majomut en 
1996. 
 
The second Expansion 
 
The reason because we have decided to make a division between phases Expansion 
I and Expasion II is because the growth that UCIRI had after 1997 changed of 
orientation, in great part because the action of a new and important actor in the Fair 
Trade Movement: FLO. 
 
Indeed, FLO creation, it seems that divided the Fair Trade movement between two 
sales schemes or systems that we have commented before. The important thing is 
that in the “second” UCIRI’s expansion, the organization were focused to grow in 
the market opened by FLO; which is explained by the high expectations that this 
organization raised in the developing countries and in the peasant organizations11. 
                                                 
11 In FLO creation, UCIRI played a very important role. As we have said before, is thinkable that 
this organization became the representative of peasant organizations in the world of Fair Trade. In 
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 Thus, during 1998 UCIRI concentrated an important part of its efforts to strengthen 
local projects launched in the previous phase, but fundamentally to contribute to the 
consolidation of FLO’s global system. To do this, the organizations participated in 
the design of the peasant certification mechanisms, collaborated in creation of the 
importers standards (enterprises disposed to sell Fair Trade products), contributed 
in the standardization of national labels and supported the efforts that concluded in 
the homogenization of the Fair Trade price. 
 
Another way in which the organization contributed in the FLO’s system 
consolidation, expansion and strengthens it was its decided support to the creation 
of the Mexican certification label Comercio Justo México, which was finished in 
2001. UCIRI’s participation in this process was really important, since because of 
its huge experience of working with other national labels, it could bring relevant 
information about their operation, management, alliance building, and other 
important issues. The creation of Comercio Justo México has, in this sense, a huge 
analytical relevance, because in part thanks to UCIRI support, Mexico was the first 
country in which both Fair Trade faces were expressed: the North version, 
conformed by groups of shared in common activists and responsible consumers of 
developed countries and South version, composed by little and poor primary 
producers. 
 
We must clarify that the new UCIRI’s growth line, inaugurated by FLO creation, 
didn’t mean that the expansion line described in the previous section, had been 
abandoned. The ascendant line of local growth, in terms of affiliation and projects 
continued in this phase. In 2000, it was created the cloth manufacture plant. A year 
later, a local development Trusteeship was formed in collaboration with Federal 
Government to promote agro business. In 2002 was integrated the mixe zone 
organization which needed the installation of the basic infrastructure to process the 
coffee in a decentralized regional organization. In terms of agreements with other 
organizations and Fair Trade expansion in the national level, UCIRI played a 
central role in the creation of Agromercados in 2000. This joint-stock company was 
formed to as a social commercial enterprise, in which no just coffee is traded but 
                                                                                                                                        
fact, UCIRI was one of the firsts to propose the necessity of the labels unification, because of the 
hard and tortuous process that have resulted to make for each country a process of certification. 
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 other products like beans, bananas, maguey, etc. too. Indigenous organizations like 
CEPCO, Unión Majomut and others, participated in the creation of this enterprise 
to promote Fair Trade and organic products commercialization. In the same way, 
UCIRI took the iniciative to launch the Consejo Mexicano de Cafeticultura 
Sustentable, which is the last of the versions of Fair Trade in Mexico. 
 
Nonetheless, although in this phase we could find important evidences of UCIRI’s 
expansion in terms of global, national and local capacities and possibilities, it 
started to surge some symptoms of discomfort that reflected the necessity of some 
changes in the organization. It is very likely that one of the explanatory sources of 
this uneasiness it was produced by the fallen of the high expectations put it in FLO 
and the polemic policies this organization has followed since its creation: The low 
participation of producer organizations in FLO governance, the erratic and 
sometimes unclear producer organizations certification process, the indiscriminate 
opening to new Fair Trade Markets12, and the “slow” results of the organization, as 
well as the attempts to diminish the minimum coffee Fair Trade price in order to 
sell higher volumes caused the necessity to rethink the current course of the 
organization. 
 
Restructuring phase 
 
Indeed, when UCIRI members realized the huge dependency to FLO policies and 
its low results, they launched an organizational restructuring process that have last 
to these days. When FLO begun some thought that the benefits that Fair Trade 
generate would grow quickly and automatically. Nonetheless, although it is 
impossible to say that they didn’t happened, they were not big enough to mean a 
radical transformation of living conditions of coffee producers. For that reason, and 
this is an opinion that share a big part of UCIRI’s members, Fair Trade is actually a 
promising project in the horizon and not a complete reality now a days. This is not 
the pertinent space to discuss that, the important point is to stress that probably this 
discomfort and uneasiness with Fair Trade global movement, and in particular with 
FLO, has produced new development strategies and growth in UCIRI. 
                                                 
12 Like the certification given to Starbuck’s, MacDonald’s, among others. 
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One of these strategies could open a new stream in the global movement of Fair 
Trade. We are talking the direct agreement between the organization and the French 
Toaster Malongo and the commercial chain Carrefour to sell a significant part of 
UCIRI’s production without FLO intervention nor the any national label nor any 
OCA. This decision, taken by UCIRI’s members in 2004, was taken in a moment in 
which FLO Board of Directors was discussing the possibility to diminish the 
minimum Fair Trade price (120 USD by hundredweight, which is around 220 
pounds or 100 kilograms) with the objective to extend the clients base in the global 
level13. Once this decision was taken UCIRI showed that it is possible to expand the 
market without pushing down the minimum Fair Trade Price, but demonstrated that 
FLO, in some moments, it is an autocratic structure. 
 
On the other side, at the local level, there were also some important changes that 
denote a new strategy. In 2003, was created the Agencia de Desarrollo Local in 
order to diversify UCIRI projects and to implement technical assistance plans in the 
communities where has presence. At the next year, it was purposed, to the 
Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (CONAMP), the coordinated 
certification and defense of natural areas in Mexico. In this period, also some 
projects are closed because financial problems, like the hardware store in Ixtepec 
City, and the Health Center while others suffer major transformations: in particular 
the CEC and the transportation projects. 
 
However, even though the problems and the restructuring process, the organization 
has growth constantly its membership and it keeps being a central referent in the 
life of thousands of producers and their families in the Tehuantepec Isthmus. 
 
UCIRI Governance Structures 
 
In organizational words, probably UCIRI’s most important characteristic is that it is 
not only peasant organization, but a mechanism of community integration. Thus, it 
                                                 
13 This debate is part of a bigger discussion in which, in one side, there is apposition that holds that 
is necessary to expand the marker for Fair Trade products, even though this signify diminishing its 
amount. While the other position says that the current price is the minimum acceptable and is unfair.  
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 can be seen as a second floor organization because it interconnects communitarian 
representations and individual peasants from distinct communities. UCIRI could be 
defined as a postcorporative organization because it was born out of the control 
networks created by the ancient regime in Mexico to co-opt and to handcuff any 
kind of independent associative effort. In this sense, it’s important to say that 
become a member of the organization it is a personal decision that implies the 
recognition of rules and rights to participate in equal conditions. 
 
UCIRI, first normative principle, is that it is open to everyone. It does not exclude 
members because of religious preferences, partisan or ethnic differences and does 
not use collective affiliation mechanisms to serve political parties or the existing 
corporative peasant confederations (VanderHoff 2002, UCIRI 2007).  
 
UCIRI presents a democratic scheme of internal governance with pluralistic 
characteristics that in its more than 25 years of life, has demonstrated to be 
functional and operative. To present and to discuss UCIRI’s internal governace we 
propose four dimensions: 
 
1. Representation: 
UCIRI is governed by community representatives that get together in the main, 
deliberation and decision making body, the delegate’s assembly. This type of 
internal governance results very novel since representation is conceived as a 
communitarian affair rather than an individual one (Almanza 2005). The 
delegates take decisions “about the course of the organization” (Jurado 2005). 
The Assembly largely delegates responsibilities and tasks to community 
representatives, what has given the organization both, (a) an adequate and 
inclusive mechanism of involvement that makes easier operation, 
communication and interaction among its members; and (b) much legitimacy 
vis-à-vis its members and the communities served. Its regulations force UCIRI 
to be open to any primary producer that wishes to join to the organization, with 
one single exception, “little and big profiteers” which can only become 
members when they “make public their wish to stop taking advantage of the 
other producer’s work” (UCIRI, undated). A fundamental point in the UCIRI 
governance bodies is that, all the representation positions both at the general 
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 Assembly or at the community level, are decided by direct election with people 
from the communities (Jurado 2005, Mazariegos 2006). Indeed, in the local and 
general assemblies, members are proposed to integrate the Board of Directors, 
Monitoring Council, and the community’s representations. Another 
fundamental element in the representation issue is the constant rotation of the 
members of the Boar of Director or Monitoring Council, practice which results 
very contrasting with the previous corporativist organizations in Mexico 
(VanderHoff 2002). Thus, members of Management Council or delegates of the 
Monitoring Council, lasts three years in their position, while the members of the 
local Directors (from the directive assemblies that are created in each 
community) and the Monitoring Council lasts one or two years. In all the 
direction levels, reelection is strictly prohibite. In this manner, UCIRI practices 
democracy as an empty space (Lefort 1990). Finally we have to say at this point 
that while the community delegates, voice the problems and proposals of their 
communities, in the same manner, they communicate back the decisions that are 
taken in the general assembly, by so doing they strengthen the informational 
flow.  
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 
 
Organizative 
framework 
Operative 
framework 
Administration 
Council 
Monitoring Council 
Assembly of delegates 
Communities (legal partners) 
General Projects: Transportation 
(UPZIMI), Capacity Building 
Center, Financial Institution 
(Esperanza Indígena Zapoteca) 
Equipo Técnico: Organic 
production promotors, internal 
inspectors, internal control 
systems. 
 
Projects: Education, Health, Women, 
Toasting, etc.  
Comercialization department: 
Nacional and International 
 
Advisers 
Founder Members 
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 Source: Own elaboration with information from Jurado (2005), Mazariegos (2006) 
y UCIRI (2007). 
 
2. Decision making process:  
A fundamental aspect in the decision making process is that any decision about 
organizational matters is adopted by voting, so the construction of consensus is 
a daily task. The deliberation and, to less extent, the negotiation and the 
bargaining, are fundamental political practices of a complex organization as 
UCIRI is, integrated by several partners, scattered in far communities with 
severe limitations of transportation (VenderHoff 2005a y VanderHoff 2005b). 
Considering that consensus needs both, an adequate and complete flow of 
information and a process of deliberation, UCIRI is well organized to realize 
both. Aside the information that community representatives bring back to their 
communities, Bulletin PASOS is one of other mechanisms through which the 
organization communicates with memebers. In this bulletin it is compiled the 
information generated in the Delegates Assembly, which is discussed in each 
communitarian assembly (García, 2007). In the same way, the delegates have 
the “Informative Bulletin”, that “compile the discussed information and the 
agreements reached in the Genera Assembly; each member has a copy of this 
bulletin” (Mazariegos, 2006: 262). Other important aspect is membership 
participation. UCIRI´s members are obliged to participate in different meetings 
and assemblies, to avoid sanctions. 
 
 Another issue to consider is the role of the advisors. These members are 
present in all the decision making process, in all the phases, both in the 
organizational structure and the operative one. In governance structures, they 
are members with voice but not vote. They have the mission to contribute to 
enrich the discussion by presenting “complete maps” of the different subjects to 
be treated in the assemblies.  
 
3. Political Leadership:  
One would think that in an indigenous organization, traditional forms 
leaderships would be very significant. In UCIRI, these kinds of leadership do 
exist and are not ignored, however, the organization´s leadership has become 
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 very variable and it is in constant movement. The reasons are UCIRI´s, non-
reelection of directive positions, its pluralist and participatory governance 
structure and indeed, leadership generational renewal, what has given the 
organization a constant renovation of directive positions. Another factor 
contributing to make leadership more “horizontal”, is that it is nourished with 
less formal, but no less important, leaderships that help the organization´s 
information flow and deliberation process. The parallel leadership of advisors 
and founder members plays a significant part in the decision making process as 
well recognized sources of information. Their instrumental rationality, 
strengthens the debate, propose likely and desirable scenarios and organize and 
systematize the information in order to contribute to enhance and improve the 
decision making process. All these factors impact the organization in two 
manners, first, all new directives have to learn quickly how the organization 
must be guided, which means that those interested have to previously dedicate 
some time to understand the complex procedures and formal processes of 
UCIRI´s direction14; on the other hand, there is a constantly growing of 
qualified and knowledgeable members that can more effectively discuss 
decisions, as well as bring leaders accountable. These are highly valuable assets 
for the organization.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the previous paragraphs we have intended to show, that UCIRI, as a part of the 
Fair Trade movement, has open up an ample vision on the role that a community-
based grassroots organization can play in a global effort. Our departure point was to 
review UCIRI’s successful role, asking ourselves, how a small peasant indigenous 
organization could contribute in such significant way that now a days has global 
possibilities? We intended to answer this question by highlighting two central 
aspects that have strengthen the organization, effective project management and 
internal legitimacy based in democratic and pluralistic internal governance bodies.  
We highlighted here how UCIRI promoted interesting efforts of local development 
in the communities it served and how it successfully dealt with vested interests. We 
                                                 
14 In this case the role of advisors and founder member is crucial to save time. 
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 also stressed how the organization gained legitimacy by introducing much needed 
services and minor development projects. We argued that this gave the organization 
solidity vis-à-vis its membership as well as cohesion and strength vis-à-vis 
counteracting interests. We also argued in this paper that the internal governance 
mechanisms and the horizontality of decision making, representation and leadership 
locks were assets that gave much of its legitimacy to the organization. All these 
factors allowed the organization to participate actively in the global and complex 
movement of Fair trade. 
 
Of course exogenous factors are also to be taken into account. Therefore, issues like 
the political opportunity open up by international actors, as the lack of other 
economic opportunity for members, i.e., a minimal opportunity cost, made exit 
costly, since to leave the organization reduced the opportunities “that in the future 
something better could happen”15. In this scenario, members founded powerful 
incentives to look for mechanisms to organize collective action and exert their 
Voice. 
 
The UCIRI case teaches that existing local social capital can be rearticulated to 
serve communities. It also showed that social entrepreneurship can become local 
activism towards the construction of a more solidarian economy. This case also 
shows that rural peasants can be the main actors of a process of planning of their 
own development. In other words it exemplified that bottom up development can be 
achieved when attention is given to grassroots organizations.  
 
The UCIRI case show also that there is much room to improve national 
development strategies in Mexico and Latin America, in order to attend for those 
excluded of the economic integration process. It is an example that, we do not 
necessarily have to wait for the trickle down to flow downwards but, parallelly, can 
initiate a bottom up process to achieve social inclusion and poverty reduction. Our 
case indicates that technology transfer (even if small, like in the UCIRI case) can 
boost development. 
 
                                                 
15 In this situation play a particular role the Fair Trade alternative that UCIRI’s members enjoys. 
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 The UCIRI case also teaches that fair-trade as a development policy may also give 
peasants a different insight into land value and property rights, since FT show them 
that there is a clear relation between land and income improvement. This can very 
much reduce migration and foster the emergence of local economies of scale. 
 
Finally, the UCIRI case should also make us reflect on the current orthodox 
conceptualization of development, and on the purpose of international development 
aid, while continue dreaming on promising horizons of participation and insertion 
of the rural poor in alternative market mechanisms and social redistribution 
schemes. Lets maintain this hope and actively work to achieve the utopia. 
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RESUMEN  
Las políticas que han orientado la formación de regiones en la economía mundial en las últimas 
décadas, tienen su origen en el orden internacional que emerge de la conferencia de Bretton Woods. 
En los países centrales (Europa) y América Latina, aunque por diferentes razones, se impulsaron 
políticas específicas de cooperación regionales. Una renovada intensificación de los procesos de 
integración tiene lugar desde mediados de la década de los 80s. Los nuevos regionalismos implican 
cambios cuantitativos y cualitativos con respecto a etapas anteriores, aunque no suponen nuevas 
estrategias de desarrollo. Argumentamos que en la fase contemporánea de las relaciones 
internacionales, los espacios integrados no pueden aislarse del estudio del orden mundial ni del 
fenómeno de la globalización.  
 
ABSTRACT  
The policies that have driven the formation of regions in the world economy during the last decades, 
have their origin in the international order that emerged from Bretton Woods conference. The central 
(Europe) and Latin American countries, although for different reasons, have promoted policies of 
regional cooperation. A renewed intensification of the integration processes has taken place from the 
mid 80s of the XX century. The new regionalisms imply both qualitative and quantitative changes with 
respect to the previous periods, though they not entail new development strategies. We defend that, in 
the current phase of the international systems, the already integrated spaces should neither isolate 
themselves from the consideration of the world order, nor ignore the globalisation phenomena. 
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  INTRODUCCION 
En este documento analizamos la formación de acuerdos regionales de comercio, 
surgidos en el contexto del orden económico de la segunda mitad del siglo XX, con 
proyección a los inicios del siglo XXI. Partimos del supuesto de que sólo es posible 
comprender los cambios que han tenido lugar en el sistema internacional -su forma actual, 
sus contradicciones, sus tendencias y conflictos- si se los analiza desde un punto de vista 
histórico (Krippendorff, 1985; Bernal-Meza, 2000). Este enfoque se sustenta en el principio 
de que el conocimiento del pasado puede ofrecernos indicios, también regularidades, sobre 
posibilidades futuras. En particular, nos facilita la realización de estudios prospectivos sobre 
la evolución de los escenarios regionales e internacionales.  
1. INTEGRACION REGIONAL EN LA ECONOMIA MUNDIAL  
El sistema internacional contemporáneo ha sufrido enormes transformaciones en las 
últimas décadas. Entre ellas, podemos identificar cuatro principales: a) la caída del bloque 
comunista de economías de planificación centralizada y el desmembramiento de la Unión 
Soviética, junto a la transición de estos países  hacia una economía de mercado; b) la 
unificación de la economía mundial mediante un proceso multidimensional y complejo de 
globalización/mundialización, en un escenario internacional de fuertes asimetrías2 en donde 
conviven fuerzas centrífugas de dispersión, fragmentación y crisis, con centrípetas de 
entrelazamiento e interdependencia; c) la vigencia de un paradigma socio-tecnológico que 
incluye nuevos modelos de producción científico-tecnológicos, localizados en sistemas de 
innovación territoriales de alta especialización para la generación de tecnologías digitales, 
infraestructuras y redes de acceso universal, todo lo cual está generando un nuevo tipo de 
organización que denominamos sociedad de la información d) una renovada tendencia a la 
formación de espacios regionales de comercio e inversiones, con agendas de discusión 
inéditas por la variedad de temas y el alcance de las negociaciones, en una dinámica de 
regionalización del sistema internacional.     
Nuestro punto de partida es que en esta etapa de la coyuntura mundial, no se 
pueden separar los macroprocesos anteriormente enumerados, en particular el de los 
cambios en la política internacional -del paradigma Este-Oeste al escenario de la postguerra 
fría- y el de la evolución de la economía -desde la conferencia fundacional de Bretton Woods 
en 1944 que impulsó la institucionalización del orden económico internacional y legitimó la 
hegemonía norteamericana- hacia un capitalismo global.  
                                                   
2 Las principales asimetrías se refieren a la altísima concentración del progreso técnico en los países 
desarrollados y, en particular, a la ampliación de la brecha digital; la mayor vulnerabilidad 
macroeconómica de los países en desarrollo ante los shocks externos; y la asociada al contraste 
entre la movilidad de los capitales y la restricción al desplazamiento internacional de la mano de obra. 
Cf. CEPAL, 2002; Raúl BERNAL-MEZA y Gustavo MASERA, 2007.  
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 El hecho que los aspectos tradicionalmente denominados como de “baja política”, 
como son aquellos vinculados a la economía, el comercio, las finanzas y la tecnología –e 
incluso otros, como los que se relacionan con los derechos sociales y la gobernanza (porque 
ahora se mira más al interior de los Estados) hayan desplazado en buena medida las 
prioridades que antes se asignaban a la seguridad y los aspectos diplomático-políticos y 
militar-estratégicos, considerados como de “alta política”, ha implicado el surgimiento de 
nuevas prioridades, una de las cuales es la primacía de las negociaciones económicas 
internacionales y, por tanto, el desarrollo de la diplomacia económica (Bayne & Woolcook, 
2003).  
Argumentamos que el destino que adoptan las corrientes financieras, las estrategias 
de localización de las grandes firmas internacionales, el desarrollo desigual que comportan 
las lógicas asociadas a la creación de economías de aglomeración -gracias a la 
acumulación de  factores que posibilitan que una región se transforme en un polo de 
crecimiento con industrias motrices- (Krugman y Obstfeld, 1999), y la direccionalidad de 
los movimientos en las transacciones de comercio, dan lugar a importantes cambios 
estructurales en las relaciones internacionales.  
En particular, constatamos que la economía mundial se está polarizando en un 
regionalismo continental con tres núcleos regionales principales. En estas áreas económicas 
se ven reforzados los vínculos más estrechos entre Estados que comparten un ámbito 
geográfico, histórico, cultural y económico, y que estarían centrados en torno de las 
economías más dinámicas (dados los niveles de flujos de inversión y corrientes de comercio 
recíprocos) y sus respectivos mercados. Los polos de integración de la tríada mundial, 
serían Norteamérica, con el liderazgo de los Estados Unidos, Europa occidental y central, 
con la centralidad de la Unión Europea, y la zona económica Asia-Pacífico, con el 
predominio de Japón y China (Bernal-Meza, 1994b; 2000; Bernal-Meza y Masera, 2005). 
Al observar estos cambios debemos realizar una primera diferenciación analítica. Si 
la regionalización es el proceso mediante el cual se conforman áreas regionales de 
comercio en la economía mundial, el regionalismo es tanto el sistema de ideas que actúa 
como teoría de la diversificación de los espacios de integración en el escenario 
internacional, como el criterio normativo que permite la formulación de políticas orientadas a 
la construcción de esquemas institucionales regionales.  
En la economía mundial, la evidencia muestra que la regionalización promueve 
fuerzas que tienden a integrar en un mismo espacio regional a países geográficamente 
próximos y económicamente complementarios, por lo menos en lo que respecta a la 
acumulación de recursos y en el aumento de las dimensiones del mercado. Pero, si las 
fuerzas de la integración regional son consideradas centrípetas o centrífugas, depende del 
enfoque teórico utilizado y de la carga valorativa previa que adopta el analista. Porque, 
aunque el instrumental nos demuestre que existe una mayor creación de comercio en un 
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 área regional determinada, el esfuerzo de regionalización puede estar sesgado hacia el 
aumento de la polarización global y el desarrollo desigual de las regiones en el mundo o 
hacia procesos de “armonización imperial”. Por esta razón consideramos que una correcta 
comprensión del significado de los espacios de integración, obliga, previamente, a vincular 
éstos con la reflexión sobre el orden mundial. 
2. REGIONALISMO Y ORDEN MUNDIAL.  
El orden mundial es un conjunto de normas e instituciones que reflejan una 
determinada hegemonía de una estructura histórica particular. Además, representa un cierto 
consenso sobre la aceptación de determinadas prácticas y reglas, fuera de las cuales los 
Estados no podrían existir.   
Debemos tener en cuenta que el hecho de que existan al interior del sistema-mundo 
distintas unidades políticas -los Estados-nación, que son el aspecto político de la forma de 
acumulación dominante llamada capitalismo- se explica por la naturaleza misma del sistema 
mundial: una organización también estatal, pero cuyo vínculo clave es económico y no 
político. Sin embargo, el proceso de mundialización actual tiene componentes 
esencialmente distintos (en términos de actores), pero no por ello diferentes en la lógica que 
fundamenta su gestión: la acumulación permanente; así como los recursos a la ideología, 
como instrumentos para impulsar el mismo (Wallerstein, 1985). 
Otra manera de pensar el asunto parte de la perspectiva que considera a los órdenes 
mundiales como estructuras históricas, en las que interactúan tres categorías de fuerzas: 
atributos materiales de poder, ideas (intereses e ideologías) e instituciones (Cox, 1986). 
Simplificadamente, si aplicamos la perspectiva de Cox a las condiciones del sistema 
internacional contemporáneo podemos decir que: a) los atributos de poder, en tanto 
capacidades para determinar el curso de los procesos políticos y económicos mundiales, 
estarían representados, por ejemplo, por la relación estratégica Estados Unidos de América 
con la Organización para el Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN); b) las ideas, en cuanto 
esquemas conceptuales, modelos e ideologías, por ejemplo, la sociedad de la información 
(esto es,  el nuevo paradigma socio-tecnológico y la nueva forma de organización social 
caracterizada por el predominio de los sectores info-comunicacionales)3; c) las instituciones, 
representadas por 1.) Los organismos, organizaciones, agencias especializadas o 
regímenes (en lo que se refiere a organismos internacionales de carácter 
intergubernamental o multilateral, el G-8, Banco Mundial, Fondo Monetario Internacional, o 
la Organización Mundial de Comercio); o 2.) Los acuerdos regionales de comercio y bloques 
                                                   
3 Los principios rectores que dirigen la construcción de la sociedad de la información son auspiciados, por 
ejemplo, por las Naciones Unidas, junto a la labor de agencias especializadas y organizaciones 
internacionales como la Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones, la UNESCO, y la Alianza Global para 
el Desarrollo de la Información. 
102
 regionales internacionales con estilos de integración institucionalizados en mayor o menor 
grado.  
En última instancia, el regionalismo está inevitablemente vinculado al ámbito 
multilateral y al orden mundial, porque todo proceso particular de regionalización genera 
repercusiones sistémicas por los alineamientos estratégicos que producen los países que 
construyen la región y  que modifican la situación relativa de éstos en la economía mundial 
y, porque conllevan estrategias de alianzas que inciden y/o determinan el curso de 
negociaciones multilaterales como, por ejemplo, lo han sido -en la historia contemporánea- 
los debates sobre la cooperación y el desarrollo; las negociaciones por el nuevo orden 
económico mundial y la reformulación del GATT con su posterior transformación en la 
Organización Mundial de Comercio (OMC). 
3. CONSTRUCCION REGIONAL E INTEGRACION 
Los países se plantean la posibilidad de participar en un proceso de integración 
regional porque prevén que con esta agrupación pueden obtener mayores beneficios 
políticos y económicos que si continúan aislados. En este sentido, la percepción de que en 
un mundo globalizado, las economías pueden ser más competitivas, con mayor poder de 
negociación y de inserción internacional si cooperan con otras, se relaciona con el aumento 
de la conciencia regional (Hurrell, 1994)  
La  construcción de una región descansa en elementos comunes básicos, que 
facilitan la tarea de la integración: a) la proximidad: a pesar de que las regiones son, a priori, 
comunidades más imaginadas que reales (Smouts, 1997), es evidente que las mismas 
tienden a conformarse en aquellos ámbitos territoriales en donde existen factores comunes 
previos, ya sean éstos históricos, culturales, o geográficos. Es por ello que no sería erróneo 
hablar de regiones naturales con una identidad propia, y con un peso tal como para ser 
reconocidas como actores unitarios en el escenario internacional; b) valores fundamentales 
compartidos: como por ejemplo, la promoción de un sistema político, la búsqueda del 
desarrollo socioeconómico regional; la industrialización; el crecimiento económico 
redistributivo y, en términos del más reciente paradigma de la Comisión Económica para 
América Latina y Caribe de Naciones Unidas (CEPAL), la transformación productiva regional 
con equidad; c) estrategias de gobernanza común: amplios y complejos vínculos de 
participación, tanto de actores públicos como privados, en términos de acciones socio-
políticas conjuntas, integrando programas y decisiones de gobierno junto a una adecuada 
participación de las comunidades (sociales, étnicas, políticas) y de los agentes 
socioeconómicos en una orientación abajo-arriba (bottom-up) y no sólo arriba-abajo (top 
down). Estas prácticas le confieren legitimidad y credibilidad al proceso de integración y 
cooperación regional, puesto que permiten evitar conflictos de intereses, al pensar no sólo 
en lo inmediato (en la medida que decisiones de tal tipo conllevan predisposiciones a optar 
por uno u otro camino; cada uno de ellos vinculado a sectores que en lo inmediato reciben 
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 beneficios, versus otros que son postergados en el tiempo), sino en el interés del conjunto a 
largo plazo, en el marco de una estrategia coherente y adecuada entre los múltiples factores 
políticos, económicos y culturales involucrados.  
En su proceso de acercamiento entre sí estos países pueden implementar 
mecanismos para cooperar y compartir responsabilidades con la finalidad última de lograr 
objetivos comunes en áreas específicas, como puede ser por ejemplo, en el ámbito de un 
programa de protección del medio ambiente o en el desarrollo de programas científicos 
(Baalam & Veseth, 2004).  Pero, desde una óptica estrictamente económica, la integración 
regional supone el proceso de acercamiento y coordinación de las economías de dos o más 
países de modo de constituir un territorio económico común. Sus objetivos principales 
pueden ser entre otros, la creación de comercio; la generación de un mayor nivel de 
competencia intrabloque; el aprovechamiento de economías de escala; la cooperación 
intrarregional en proyectos de innovación tecno-industriales asociados incluso mediante el 
progreso hacia nuevas actividades; una más eficiente y mejor racionalización de la 
producción mediante una división regional de la industria; la generación de mecanismos de 
financiamiento regional; la complementación económica; y, por ultimo, la sinergia en los 
frentes de negociación internacional (Balassa, 1980). Tengamos en cuenta que, a pesar de 
los beneficios evidentes, la integración puede generar también costos sectoriales y efectos 
negativos puertas adentro y hacia fuera del acuerdo.    
4. COOPERACION E INTEGRACION ECONOMICA REGIONAL 
Una distinción entre los términos de cooperación e integración se hace aquí 
necesaria. A pesar de que no existe una frontera claramente delimitada entre ambos 
conceptos, su utilización equívoca puede derivar en confusión. Mientras que la cooperación 
es posible entre países que tienen distintos sistemas monetarios, fiscales, de seguridad 
social y hasta con una visión completamente distinta de la organización de la empresa y los 
mercados, la integración plena es factible cuando se ha llegado a una armonización muy 
profunda del marco institucional de la economía4.  
La integración supone una acción de política económica más específica y profunda 
que la cooperación. La integración contempla una primera tarea, orientada a la reducción de 
barreras y obstáculos, para dar a las transacciones económicas una mayor flexibilidad; en 
una segunda etapa se persigue la supresión absoluta de tales barreras, a fin de crear un 
mercado único, sin trabas fronterizas, y con la mayor transparencia en las tarifas no 
arancelarias. El concepto clave es la armonización de políticas, en la medida en que ésta 
supone la supresión de políticas de tratamiento diferencial entre los países miembros del 
acuerdo.  
                                                   
4 Para la distinción entre los conceptos de cooperación e integración véase James CAPORASO, 1987; 
Raúl BERNAL-MEZA, 2001 y  Alcides COSTA VAZ, 2002.  
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 Lo anterior se traduce, desde una perspectiva de linealidad económica, en el 
acercamiento progresivo de los países firmantes de un acuerdo, con el fin de eliminar 
restricciones comerciales, discriminaciones o diferenciaciones (normas técnicas, medios de 
pago, etc.) y las trabas a la movilidad de los factores productivos. Además, en un acuerdo 
de integración se incorporan, de manera gradual, compromisos que se reflejan en un 
particular nivel de integración (zona de libre comercio, unión aduanera, mercado común) 
para llegar, por fin, al establecimiento de una unión monetaria y económica. Mediante el 
proceso de acercamiento y de articulación de los mercados y las sociedades, los países 
tienden a coordinar sus políticas, en un amplio abanico que va desde las políticas 
microeconómicas e industriales hasta las políticas macroeconómicas, como por ejemplo 
sucede con las monetarias, que permiten las construcción de áreas monetarias óptimas 
(Tugores, 2004). 
En última instancia, la integración económica se refiere al proceso en virtud del cual 
países y mercados previamente separados, se incorporan al funcionamiento de una nueva 
unidad considerada de dimensiones geo-económicas más adecuadas (Tamames y Huerta, 
1999). La integración puede darse en niveles muy diferentes, que van desde una 
coordinación mínima y ajuste recíproco de la conducta de las partes involucradas hasta la 
renuncia a aspectos de soberanía política de éstas, en la medida en que los actores pasan a 
constituir una nueva entidad. Este acercamiento se ve facilitado cuando se realiza entre 
países geográficamente próximos, con capacidad de interacción regular de una cierta 
intensidad entre sí. Además, éstos deben tener la capacidad de verse y de ser vistos como 
un actor con identidad propia en el escenario regional e internacional. Es decir, comparten 
un sentido de identidad regional y son reconocidos como tal por actores externos (Atkins, 
1991).  
La regionalización es, entonces,  tanto el proceso de creación específica de un 
espacio común, como el resultado de la puesta en marcha de la integración. El proceso 
supone, entre otros objetivos: poner en contacto economías relativamente homogéneas y de 
nivel de desarrollo relativo comparable en la trayectoria de acoplamiento progresivo de las 
estructuras socio-económicas; la convergencia política, a fin de crear instituciones comunes 
que permitan seguir, cuando sea necesario, una política coordinada en los ámbitos 
monetarios, financieros, industriales, comerciales, etc. Aunque el énfasis se encuentra en 
los aspectos económicos, por las razones previas se debe reconocer que un proceso de 
regionalización no es puramente económico, sino simultánea y sistémicamente, político, 
social y cultural (Bernal-Meza, 2000).  
5. GLOBALIZACION/MUNDIALIZACION 
En los inicios del siglo XXI se ha perfilado una nueva situación en la economía 
mundial que afecta a los procesos de regionalización. En otros trabajos hemos definido 
nuestra posición acerca de los orígenes de la globalización, y la actual etapa de 
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 mundialización como el eslabón más actual de la acumulación capitalista. Esta visión se 
sustenta, asimismo, en el pensamiento de diversos autores con los cuales compartimos una 
similar concepción histórico-estructural de interpretación del sistema mundial (Wallerstein, 
1985;  Krippendorff, 1985, Bernal-Meza, 2000). 
Diferenciamos analíticamente la mundialización como proceso prioritariamente 
económico y tecnológico, de su carácter como ideología, que es la globalización en sentido 
estricto. En líneas generales, argumentamos que el proceso de globalización/mundialización 
es un fenómeno amplio y complejo, no consolidado, que identifica y expresa la 
intensificación de flujos portadores en espacio y tiempo, de nuevas formas de pensar, de 
producción, de vinculación y de relación; proceso que sin ser nuevo en la historia, se ha 
profundizado y acelerado, durante los años recientes, en especial en los aspectos 
financieros. Pero, junto a ello, la globalización ha pasado a ser un paradigma; un modelo 
ideológico, bajo el cual se escudan o justifican políticas internacionales y nacionales; cuyas 
consecuencias negativas se están progresivamente internalizando en los países; en 
particular, en los subdesarrollados, periféricos o semiperiféricos. La globalización es un 
fenómeno de convergencia de diversas variables y factores de las principales economías del 
mundo en el que coexisten tendencias de homogenización y fragmentación. Desde un punto 
de vista de las ideologías dominantes, representa la nueva visión del mundo del capital que 
justifica la financiarización de la economía internacional. Es un paradigma que -como tal- 
expresa un marco conceptual, eidético, interpretativo y prescriptivo, cuyo origen está en las 
sociedades, grupos y poderes dominantes y se difunde hacia las sociedades que integran el 
sistema mundial; desde el centro hacia la periferia (Bernal-Meza, 2000).  
La globalización no es un fenómeno distinto, diferente, autónomo de la historia social 
y económica del sistema internacional, sino que es eslabón de un largo proceso, tal como 
han sugerido Tomassini (1984) y Sunkel (1987); iniciado con la internacionalización y 
seguido luego por la transnacionalización de las economías nacionales.  
La existencia de la globalización es posible sólo y dentro de un sistema mundial, 
cuya característica estructural es la expansión del modo de acumulación dominante, 
mediante determinados impulsores que la motorizan. Entre ellos, mencionamos la 
ampliación de los ámbitos de acción de las firmas internacionales, asociado al crecimiento 
del volumen y tipo de los negocios internacionales; la mundialización de las finanzas; la 
aparición de nuevas formas de organización empresaria vinculadas con modernos 
paradigmas de gestión (por ejemplo, redes tecnoeconómicas, redes de investigación más 
desarrollo e innovación I+D+i, alianzas de firmas, clusters); la aplicación de diversas 
estrategias empresariales (deslocalización y relocalización geográfica industrial; 
encadenamientos globales; terciarización en el sentido de subcontratación y de prioridad del 
sector terciario de la economía; segmentación/partición de la cadena de valor) en un marco 
de hipercompetencia por el liderazgo, el posicionamiento competitivo y la participación en 
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 los mercados internacionales; la aparición de un sistema genérico de economía de mercado, 
en donde participan diversas estructuras político-institucionales que responden a formas 
distintas de interpretar la relación entre Estado, mercado y sociedad, y por último, la 
aparición de renovadas formas de competencia regional mediante la proliferación de 
bloques regionales y acuerdos de cooperación e integración.  
6. ANALISIS DE LA GLOBALIZACION Y LA REGIONALIZACION  
La regionalización, en su relación con la dinámica de globalización/mundialización, 
puede ser analizada bajo dos perspectivas: a) la que considera que los mismos son dos 
procesos simultáneos en comercio, inversión y desarrollo tecnológico, aunque distinguibles 
por su naturaleza: mientras que la regionalización es un proyecto político-económico 
esencialmente Interestatal, la globalización es un proceso socialmente complejo y 
multidimensional. Aquí se interpreta que el rumbo de la economía mundial tiende a dos 
procesos no exactamente coincidentes, aunque por momentos puedan tener trayectorias 
paralelas (como motores de la integración global), o quizás contrarias (globalización versus 
regionalización); b) la que los examina como procesos derivados causalmente, esto es, que 
uno genera o es principio del otro. Esta última diferenciación tiene a su vez dos posibilidades 
de lectura, 1) donde la formación de regiones sería un corolario o consecuencia de la 
creciente globalización. A favor de este punto se plantea que hasta ahora la globalización no 
ha generado un mundo en el cual las naciones interactúen con otras igualitariamente, sino 
que, más bien, la actividad económica, aunque parezca más dispersa, se está concentrando 
crecientemente en las tres grandes regiones continentales (América del Norte, Europa y 
Asia-Pacífico); 2) donde el surgimiento de regiones internacionales constituiría una realidad 
anterior a la globalización. La articulación progresiva de espacios y bloques conformaría una 
trama compleja de ámbitos de cooperación e integración, que permitiría impulsar el 
desarrollo de un entorno global. 
Si los movimientos hacia la globalización y la regionalización son simultáneos, es 
casi inevitable el surgimiento de tensiones, ya que las agrupaciones regionales limitan de 
hecho la globalización absoluta de la economía mundial. Este conflicto estaría afectando la 
continuidad y la implantación de un sistema internacional de comercio eficiente, abierto y 
equitativo  y, obviamente, más multilateral (Adda, 1996). En efecto, la crisis de la actual 
ronda de negociaciones de Doha, daría evidencia como para inferir que el desvío de 
comercio, el proteccionismo vigente en ciertos sectores y la consolidación de áreas de 
comercio discriminatorias estarían amenazando la continuidad del sistema multilateral. De 
mantenerse en el tiempo esta situación, se restaría legitimidad, incluso, a los mecanismos 
institucionales establecidos por la Organización Mundial de Comercio.    
Por otra parte, si la regionalización es un corolario de la globalización de la economía 
mundial (Bernal-Meza, 1994; 2000; Bernal-Meza y Masera, 2005), desde una perspectiva 
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 centrada en los problemas de América Latina, la formación de espacios de integración y 
cooperación podría representar una estrategia coadyuvante de las políticas del desarrollo.  
Consideramos que la integración regional puede ser analizada bajo el enfoque de las 
ganancias derivadas de la formación de un espacio regional: a) la potencial cooperación en 
los diversos planos y dimensiones del sistema social (política científico-tecnológica, política 
cultural, política industrial, etc.) entre los países miembros de un acuerdo; b) la línea 
estratégica fundamental para la inserción  competitiva de los países en la economía 
internacional; c)  la transformación de las sociedades en pos de un modelo de crecimiento y 
desarrollo; d) la coordinación de posiciones de economía política en los foros 
internacionales, junto a los otros miembros de un acuerdo;  e) la creación de un espacio 
defensivo, tanto en el plano económico como en la dimensión política y cultural (por ejemplo 
en lo que respecta a la identidad), frente al avance de actores más poderosos, como sucede 
por ejemplo en el caso de las industrias culturales.  
Por lo expuesto, concluimos que el vínculo entre globalización y regionalización  nos 
permite comprender la estructura del sistema internacional desde una perspectiva temporal 
de la expansión del capitalismo global. Además, que en las transformaciones más recientes 
está jugando un rol decisivo el pujante proceso de integración económica regional entre 
países. 
7. FACTORES DE LA REGIONALIZACION EN AMERICA LATINA 
En América Latina, la cooperación y la integración han tenido, históricamente, 
características distintivas de aquellas que, por ejemplo, se han dado en Europa occidental o 
entre Estados Unidos y Canadá, puesto que las metas que se perseguían con esos 
instrumentos se relacionan directamente con el desarrollo económico. En efecto, la 
exigencia de la integración se supeditaba a ciertas insuficiencias estructurales identificadas 
en la región por Prebisch, en su informe de 1949. De allí en más, los análisis de la Comisión 
Económica para América Latina, de la cual Prebisch fue su primer secretario, detectaron 
diversos factores críticos que estaban presentes en los sistemas socio-económicos de los 
países latinoamericanos: insuficiencia en la estructura productiva, escasa oferta exportable, 
inadecuado avance en la construcción institucional (por ejemplo de los mecanismos 
financieros de pago), atraso y estancamiento de la economía rural junto a zonas de baja 
productividad y excesivo latifundismo, ausencia de una base tecnológica endógena en 
sectores dinámicos, falta de movilidad social,  extrema desigualdad en la distribución del 
ingreso, pobreza, exclusión y fuerte fragmentación social, etc. El concepto que resumía esta 
situación era la  heterogeneidad estructural, la que junto a una enorme dependencia del 
sector externo y un débil desarrollo industrial, imposibilitaba recuperar el deterioro de los 
términos de intercambio que producía el sistema importador-exportador. Los países de la 
región se habían incorporado tardíamente a una economía mundial dominada por los 
sectores industriales más innovadores de los países centrales.  
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 El enfoque elaborado por la corriente cepalina asumió una visión de conjunto de la 
estructura de la economía mundial, sustentado en la identificación de dos áreas 
intervinculadas asimétricamente: el centro y la periferia. A partir de esta morfología, Prebisch 
formuló su teoría del “Intercambio Desigual”, que pasaría a ser un fundamento específico de 
las políticas orientadas a impulsar procesos de integración, mediante la sustitución de 
importaciones y el crecimiento industrial de la región en un proceso combinado con el 
aumento de exportaciones y de participación en el comercio internacional (Prebisch, 1963; 
CEPAL, 1959; 1969; 1974; 1982; 1987; Ayza, Fichet, González, 1975). La idea central es 
que a través de la  implementación de políticas de cooperación regional se podrían modificar 
situaciones estructurales de subdesarrollo. Uno de los principales logros de un espacio 
integrado podría ubicarse en las economías de aglomeración, aunque se reconocía que 
debía exigirse una amplia coordinación -en los niveles nacional y regional- de las políticas 
de inversiones, fiscales, de salarios y precios, para evitar la tendencia a la concentración 
geográfica, y por ende desigual, de los beneficios y de los esfuerzos de acumulación 
(Furtado, 1972; 1983).  
Si tenemos en cuenta el marco de interpretación más general que nos ofrece la 
disciplina de las relaciones internacionales, podemos señalar que el regionalismo en 
América Latina ha oscilado históricamente entre dos polos: por un lado, mediante el 
desarrollo de esquemas de integración intra-latinoamericanos sin presencia de los Estados 
Unidos de América, y por otro, con el establecimiento de ámbitos de cooperación bajo la 
égida norteamericana (desde el Panamericanismo del siglo XIX al proyecto ALCA de fines 
del siglo XX).  El Área de  Libre Comercio de las Américas, desde su lanzamiento en 1994, 
representaba una nueva versión del modelo de dominación hegemónica de los Estados 
Unidos en el hemisferio, no sólo porque incluía en su agenda cuestiones que iban más allá 
de las comerciales –como inversiones, servicios, acceso a mercados, etc.- sino porque su 
efectiva constitución podría haber tenido profundas consecuencias para los países 
latinoamericanos. Podría haber significado, por ejemplo, dado el nivel de las asimetrías y el 
desigual carácter de los intereses en juego, el fin de los esquemas subregionales 
(MERCOSUR, CAN). El ALCA personificaba para los Estados Unidos un instrumento de su 
estrategia global y de seguridad nacional, porque se hubiera constituido en la potencia del 
bloque más importante del mundo en cuanto a cifras económicas, demográficas, etc. 
Además, el ALCA le hubiera posibilitado, entre otros factores, mejorar su posicionamiento 
negociador en la OMC y frenar la presencia de la Unión Europea y de las potencias asiáticas 
en la región (Bernal-Meza y Masera,  2006).  
Específicamente, el surgimiento del regionalismo latinoamericano puede ser 
analizado bajo tres enfoques (Hurrell, 1994): 1). Competencia política y mercantilista por el 
poder: según este enfoque el regionalismo es una respuesta a las presiones sistémicas 
ejercidas por una determinada configuración de las fuerzas internacionales y a la 
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 competencia ejercida por aquellos grupos de países rivales, con o sin presencia de una 
potencia hegemónica, que intentan acumular poder. Este enfoque, que nosotros  
denominamos de “regionalización estratégica”, puede ser evaluado, por ejemplo, en 
términos de participación en mercados; 2) Factores de interdependencia: de acuerdo a este 
enfoque, el regionalismo surge como respuesta funcional a los problemas creados por los 
lazos de interdependencia asimétrica y vertical (por contener países del hemisferio norte y 
sur), como por ejemplo sucede en el NAFTA o Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del 
Norte (TLCAN), en la relación entre Estados Unidos de América y México; 3) Factores 
internos: según esta perspectiva, el movimiento hacia el regionalismo pone de relevancia 
aquellos elementos comunes de los países que participan de un esquema de integración y 
cooperación regional; por ejemplo, la homogeneidad étnica y lingüística, factores éstos que 
refuerzan el sentido de identidad de una región y que le permiten actuar como un actor 
unitario en la obtención de ciertas metas, y como una plataforma de promoción de los 
intereses comunes. 
En última instancia, la trayectoria histórica de la integración regional en América 
Latina –de ALALC al MERCOSUR- nos muestra la dificultad inherente que supone generar 
espacios económicos ampliados en el marco de la estructura de poder subyacente a la 
economía mundial. El regionalismo nos ha revelado, en otro nivel, la especificidad de las 
estructuras socio-económicas de la periferia,  y las limitaciones políticas y económicas que 
se derivan de la integración en condiciones de subdesarrollo. La reproducción de las 
estructuras centro-periferias al interior de los bloques junto a una marcada asimetría 
producto del desarrollo desigual entre las regiones son una muestra de ellas. Es para tener 
en cuenta la afirmación acerca de que “las periferias dinámicas continuarán siendo 
periferias, es decir, sociedades atravesadas por todas las principales contradicciones 
producidas por la yuxtaposición de enclaves modernizados, rodeados de un océano poco 
modernizado” (Amin, 2003: 38-39). 
8. COOPERACIÓN, CONCERTACIÓN POLÍTICA Y DESARROLLO EN LAS 
RELACIONES EXTERNAS REGIONALES DE LOS PAÍSES LATINOAMERICANOS 
De otra parte, en América Latina existe un vínculo directo entre cooperación, 
concertación política y desarrollo en las relaciones externas regionales. En particular, y 
porque “el desarrollo económico es probablemente la dimensión esencial de las relaciones 
internacionales de los países subdesarrollados” (Tomassini, 1992), ambas, integración y 
cooperación son estrategias coincidentes; aunque pensamos que debe darse a la 
cooperación un sentido político que antecede a la cooperación económica y a la integración. 
Éste es el punto de vista que dio inicio al proceso del MERCOSUR, el subsistema de 
cooperación e integración que más expectivas ha creado entre los países del Cono sur 
latinoamericano desde los años de la ALALC.  
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 Diversas experiencias, tanto de concertación y de integración regionales (así como 
de vinculaciones interregionales) se inscriben en lo que se ha denominado como la tercera 
etapa de las relaciones internacionales de América Latina. Ésta se basa en el surgimiento 
de nuevas formas de diplomacia multilateral o de concertación directa entre los gobiernos 
latinoamericanos para el manejo colectivo de los problemas internacionales; experiencias 
que, al menos al inicio de los años noventa, presentaban un sesgo marcadamente informal y 
evolutivo (Tomassini, 1990, 17).  
Las nuevas formas de concertación directa entre gobiernos latinoamericanos, o de 
diplomacia multilateral a alto nivel, tienden más bien a facilitar el manejo colectivo de ciertos 
problemas internacionales de importancia crítica para la región, o para determinados grupos 
de países en un momento dado y tienen a la cooperación política como elemento esencial 
de sustento.  
Tomando como ejemplo el estudio específico acerca del nuevo regionalismo 
latinoamericano, el análisis de esta etapa ayuda a evaluar en qué medida esos procesos 
han contribuido al surgimiento de un subsistema en que las relaciones de cooperación 
predominan sobre las de conflicto. Tomassini (1990) señalaba que en el futuro se podrían 
aprovechar cada vez más las ventajas que ofrece la complementación económica, política y 
cultural entre esos países, y se diera impulso a la proyección de sus intereses externos en 
un mundo fraguado en diversos circuitos productivos, tecnológicos y financieros; dividido en 
sólidos bloques comerciales. Por ejemplo, aún cuando los orígenes del MERCOSUR se  
remontan al Programa de Integración y Cooperación Argentino-Brasileño de 1986, es válida 
la interpretación que sostiene que tanto la profundización de los procesos de regionalización 
y de globalización como la emergencia de una nueva agenda política estimulada por la 
posguerra fría repercutieron en los comportamientos externos de los países 
latinoamericanos (Hirst, 1993). El efecto fue una reducción de los espacios de inserción 
internacionales, al tiempo que se profundizó la relativa importancia del regionalismo (Unión 
Europea, NAFTA).  
Tal cual surge de la experiencia de los años noventa, la movilización política y 
económica hacia la regionalización en América Latina ha sido considerada, en general, 
como la confluencia de dos desarrollos históricos en particular: por un lado, la 
macroestabilización económica, lo cual convirtió a la coordinación económica en una 
condición necesaria para lograr cualquier grado de crecimiento económico y, por el otro, la 
formación de foros institucionalizados para la cooperación y negociación internacional, como 
resultado de Contadora y el Grupo de Río (Bernal-Meza, 2001).   
El “dilema de los intereses comunes” es relevante para abordar la discusión sobre 
los procesos de integración. Es posible entender entonces el resurgimiento de la 
concertación latinoamericana y el lanzamiento de la regionalización desde mediados de los 
años ochenta como un proyecto común, como resultado de los abrumadores retos 
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 compartidos por los países: deuda externa, reestructuración macroeconómica, inestabilidad 
política y el desarrollo (Perales, 1998). En este contexto, la formación de regímenes de 
integración, como parte de un proyecto estratégico de una región (ya sea un nuevo 
industrialismo o un regionalismo abierto), puede entenderse como una respuesta a las 
exigencias del desarrollo, en una economía mucho más internacionalizada. Pero, por estos 
mismos retos y desafíos, alcanzar un grado importante de institucionalidad en los esquemas 
de integración, es tan importante como indicador y calificador de la efectividad de los 
esfuerzos de regionalización (Bernal-Meza, 2001).   
9. SIGNIFICADO DE LOS NUEVOS REGIONALISMOS 
La trayectoria del regionalismo en el siglo XX ha pasado por tres fases principales. 
La primera es la que corresponde a los años 50s. y 60s., de gran énfasis en la cooperación 
regional con las experiencias de la Comunidad Europea (Tratado de Roma, 1957) y con la 
Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio -ALALC- en América Latina (Tratado de 
Montevideo, 1960). Podemos constatar la existencia de una segunda fase en los años 70s., 
cuyas características son la caída del dinamismo regionalista a causa de la desconfianza en 
los logros potenciales de los esquemas de integración y cooperación. En el ámbito 
latinoamericano, en particular, es la época de crisis de los modelos de sustitución de 
importaciones en lo económico y de los cambios de régimen en los sistemas políticos. En 
una tercera etapa, desde mediados de los años 80s., es visible un nuevo impulso en el 
movimiento hacia la construcción de esquemas regionales, bajo el paradigma del 
regionalismo abierto y las políticas neoliberales que los sustentan, lo que generó, desde 
entonces, impactos significativos en la conformación de la economía mundial. El auge del 
regionalismo se ha dado desde entonces con tanta intensidad, que algunos autores 
consideran que estamos en presencia de una “transformación espacial de las relaciones 
internacionales” (Smouts, 1998), lo que significa que la economía mundial se está 
orientando hacia la dirección la conformación de regiones internacionales y bloques 
económicos.  
Diversos factores han colaborado al resurgimiento de los procesos de 
regionalización, entre otros; 1) la firma del European Single Market Act en 1986 y el 
posterior Tratado de Maastricht en 1992, con el que se da nacimiento a las etapas más 
complejas y recientes de la Unión Europea; la caída de la Unión Soviética y la transición a la 
economía de mercados de los antiguos países socialistas, proceso que contribuyó al auge 
regionalista mediante la celebración de acuerdos de incorporación a la Unión Europea; 2) la 
demora en las negociaciones de la ronda Uruguay del GATT, que contribuyó a privilegiar la 
vía regional, aunque  años después,  el surgimiento de la Organización Mundial de 
Comercio (1994) indudablemente favoreció la difusión de regiones comerciales. Es 
interesante constatar que en la actualidad, una última señal para la proliferación de los 
acuerdos regionales nos lo da la paralización de la ronda de Doha. Como en períodos 
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 anteriores, la crisis sin miras de solución a corto plazo en la negociación multilateral puede 
derivar en un impulso de la estrategia regional. Esto es así siempre y cuando la dirigencia de 
los países interpreten que solamente en los ámbitos regionales se pueden llegar a alcanzar 
ciertas metas, muy difíciles de lograr en el sistema internacional de comercio dada la 
complejidad de los temas en disputa; 3) la respuesta regional a la Europa integrada, 
impulsada por los Estados Unidos de América (Fishlow & Haggard, 1992), con la firma de 
la zona de libre comercio con Canadá, y años después, con la puesta en funcionamiento del 
Tratado con México y Canadá (enero de 1994) junto a la propuesta lanzada en la Cumbre 
de Miami, en el mismo año, de crear un Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA); 4) 
Por su parte, en América Latina, la restauración democrática dio impulso a los programas de 
cooperación e integración. Es el caso del ámbito subregional, con los acuerdos PICAB entre 
Argentina y Brasil, a los que siguió la constitución del Mercado Común del Sur 
(MERCOSUR) en 1991.   
Es esta proliferación de acuerdos lo que ha transformado al regionalismo en un 
fenómeno universal. Podemos observar, también, los espacios de comercio integrado son 
ámbitos más vulnerables –dado su excesivo marco regulatorio- y que se encuentran en 
contradicciones con otros regímenes donde a veces participan los mismos Estados.    
Advertimos cambios de orden cuantitativo y cualitativo en los nuevos regionalismos. 
En lo que respecta al primero, las cifras nos indican que cuando el Acuerdo de Comercio 
sobre tarifas y aranceles (GATT) entró en vigor en 1948, los acuerdos de comercio eran casi 
inexistentes. En el marco del GATT, durante toda su actuación, en cerca de cuarenta años, 
fueron notificados un poco más de cien acuerdos bajo el artículo XXIV y la cláusula de 
habilitación. Desde que empieza a funcionar la Organización Mundial de Comercio (OMC), 
no sólo se multiplican el número de  acuerdos, sino que la evidencia empírica muestra que 
un importante porcentaje (se estima alrededor del 55% el del comercio mundial) se 
desarrolla ya en el interior de los bloques económicos (Gilpin, 2001). En todas las áreas 
económicas regionales se puede observar una mayor concentración de los volúmenes de 
comercio e inversiones entre los países de la tríada regional mundial (Europa Occidental, 
América del Norte, Asia Oriental), paralelamente a un aumento del comercio intrazona en el 
conjunto de los intercambios mundiales. Acompañando este movimiento hacia el 
regionalismo, se firmaron y notificaron al sistema multilateral de comercio más de cien 
acuerdos, exclusivamente durante la década de los noventa (Bouzas, 2001). 
Es de notar que existe también un cambio cualitativo en los actuales procesos 
regionales (Gana, 1994), porque en las agendas de negociación de los nuevos acuerdos se 
incorporan temas que ya no se refieren sólo a cuestiones arancelarias o comerciales, sino 
que pueden ser incluidas otras materias (inversiones, migraciones, terrorismo, mercado del 
trabajo, narcotráfico, transferencia de tecnología, políticas de cooperación industrial, etc.), 
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 abarcando incluso cuestiones de carácter tradicionalmente consideradas como del ámbito 
interno, soberano de un estado nación.  
Otra novedad de alto impacto en las relaciones internacionales es el hecho que, 
desde hace algunos años, se celebran acuerdos no sólo entre países, sino entre bloques, 
por ejemplo, la asociación bi-regional Unión Europea-América Latina, o los acuerdos Unión 
Europea-Mercosur (ambos aún en etapas de negociación). Un lente más fino nos revela que 
el regionalismo ya no es cerrado como en el pasado, sino que tiende a ser abierto, de 
carácter vertical y asimétrico, puesto que se puede dar entre países desarrollados y en vías 
de desarrollo, del norte y del hemisferio sur.  Además, los actuales esquemas de integración 
y cooperación regionales son acuerdos complejos, porque se desarrollan bajo una 
multiplicación de actores e intereses sectoriales. Por último, las agendas son más  
conflictivas, por los numerosos obstáculos y condicionamientos que existen en la discusión y 
por los efectos no deseados en las sociedades de los países que integran los acuerdos 
(Bouzas y Fanelli, 2001a).  
CONCLUSION  
El regionalismo es un elemento clave del orden económico internacional surgido 
después de la segunda guerra mundial. Los países que comparten un espacio regional, se 
unen para lograr una mejor capacidad de negociación internacional, de competitividad en los 
mercados mundiales y, potencialmente, para lograr objetivos mediante la coordinación de 
esfuerzos en los foros internacionales, en la labor de atracción de inversiones o en el 
desarrollo de proyectos industriales y tecnológicos conjuntos.  
Una de las conclusiones del presente estudio nos indica que la regionalización de la 
economía mundial se nos muestra como un proceso ciertamente pujante, caracterizado por 
la formación de espacios de integración y cooperación junto al desarrollo de la conciencia 
regionalista. Otra se refiere al hecho que hay un directa vinculación entre la transformación 
del escenario de las relaciones internacionales en los últimos decenios y la tendencia a la 
diversificación de los espacios regionales. Ahora bien, si la regionalización es contraria, 
simultánea o derivada del proceso de globalización/mundialización, es un tema cuyos 
argumentos se encuentran todavía en discusión. De lo que no pueden quedar dudas es que 
el regionalismo es una estrategia plenamente aceptada por los países en la formulación de 
sus relaciones económicas externas, y que esta vía coexiste –a veces conflictivamente- con 
la multilateral. En este sentido, todavía estaría por ser evaluada de un modo más 
concluyente y menos ideológico, la articulación del regionalismo con el sistema internacional 
de comercio.  
Si la regionalización supone que los países miembros de un acuerdo buscan la 
obtención de ventajas comerciales y estratégicas mediante el establecimiento de un espacio 
integrado, el escenario multilateral nos muestra que los potenciales beneficios a obtenerse 
con la liberalización comercial en diversas áreas, pueden quedar diluidos si no hay 
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 reciprocidad en la concesión de preferencias comerciales y en los accesos a los mercados. 
Esta situación puede tornarse más conflictiva porque los temas de la agenda de los nuevos 
regionalismos –al igual que en la OMC- no son exclusivamente comerciales. En efecto, los 
temas que se están incorporando de modo progresivo en las negociaciones desbordan los 
tópicos tradicionales (por ejemplo, aranceles) e incluyen, según hemos considerado,  
cuestiones nuevas e, incluso, algunas novedosas (brand issues y new brand issues), tales 
como las regulaciones del mercado del trabajo, los estándares ambientales, la migración de 
personas o los movimientos de capital. Estas realidades que reflejan los movimientos 
regionales en relación con el orden económico mundial, generan fuertes condicionamientos 
sobre los lineamientos externos de los países y sobre la formulación de sus políticas 
internas. En otro trabajo, habría que analizar los nuevos rumbos de la cooperación y su 
reflejo en el campo de las negociaciones multilaterales. 
En lo que a nuestro ámbito regional se refiere, los cambios estructurales en la 
economía global y la configuración de un orden económico fundado en gran parte en la 
dinámica del regionalismo, ha promovido en América Latina el resurgimiento, 
aggiornarmiento o renovación de los esquemas ya existentes, e incentivando la 
conformación de nuevos espacios de integración como son los actuales esfuerzos, 
impulsados por algunos países, de transformar el MERCOSUR y la Comunidad Andina de 
Naciones (CAN) en un ámbito de cooperación más amplio, tal la Unión de Naciones 
Sudamericanas (UNS), también llamada Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones. 
Observamos que en este proyecto, liderado por Brasil como potencia regional indiscutible 
del Cono Sur, resta profundizar la discusión sobre el mejoramiento de la infraestructura 
regional en el marco de la Iniciativa IIRSA (Bernal-Meza y Saha, 2005). Asimismo, la UNS 
podría ser el comienzo de una solución para los problemas derivados de la superposición 
excesiva de procesos paralelos de cooperación e integración y de frentes simultáneos de 
negociación.   
La crítica que realizamos desde nuestra perspectiva latinoamericana, es que los 
objetivos del regionalismo aparecen hoy más vinculados a la inserción en los mercados 
internacionales, y a una articulación externa de los países de la región con los centros 
dinámicos de la economía mundial, que al logro de una transformación real de las 
estructuras socio-económicas aún poco competitivas, heterogéneas y fragmentadas; 
porque, en definitiva, la inserción, por más exitosa que sea, no puede suplir la ausencia de 
una verdadera estrategia de desarrollo. 
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 South American Regional Integration in Brazil’s Development Strategy 
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This paper addresses Brazil’s regional integration strategy at the level of Mercosur and South 
America and its relevance in Brazil’s development strategy during the Lula government. This issue 
is discussed from the perspective of its importance in Brazil’s strategy of development and response 
to the globalization process.  
 
Brazil’s regional integration strategy in South America is significant in terms of understanding 
current developments in the international system. Is it likely that South America under Brazil’s 
leadership may emerge as a pole in a multi-polar world as the current Brazilian government under 
the leadership of president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva wishes? What role does Brazil’s regional 
integration strategy play in its development strategy? How does and how may regional integration 
contribute to Brazil’s development? These are some of the central issues that the analysis takes up.  
 
Within this broad area of issues, the main issue I analyze is the significance of regional integration 
at the level of Mercosur and South America for Brazil’s economic development. Contrary to 
analysts who see Brazil’s relationship to its South American neighbours as a minor issue for a 
country that aims at developing its importance on the global stage as a global player with a 
diversified trade structure, I argue that Brazil’s relationship to its South American neighbours plays 
a strategic role in its economic development and in its aim at becoming an important global player. 
Therefore, the second key issue taken up is an analysis of the challenges Brazil faces in its regional 
integration strategy in South America. Special attention is given to the question of economic 
asymmetries between Brazil and its neighbours and how Brazil deals with them and why.  
 
This last question is significant from the perspective of domestic politics as well. There are 
considerable disagreements in Brazil nowadays about the country’s foreign policy strategy, and the 
issue of Brazil’s South American strategy is amongst the most controversial. Domestic politics is 
important for the regional integration project both from the perspective of Brazil as the leading 
country in the region and from the perspective of other countries. In fact, regional integration at the 
level of Mercosur faced a serious crisis in the period between 1999 and 2002, when all the members 
of Mercosur, i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay faced economic development crises and 
responded with measures aimed at protecting national interests. National development success is 
thus importance for the process of regional integration. How is this reflected in the strategies of 
Brazil at the regional level as the most powerful country in South America? Does Brazil use its 
power capabilities to play the role of the preponderant country that is willing to take on the costs of 
leadership with the expectation of long-term benefits from regional integration, or does Brazil lack 
the capability to take on such a leadership role due to its own development problems that make it 
difficult for Brazil to play such a role? 
 
In the analysis, I focus particularly on Brazil’s regional integration strategy and its relevance in 
Brazil’s development strategy during the Lula government, that is from 2003. I claim that an 
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 important redirection happened in the process of regional integration in South America with the 
ascendance of Lula and Néstor Kirchner to the presidencies of Brazil and Argentina in 2003. I 
emphasize the role of Brazil in the process of regional integration as I see it as the preponderant 
country in South America due to its superior size and power resources. Secondarily, I emphasize the 
role of Argentina and Brazil as the central axis around which Mercosur and South American 
integration develops. However, it is clear that regional integration is a common project of 
construction, so it cannot be understood without understanding the motivations of the member 
countries more generally. I therefore seek to analyze the different national positions with regard to 
regional integration in South America in the light of different national interests and development 
strategies. 
 
The paper is structured in the following way. After the introductory discussions above, I go on to 
briefly analyze the historical background of Mercosur. I then analyze the difficulties faced by 
Mercosur during the period 1997-2002. With this background analysis in mind, I move on to 
analyzing the domestic and international political agenda of the new Lula government in 2003. This 
brings me to the central part of the analysis where I analyze the importance of regional integration 
in Brazil’s development strategy and Brazil’s responses to frictions at the regional level. 
 
Mercosur’s Historical Background Prior to 2003 
Mercosur was established in 1991 with the Asunción Treaty, establishing a free trade agreement 
between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. It was made possible by the mutual efforts of  
Argentina and Brazil to strengthen their ties after a long history of rivalry and of living with the 
back to one another. Historically, both countries had emphasized relations with the developed 
countries, although some efforts had been made from 1960 to increase cooperation in Latin 
America. The integration process was started in 1985 with a historical meeting between the 
presidents of Argentina and Brazil that led to a political decision of bilateral integration. The 
context influenced this decision, as there were particularly advantageous conditions for cooperation. 
Both Argentina and Brazil had recently gone from dictatorships to democracies, and both countries 
were facing significant external constraints on their development as a consequence of their large 
foreign debt loads (Christensen, 2007a: 4-5).  
 
The experience of common development problems thus prompted the alignment of the two 
countries and contributed to the development of a common vision of how the development of the 
two countries could be improved through closer cooperation. The integration between the two 
countries was based on a strategic partnership and was markedly economic in character (Patricio, 
2006: 9-18). The goal was to create a common market, but the first step taken was the signing of 24 
protocols of cooperation with sector specific programs. The focus was on strengthening the 
industrial sector through intra-industrial integration (Christensen, 2007a: 4-5). While Argentina 
historically had been the leading country economically, Brazil had overtaken Argentina on the 
industrial front in the 1970s (Hirst, 2005), but both countries had experienced major difficulties in 
defending the industrial sector when they went into economic decline as a consequence of the 
financial crisis that hit them both in the early 1980s. Bilateral economic integration thus was a 
concerted effort aimed at turning around this tendency. The model of integration was based on the 
import-substitution and industrialization strategy (ISI) and on an active role of the state in 
promoting economic development through ‘vertical’ sector policies. However, the heterodox 
economic strategies pursued by both Argentina and Brazil did not succeed in stabilizing their 
economies and in 1989 and 1990 both countries faced hyperinflation (Baumann and Mussi, 2006: 7). 
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 This led to a change in economic development strategies that was reflected in the model of 
integration pursued by Mercosur after its establishment in 1991. Both the model of integration and 
the overall strategy of economic development and of integration into the global economy changed 
markedly in a neo-liberal direction. This direction had already started shortly prior to the 
establishment of Mercosur, when the new government of Carlos Menem in Argentina (1989) and 
Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil (1990) turned towards neo-liberal responses to the renewed 
financial crisis in the late 1980s. They put behind them their common active industrial policies 
(Ferrer, 1997: 121) and while opening up intra-regional trade they also unilaterally opened up for 
extra-regional imports thus introducing a new model of integration that came to be known as “open 
regionalism” or “open integration”. The new direction had a clear neo-liberal orientation that can be 
characterized as market-led development associated with the withdrawal of the state from 
promoting strategically oriented active policies (Christensen, 2007a: 6). The belief in active policies 
had suffered as a consequence of the poor development results and ongoing financial problems of 
the 1980s, and it was believed that a strategy of open integration into the world economy coupled 
with continued regional cooperation was the right cure (see e.g. Lafer, 2004). The new model of 
integration was built on a commercial approach and a neo-liberal philosophy (Patricio, 2006: 18). 
 
The programme of trade liberalization was constructed on lineal and automatic tariff reductions of 
7% every six months and an initial reduction of 47%. All products were included with the exception 
of those on the national lists of exceptions. With the Ouro Preto agreement in 1994, Mercosur 
turned into a customs union with a common external tariff. Some exceptions were allowed in the 
sectors of capital goods, information and telecommunication, where there are differences of 
interests between Mercosur members due to differences in economic structures. For the more 
industrially advanced Brazil, particularly, common external tariffs in such advanced economic 
sectors would be an advantage, while less developed members have an interest in differential 
external tariffs in order to import as cheaply as possible. Furthermore, lists of national exceptions 
were accepted, although tariffs were to converge gradually. Asymmetries between the different 
member economies were taken into account by differentiated treatment of the smaller member 
states, Paraguay and Uruguay, that were allowed longer lists of products exempted from the 
common external tariff as well as a longer period for reaching the common tariff (CEPAL, 2001: 
20).  
 
Although asymmetries of economic size and structure were thus taken into account, it is clear that 
the philosophy behind the integration model built on rule-oriented liberal ideas of lineal and 
automatic liberalization that would eventually lead to a common market and a common external 
tariff.  The underlying assumption was therefore that economic liberalization pursued in this gradual 
and automatic way would be likely to promote national economic development for the members.  
 
The outcome of this strategy was remarkable at the level of intra-regional trade. Intra-regional trade 
increased expressively between 1991 and 1997 and the relative weight of intra-regional trade came 
to be much higher in 1997 than at the outset, thus creating a tendency towards increased economic 
interdependence between member countries. 
 
Table 1: Mercosur’s exports intra-regionally and its total exports 
(In millions of US dollars and percentage participation) 
Year 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Intra-
Mercosur 
4,127 14,451 17,115 20,584 20,362 
120
 exports 
Total 
Mercosur 
exports 
46.430 70.493 74.997 83.287 81.337 
Mercosur/total 8,9% 20,5% 22,8% 24,7% 25,0% 
   (CEPAL 2001: 10) 
 
Table 1 shows that intra-Mercosur exports increased strongly from 1990 before the establishment of 
Mercosur to 1997 and that the participation of intra-Mercosur exports of total world exports of the 
Mercosur countries rose significantly in the period between 1990 and 1998 when it reached its 
historical maximum of 25%. As can be seen, the highest intra-Mercosur export figure was reached 
in 1997, since this figure fell along with total Mercosur exports in 1998 that marked the first year of 
the crisis period between 1998 and 2002 where intra-Mercosur exports experienced a significant 
reduction as a consequence of the on-set of a series of financial crises that provoked economic 
downturns in the member countries. These crises were provoked by a combination of factors 
amongst which growing foreign debt exposures and high current account deficits arguably were the 
most significant. These two inter-related problems, furthermore, show that the strategies pursued in 
the 1990s led to a problematic integration in the global economy as the strong surge in imports and 
an insufficient export growth contributed to rising external imbalances and therefore also to an 
increase in external vulnerability, not the least on the part of Argentina and Brazil. Also, industrial 
production came under pressure in the context of neo-liberal reforms. As Samuel Pinheiro 
Guimarães argues (2006: 150), this shows the erroneous vision behind the neo-liberal strategy 
pursued. 
 
In response to problems provoked by external vulnerability, Brazil devalued its currency in early 
1999. This went on to provoke frictions between Mercosur member countries (Genna and Hiroi, 
2007: 47-51). The combination of these frictions along with the situation of a high level of external 
vulnerability and economic stagnation provoked a sharp contraction in intra-Mercosur exports 
between 1997 and 2002 as can be observed in table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Mercosur’s intra-regional exports 
(In millions of US dollars) 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 20,504 20,278 15,095 17,671 15,107 10,132 
(IADB-INTAL, 2004: 57)1 
 
This sharp reduction in intra-regional exports had particularly harsh consequences in Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay due to their pronounced dependency on the Brazilian market. As a 
consequence, only Brazil avoided an economic decline in the period 1998-2002. This was in part 
also due to its relatively strong export growth (IADB-INTAL, 2007a: 10) that was helped along by 
the 1999 devaluation that increased Brazil’s international competitiveness. Brazil is also the only of 
the four member countries that more or less maintained the relative importance of the industrial 
sector in the national economy. The participation of the manufacturing industry of 21,5% in the 
1990-1992 period had fallen marginally to 20,4% by the 2003-2005 period. The corresponding 
figures for Argentina were 25,7% and 16,6% and constitute the most dramatic decline within the 
                                                 
1 The figures for 1997 and 1998 of table 1 and 2 differ slightly. However, the difference has been deemed 
inconsequential for the purposes of this analysis 
121
 Mercosur although Uruguay’s industrial participation in national GDP was also hard hit (Baumann 
and Mussi, 2006: 12). Thus, Argentina and Uruguay experienced a process of de-industrialization, 
while Brazil maintained a relatively strong industrial sector, although the liberalization strategy did 
lead to a reduction in the relative size of the most advanced sectors in Brazil (Pinto, 2007: 10). 
 
Brazil’s devaluation led to a reduction of close to 30% of Argentina’s exports to Brazil in 1999 
compared to 1998 (Bernal-Meza, 2002: 87) and provoked a serious deterioration in bilateral 
relations (Candeas, 2005: 207) as a number of trade conflicts between Argentina and Brazil erupted 
in the 1999-2001 period (CEPAL, 2001: 21-23). However, as Eduardo Duhalde took over the 
presidency in Argentina in midst of a sharp economic downturn, domestic forces in Argentina 
favourable of improved relations to Brazil were strengthened (Candeas, 2005: 208) and gave way to 
a renewed emphasis on the strategic alliance between Argentina and Brazil. 
 
Regional Integration in Mercosur and in South America from 2003: Introductory Remarks 
As the dominant power in South America, Brazil’s regional strategy is of pivotal importance to 
integration in the region. Since regional integration is a common project of construction, other 
countries cannot be ignored. Argentina is particularly important as the second biggest economy and 
together with Brazil forms the axis of Mercosur. For Mercosur to succeed there needs to be a good 
understanding between these two states, Aldo Ferrer argues, and he continues that its success rests 
secondarily on the capacity of the two leading countries to open up opportunities for Uruguay and 
Paraguay (Ferrer, 2006: 19), since Mercosur is only useful for member countries if it is compatible 
with their own national development (ibid: 13-14).  
 
Brazil is by far the most important country in South America. According to Samuel Pinheiro 
Guimarães Brazil’s territory occupies 48% of South America’s total area, its population 
corresponds to more than half of the total population of the continent and its GDP to more than 50% 
of South American total GDP (Guimarães, 2006: 272-273). At the level of Mercosur, the bilateral 
trade between Argentina and Brazil in 2006 reached almost US$ 20 billion out of less than US$ 26 
billion in total intra-Mercosur trade. In terms of total intra-Mercosur exports, the two countries 
accounted for approximately 93%. Argentina’s share of total exports was around 38% against 
Brazil’s 55% (Calculations based on IADB-INTAL, 2007b: 140). 
 
Given Brazil’s superior economic resources both in term of GDP, industrial capacity, territory and 
population it seems reasonable to argue that the inclusion of Brazil in the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), a scheme proposed by the United States that would lead to free trade between all 
countries in the Western Hemisphere with the exception of Cuba, is of pivotal importance for the 
FTAA to gain significance. Without Brazil, there would be no FTAA. It has been argued by some 
analysts that it would be dangerous for Brazil to be excluded from an FTAA since this could 
marginalize the country. However, the Lula government disagrees with this proposition. Foreign 
Minister Celso Amorim argued already in August 2003 (Amorim, 2007a: 205-206) that there was a 
lot of interest globally in cooperating with Brazil and that it would be dangerous for Brazil to enter 
into a free trade agreement of the type proposed by the United States. Similarly, Samuel Pinheiro 
Guimarães, Lula’s personal foreign policy advisor argued (Guimarães, 2006: 281-284) that an 
FTAA based on the proposal of the United States would be likely to wipe out Brazilian industry, 
reduce foreign direct investments in Brazil and lead to a persistent current account problem. The 
external vulnerability and the reduction in the government’s room of manoeuvre that would be the 
outcome of a free trade agreement along the lines proposed by the US would provoke a loss of 
national autonomy, make the government unable to pursue active industrial and technological 
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 policies and lead to a vicious circle in the country’s development. For this reason it would not be a 
problem for Brazil to stand outside an FTAA along the lines proposed by the United States.  
 
Brazil’s difficulty with accepting US proposals is therefore caused by its advanced economic 
structure. This also helps explain why less developed countries may be more willing to accept the 
policies championed by the United States as their less advanced economic structures makes this less 
problematic than for a country like Brazil.  
 
Brazil’s advanced economic structure is therefore an incentive for the country to reach wide-
ranging agreements of cooperation or integration in South America as a way to pave the way for 
Brazilian producers in South American markets making market access for Brazilian producers freer, 
in the same way that it is for the US. After it became evident that a broad FTAA along US lines 
would not be reached easily, the government of George Bush has pursued a strategy of competitive 
liberalization in Latin America based on bilateral agreements (Epsteyn and Gusmão, 2008). Thus, 
the US and Brazil can be seen as commercial rivals with a common interests in preferential 
agreements with South American countries. As Luiz Augusto Souto Maior, a former Brazilian 
ambassador, argues, the Lula government sees an ever closer relationship with its South American 
neighbours as a way to develop Brazil’s economic potential (Maior, 2007: 12) and geopolitical 
influence. As Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães argues (2006: 267), South America is a key space in 
Brazil’s global strategy, and a South American regional block could help articulate Brazil’s 
potential (ibid: 263). The Lula government thus sees South America as a continent that is useful for 
Brazilian economic development and for the aggregation of power that would allow Brazil to 
become a more significant global player. This view is made explicit by foreign minister Celso 
Amorim who argues (2007d: 120) that in a world of blocks even Brazil is a small country and 
therefore Brazil has sought to give impetus to South American integration. 
 
In Argentina’s case a similar critical vision of the FTAA and of neo-liberal globalization developed 
in the aftermath of Argentina’s severe downturn that led to a fall in GDP of approximately 11% in 
2002 alone (ECLAC, 2003). This vision was particularly developed after Néstor Kirchner became 
president in May 2003 and led to a renewal of the strategic alliance of Argentina and Brazil and to a 
more common vision in the development agendas of the two countries. In spite of the strengthening 
of a common vision, frictions persisted, largely as a consequence of Argentina’s autonomy seeking 
response to its development crisis. These frictions, however, should not be overstated. Instead what 
is noteworthy from 2003 and onwards is the success in maintaining the bilateral cooperation and 
dealing with the challenges with flexibility at the same time that they were able to pursue a broad 
common external agenda at the level of Mercosur.  
 
The External and Domestic Agenda of the Lula Government 
Luiz Inácio ”Lula”da Silva took over the presidency in Brazil on January 1 2003 in a situation 
where Brazil had been affected negatively by instability in international financial markets worried 
about the prospects of a the leftist PT in power in Brazil. In a speech by Ambassador Samuel 
Pinheiro Guimarães at his investiture as External Relations Secretary-General of the Lula 
government on January 9th Guimarães (2003), who is a sort of key ideological strategist of the 
government, particularly in the area of external relations, listed what he saw as the four most 
important challenges of Brazilian society: 1. To reduce economic, social and other disparities. 2. To 
eliminate external vulnerabilities. 3. To realize Brazil’s potential. 4. To construct an effective 
democracy with citizen participation in the formulation of public policies. The first of these three 
challenges are strongly intertwined since the elimination of external vulnerabilities of Brazil can 
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 help in reducing economic and social disparities and in allowing Brazil to realize its potential in 
terms of becoming a more developed country with a more central role in global and regional politics. 
 
A complex web of policies and actions on the part of the Brazilian government has been set in 
motion in order to achieve an improved development for Brazil in terms of economic growth and 
the three first goals or challenges highlighted by Guimarães. In regard to this, President Lula (2005) 
has emphasized that Brazil’s foreign policy is not just aimed at an increased international projection 
for Brazil but also plays a constitutive part in Brazil’s national development strategy. 
In this context, President Lula made clear from the outset of his first presidential period in 2003 that 
regional integration was of particular importance to Brazil’s foreign policy in his view. In his 
inaugural speech, he thus announced (2003) 
 
 “The greatest priority of our foreign policy during my government will 
 be the building of a politically stable, prosperous and united South America, 
 founded upon the ideals of democracy and social justice. To this end, decisive  
 action is required to vitalize Mercosur…” 
 
This emphasis on the importance of South America has been repeated time and time again during 
the Lula government. In respect to this, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães argues (2006: 364) that a just, 
democratic and rich South America is the goal in Brazil’s regional integration effort and that the 
key to achieving such an outcome and to making South America a pole in the international system 
is the alliance between Argentina and Brazil. The government’s external policy further is 
characterized by a tendency towards South-South cooperation, particularly with the large emerging 
world powers such as China, India, South Africa and Russia (Mercadante, 2006: 41) and the 
introduction of an ethical or social dimension in its external agenda that emphasizes the goal of a 
more socially just world (Lima and Hirst, 2006: 22). The government thus is characterized by 
having an agenda of change on the domestic front and on the international front, an agenda of 
change that focuses on development in the developing world and in Brazil and on furthering 
Brazil’s ambition of becoming a global player of greater importance in the international system.  
 
2003: A Defining Moment in Mercosur’s and South America’s Process of Integration 
As it has been argued the Mercosur countries and particularly Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay 
experienced a negative development in the period between 1997 and 2002. This created frictions 
between Member countries as well as a strong reduction in intra-regional exports. However, with 
the elections of Lula in Brazil and Kirchner in Argentina, regional integration came to get a new 
impetus (Lima and Coutinho, 2006: 12). Foreign minister Celso Amorim argues (2007c: 153) that 
the two leaders developed a broad convergence of views with regard to the problems and challenges 
faced by the two countries, although they also recognized the differences in the particular situations 
of the two countries. The convergence in views was expressed in a common document signed by 
the two presidents on October 16th. The document that was entitled the “Buenos Aires Consensus” 
underlined the strategic alliance between the two countries and their common aim of promoting 
development with equity (Candeas, 2005) and to use regional integration strategically as a way of 
strengthening the position of the two countries in the world, improve their negotiation capacity in 
international negotiations and gain greater decision-making autonomy by standing united. 
Furthermore, the document emphasizes the goal of fostering a broader South American integration 
process through balanced agreements with South American countries outside Mercosur as a way to 
foster economic growth with social justice (IADB-INTAL, 2003: 3). In this way, the presidents 
delineate a new model of regional integration that emphasizes the goal of a socially balanced 
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 development inside and between countries, whereas the model of integration pursued from 1991 
was more insistent on assuring a model of open integration based that emphasized the rules to be 
followed in the integration process. Although, agreements and rules are still important in the 
regional integration process in South America, it can be argued with reason that Mercosur moved 
from a rule-driven approach to a policy-oriented approach as Aldo Ferrer has argued. Ferrer argues 
(2006: 14) that it is clear that you cannot make Mercosur succeed through inflexible rules, because 
Mercosur only makes sense and is only useful for the individual member countries to the extent that 
it is compatible with their own development. In other words, if regional integration is unsuccessful 
in fostering national development there needs to be sufficient flexibility in rules and a search for 
policies that can help national development along. 
 
From this perspective, regional integration is likely to be successful if it is able to address common 
problems and interests and if is based on a flexible attitude, particularly on the part of the most 
powerful countries. Genna and Hiroi (2007: 43-44) argue from a theoretical point of view that it is 
likely that in regional integration processes “larger trade partners are willing to incur 
disproportionate costs because they expect the benefits from cooperation to outweigh them”. 
Exactly the emphasis on the need for a flexible attitude towards its South American partners has 
characterized the position taken by the Lula government, and it can be seen as part of its doctrine of 
solidarity in international affairs that I will get back to in the section on Brazil’s approach to dealing 
with asymmetrical development and asymmetrical interdependence at the level of Mercosur and 
South America. This flexible and solidarity-oriented approach has been developed by the Lula 
government in concordance with Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães view of how to approach regional 
integration. Guimarães thus argues (2006: 383) that the creation of a common territory, i.e. regional 
unification, is more political than economic and more economic than institutional and commercial. 
This position seems quite different from the one that was dominant in Mercosur in the 1990s where 
emphasis was on the commercial level. 
 
Apart from this development towards a more policy-oriented approach to regional integration and 
the strengthened emphasis on the role of Mercosur as an instrument of power aggregation that could 
give Mercosur and South America a stronger negotiation position in international negotiations and 
thus enhance decision-making autonomy, there has also been a move away from the commercial 
emphasis of the 1990s and towards a stronger emphasis on integration at the level of physical 
infrastructure and energy. As Lima and Vasconcelos argue (2006: 5) this type of integration builds 
on the states’ strategic vision of the region as well as on their capacity to mobilize needed resources. 
It also differs from the liberal open integration emphasis on market-driven economic and regional 
development and state withdrawal. In other words, the kind of regional integration that Brazil has 
been promoting in South America from 2003 has differed widely from the model of open 
integration in the 1990s. 
 
The convergence in thinking in Argentina and Brazil that was developed between the government 
of Kirchner and Lula in 2003 had an immediate impact in their international trade negotiations both 
at the level of South America, the Western Hemsiphere and at the multilateral level of WTO. 
 
At the hemispheric level, the FTAA envisioned by the United States was basically buried at the 
negotiating round in Miami in November 2003. Lula and Kirchner had agreed to participate in the 
FTAA negotiations from Mercosur and to seek a balanced agreement that would respect the 
different interests of the different states negotiating the FTAA (IADB-INTAL, 2003: 3). However, 
as the United States was unwilling to discuss agricultural trade, an area where Mercosur possesses 
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 offensive interests in opening up US markets to agricultural imports from Mercosur, while they 
went on pressing for common disciplines in the new issues of government procurement, 
investments, services and intellectual property where the US had offensive interests, the broad 
agreement that had been sought by the United States fell to the ground. As Mercadante points out 
(2006: 41), Brazil was unwilling to agree to such common disciplines as it would compromise 
Brazil’s capacity to pursue development-oriented industrial and technological policies. The 
affirmation of own interests and the willingness to defend the room of manoeuvre to pursue 
development-oriented policies has characterized the governments of Lula and Kirchner. This 
attitude of actively promoting own interests, along with the interests of the developing world more 
broadly, was also highly visible in the Cancún meeting of the WTO in September 2001, where the 
Brazil took a prominent position in the G 20. The G 20 was established shortly before the Cancún 
meeting as a coalition of developing countries with the inclusion of Brazil, India and China as well 
as Argentina and a number of other South American countries. The common interest of these 
countries was to negotiate global agricultural trade offensively with a view of opening agricultural 
markets in the developed world and more generally to change the rules in international agricultural 
trade in a direction that could enhance the development of developing countries. Although no 
agreement was reached in Cancún and that the developed nations have blamed the G 20 for getting 
in the way of a successful conclusion of the trade round, Brazil’s foreign minister Celso Amorim 
argues (2007e: 222) that “Cancún represents a moment of affirmation for the new actors arising in 
the scenario of trade diplomacy, who are committed to overcome the historical distortions of the 
international trade system, that are harmful to the developing countries”. At the level of South 
American regional integration, the new understanding and purpose of Brazil and Argentina helped 
to strengthen the cooperation at the level of Mercosur that gave way to a free trade agreement with 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela and a free trade agreement with Peru in 2003. On this 
background the South American Community of Nations was formed in 2004 thus creating a new 
entity where all South American nations were members (Mercadante, 2006: 38-39). In this way, it 
can be argued that the Lula government was successful in moving fast from the beginning towards 
the explicit goal of the construction of South American regional integration. At the same time, a 
common vision was developed between Argentina and Brazil with regard to development and 
international relations. This does not mean that frictions and disagreements were absent. There were 
such frictions and disagreements, largely as a function of different national interests and due to 
asymmetries between the two countries. 
 
In the following segment, I will analyze the significance of regional integration at the level of 
Mercosur and South America for Brazil’s economic development. An understanding of this issue 
helps to explain Brazil’s emphasis on regional integration in South America and its attempts at 
dealing with the challenges that emerge on the basis of development asymmetries and different 
national interests. 
 
The Significance of Mercosur and South America for Brazil’s economic development  
Brazilian foreign policy has different purposes. A key purpose of its foreign policy is that it should 
contribute to national development (Lima and Hirst, 2006). In a recent newspaper article foreign 
minister Celso Amorim argues (2007b) that the ministry of external affairs during his period has 
worked intensively to promote Brazil’s development by pragmatic means and with a long term 
vision. He points out that South American integration has paved the way for a wider level of Latin 
American integration and that Latin America and the Caribbean now absorbed 26% of Brazilian 
exports and that South America alone was a bigger export market than the United States. At the 
same time 55% of Brazil’s exports now went to the developing countries and most of these exports 
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 were manufacturing exports. These comments show that South America and the developing world 
more generally are thought of in grand Brazilian development strategy in terms of its weight in 
Brazil’s exports and thereby also in terms of how Brazil can reach its potential by an emphasis on 
relations with the developing world. These relations contribute to Brazil’s development potential 
and to its relative power status in international affairs through a combination of improved market 
access in these countries and a policy of coalition building with other developing countries with a 
view of furthering their interests and influence in the international system. Integration with 
Mercosur countries and at the level of South America is a key ingredient in this overall strategy. 
 
Brazil has sought to diversify its external relations and its exports giving emphasis to the 
developing world and to South America in particular. For Brazil, the relationship to South America 
is a strategic project pursued with a long term vision (Lima and Coutinho, 2006) and it forms part of 
a strategy to trade “horizontally”, i.e. with other developing nations in South America and the 
developing world as a whole. The government itself speaks of this in terms of changing the 
geography of international trade. This strategy can be seen from the perspective that the 
diversification of exports helps reduce Brazil’s dependence on traditional export markets in the 
developed countries. In 2002, for instance, 25,0% of Brazil’s exports were absorbed by the EU and 
25,7% by the United States (BCB, 2003: 136). These percentages had dropped to 22,1% to the EU 
and 18% to the United States by 2006 (BCB, 2007: 117). Another way of understanding the 
strategy is from the perspective that the dynamics of the global economy mean that the developing 
world is growing in importance and that the Brazilian strategy therefore is to diversify exports 
towards the dynamic markets in the developing world. 
 
Mercosur and South America as a whole these markets have grown in importance during the 
presidency of Lula. The combination of renewed economic growth in the region, the revitalization 
of Mercosur along with new trade agreements and other initiatives in South America have 
contributed to this picture. The relative weight of exports to regional markets in total exports has 
grown at a time where exports as such have grown with a high degree of dynamism. Total exports 
thus went from US$ 60.362 billion in 2002 prior to Lula’s presidency to US$ 137.471 billion in 
2006 at the end of his first presidential period (SECEX/MDIC, 2007: 10).  
 
Dynamic exports and significant trade surpluses have been an explicit goal of the government in its 
attempt to bring down the external vulnerability of Brazil and to create the conditions for dynamic 
economic growth (Mercadante, 2006: 47-59). At the same time, the government’s trade, export and 
industrial policies aim at strengthening the industrial sector and not the least in sectors characterized 
by high value-adding. In this regard, Brazilian exports to the South American region are strongly 
dominated by manufacturing exports. In a report on the importance of South America to the 
industrial sector, Brazil’s National Industrial Confederation stresses that South America has 
strategic value for the industrial sector in Brazil (CNI, 2007a: 9). After the downturn in Brazil’s 
exports to South America during the crisis period 1998-2002, exports to South America started 
rising faster to South America than to the rest of the world, and in 2006 South American markets 
absorbed a greater share of Brazil’s exports than the United States. Also, although the contribution 
to Brazil’s total exports was a little below 20%, South America absorbed 31,5% of Brazilian 
manufacturing exports and at the same time, Brazilian investments in the region have grown 
significantly in recent years (CNI, 2007a: 9-11). In this way, South American markets are of great 
importance to the strengthening of the Brazilian industrial sector and therefore they are also quite 
important for the overall economic development of Brazil. The same tendency can be seen in 
statistics on Mercosur and the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). In the following I 
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 go into some more detail with regard to the importance of the region to Brazilian exports, foreign 
direct investments and to Brazilian development. I particularly focus on Mercosur and South 
America as a whole and briefly bring in LAIA where the ten most economically important South 
American countries are members along with Mexico and Cuba. 
 
 
Exports to Brazil’s Mercosur partners have increased significantly after the steep fall between 1998 
and 2002 as it is evident from table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Intra-Mercosur exports in millions of US$ and as a percentage of total exports 
 
Year 1998 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Exports to 
Mercosur 
20,322 10,197 12,709 17,319 21,134 25,675 
Percentage 
in total 
Mercosur 
exports 
25,3 11,4 11,9 12,9 13,0 13,5 
(Cepal, 2007: 137) 
 
Table 3 shows that the percentage of total Mercosur exports accounted for by intra-Mercosur 
exports has been rising constantly, though slowly, from 2002 to 2006. The value of intra-Mercosur 
exports has risen strongly though. This reflects the dynamism of total Mercosur exports that more 
than doubled between 2002 and 2006 (Cepal, 2007: 37). This export dynamism has assured 
Mercosur substantial trade surpluses of above US$ 50 billion in 2005 and 2006 (IADB-INTAL, 
2007b: 25). However, the results vary substantially between the four member countries. Brazil and 
Argentina both have significant trade surpluses while Uruguay and Paraguay have trade deficits. 
Brazil’s trade surplus in 2006 thus reached the record high level of US$ 46 billion and Argentina 
showed a trade surplus of around US$ 12 billion (ibid: 29). With regard to intra-Mercosur trade, 
however, only Brazil shows a surplus. This surplus has been on the rise in recent years and was 
slightly higher than US$ 5 billion in 2006. The highest deficit was registered by Argentina, whose 
intra-Mercosur deficit was somewhat above US$ 2.7 billion (ibid: 23). When considering the 
relative weight of exports to Mercosur in the trade composition of the four members, the following 
picture emerges for the year of 2006. Brazil exported slightly more than 10% to Mercosur, 
Argentina around 19,5%, Uruguay almost 25% and Paraguay close to 48% (ibid: 29). This shows 
that interdependence between the four countries is asymmetrical. The small members and Argentina 
are relatively more dependent on Brazil for their exports than Brazil is on exports to the Mercosur. 
The relatively high degree of dependence on the part of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay on 
Mercosur (particularly on Brazil) shows that Mercosur has come to be important for their 
development. In the case of Argentina, Brazil was its biggest export market in 2004 and 2005 
(IADB-INTAL, 2007a: 20). The dependence of its Mercosur partners on Brazil gives Brazil a 
powerful position in the region. Apart from asymmetries in mutual trade in terms of Brazil’s surplus, 
asymmetries in the composition of exports are also clear. Brazil’s exports are predominantly 
industrial whereas Uruguay’s and Paraguay’s are predominantly natural resource based (IADB-
INTAL, 2007b: 24). Similarly, the bilateral trade between Argentina and Brazil in the period from 
2002 to 2005 went from a situation of an Argentinean surplus to a growing Brazilian surplus, and 
by 2005 Argentina experienced a record trade deficit with Brazil in industrial exports (IADB-
INTAL, 2006: 31) and the trade composition was also favourable to Brazil that had more high 
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 value-added exports (Ferrer, 2006: 14). The picture improved a bit in 2006 from the perspective of 
Argentina as it reduced its deficit in bilateral trade with Brazil largely thanks to dynamic 
manufacturing exports (IADB-INTAL, 2007b: 23).  
 
Mercosur thus provides Brazil with an important export market in which manufacturing exports 
dominate. This is helped along by Brazil’s competitiveness and higher level of development in this 
area and by the customs union that favours Brazil’s competitiveness. Mercosur’s importance for 
Brazilian foreign direct investments has also increased strongly during the presidency of Lula, 
particularly to Argentina, while FDI in Brazil originating in other Mercosur countries is relatively 
unimportant in spite of Brazil’s strong success in attracting FDI (ibid: 23-24). Thus, from 
Argentina’s crisis and its devaluation of the peso in 2002 and to mid-2007, Brazilian industrial 
businesses have invested more than US$ 7 billion in Argentina, an amount that is almost four time 
as high as Brazilian direct investments in Argentina during the 1990s and is explained in part by the 
favourable prices in Argentina after the devaluation (ibid: 37). Brazilian investments in Uruguay 
also expanded vigorously between 2004 and 2006, while Paraguay has not been an important 
destination of Brazilian FDI (ibid, 36-38). Particularly, Petrobrás stands out in Brazil’s FDI in 
Argentina between 2002 and 2004 (CNI, 2007c: 23) and indeed in Brazil’s South American 
investments more generally. In the period 2005 to 2007, Brazils FDI in Argentina has been spread 
out on more companies and sectors (IADB-INTAL, 2007b: 37). 
 
The tendencies noted in the case of Mercosur are similar at the level of South America and LAIA. 
In fact, the Brazilian export success and trade surplus is even more pronounced at these levels., 
Brazil’s export surplus with the Andes countries in the Andes Community (Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela2) increased dramatically between 1999 and 2005, and while Brazil’s 
share in the imports of these countries increased from 4% to 8%, Brazil’s imports from the Andes 
Community remained basically stagnant (FUNCEX, 2006: 2-5). The asymmetry from a strongly 
favourable trade balance on the part of Brazil is repeated in terms of the composition of the trade. 
For instance, in 2003-2004, more than 90% of Brazil’s exports to the Andes Community originated 
in the manufacturing sector, while some 56% of Brazil’s imports from the area consisted of energy 
(ibid: 6-7). Venezuela left the Andes Community in 2006 due to the interest of member countries 
Peru and Colombia in negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with the United States, a policy 
that goes against Venezuela’s interest in furthering regional integration in Latin America and 
increasing autonomy with regards to the United States. Instead, Venezuela was accepted into the 
Mercosur, although final ratification of the integration of Venezuela is still blocked by the Brazilian 
parliament in spite of the Brazilian government’s favourable view of Venezuela’s membership 
(Lima and Santos, 2008: 8-9). In 2006, Venezuela was the fastest growing export market for Brazil 
on the list of Brazil’s 12 largest export markets (SECEX/MDIC, 2007: 21) and Brazil’s export 
surplus with Venezuela was extraordinarily high with exports of US$ 3.555 million and imports of 
US$ 592 million (CEPAL, 2007: 140).  
 
When one compares Brazil’s exports to LAIA (that includes all Mercosur members, all members of 
the Andes Community, Chile, Cuba and Mexico) with the export performance to Mercosur, what 
stands out is the stronger performance in non-Mercosur LAIA markets of Brazil’s exports. For 
instance, Brazilian exports to Mercosur markets corresponded to 10,1% of Brazil’s exports against 
the 12,7% going to non-Mercosur LAIA markets in 2006 (SECEX/MDIC: 2007: 20) and export 
growth was higher to non-Mercosur LAIA markets with 28,8% against 20,4% growth in Brazilian 
                                                 
2 Venezuela left the block in 2006. 
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 exports to Mercosur from 2005 to 2006. Argentina remains Brazil’s largest individual export market 
in the South American region with more than 40% in recent years against the more than 50% in 
1997-1998. Chile, Venezuela and Colombia follow in second, third and fourth place (CNI, 2007a: 
11) and corresponded to around 35% of Brazil’s South American exports in 2005-2006 (CNI, 
2007b: 28, 31 and 52). At the level of South America, more than 75% of Brazil’s exports are high 
value-added goods (CNI, 2007a: 11) and the two largest recipients of Brazilian FDI are Argentina 
and Chile (ibid: 20). Brazil’s success in exports in the region has led to a substantial trade surplus 
for Brazil in the region. In 2006 Brazil’s total LAIA exports reached US$ 31.382 billion, with 
around US$ 14 billion going to Mercosur and US$ 17,5 billion going to the other LAIA countries. 
Taken together LAIA was therefore Brazil’s biggest export market in 2006 (SECEX/MDIC, 2006: 
19). In the same year Brazil’s imports from LAIA countries reached US$ 16.328 billion, with 
around US$ 9 billion coming from Mercosur and US$ 7,4 billion coming from other LAIA 
countries. Taken together LAIA is Brazil’s third largest supplier (ibid: 28). Brazil’s export surplus 
with LAIA is thus substantial and trade with LAIA countries is highly asymmetrical in Brazil’s 
favour both in terms of size and composition, as Brazil’s exports are largely industrial whereas 
imports are largely natural resource based.  
 
All in all, Mercosur, South America and LAIA function well for Brazil in terms of its economic 
development, the strengthening of its manufacturing sector and the reduction of its external 
vulnerability. As a consequence, it is in Brazil’s economic interest to maintain close relations to its 
regional partners.  
 
Brazil’s successful economic relations with its regional partners is caused by a combination of the 
high level of economic growth in the region from 2003, Brazil’s trade agreements in the region that 
have improved its market access and Brazil’s competitive economy and strength in sectors where 
import demand is high in the region, basically in the industrial sector. In short a combination of 
Brazil’s competitive economy and the political priority given by Brazil to the region are factors that 
have contributed to its strong export and FDI performance in the region. 
 
Apart from this economic aspect related to the strategic importance of regional integration from the 
perspective of Brazil, regional integration is also viewed as strategically important in assuring 
Brazil a stronger role politically in the international system as a leader of an expanded Mercosur 
with the inclusion of all of South America in the Community of South American Nations, now 
UnaSul or Union of South America.  
 
However, dissatisfaction with the increasingly asymmetrical nature of the relationship between 
Brazil and its South American neighbours, suspicions with regards to the goals of Brazilian 
leadership, differences of national interests and strategies of integration in the global economy 
along with rivalling projects and alliances could derail Brazil’s project of reaching its potential and 
an improved international power status by making South America a pole in a multi-polar world 
order under Brazilian leadership. 
 
In short, Brazil’s South American neighbours may not want the kind of South America that Brazil 
wants. Thus, national level politics and national interests in the region could make it difficult for 
Brazil to keep regional integration on track. The same is true with regard to domestic Brazilian 
politics. In Brazil, the Lula government’s foreign policy in general and particularly its South 
American policy is controversial. Critics find the policy unrealistic and counterproductive and 
would prefer that Brazil emphasized closer relations with the United States and the EU more. 
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 Marcelo de Paiva Abreu is an example of one of the harshest critics. He argues that the Lula 
government’s attempt at becoming strong by allying itself with South America and powerful 
developing countries and to expand Mercosur in order to weaken the FTAA desired by the United 
States is unrealistic and grotesque. He particularly criticizes the flexible position of the Lula 
government towards Argentina at the level of Mercosur, the policy of prioritizing an alliance with 
Venezuela and the desire to gain a protagonist role on the international political stage (Abreu, 2006).  
 
In the following section, I will briefly analyze the frictions and conflicts that have emerged in 
Mercosur in the recent period and what Brazil has done to strengthen regional cohesion in Mercosur 
and to expand regional integration at the South American level. I will also bring in the debates in 
Brazil around Brazil’s strategy in order to assess future scenarios in Brazil’s foreign policy strategy. 
 
Difficulties in the Regional Integration Process and Brazil’s Responses 
A number of frictions and conflicts have developed in the South American region since 2003, but at 
the same time the period has been a period of increased cooperation in the continent. Brazil’s 
strategic emphasis on South American integration has contributed to this increased cooperation. 
 
I would argue that Brazil has had two main focus areas. The main focus has been its bilateral 
strategic alliance with Argentina, and the second most important focus has been the attempt to 
create South American unity at the level of the Community of South American Nations, now 
Unasul. There are different reasons for these priorities. An important reason is that Argentina and a 
number of CASA members outside Mercosur are Brazil’s most important economic partners. 
Another reason has been to compete with the United States in attracting cooperation in the region, 
where the United States has made bilateral free trade agreements with Chile and Peru, and is 
considering a similar agreement with Colombia. Brazil therefore faces difficult challenges in 
constructing South American unity due to the perforation in unity and trade preferences implied by 
the mentioned trade agreements. 
 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães finds (2006: 255) that the FTAA proposed by the United States has 
neo-colonial aspects to it. This position was shared by the Argentine government of Kirchner and 
the Brazilian government in 2003 that espoused a high degree of mutual understanding and ability 
to coordinate their foreign trade strategy (Candeas, 2005: 209). Both governments prioritized the 
South American space and wanted to avoid the FTAA proposed by the United States and instead 
protect the autonomy of Argentina, Brazil and South America (Patricio, 2006: 20). Post-crisis 
Argentina had thus left behind its strong alignment with the United States that had characterized the 
1990s (Bernal-Meza, 1999). This strengthened Brazil’s chance for creating a stronger alliance at the 
South American level, although the interest of countries such as Chile, Colombia and Peru in 
bilateral free trade agreements complicated the goal of uniting South America and making it a pole 
in international politics. 
 
In spite of the common understanding of Argentina and Brazil in international trade negotiations 
outside the Mercosur, there were frictions internally in Mercosur. During the crisis in 2001, 
Argentina had introduced a number of unilateral policies aimed at protecting and promoting the 
economy. Amongst these, it broke the rules concerning the common external tariff (Christensen, 
2007a: 15). In response to its development crisis, Argentina completely reversed its neo-liberal 
strategy both in terms of economic policies, leaving behind liberal norms and agreements and 
introducing strong interventionist policies, and in terms of its foreign policy strategy that left the 
strategy of cooperation along liberal norms and re-introduced a policy of “heterodox autonomy” 
131
 (Candeas, 2005: 180). Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt and it broke contracts with privatized 
service sector companies that were often owned by foreign TNCs. At the level of Mercosur, 
Argentina broke a number of norms (Crawley, 2003: 15) and introduced restrictions against imports 
from Brazil (IADB-INTAL, 2004: 56). Brazil took a conciliatory stance in relation to Argentina’s 
criticisms of Brazil’s industrial and export support mechanisms (ibid: 64) and during 2003 there 
was a number of bilateral meetings between Argentine and Brazilian vice-ministers of trade and 
industry (BCB, 2004: 112). 
 
In spite of Brazil’s good will, Argentina’s trade deficit with Brazil went on growing at the same 
time that Brazil was vastly more successful in attracting FDI from outside Mercosur (IADB-INTAL, 
2005: 31), and Argentina sought to introduce norms in the Mercosur that should allow escape 
clauses in trade rules in situations characterized by disruptive intra-Mercosur trade as well as to 
introduce a policy of regulating FDI to the region (ibid, i). The aim was to protect what was seen as 
“sensitive sectors” in the economy. All of these belonged to the manufacturing sector (ibid: 49-54). 
The policy suggestion was designed to protect the industrial sector in Argentina by circumventing 
intra-Mercosur trade norms. There were different reactions in Brazil to Argentina’s demands (Hirst, 
2005: 2). The government took a conciliatory position, after first having gone against the proposal, 
arguing that Brazil was not interested in the de-industrialization of Argentina (Candeas, 2005: 210) 
and a number of sector level agreements were reached (IADB-INTAL, 2007a: 22, 36 and 39). 
Amongst the critical voices, José Augusto Guilhon de Albuqerque criticized Argentina’s flexible 
posture, arguing that it hurt Brazilian business interests, and the Brazilian business sector was also 
strongly against the idea (Christensen, 2007a: 18-19). However, the policy was introduced and gave 
way to the MAC mechanism that institutionalized the right to temporarily go against Mercosur’s 
trade rules in order to protect economic sectors from Brazilian imports. 
 
Clearly, Mercosur’s approach to regional integration was changing in the direction of addressing 
asymmetries in order to assure support for Mercosur. According to Celso Amorim (Pinto, 2006: 16-
17), this direction was called for, as the strong trade growth in the 1990s had led to the neglect of 
this important issue. Amongst the defenders of this new flexible approach, Lima and Coutinho 
(2006) argue that it was not strange that Argentina wanted to protect itself against the strongly 
competitive Brazilian industrial sector. Mercosur thus had entered a period where the emphasis was 
not so much on rules as in the 1990s but more on constructing the possible Mercosur as argued by 
Aldo Ferrer (2006: 13) by taking into consideration national development needs. He further argues 
that this should be seen as an improvement of Mercosur since Mercosur should be functional in 
terms of national development for all the members. The arguments for and against this kind of 
policy are many. Some find that it shows an overly ideological posture on Brazil’s side in terms of 
supporting leftist governments in the region and in terms of emphasizing the need to fight 
development asymmetries. Others find that Brazil’s flexibility and solidarity is good and that it is 
likely to be useful in terms of the country’s long-term strategic interests. I would agree to this last 
point. One should also consider that Argentina’s arguments for allowing for flexible rules is based 
on Argentina’s competitiveness problem in the industrial sector (IADB-INTAL, 2007a: 39) and that 
it is understandable and reasonable that Argentina seeks to re-industrialize by defending the 
interests of its industrial sector after its crisis. If Brazil had been inflexible in a rules-oriented 
posture, it could have hurt Mercosur and the bilateral relations between Argentina and Brazil. 
Argentina’s defence of its industrial sector is carried forward by the same kind of concern that led 
Brazil to go against the FTAA proposed by the United States, one should also remember.  
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 Before discussing Brazil’s strategy towards Paraguay and Uruguay, let us now move to what I see 
as the second most important emphasis in Brazil’s South American regional strategy, namely the 
construction of South American unity. The first step in this direction was taken in 2003 with the 
ACE 59 agreement between Mercosur and the three Andes Community members Ecuador, 
Colombia and Venezuela that made these countries associated members of Mercosur, and with the 
trade agreement between Mercosur and Peru. With these agreements Mercosur and the Andes 
Community moved closer (Mercadante, 2006: 38-39). In the ACE 59 it was agreed to introduce 
schedules for gradual tariff reductions and special treatment of less developed countries (IADB-
INTAL, 2004). These agreements opened the space for a South America wide agreement in 2004, 
the so-called South American Community of Nations. The SACN (now UnaSur) consists of the 
Mercosur countries, the Andes countries and Chile, Suriname and Guyana and thus all of South 
America. The goal of this new economic alliance was to increase coordination between the member 
states and to create convergence between the Mercosur, CAN and the other countries as well as to 
promote integration of physical infrastructure and energy on the whole South American continent 
(Mercadante, 2006: 39). The SACN also aimed at creating a free trade zone consistent with 
economic growth and development and the reduction of economic asymmetries (ECLAC, 2007: 
146). According to Celso Amorim (2007d: 119-120), physical integration of the continent should 
make South America rich in the 21’st century in the same way that physical integration had made 
the United States rich in the 19’th century, and the physical integration should help avoid that South 
America was to be split up in a Pacific part and an Atlantic part. In this way, the Brazilian 
government is taking a logistical approach to South American integration focused on the transport 
infrastructure and the energy infrastructure. This is similar to the strategy of the European Union 
that at the outset started as a steel and coal union. At the same time the policy can be seen as an 
attempt to draw in Brazil’s South American neighbours in a process of closer cooperation and 
perhaps avoid that they become overly tied to the US economy as a consequence of bilateral free 
trade agreements with the US entered by Chile and Peru and under negotiation with Colombia. 
 
The conception of integration underlying the emphasis on physical integration is quite different 
from the commercial approach of the 1990s, and it builds on a model of integration in which the 
state is involved in coordinating the process of physical integration. Both the Brazilian development 
bank (BNDES) and the development bank of the Andes Community (CAF) have helped finance a 
large number of infrastructural projects (Mercadante, 2006: 40) and thus make up for the lack of 
investments in infrastructure since the debt crisis of the 1980s (Alexandre and Pinheiro, 2005).  
 
With regard to economic asymmetries between Brazil and e.g. the Andes Countries, these have 
become quite pronounced as mentioned earlier. The Brazilian government sees this as a problem 
(Pinto, 2006: 16) and has attempted to find ways to import more from the Andes Countries. In a 
report from FUNCEX (2006) it was attempted to find out what the hindrances and possibilities for 
this were. The conclusion was that the two main problems were a lack of competitiveness and 
knowledge about the Brazilian market in the Andes countries as well as poor infrastructure. It is 
therefore by no means easy to create incentives for the Andes countries, and Peru and Colombia 
continue giving priority to their relations to the United States. Conflicts have also emerged recently 
between Colombia on the one side and Venezuela and Ecuador on the other side in relation to the 
killing by the Colombian army of a FARC guerrilla leader in Ecuador. However, this incident may 
not have lasting consequences and infrastructural projects may have positive impacts on 
development in the region and thus come to create an incentive for cooperation. It is too early to say 
though if it will help create the unity desired by Brazil. Also, the free trade agreements in place in 
the SACN are shallower in terms of investment issues than is the case between some of the 
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 members and extra-regional developed countries (ECLAC, 2007: 150-151), and critics such as 
Rubens Barbosa3 find that Brazil should deepen agreements with the countries that have free trade 
agreements with the United States. The National Confederation of Industry has criticized the 
agreements with the Andes countries for being too favourable for the Andes countries in terms of 
their easier market access to Brazil than the other way around (Costa, 2007: 33). This criticism is a 
typical criticism against the Lula government from those who find that it is overly ideological in its 
approach and that it is too generous towards its neighbours due to their similar left-wing ideologies 
or less developed economies. This criticism is often raised against the Lula government and it was 
particularly harsh when Bolivia decided to nationalize energy resources and later oil refineries in 
2006 and 2007 as these decisions were met with acceptance on the part of the Brazilian government 
based on their arguments about Bolivia’s right to nationalize and a posture of solidarity towards 
Bolivia due to its deep development problems (Christensen, 2007b: 150-152). 
 
I find the criticism unconvincing. It would seem that if Brazil wants to have a good relationship 
with its neighbours and to protect its long term interests, Brazil needs to take a pragmatic stance and 
it needs to be perceived as being willing to address economic asymmetries. Brazil is definitely 
winning from their relationship with the region and it is in its strategic long-term interest to 
maintain good relations in the region. 
 
The acceptance of Venezuela into Mercosur in 2006 has also been met with strong criticisms from 
the opposition in Brazil. Critics worry that Venezuela will politicize Mercosur due to the strong 
anti-US rhetoric from president Hugo Chávez and due to the socialist orientation of the Chávez 
government. Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur could also make agreements with the US and EU 
even more difficult (Christensen, 2007b: 153-154). However, as Mônica Hirst (2006: 2) argues the 
last argument should be turned around. It was probably more as a consequence of Brazil’s and 
Mercosur’s distancing from the US-sponsored FTAA that Venezuela got interested in joining 
Mercosur. Particularly after Venezuela’s Andes Community partners Colombia and Peru set on a 
course of negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with the US. Furthermore, Mercosur gains in 
economic size and is strengthened in the energy sector with the inclusion of Venezuela. 
Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur, however, has not been ratified yet as there is some resistance to it 
from Paraguay and Brazil. In Brazil the government supports Venezuela’s inclusion, but there is 
resistance in parliament. Thus, there is a possibility that Brazil may come to stand in the way of 
Venezuela’s entry. This would surely weaken the process of further integration in the region and 
could get in the way of the Lula government’s overall strategy. Lima and Santos (2008: 15) argue 
that a further risk is that this would throw Venezuela in the arms of extra-regional powers much like 
Cuba’s isolation in the region after the Cuban revolution may be said to have given it incentives to 
find a new “sponsor” extra-regionally in the form of the USSR. As they argue, this would definitely 
not be in Brazil’s long term interest and Brazil ought to take a long term strategic view on its 
relationship with Venezuela instead of emphasizing the characteristics of its current government. 
Apart from such questions of grand long term strategy, the fact is that Brazil’s day to day economic 
relationship with Venezuela has developed in an extraordinarily positive way for Brazil that has 
seen record growth in its exports to Venezuela that is almost exclusively concentrated in 
manufacturing making Venezuela Brazil’s third largest export market in South America following 
Argentina and Chile (CNI, 2007b: 31) and that the two countries are developing energy projects in 
collaboration paving the way towards the physical integration that forms part of the Lula 
government’s development and regional integration strategy. 
                                                 
3 Denize Bacoccina, Folha de São Paulo, March 14’th 2008: “Rubens Barbosa vê ideologização na política externa”. 
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The Brazilian government’s emphasis on its bilateral relationship with Argentina and its project of 
South American integration has arguably put the relationship with Paraguay and Uruguay in the 
background, at least in the first part of the Lula government. This seems to be changing now. In fact, 
a number of initiatives for reducing asymmetries in Mercosur in order for it to work better for the 
two small members were taken from the onset of Lula’s presidency in 2003 (IADB-INTAL, 2007b: 
39). However, in spite of these initiatives the reality was that Paraguay’s and Uruguay’s intra-
regional exports were basically stagnant between 2004 and 2006, while rising imports led to a 
growing trade deficit with the two big member states (IADB-INTAL, 2007a: 17; IADB-INTAL, 
2007b: 23). According to an IADB-INTAL report, Paraguay’s export problems in the region is 
mainly due to the composition of its exports that is not complementary with the import needs in 
Argentina and Brazil, while Uruguay’s problem is mainly with a lack of competitiveness (IADB-
INTAL, 2007a: 39-42). At the same time, the ongoing conflict between Uruguay and Argentina 
regarding the installation of polluting paper factories in Uruguay strained relations (Christensen, 
2007b). This led to frustration in the two small member countries and to threats that they would 
pursue a free trade agreement with the United States and possibly leave Mercosur. The Brazilian 
government has argued that the frustration was understandable and that a new deal should be sought 
in Mercosur (Pinto, 2006: 16-17). The introduction of structural funds (FOCEM) in Mercosur was a 
first step in this direction (Mercadante, 2006: 37-38). Another step was taken in 2006 when 
Mercosur’s Common Market Council (CMC) asked Paraguay and Uruguay to develop a plan for 
extinguishing asymmetries in the block. This plan was developed and in 2007 an agreement was 
made with decision no. 33/07 of the CMC regarding the instalment of a high level group that should 
elaborate a final plan with an emphasis on support for smaller countries and better market access for 
the smaller members to the markets of the bigger members. The high level groups should also come 
up with different types of instruments that could support the development of the smaller countries 
through financing, policies of integration and complementation of productive sectors, joint venture 
programs, cooperation programs etc (Mercosur/CMC/DEC No 33/07). In this way, the Mercosur is 
returning to the original character of the bilateral integration process between Argentina and Brazil 
in the late 1980s with its emphasis on strategic actions and productive development contrary to the 
purely commercial approach of the 1990s. 
 
Relationships between Uruguay and Brazil have improved recently as Brazil accepted Uruguay’s 
Trade and Investment Facilitation Agreement with the United States and promised new Brazilian 
investments and development finance from the BNDES with the argument “that it was the 
responsibility of the larger members to address the “asymmetries””4 that had provoked Uruguay’s 
dissatisfaction. Uruguay, however, had also been committed to develop the agreement with the 
United States in a way that would not harm the common external tariff of the Mercosur, arguing 
that Mercosur was a strategic priority for Uruguay, although Uruguay is working for a reform of the 
common external tariff that is more in its interest (IADB-INTAL, 2007b: 40). In the case of 
Paraguay, the threat to leave Mercosur is not credible. In 2006 more than 50% of its exports went to 
Mercosur (IADB-INTAL, 2007a: 29) and it is thus highly dependent on the regional market. 
However, as in the case of Bolivia, Paraguay is a weak economy based on primary goods (Kfuri and 
Lamas, 2007: 2) and with energy exports particularly from the bi-national electricity producer Itaipú 
playing an important role in its exports. Paraguay and Brazil own Itaipú in common, but Paraguay 
exports most of its 50% share in the electricity production to Brazil at a negotiated rate 
corresponding to the cost of production. Paraguay’s newly elected president, Fernando Lugo wants 
                                                 
4 Mercopress, Tuesday, February 27, 2007: ”Lula da Silva and Vezquez agree to another patch for Mercosur” 
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 to change this deal and assure a more adequate price for Paraguay. While Lula rejected the idea for 
a start arguing that a deal is a deal and has to be respected, Celso Amorim was favourable of 
discussing a fair price. He argued that the most important was to reach agreement on a fair price in 
order to assure harmony in Mercosur5. This posture of solidarity and harmony is strongly criticized 
by some of the government’s critics with the argument that the government is overly flexible and 
does not defend the interests of Brazil. 
 
I disagree with this view. It seems that Brazil’s pragmatic posture of negotiating with its neighbours 
in order to reach a good understanding is a prerequisite for the success of a regional integration 
process that needs to be seen as beneficial by all member states in order to gain strength and in 
order to work towards a common voice in international affairs. At the same time, Brazil’s external 
action of working against asymmetries is mirrored by the Lula government’s internal action with its 
aim of reducing social and regional asymmetries in Brazil (Mercadante, 2006: 113-183). It has been 
argued by critics of the government that since Brazil is poorer in terms of average GDP per capita, 
it does not really have the resources to also fight asymmetries externally. However, it should be 
noted that the Brazilian policies towards asymmetry reduction largely focus on trade related matters 
and investments that are arguably also in Brazil’s development interest and less on monetary 
support. Where Brazil has taken on costs and may take on further costs, such as in the case of gas 
imports from Bolivia and electricity imports from Paraguay this has had to do with relationships 
where Brazil is the richer country and where a posture of solidarity enhances its possibility for 
cementing a leadership position in the region that has been somewhat challenged by the Chávez 
government’s largesse. As for the structural funds in the Mercosur, these have been very limited 
largely due to fiscal strictness, but should grow as Brazil and Argentina grow stronger and their 
capacity to contribute to structural convergence funds increase. In the long term, it is unclear how 
Brazil’s South America strategy will develop. This will depend on a number of things such as 
possible contingencies that come up and make South American unity more difficult in a region that 
is characterized by large development problems and very different development strategies and 
foreign relations. However, an essential question has to do with Brazil’s future governments. What 
will they want and how will they look at South American integration. The Lula government clearly 
has given strong emphasis on South American integration and South-South cooperation more 
generally, but it is having difficulties getting its support for Venezuela’s inclusion accepted in 
Congress. There are also groups in Brazil that favour a closer relationship to the US and to the EU 
higher than South American integration. Therefore, domestic Brazilian politics will be of key 
importance to the future of South American integration, since the strategies of the preponderant 
country in South America is of utmost importance in this regard.      
 
 
Conclusion 
Brazil’s development strategy during Lula’s presidency has aimed at constructing a solid basis for 
sustainable growth with social integration in the long term and to avoid the many swings in the 
development path of Brazil provoked by its external vulnerability from 1980 until the beginning of 
the Lula government. 
 
In order to achieve this long term goal, the strategic action of the state in a number of areas has been 
of utmost importance.  
 
                                                 
5 Folha de São Paulo, Folha Online, April 22, 2008: ”Lugo quer renegociar tatado de itaipu; Lula nega revisar o preço”. 
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 First of all it was important to increase exports substantially in order to assure a large trade surplus 
that could help stabilize the economy financially and create conditions for productive growth and a 
reduced “country risk” in international financial markets. A renewed emphasis on strategic 
industrial policies along with trade and technology policies was introduced with this aim, and the 
emphasis on physical integration in South America should be understood in this context as well, i.e. 
as a way to construct productive capacities systemically and in this way gain competitiveness 
internationally. 
 
In this strategy South America and the global South played an important role. South America was 
important as a platform for Brazil’s exports and international competitiveness and for its industrial 
development. It was also important in political terms as a means for aggregating political power to 
be utilized in international negotiations. The global South was important as it was useful in terms of 
assuring the diversification of Brazil’s exports geographically and to contribute to its industrial 
exports as well. Furthermore, South-South coalitions also functioned as a way to aggregate power 
and promote Brazilian interests in international trade negotiations particularly in order to press the 
developed countries to agree to more balanced trade rules. These were seen as a way to reduce 
development asymmetries globally and were part and parcel of Brazil’s international agenda of 
shaping globalization in a more socially inclusive direction, both in the interest of Brazil’s own 
development and in the interest of other developing countries. This emphasis on the reduction of 
development disparities and problems can be seen as a new contribution by the Lula government to 
Brazil’s international political agenda. This ideological posture, it may be argued, helps explain 
Brazil’s solidarity-oriented policies in Mercosur and South America as well. However, it would be 
wrong to say that the ideological orientation of the Lula government has made it overly flexible 
towards leftist regimes and poor countries in South America to the detriment of Brazil’s own 
development and interests as critics inside Brazil argue. It should be recognized that South America 
has functioned exceptionally well in Brazil’s strategy of constructing the basis for long term 
sustainable growth as Brazil has achieved growing export surpluses in the region along with a 
growing foreign investment portfolio. It is therefore in Brazil’s interest to gain legitimacy at the 
regional level by pursuing policies that are seen as motivated by solidarity towards its poorer 
neighbours and that support Argentina’s re-industrialization. This may be a prerequisite for the 
continued strengthening of Brazil’s exports and economic presence in the region and for being 
accepted as the informal leader of South America. Such a position could enhance its negotiating 
muscle in international affairs and it could help drawing South America more and more in Brazil’s 
direction in a kind of competition with the United States for influence in the region. 
 
In other words, the dichotomy sometimes set up by critics of the Lula government between ideology 
and national interests is wrong-headed. It is indeed possible to combine an ideology of reduction of 
development disparities and social inequality at the regional and national level with Brazil’s 
interests. This is true both in terms of how solidarity at the regional level can enhance Brazil’s 
development and leadership role and in terms of how the international solidarity agenda of the Lula 
government towards shaping globalization in a more socially inclusive way could both help 
enhance Brazil’s ability to reach more satisfactory international trade rules and a role as an informal 
leader of the global South. If Brazil is able to negotiate internationally from a position as the 
informal leader of South America this will enhance Brazil’s negotiating muscle substantially. 
 
South America is therefore very important in Brazil’s development strategy: as a platform for its 
exports and international competitiveness, as a geographical area where development is pursued by 
constructing productive capacity with the help of physical integration, and as a region that could 
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 strengthen Brazil’s international “voice” if Brazil is successful in constructing a legitimate 
leadership role in the region. It is true that Brazil faces difficult challenges in some of these areas, 
particularly with regard to drawing all countries towards Brazil’s sphere of interest, as some 
countries such as Chile, Peru and Colombia have agreed to deeper trade and investment agreements 
with the United States than with Brazil and Mercosur. However, Brazil has had some success in 
moving in the right direction with trade agreements in the region and with the construction of 
Unasur, and even if Brazil does not succeed in becoming the preferred ally of some countries the 
construction of closer ties and physical integration is still likely to be very useful in terms of 
Brazil’s long term development interests. 
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I. Abstract 
Since the 1960’s regional association has been perceived as a development strategy in Latin 
America. After some unsuccessful previous attempts, in 1991 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay impelled the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), which has become, 
through the time, the most progressive associative experience in the region. However, in the 
search for regional development, the steps of Mercosur have not been simple, since the 
strategies pursued by the block have significantly changed during the two decades of its 
existence, turning from a neoliberal model in the 1990’s to a social-oriented strategy since 
the beginning of the 2000’s. 
 
II. Regional association as development strategy in Latin America 
Throughout the time, nations of the world have realized that isolation threatens 
development. The unequal distribution of power, resources and territories has forced 
them to work together in order to mutually strengthen. In this sense, it is possible to 
assert that regional association is not a goal in itself, but rather a tool to achieve 
development, since unity allows overcoming obstacles and resisting more adequately the 
pressure of external circumstances. 
Nevertheless, willingness of associating is not enough, but it should also be supported by 
certain internal and external factors of integration1 that determine the reasonableness of 
the regional union. 
The internal factors are related to common features of nations within a region (such as 
the geographic unity, the similar ethnic traits, the socio-cultural elements that determine 
the cultural identity, the political features that differentiate the region within the 
international community, the juridical basis that result in certain constitutional structures, 
and the economic systems relating to the regional productivity), while external factors 
                                                 
1
 Savid Bas, Luis Ignacio „El derecho de la Integración. Mercosur”, in Curso de Derecho Internacional 
Público, Advocatus, 2007, pg.675. 
143
“New Latin American development strategies in a changing international economic and political context” 
Aalborg University, Denmark 
 
Laura A. Casola 
refer to the socio-political and economic junctures, coming from the international 
community, which show the region as a different entity. 
The convergence of those internal and external circumstances in addition to the political 
willingness to use interstate association as development tool, have unleashed the 
emergence of many regional blocks all along the world. 
Naturally, Latin America has not been left out of this transition, which has taken place in 
successive stages that began with its involvement in processes of cooperation that turned, 
gradually, into integrative strategies. 
Reviewing the associative background of Latin America, it is possible to find diverse 
regional projects: The Latin American Free-Trade Association (1960), the Central 
American Common Market (1961), the Andean Community (1969), the Latin American 
Integration Association (1980), and the Southern Cone Common Market (1991), also 
including, somehow, the participation of Mexico in the North American Free-Trade 
Agreement (1994) and the frustrated scheme of the Free-Trade Agreement of Americas 
(1994). 
All those experiences, to a greater or lesser extent, have demonstrated the regional 
vocation of Latin America or, in other words, the tendency of nations to work together in 
order to achieve development. Moreover, those associative projects have taken place 
within a regional context characterized by successive political and economic changes, 
which have ranged from political models enrolled in the old regionalism of the 1960’s, to 
schemes of post-liberal integration since the beginning of the 2000’s. 
In this sense, earlier Latin American associative phenomena were inspired in the ideas of 
the old regionalism, which can be described as an extremely protectionist economic 
model devised by the CEPAL, consisting in promoting the industrialization of Latin 
American nations through import substitution. 
Following such a political-economic ideology, the first concrete project of regional 
association was embodied in the Latin American Free-Trade Association (LAFTA), 
whose main objective was the establishment of a free-trade zone, in order that Latin 
American countries were able to accelerate their processes of economic development to 
assure better living conditions for their populations. The ambitious idea embraced almost 
entirely the Latin American area, from Mexico to Argentina, excluding Central American 
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countries. Nevertheless, the complex political and economic circumstances of that time 
determined the failure and disintegration of the block; “the excessive inflexibility of the 
clauses of the Treaty, the political instability of the region, the lack of a common external 
strategy, the economic heterogeneity of its partners, the policies of import substitution, 
and even its extremely wide goals, were decisive at the time of the failure”2. 
During the 1980’s a new political and economic wave arrived at Latin America. The slow 
transition to democracy, along with the approach to market economy, determined a 
regional ideology related to the postulates of the new regionalism or open regionalism, 
which is characterized to promote intra-block trade liberalization and extra-block 
lessening of trade restrictions. 
Within this frame, the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) came to replace 
the obsolete LAFTA. Although the new associative strategy has played an important role 
at regional level, from the strict viewpoint of its objectives as a block it is possible to say 
that it has undergone a similar destiny to LAFTA, since it has not been able to 
consolidate the planned free-trade area. Instead of that, the great merits of LAIA have 
been to improve the level of inter-regional exchange and provide the normative 
framework for the emergence of new regional agreements. 
As a result of the particular functioning of LAIA, which seems to have been relegated to 
be just a normative umbrella, many kinds of regional associations have been organized 
and the most important one is he Southern Cone Common Market, which has emerged as 
a process of integration with objectives that go far beyond the mere cooperation in 
economic issues, also embracing matters such as politics, society, justice, human rights, 
environment, work and culture. 
With a GDP of more than 2 trillion dollar, a territorial extension of 12 million Km², and a 
population of more than 200 million inhabitants, Mercosur has become the sixth world’s 
largest economy, after NAFTA, the EU, China, Japan and India. However, the 
development of the block has been neither smooth nor stable since 1991, because during 
the course of the two decades of its existence, it has slowly turned from a neoliberal 
model to a social-oriented strategy. 
                                                 
2
 Silvia Jardel y Alejandro Barraza; Mercosur. Aspectos jurídicos y económicos. Buenos Aires, Ciudad 
Argentina Ed., 1998, p. 29 
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Naturally, such a transformation is not relevant in itself, but rather in terms of the 
significant changes that it has prompted in the political, economic and social areas of the 
integrative process, which will be immediately examined. 
 
III. First stage of Mercosur: Open regionalism 
The first decade of Mercosur, from the early 1990’s to the beginning of the 2000’s, took 
place within a regional context characterized by young and inexpert democracies, 
conservative governments, considerable external debts and the USA as hegemonic 
continental power. 
The combination of all those factors produced a particular socio-political and economic 
environment: the immature democracies with significant external debts, existing within 
the frame of conservative regimes, approached the four member states to the USA and 
favoured the implementation of Washington Cosensus’ policies, which led to a neoliberal 
strategy broadly associated with expanding the role of market forces and constraining the 
role of state in all its basic functions. 
That was the time when regional ideology dissociated itself from protectionist policies 
and the earlier Welfare State, and it was the beginning of a period characterized by the 
following traits: 
In the political aspect, during the 1990’s regional glance was oriented to the USA. The 
economic and military superiority, the political stability and the influence in the 
international financial organizations, put the USA in the position of continental 
hegemonic power. From that place it exerted a strong influence on the centre-right 
governments of Mercosur, which entered into a harmful relationship of political 
subordination. Such a quasi ‘political dependency’ was especially serious in the 
Argentine case, whose connection with USA was clearly described by the Foreign 
Minister Guido Di Tella, through the regrettably famous expression “carnal relations”, 
which remains indelible in the collective memory. 
In the economic aspect, the close relationship with the USA went along with the 
implementation of a neoliberal model imported from North America and faraway from 
the South American needs. The external indebtedness added to the conservative regimes 
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and the connection with USA, opened two ways of entrance of neoliberalism in 
Mercosur: a) the adoption of Washington Consensus’ policies, based on trade 
liberalization, promotion of FDI, privatization, deregulation and affirmation of the 
property rights; and b) the necessary negotiations with the international financial 
organizations, in the sense that the “severe recessions, together with the high rates of 
external indebtedness forced [member states] into negotiations with the International 
Monetary Fund, which led to conditional agreements that required the liberalization of 
their economies”3  
During this decade of open regionalism, the regional economy was characterized by: 1. 
the promotion of external exchange (although it was obviously affected by the exchange 
rate parity between peso and dollar); and 2. the clear separation between State and 
Market, through different policies of deregulation and privatization. This set of political 
ideas led to privatization of the main part of national patrimonies: public services 
(transport, water, gas, electricity and communications), assets of public mineral deposits, 
oil and gas fields, factories of military supplies, and almost all the ‘privatizable’ national 
physical capital. “Mercosur as a block completely neglected a common industrial policy 
and the productive complementarity of national economies. Individually, [only] Brazil 
upheld an active industrial policy; but Argentina, [Uruguay and Paraguay] abandoned all 
state-sponsored industrial initiatives.”4  
The logic consequence of this process was the des-industrialization and dismantlement of 
the states, the subsequent dependency on foreign capitals and the financial and economic 
collapse in the four member states between 1999 and 2002.  
In the social aspect, the context can be described by saying that there was an isolation of 
social issues, which were not included in the regional agenda.  
Within the structure of the block there were no real spaces for participation of civil 
society, and welfare of population was not the main concern of regional government, 
which ruled the block as an exclusively economic association.  
                                                 
3
 Richards, Donald G. „Dependent development and regional integration: a critical examination of the 
Southern Cone Common Market“, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 24, N° 6, 1997, pg.133. 
4
 Carranza, Mario E. „Can Mercosur survive? Domestic and international constraints on Mercosur”, Latin 
American Politics and Society, Vol. 45, N° 2, 2003, pg.78. 
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The omission of a social agenda produced the divorce between Mercosur and national 
societies, which perceived the regional strategy as an expensive and obsolete 
bureaucratic structure, and lost their interest on what should have been a collective 
project. 
 
IV. Second stage of Mercosur: post-liberal strategy 
After the failure of the model applied during the 1990’s, since the early 2000’s the 
regional context has experienced very significant changes, motivated in the previous 
collapse and the renovation of national policies, all which have had a deep impact on 
political, economic and social arenas. 
In this sense, the second decade has found a block that, although it maintains high levels 
of external indebtedness, is ruled by governments that seem to have moved away the 
ghost of dictatorships and strengthened democracy, at the same time that they have 
gradually turned from conservative into centre-left regimes. Within this frame, the USA 
has lost its traditional hegemonic position, which has been contradicted and challenged 
by the ‘new’ regional governments.  
Such transformations at national level have had a crucial impact in Mercosur, 
determining a new format of regional integration that could be denominated ‘postliberal’ 
or ‘post-neoliberal’, characterized by a strong presence of market economy along with a 
political discourse oriented to the promotion of general welfare.  
Within this context, regarding the political arena, it is possible to assert that, after a long 
decade looking at the USA, member states have radically swerved the gaze towards 
Europe and its associative strategy, which transcends the mere economic issues proposed 
by North America.  
This change implies the acceptance that integration requires more integral policies, able 
to equilibrate the relationship between economic and social matters in order to reach a 
sustainable regional development. The mercantilist format of the previous decade, 
inspired by the neoliberal model promoted by the USA, collapsed because, besides 
macroeconomic and financial reasons, it completely neglected the general welfare as 
final goal of the integrative process. 
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Consequently, the centre-left or left regimes that appeared from 2003 on, have tried, at 
least rhetorically, to make Mercosur independent from the USA’s policies and, at the 
same time, they have also tried to follow the European model, which shows that 
integration is not possible if economy does not go along with the regulation of the other 
areas involved in the process, such as society, environment or education.  
This political change can be perceived through the increase of political dialogue between 
the EU and Mercosur, the advisory that European organs give to Mercosur, and the 
presidential discourses that challenge the influence of the USA and express their interest 
on the European experience.  
Regarding the economic aspect, after the depletion and failure of the neoliberal model – 
which involved Mercosur members in a severe economic, financial, social and political 
crisis between 1999 and 2002 – the new centre-left governments have tried to 
reformulate the South American block on new economic bases that can be summarized in 
three main aspects:  
a) A far-reaching model of integration. Since the beginning of 2000’s and specially after 
2002, the regional administration has been aware that integration is much more than 
simple economic planning, by taking care of closely related matters, such as politics, 
society, environment, work, education or justice. Within this context, member states 
seem to have understood that economic aspect of integration should be synchronized 
with all the other areas, in order to achieve a sustainable development. 
b) Market economy based on General Welfare. Although economic orientation of the 
block remains within the classical parameters of liberalism – there is no return to the 
Welfare State – it is possible to speak about a ‘post-liberal model’ since the current 
regional political strategy pretends to combine some aspects of liberalism with state 
activity protecting human rights. In this sense, indiscriminate advance and free 
functioning of markets would be limited by the social, politic and economic rights of the 
South American population.  
c) The search for regional financial independence. Another feature is the attempt of 
cutting down the financial dependence on international credit institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank, 
by establishing South American financial organs that involve all member states of the 
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Southern Cone Common Market. The project has devised the ‘Bank of the South’ and the 
“Monetary Fund of Stabilization” as alternatives to IMF, WB and IDB, with the intention 
of lending money to Latin American nations for the construction of social programs and 
infrastructure. 
Finally, in attention to the social aspect, it is possible to say that the new model of 
integration, with an economic engine and the central axis focused on the protection of 
human rights, intends to correct the democratic deficit that affected the process during 
the first stage.  
In this sense, the regional administration seeks to achieve popular support by promoting 
citizen participation. The goal of including society in the regional process is creating ties 
of identification and feelings of belonging that strengthen the integrative enterprise in 
order to reach the regional development.  
In other words, the regional administration seems to have understood that Mercosur can 
not survive as an exclusively political process, but rather it needs to be legitimated and 
fortified by means of citizen endorsement. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Summarizing the previous ideas, it is possible to assert that the regional strategy pursued 
by Mercosur has changed during the two decades of its existence. In the 1990’s the 
associative scheme was devised within the frame of the open regionalism, under a 
neoliberal ideology oriented to economical aspects and neglected of social issues.  
Yet, the regional crisis that took place since 1999 as a result of such a kind of policies 
forced a shift towards a post-liberal model of integration whose axis is posed in the 
protection of human rights and democracy as conditions for development.  
Nevertheless, beyond the encouraging governmental discourses, the fact is that all the 
attempts of transformation are still more rhetorical than concrete. The thorough analysis 
of Mercosur’s functioning shows the following problems, which seriously constrain the 
change: a) there is an institutional deficit, in the sense that the structure is not coherent 
with the regional goals; b) after enlarging the objectives beyond the economic matters, 
the regional agenda became too wide, without concrete focuses and with a low level of 
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commitment, which impacts negatively on the functioning of the block; and c) such a 
kind of 'internal chaos’ is translated into lack of clear mechanisms and concrete actions 
towards the real change. 
On the other hand, it is fair to remark that, despite multiple failures, Mercosur evidences 
a slow transformation characterized by: 
1. The search for its political independency, since it is trying to cut down the influence of 
USA and learn from the European experience.  
2. The search for an integral development, by means of strategies oriented towards 
economic as well as social issues, namely, a) synchronization of economic regulation 
with all related areas – politics, society, justice, environment, etc.; b) constraint of market 
economy in terms of protecting the general welfare; c) heightening of human rights as 
basis of the regional policies; and d) democratization of the integrative process through 
the inclusion of Society as a main actor. 
To sum up, from this juncture is emerging a model of integration different from the 
model applied during the 1990’s, which has goals that largely transcend the economic 
profile. Consequently, in this new regional stage governments seem to have recognized 
the significance of the social issues in order to build a model of “integration for 
development”, reviving, in this way, the spirit of the Treaty of Asunción, whose 
preamble states that the aim of Mercosur is the economic development with social justice 
for its population.  
The change seems to have been well oriented. Only the time will say whether member 
states will be able to overcome their differences to achieve such important and ambitious 
objectives. 
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 After Neoliberalism in Argentina: The Internationalisation of the (Old) New 
Nationalism  
Pía Riggirozzi, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield1 
 
Argentina’s economic collapse in December 2001 is seen as perhaps the most emblematic 
evidence of the failure of neoliberalism to provide sustainable and equitable economic 
growth in the developing world. That crisis, however, provided a turning point out of 
which an alternative project of political and economic governance has developed. The 
search for post-crisis governance has meant a new and more dynamic role for the state in 
the pursuit of growth and social stability in the context of a model that I term ‘open-
economy nationalism’. It is built on the basis of a new nationalist rhetoric that recalls the 
welfare state and the import substitution era of the 1940s yet remains committed in 
important respects to open markets and export-led growth. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine what, precisely, ‘open-economy nationalism’ 
implies in terms of governance. It explores the new organisation of the economy and the 
nationalistic political project that has come to structure key aspects of state-society 
relationships since 2002. In the process, the chapters explores the constraints on the new 
governance project and poses the question of whether this post-crisis reassertion of 
nationalism constitutes a stable, socially integrating model able to resolve the vast social 
and democratic legacies left in Argentina after a decade of neoliberalism.   
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first analyses the origins and nature of 
nationalism as a political economic project in Argentina, the role played by Peronism in 
the articulation of new forms of social and collective action, and the economic and 
political limits of a state-centric model. The second section turns to the emergence of 
neoliberalism as a triumphant response to the failure of inward-looking models of 
development that nevertheless had huge consequences on the social and macroeconomic 
foundations of Argentina’s political economy and that ultimately led to economic 
breakdown in 2001. I identify how the pendulum swung back to a more state-centric 
model for development. The third and fourth sections analyse the characteristics of the 
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 ‘open-economy nationalism’ model as an alternative to neoliberalism. The final section 
evaluates the challenges, limits and sustainability of state-led governance in Argentina.    
 
Nationalism as a political economic project in Argentina 
 
Manifestations of nationalism have been a defining feature of Latin American political 
economy since the early 20th century. Emerging in the early 1940s as a reaction to the 
crisis of the liberal, oligarchic rule, nationalism provided the frame for a new way of 
thinking and speaking about politics, economics and culture. It appealed to an emerging 
working class as it appeared to offer access to rights and resources and prompted feelings 
of solidarity, belonging and identity. Argentina, along with other countries in Latin 
American during this period, experienced state consolidation, rapid economic growth, 
industrialization, and a booming trade sector, especially in the agricultural sector. New 
social groups challenged dominant liberal ideologies, resulting in the rise of popular 
nationalism (see Germani 1955, Di Tella 1965; Collier and Collier 1991). Marginalized 
sectors including rural and urban workers and those adversely affected by the export-led 
growth provided a growing constituency that opposed the ‘liberal project’ and economic 
internationalism. These groups provided support for the new nationalist/interventionist 
economic policies that, by the mid-1940s, were taking shape as an alternative to 
liberalism with the advent of Peronism. After Juan D. Perón won the elections in 1946, 
the government initiated an industrialization plan (Lewis 2005). The introduction of 
protectionism and state control of industrial development provided the material means to 
integrate the working class through a welfare regime managed via labour unions, co-
operatives, recreational groups and other social network associations (James 1988). The 
improvement in working class conditions that took place around the same time 
encouraged the expansion of Argentina's internal market and provided a stimulus for the 
import substitution economy. 
 
The nationalistic rhetoric and the political economy of Peronism redefined ‘citizenship’ 
in terms not of individual rights but as economic rights and social inclusion. This 
heralded something of a pragmatic and contingent class compromise in Argentina, as 
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 business came to terms with the new politics. However, industrialization under Peronist 
import substitution remained heavily dependent on the surpluses provided by agricultural 
exports, which meant in turn not only an external vulnerability but also continuous 
negotiations to balance the interests of the landowners, tenants and exporters and, at the 
same time, deliver for the working class (Teubal 2001: 36). Development of welfare state 
institutions was an essential element of the process of economic growth and social 
integration in Argentina under Peronist rule and Argentina saw rapid growth in social 
spending, the expansion of social programmes, and the expansion of regulation of the 
overall economic process.  
 
The corporatist developmental state under Peronism was part of a regional trend 
associated with the ECLAC/CEPAL which advocated protectionism for infant industries, 
exchange rate control and other forms of state arbitration in order to foster ‘national 
capitalist’ growth (see for instance, Prebisch 1949; 1952). In Argentina, it contributed 
considerably to social and economic development; but this was not accompanied by 
political stability. A conservative revolution in 1955 tried to re-impose the liberal order 
and to disarm the populist state. Despite the apparent eclipse of Peronism, however, a 
mobilized and organized working class, attached to the symbols and ideas of Peronism, 
was impossible to evict completely from national politics. Equally, the notion of 
development based on national industrialization had an important constituency of support 
beyond the Peronist coalition (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2007: 89). What followed the 
overthrow of Perón, therefore, was a period of ideological dispute between those who 
sought to uphold the legacy of corporatist nationalism and the dominant factions of 
bourgeois society. According to Teubal (2001: 39): 
On the one hand, we can identify the more ‘nationalist’ alliance 
based on an explicit or implicit pact of labour with certain 
bourgeois factions generally interested in furthering ISI and the 
domestic market. On the other hand, the ‘liberal’ alliance between 
the traditional agrarian interests, associated with certain 
transnational interests and with foreign capital, vied continuously 
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 for their say in policy decisions, tending to greater liberalization of 
the economy and monetarism.  
 
This tension not only shaped the course of the Argentine political economy in the 
aftermath of Peronism: it continues to explain the nature of social conflict today in 
Argentina.  
 
Distributional conflicts and social instability dominated the period after 1955, creating 
uncertainties as to the direction of political and economic governance. This led to erratic 
‘stop-go cycles’ by the late 1960s where economic expansion was followed by 
contraction and political stalemate that culminated in the military dictatorship between 
1976 and 1983 (O’Donnell 1972; 1982; Basualdo 1987). The coup in March 1976 took a 
fiercely anti-Peronist stance, persecuting union leaders and party militants. The ruling 
Junta launched a ‘Process of National Reorganization’, known as el proceso, that in 
political terms meant social demobilization by means of persecution and kidnapping of 
civilian dissidents – mainly labour movement representatives and Peronist activists. The 
Junta closed Congress, imposed censorship, banned trade unions, and brought state and 
municipal government under military control. The international community, in particular 
the US, not only overlooked the massive human right abuses that occurred in this period 
but actively helped the regime by offering military training and economic support. In the 
midst of the Cold War, US support to anti-nationalist and anti-communist regimes in 
Latin America such as that in Argentina was significant.  
 
The proceso also led to plans to draw up a new economic programme for Argentina. In 
March 1977, the Minister of the Economy, Jose Martinez de Hoz, announced austerity 
measures and launched a new and unprecedented strategy of market opening, trying to 
reverse traditions of state dirigisme and import substitution strategy. In the years that 
followed, cuts in wages and a strict monetary policy shaped economic planning. But they 
resulted in only erratic control over inflation and devastated much of the manufacturing 
sector, which was unable to compete with the flood of foreign imports. In turn, the trade 
deficit increased to gigantic proportions and international reserves decreased to a critical 
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 point. The resulting financial crisis put an end to the apparent internal cohesion of the 
ruling Junta and internal disputes began to plague the regime. The decision to freeze 
wages completely and a plan for the privatisation of part of the military-industrial 
complex could not undercut the emerging, though restricted, opposition (Pion Berlin 
1985). In an attempt to revert the economic and now political backlash, in April 1982 
President Leopoldo Galtieri took the extreme and ludicrous decision to embark on a war 
with the British in order to recover control of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. The swift 
defeat of Argentina’s military forces, combined with the devastating economic situation, 
brought a transition to democracy in December 2003. 
 
Argentina’s return to democratic rule was shaped by the various traditions it inherited, 
both from the ISI period and the more recent military regime. Democratization took place 
amidst economic crisis and, as a result, state capacity to institutionalize more effective 
forms of economic governance was highly reduced. Politically, there was a strong 
convergence of civil society actors and political parties around the need to make 
democracy work, unlike in the past. Labour unions and human rights organization both 
played their part in the democratic transition (see Drake 1996; Munck 1998). But 
although the resilience and political power of the unions and of civil society contributed 
to re-establishing the foundations of democracy, the traumas from the past, alongside 
intense economic vulnerability, meant that governance remained problematic. Raul 
Alfonsín, the new Radical Party (Unión Cívica Radical – UCR) president, failed to 
establish create a sense of common identity within the country or build a coalition 
capable of establishing a stable project of governance. Institutionally, the government’s 
inability to force the military to submit to civilian rule led to a series of rebellions that 
were resolved only by the government conceding to military demands (Levitsky 2005: 
74). Economically, the heterodox economic project embodied in the so-called Plan 
Austral in 1985 led to the introduction of new policies in an effort to stop inflation – 
which exceeded 600 per cent in 1984 – by freezing prices and wages. But labour 
opposition undermined the plan. Without social or cultural ties to the Radical government 
of Alfonsín, the trade unions rejected all attempts by government to negotiate a social 
pact, leading to thirteen general strikes against the government between 1984 and 1988 
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 (Smith 1990). In addition, a Peronist controlled Senate opposed many reform initiatives 
causing stalemates between the Executive and Legislative branches. In short, the relative 
strength of Argentine democratic institutions was severely challenged by economic 
collapse, hyperinflation and the failure of the government to stabilize the country, 
economically and politically.  
 
With his leadership in tatter, Alfonsín resigned in June 1989, five months before 
completing his term. As a result, the candidate for the Peronist party, Carlos Menem, who 
had been elected president in the elections of May 1989, took office in July. Despite his 
free use of nationalist discourse and ideological manipulation associated with Peronism, 
once in government the need for political and economic stability and the desire to avoid 
financial chaos led the new government to take an extraordinary ‘right turn’, in which it 
adopted a new development paradigm consistent with neoliberal ideas and in tune with 
the demands of IFIs. Sweeping reforms followed that dismantled the multiple roles the 
state had come to play in Argentina in development, as an instrument of social mobility 
and mobilization and a tool for redistribution and social integration. Along with a new 
matrix for the economy, the neoliberal reforms were accompanied by a view of politics 
that had profound consequences for social actors and forms of collective action (Garretón 
2002: 14).  
 
Neoliberal transformation in Argentina’s political economy 
 
The failure of import substitution projects, together with severe repression of the left as a 
result of the military dictatorship, meant that Argentina, like many other Latin American 
countries, was fertile terrain for the introduction of new ideas of political and economic 
liberalization. Additionally, the Alfonsín administration, having failed to pull social and 
economic groups interests into a stable coalition, had discredited heterodox approaches to 
stabilisation and left a problem of governance that was manifest in high levels of political 
uncertainty, social discontent and economic stress. A generalized sense of ‘urgency’ in 
Argentine society helped push through an agenda of radical reforms and gave the new 
government the legitimacy to deal with sporadic domestic resistance (Palermo and 
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 Novaro 1996: 124). At the core of the new neoliberal agenda were two main objectives: a 
radical reduction in the size of the state through privatization of public services and a 
cutback of social spending; and the deregulation of the economy, including the labour 
market. 
 
One of the challenges of democratization, not only in Argentina but in Latin America in 
general, was whether the various social and political actors would be able to reach an 
agreement over distribution of goods, services and incomes, given their contradictory 
interests in situations that were frequently marked by high levels of political and 
economic uncertainty (Acuña and Smith 1994). In Argentina, where this had become an 
almost intractable problem, in the context of economic and hyperinflation crises, the 
threat of a military coup and the latent possibility of violent domestic protest, the 
‘solution’ was power delegation to the Executive. Following the decision to bring the 
presidential succession forward in 1989, two laws were enacted that conferred on the 
Executive ample powers to define the detail of reform policies. The State Reform and 
Economic Emergency laws granted power to the Executive to modify critical aspects of 
economic and socio-political relations simply by presidential decree. These included the 
suspension of state subsidies for industrial promotion; the introduction of identical 
regimes for foreign and national investors; modifications to the taxation system; and 
downsizing of public administration by suspending contracts and the recruitment of new 
employees within the central administration, public enterprises and other state units (see 
Bambaci et al. 2002). 
 
In fact, Menem’s concentration of power was also facilitated by a distinctive power 
imbalance that emerged as a result of the 1989-90 hyperinflation crisis, followed by the 
effects of the subsequent reforms process that reduced the room for manoeuvre of 
pressure groups. This situation was exacerbated by the government’s extraordinary 
success in stabilizing the economy, which conferred on Menem and his Economic 
Minister, Domingo Cavallo, a sense of ‘indispensability’ by much of the economic elite 
and a significant fraction of the electorate. It would become clear subsequently that this 
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 perceived indispensability raised the threshold of public tolerance for abuses of power 
(Levitsky 2000: 60). 
 
As part of a new rhetoric and in order to show commitment to change, the Convertibility 
Plan was introduced in 1991. The Convertibility Plan crowned a decisive moment in 
economic and political reforms and in development thinking in Argentina. The 
programme pegged the peso to the dollar and thus created the conditions for a new 
stability plan. The plan brought prompt relief, reducing annual inflation from 200 per 
cent in 1989 to less than 5 per cent by 1994 (Pastor and Wise 2004: 8). Menem’s 
monetary reform managed to convince the IFIs of the country’s commitment to reform 
and they soon recommenced their activities in the country. It also satisfied the interests of 
both local and international private financial institutions. The global financial enthusiasm 
for emerging markets in the early 1990s, meanwhile, led to a huge influx of foreign 
investment, mainly in the newly privatized sectors of the economy, climbing from 
US$3.2 billion in 1991 to US$11 billion in 1992, and to US$10.7 billion in 1993 (Rock 
2002: 65). 
 
Contrary to what much of the literature on the political economy of reforms, in Argentina 
the reform process was not carried out by an Executive power in isolation from social, 
political and institutional actors (see, in particular, Haggard and Kaufman 1992). Rather, 
reforms were the product of a series of negotiations between the Executive and some key 
actors as well as the neutralization of potential opposition. A new law in April 1999, the 
Ley de Ampliación, increased the number of members of the Supreme Court from five to 
nine, creating a favourable climate for the introduction of further reforms since Menem 
could now appoint four new members to the Supreme Court, where ultimately the fate of 
many of the reforms would be decided since, constitutionally, Supreme Court approval 
was required for reforms for some of the most contentious political and economic 
reforms, especially those linked to the privatization of services (Carrió and Garay 1996). 
In addition, Menem resorted to the use of presidential decrees. For instance, while 
President Alfonsín issued 10 decrees, during his administration Menem enforced a total 
of 308, covering the sensitive issues of economic deregulation, privatization and tax 
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 collection (Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1996). Menem also successfully neutralized the 
opposition of domestic firms, especially those traditionally protected industries, like 
textiles, electronics and auto-parts, affected by these reforms, and the bargaining power 
of the unionized movement by negotiating with union leaders concessions in support of 
reformers. At the same time, the government managed to build an alliance with the 
powerful and diverse business firms that benefited from the liberalization of trade and the 
privatization of state-owned companies (Murillo 1997; Acuña et al 2006: 21-23).  
 
Macroeconomic stability together with the return of credit led to an immediate increase in 
consumption and to a period of economic growth that, in turn, was turned into political 
capital for Menem and strengthened commitment to the programme. Privatization and 
budgetary austerity followed led to growth rates between 1991 and 1995 that were in 
excess of 4 per cent per year – among the highest since 1945. Nevertheless, the 
endorsement of neoliberalism inside the Peronist Party as a whole, though widespread 
was largely pragmatic. For instance, the process of decentralization, which accompanied 
neoliberalism and served as a way to reduce state spending, strained federal relations with 
provincial elites and eroded the bonds between the poor/working class and the Peronist 
Party, both key factors in ensuring stable governance under Menem. As Rock (2002: 67) 
explained:   
 
The role of federal government was transformed. Instead of operating as 
an ‘interventionist state’, its main function now consisted of raising 
revenues and passing them on to the provinces through the system known 
as coparticipación. Responsibility for health and education was also 
decentralized – the reforms placed more than 180,000 teachers under 
provincial jurisdiction. In the process, the federal government shed more 
than 200,000 jobs between 1990 and 1992 – although around 40 per cent 
of these were transferred to the provinces. Decentralization attracted little 
criticism at the time; the provinces had plentiful access to coparticipación 
funds and rediscounts from provincial banks.   
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 Cutting the role of the state in this context often meant that the central government 
transferred its responsibilities, but not its resources, for certain services in health, 
education and welfare to the provinces that took on a range of extra responsibilities. In 
most cases the process meant a serious strain in the fiscal accounts of the provinces that 
was often translated into poor service delivery and job reductions. In this context, 
stability was guaranteed by discretionary use of funds via clientelism and patronage to 
gain support from provincial governors in Parliament (Gibson 1997; Pastor and Wise 
2004; Levitsky 2005). 
 
Pragmatic political calculations also played an important part in Menem’s position 
toward labour. Part of the neoliberal restructuring involved a massive deregulation of the 
labour market in order to ‘modernize’ labour relations in the country. At the basis of the 
labour flexibilisation was an attempt to limit the traditional power and corporatist 
relationship between state and organized labour that had developed since the 1940s. The 
labour reforms proposed by Menem aimed to undermine the power of unions, on the 
understanding that this was an essential step in order to move promptly in other areas of 
economic reform. By 1996, Menem had successfully introduced a number of laws and 
executive decrees that radically changed social and labour rights in the country. The 
changes altered not only the context within which the unions operated but, more 
dramatically, their capacity to defend their membership. The unions were unable to 
prevent a fall in living standards for most workers, due to the dramatic decline in real 
wages and the escalation of ever more precarious working conditions (Patroni 2001). As 
with federal-government relationships, the social costs of neoliberal restructuring and 
labour contraction were mitigated by populist distribution; but this depended on 
maintaining high levels of economic growth, foreign investment, and a steady stream of 
income from privatization. In the long run, it was inevitable that rising unemployment, 
sustained federal cuts in spending, and a steady increase in impoverishment and social 
exclusion would surpass the capacity of populist redistribution schemes to mitigate these 
and other problems.  
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 The Mexican and Asian financial crises of the mid to late 1990s posed a serious 
challenge to Argentina. The rigidities of the economic model based on the currency board 
made it difficult for government to adjust to international changes. This was made 
absolutely clear in 1998 when Brazil devalued, a move which seriously undermined 
Argentina’s export performance and led to a contraction of the economy and rising 
unemployment and made debt management extremely difficult. Even before that – by 
1995 - poverty had risen to alarming figures, setting in place a trend from which, despite 
improvements recently, Argentina is yet to recover from (see Figure 5.1). Furthermore, 
the living standards of the poorest not only failed to improve but actually declined during 
the years of economic growth. The World Bank (2003) estimates that while domestic 
income has fallen, the deterioration among the poorest groups has been even more 
dramatic since 1994 (see Table 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1. Unemployment and Poverty as Percentage of Population, and Real Per 
Capita Household Income, 1990–2002 
Source: World Bank (2003: 5) 
 
Table 5.1. Income Distribution in Urban Argentina, 1990-2002  
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  Year  1990 1992  1994  1996 1998  1999  2000  2001  
May  
2002 
October 
2002  
Per capita income by decile (in 1999 pesos)  
1
st 
decile 
(lowest)  38.3 45.6  43.2  28.1  31.7  30.4  26.3  17.1  9.0  16.1  
5
th 
decile  153.4 181.1  188.1  158.1 167.3  164.2  155.1  136.3  97.9  95.8  
10
th 
decile  825.4 1,004.7  1,060.7 992.3 1,114.2 1,028.2 1,041.9  993.8  769.9 705.3  
Relative measures  
Top 20% 
share  50.7 51.0 51.6 53.7 54.8 53.8 55.1 56.8  58.2 57.2  
Bottom 
20% share  4.6 4.5 4.2 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.2 2.6  2.1 2.8  
Gini 
coefficient  0.454 0.456 0.467 0.493 0.504 0.494 0.510 0.530  0.551 .532  
Top/bottom 
20% ratio  11.0 11.3 12.3 14.9 15.7 15.4 17.2 21.8  27.7 20.4 
Source: World Bank (2003: 57) 
By the end of the decade, it was clear that neoliberalism did not provide the instruments 
to resolve the problems which had accrued in Argentina. The country faced serious social 
deterioration and a decline in its external account as a consequence of capital flight 
stirred up by the crises in emerging markets. This was made worse by the fact that the 
government revenues were beginning to suffer from the slow down in the sale of state 
enterprises by the mid to late 1990s (Schorr 2005). The economy entered a sharp 
recession in 1995 marking the beginning of a critical downturn that a brief rise in growth 
figures could not hide and that was to lead ultimately to the crisis of 2001. It soon became 
apparent that while the Convertibility Plan was successful in reducing inflation, it had left 
unaddressed problems resulting from industrial decline, high levels of indebtedness and 
the steady erosion of social security. 
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 The presidential elections of October 1999 were won by Fernando de la Rúa, the 
candidate for the opposition coalition, known as Alianza, between his own UCR and a 
centre-left group of breakaway Peronists. De la Rúa promised reform, a return to 
transparency and policies to build trust between political leaders and the electorate. 
However, once in power the administration was unable to deal with domestic and 
international pressures, especially pressures to keep the currency based at fixed exchange 
rate. It soon became clear that the government lacked the political strength to oversee 
change. In what was in the end a politically suicidal move, De la Rúa brought Domingo 
Cavallo, former Finance Minister under Menem back in to government. His appointment 
was designed to show international creditors that Argentina could be trusted; but the 
result was that Convertibility could not be abandoned.  In fact, De la Rúa began to deepen 
orthodox policies and push ahead with neoliberal structural reforms in order to obtain 
much-needed credit from the IMF. But despite adjustments that included sharp tax 
increases, restricted public spending, a timid tax-sharing agreement between the 
provinces, and the introduction of further labour market deregulation (that was 
overshadowed by allegations of corruption and bribery) recession and fiscal deterioration 
continued.  
 
As a result, poverty and unemployment steadily increased between 1998 and 2001. The 
poverty rate rose from 28 per cent of the population in May 1998 to a staggering 37 per 
cent by October 2001, as the economy stagnated and the economic/financial crisis 
worsened. Unemployment rose from 13 per cent to 18 per cent (see Figure 5.1). Attempts 
to take control of the gathering crisis were ineffective and reinforced the polarization 
between those who favoured retaining convertibility and those who argued for 
devaluation. The government’s inability to sustain the debt burden and the country’s risk 
level skyrocketed. State management capacity became increasingly questioned, 
domestically and internationally. As a policy of last resort, the government announced a 
‘Zero Deficit Plan’, a budget cut of 13 per cent in state workers’ wages and pensions plus 
the reduction of resource transfers to provincial governments. The move allowed the 
government to secure a new lending from the IMF and other creditors, who offered a 
rescue package of US$ 8 billion in September 2001 (Akkerman and Teunissen 2001). But 
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 it did nothing to pacify the increasingly vociferous protesters on the streets or stop the 
street blockages that were growing in frequency and becoming more and more 
radicalized.  
 
Collapse was triggered by the decision of the IMF to withdraw its support in November 
2001. In a desperate reaction to stop a massive wave of capital flight Fernando de la Rúa 
imposed restrictions on bank withdrawals and money transfers, a policy that became 
know as the ‘Corralito’. In response, a movement of the unemployed (piqueteros) rapidly 
emerged to oppose further cuts and to demand a re-nationalization of privatized 
companies and banks and the non-payment of the external debt (Svampa and Pereyra 
2003; Dinerstein 2003b). The middle classes joined the unemployed and public sector 
employees in massive street protests. De la Rúa declared a state of siege and unleashed a 
wave of ferocious police repression which led to over 20 deaths (Peruzzotti 2001; 
Manzetti 2002). The slogan of the demonstrations, Que se vayan todos (‘out with all of 
them’) expressed the enormous distance between government and society. It represented 
a rejection of what was now perceived as a self-serving and corrupt governing class; but, 
just as importantly, it also indicated a loss of faith in the development model which was 
now thought to have brought Argentina to the brink of chaos. Cavallo resigned first, 
followed quickly by De la Rúa. In mid-December, the country defaulted and within two 
months the value of the peso had dropped more a third and was to fall still further in the 
coming year. Between 2001 and 2002, presidents came and went in quick succession 
until the temporary parliament-led government of Eduardo Duhalde was able to assume 
some degree of institutional command.      
 
Duhalde took over in January 2002 amidst economic and political uncertainties. In the 
wake of the crisis, poverty rose still further, from 38.3 per cent in October 2001 to an 
alarming 57.5 per cent a year later. In the same period, extreme poverty rose from 13.6 to 
over 27 per cent (see Figure 5.1). The broken links between the state and society were 
increasingly compensated by the emergence of new sites of social mobilization and 
spontaneous networks of solidarity. The newly impoverished middle classes became the 
so-called ‘new poor’ – lower middle-class small business people, the self-employed or 
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 public employees who lost jobs, savings and sometimes even their home in the financial 
collapse of 2001 (Feijoo 2001). Thousands of barter clubs based on non-official barter 
monies came into existence and abandoned factories even were overtaken by former 
workers and set back into production as cooperatives (Pearson 2003; Petras 2004).   
 
The significance of this social response was foundational in many ways. Spontaneous 
organizations from within civil society provided an emergency social safety net for 
people in the form of food, shelter, clothing and primary health care in the face of the 
collapse of the state. It also established a new, and much-needed, sense of belonging, of 
citizenship, empowering those ‘abandoned by the state’. In order to re-establish internal 
governance, it was necessary for the post-crisis government to re-integrate the new social 
actors into the formal channels of state-society networks and to take control of the new 
sources of production. In contrast to the crisis of the 1980s, what was required now was 
far more than simply an adjustment in economic policy. To his credit, Duhalde 
recognized this and sought, above all, stability. He did so by appealing to old ideas and 
the residual legitimacy of the national development project, which had been overturned 
with the advent of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Reasserting nationalism after neoliberalism 
 
The crisis of 2001 epitomized three major political economic developments. First, the 
resurgence of political activism and society’s capacity for self-organization, after years of 
neutralization and even disarticulation; as a result, civil society reasserted its right to a 
voice in decision-making, especially with regard to crisis resolution policies. Secondly, 
the reassertion of the state as multi-faceted actor able to resume its role as an agent of 
development, a manager of social conflict, a source of social integration and a site of 
democratic renewal. Finally, the crisis in Argentina represented a turning point that led to 
the introduction of audacious reforms that aimed to overturn some core elements of the 
neoliberal model.  
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 Once a parliamentary government was settled in office in January 2002 it was clear that 
the challenges ahead were huge. In addition to the difficulties of managing the default 
and promoting growth, the government faced the possibility of social collapse and 
rebellion. Regaining control was only possible, the government concluded, by re-
integrating social actors into the formal channels of state-society networks. As such, the 
immediate need was to mend the fractured social consensus and restore some legitimacy 
to the state and the ruling class. But it was less clear immediately that the government 
would advocate an alternative to neoliberalism. In fact, the government was constrained 
by the need to placate the IFIs at the same time as trying to respond to the demands of 
highly mobilized domestic constituencies for accountability, welfare relief and, above all, 
a change in the rules of the game. Historically, nationally-organized interest groups, 
notably business groups, financial groups, individual investors, the politically influential 
middle-class, and corporate organizations have often acted to veto proposed changes to 
policies. Faced with the uncertainty of devaluation at this time, they all played a role in 
delaying the introduction of decisions that would modify the status quo (Tommasi 2002). 
In short, there was an impasse in terms of how to reactivate the economy without 
exacerbating social and political tensions.  
 
In this tense and delicate atmosphere, with society visibly mobilized and deeply 
politicized, the government appealed to a discourse of unifying nationalism and proposed 
a new approach to economic management. The government incorporated elements of the 
demands of popular movements, in particular those of the unemployed workers 
articulated through the piqueteros, with pressures from national and international actors 
as a means to both economic stabilization and social appeasement. First, in order to 
compensate for past mistakes and its own low levels of public legitimacy, Duhalde 
adopted a critical tone vis-à-vis the IFIs, in particular against the IMF. Economically, this 
meant balancing the populist appeal of high government spending on social policies with 
prudent fiscal and social management in order to inject some life into the economy 
whilst, in fact, beginning to reinsert the economy in the international capital flows. One 
of the first and highly symbolic decisions of Duhalde was to abandon Convertibility, 
impose a moratorium on servicing the public debt and convert financial contracts from 
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 dollars to pesos in a process called ‘pesification’, a decision that ultimately favoured 
debtors owing dollars debts but undermined middle class investors (Baldi-Delatte 2005). 
The end of Convertibility and the debt default calmed the critics who had rejected the 
neoliberal model, but more importantly, they allowed the government to recover some 
political strength.  
 
The devaluation of the Argentine peso was aided by changing dynamics within the 
international political economy. A dynamic upswing in the global economy led to 
favourable exchange terms in commodity markets, benefiting Argentina along with other 
developing countries. China's entry in the WTO in 2001 also opened markets. But while 
the international context created opportunities, the way development strategies unfolded 
depended on the domestic politics. In Argentina, the emergence of a strong domestic 
political alliance between the government and the so-called Grupo Productivo 
(Producers’ Group), formed by representatives from industrial sectors, was decisive. The 
Grupo Productivo had developed as a lobby group in the 1990s in relation to the 
privatization policy and adopted a stronger line after the recession in 1998, arguing for 
policies to promote national businesses. It went onto become highly influential in shaping 
a new national economic strategy around the needs of domestic industry. The Grupo 
strongly supported devaluation and the reactivation of national industry by lowering the 
costs of production and fostering export and trade (UIA 2001). As such, this alliance 
brought into the centre of the political and economic arena industries that provided 
substitutes for foreign imports and financial resources to back up government policies. 
 
Thus, in contrast to the 1990s when the retrenchment of the state augmented the power of 
capital over production and natural resources, the post-crisis development recovery plan 
was engineered by a combination of export expansion and re-industrialization for the 
domestic market. In tandem with a decisive bounce back effect on exports after 
devaluation, a series of ad-hoc policies restored the fiscal balance supporting the 
reconstruction of state capacity. For instance, Duhalde’s government managed to 
negotiate a 20 per cent tax on export earnings from agricultural commodities and 
hydrocarbons, which became the central source for financing social emergency 
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 programmes. Increased state income as a consequence of debt default and export-oriented 
growth bolstered welfare spending, political inclusion and the promise of job creation 
(see Grugel and Riggirozzi 2007: 28). Another key policy decision was to take a tough 
approach with the demands of privatized companies that were affected by the decision to 
control the prices of basic services they provided (Aspiazu 2002). Finally, in order to help 
stimulate the domestic market, the Corralito was lifted in December 2002.  
 
Politically and institutionally, two other policy changes contributed to the reconstruction 
of governance after the crisis. The first was the new relationship between the federal state 
and the provincial governors, while the second involved the creation of an emergency 
social programme that went on to cover almost half of the population below the poverty 
line. Given the long history of veto power by provincial governors and traditions of fiscal 
and monetary disobedience by provincial governors, the national government was keen to 
redefine state-provincial relations in ways that would strengthen presidential authority. It 
therefore presented a proposal to provincial governors for an understanding in which the 
national government committed to help finance provincial expenditures so as to allow for 
provincial government to resume the payments of salaries and public service providers, 
while provincial governments committed to reduce progressively their deficit and to stop 
printing alternative quasi-currencies. According to the Under Secretary for Relations with 
the Provinces, the so-called ‘Pacto Federal’ (Federal Pact) was the first step in terms of 
consensus building for post-crisis institutional reconstruction (interview with author, 5 
June 2006). Although triggered by IMF conditionality, the Federal Pact was a key 
instrument of post-crisis governance since it reinforced the legitimacy and authority of 
the state in national policy decision-making. In fact, as international lines of credit were 
cut, most of the resources for the Federal Pact stemmed from the devaluation of the peso 
and the subsequent reactivation of national industry as it regained competitiveness in the 
international market. 
 
A growing export sector, meanwhile, helped to stabilize the currency. Just as importantly, 
it made possible new social investments which, though modest, contributed to calming 
the situation socially by allowing the distribution of food, health and workfare plans and 
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 subsidies and integrating leading civil society groups into the implementation of social 
plans (Svampa and Pereyra 2003). Institutionally, a crisis-driven consensus-building 
initiative, Mesa de Diálogo, was launched in April 2002 with the support of the Catholic 
Church and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Mesa was 
designed to serve as an alternative to Argentina’s traditionally corporatist structure of 
social relations. Organized in thematic round tables, it encouraged inputs into governance 
discussions by a broad range of society-based actors including labour, business, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), piqueteros, social movements, political parties and 
religious groups (Barnes 2005). One of its most significant initiatives was to push for the 
adoption of urgent policies of social inclusion. In this context, the most politically 
relevant and timely social programme, the Unemployed Men and Women Heads of 
Households Programme (Programa Jefas y Jefes de Hogares Desempleados) was 
proposed. Jefes y Jefas was a workfare programme that started in April 2002 financed 
initially partly with a loan of the World Bank and partly with income from export taxes. 
The plan was designed as an emergency plan to alleviate the impact of rising 
unemployment due to the worsening economic crisis (Galazo and Ravallion 2004). 
Another important programme that placated immediate social needs was a health plan, 
Plan Remediar, supported by the IADB, which organized the distribution of basic 
medicines to the poorest social groups. Together with a re-orientation of the lending 
portfolio of the World Bank and the IADB, a new platform for social policies was 
established and with it the basis for an effective and fast response to the social problem 
that targeted employment creation, attention to health urgencies and income subsidies. 
 
These and subsequent emergency plans were also an effective strategy for controlling 
social conflict as they were implemented in ways that brought the unemployed 
organizations into national, provincial and municipal power circuits. In the immediate 
post-crisis, welfare spending worked as an effective method of political inclusion of the 
poor. What it all points to is the adoption of a qualitatively different approach to state 
responsibility and state spending that stands in sharp contrast with the belief in the market 
of the 1990s and, that, at the same time, echoes some practices from the past, in particular 
from the Peronist government of the mid-1940s. But instead of a semi-closed economy 
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 based on national promotion of domestic markets and import-substitution, the post-crisis 
political economy is based on a strong state (and governmental) leadership in the 
economy while taking advantage of the regional and international markets dynamics that 
offered opportunities for Argentine export markets. All o f this comes together as ‘open-
economy nationalism’, an attempt at reconciling the centrality of the state in social life 
and its role as an economic agent through policies that bring together social spending and 
interventionism, export-led growth and a revival of regional integration as a platform for 
an alternative political economy. 
 
Cementing the alternative? From Kirchner to Fernandez Kirchner 
 
The strategy of national inclusion and industrial reactivation inherited from Duhalde 
formed the basis of policies under Néstor Kirchner, who took office in May 2003. The 
two administrations effectively managed to re-legitimize and re-institutionalize a model 
of governance that depended closely on nationalism to justify the new coalitions shaping 
policy. Domestically, state authority was gradually recovered through the implementation 
of effective pro-poor policies, along with the successful deployment of a politics of 
identity that, like Peronism in the 1940s, proved useful for resolving distributive conflicts 
(Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006: 204). Nationalism was, therefore, a core part of 
kirchnerismo. As soon as Kirchner took office, nationalist discourses were deployed in 
order to allow the government to consolidate an alternative form of governance. In this 
context, the social investments for the poor affected by the collapse in 2001 were turned 
into political capital for the government; and the climate of mobilization and re-
politicization opened up space for a discussion on the role of the state, the quality of 
Argentina’s democracy and, even, class, all of which allowed Kirchner to present himself 
as offering something qualitatively new from the neoliberal era.  
 
Paradoxically, and in marked contrast to the earlier period of nationalist development, 
contemporary nationalism is presented as compatible with market rules. This is partly 
possible because the current international political economy is extremely favourable to 
Argentina; exports are in demand and prices are high. After devaluation, the Argentine 
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 economy benefited from improved terms of trade that, together with a competitive 
exchange rate, allowed the country to build trade and fiscal surpluses quickly and thus 
reduce its dependency on external funding. Furthermore, while in the 1990s the 
government effectively gave up interest rate and currency control in order to satisfy 
foreign investors, the devaluation of early 2002 was part of a new commitment to flexible 
exchange rates and a more expansive monetary policy. External trade and internal surplus 
were possible because economic growth took off immediately as industry and agro-
exports benefited from the depreciation of the peso and the recovery in domestic 
consumption. Growth has continued at a rate of 9 per cent since 2003. Revenue acquired 
after 2003, meanwhile, as a result of export-led economic growth has allowed the 
government to increase welfare spending on unemployment insurance and pension 
benefits in the public sector, raise transport subsidies, fix the costs of and increase state 
participation in various public services, and invest in public works. In addition to the 
political significance that welfare acquired, state spending also aimed at strengthening the 
position of the state vis-à-vis international institutions.  
 
As Argentina became less dependent on fresh money from the IFIs, the government’s 
bargaining capacity vis-à-vis the IFIs increased. Economic recovery and the 
competitiveness of national industry gave the state more control over the economy, 
allowing for higher levels of state investment, an expansion of public works and the 
introduction of forms of tighter regulation over public service companies and banks; 
policies that not only contradicted IMF rules but also made clear that Argentina was no 
longer willing to tolerate foreign creditors dictating national economic norms. At the 
same time, these policies reduced the leverage of the IMF as ‘lender of last resort’. 
Kirchner’s strategy became known as ‘des-endeudamiento’ (de-borrowing) meaning the 
renegotiation of existing debt with international institutions and private creditors on as 
favourable terms as possible, without asking for any further loan and cancelling payments 
with national reserves. In the end, the US$ 9.8 billion debt was settled in December 2005, 
creating the image inside Argentina that a new, more autonomous period of development 
was opening up (Riggirozzi 2007: 137; also Cooper and Momani 2004).  
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 Kirchner’s decision to seek independence from IMF pressure by paying the debt owes as 
much to questions of political management as economic policy. Nurturing an image of a 
sovereign state in Argentina was important in a country where the electorate had been so 
injured by external-induced reform programmes. At the same time, it genuinely allowed 
the government much greater room for manoeuvre, economically, politically and even 
diplomatically. For example, Argentina has been able to form closer ties with Venezuela 
and to find a place the new regionalist schemes that are developing in Latin America, as 
the old integrationist schemes associated with neoliberalism fall away. Kirchner formed 
an alliance with President Chávez, who offered Argentina financial support over debt 
renegotiation. Venezuela has also become a partner is emerging arrangements around 
infrastructure and energy. Deals are also being struck with Bolivia and Brazil over the 
supply of natural gas (Tussie 2009). 
 
The recovery from the crisis thus opened a new cycle of political economy in Argentina. 
But while the style of government is nationalist and Kirchner was committed to economic 
expansion via industrialization, fiscal policy has been quite conservative. Social policies 
under the new desarrollismo have clear limits (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2007). Growth, 
falling levels of poverty and fiscal responsibility allowed the government to carry out 
some politically sensitive reforms – mainly in the areas of tax, welfare and institutional 
and human rights reforms – and, at the same time, present himself as the architect of the 
miracle. Kirchner’s own political capital allowed his wife, Cristina Fernandez de 
Kirchner, to win the presidential elections of October 2007, with a promise to continue 
policies of ‘open-market nationalism’. 
 
Essentially, agreeing on how to recover from 2001 was relatively easy; accepting that 
Néstor Kirchner needed to be given ‘space to govern’ was, if not easy, then prudent for 
all concerned. However, the extent to which that space to govern is sustainable over the 
longer term and compatible with the need to strengthen Argentina’s democracy is 
becoming an issue of concern. Additionally, whilst Kirchner, and Duhalde before him, 
put in place measures that were successful in terms of economic recovery, their policies 
have not necessarily institutionalized a coherent and sustainable model of governance 
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 politically. Like Menem in the 1990s, the administration of Néstor Kirchner (and the 
pattern is similar with Cristina) relied on systematically concentrating decision-making in 
the hands of the Executive, thereby weakening other political institutions. The political 
culture of Argentina remains personalist and hyper-presidential. Kirchner tended to 
micro-manage all the areas of government he saw as crucial. For instance, fear of 
inflation meant that at times, the President himself would conduct hours of negotiations 
with business, including representatives of supermarkets and agro-industry, in an effort to 
contain prices. When negotiations of this sort failed, the government’s response was to 
take direct action, if it could. This could mean that certain goods (for example, beef) 
might be banned from export in order to keep the domestic market supplied well enough 
to prevent prices rising. At times, the President himself urged consumers to boycott 
supermarkets that raised prices.  
 
The accumulation of power in the hands of the Executive in the post-crisis period was 
indeed part of the legacy of political fragmentation, executive dominance and failure of 
Argentina’s political parties to develop clear and coherent programmes for governance. 
This, certainly, reflects the erosion of the traditional institutional bonds between state and 
society during the decade of neoliberalism (see Grugel 2009). But the post-crisis model 
of governance has not addressed the democratic deficit in Argentina either and it took 
advantage of a weak and incoherent opposition and the failures that have beset the 
Radical Party. The Peronist Party today effectively governs without a political opposition 
(Sanchez 2008). The game of opposition is played out internally, inside the Party or 
between the government and economic pressure groups, as was made abundantly clearly 
shortly after Cristina Fernandez took office when her decision to raise export taxes was 
challenged successfully by agro-exporters. The widespread public distrust and vilification 
of the political class and parties that became explicit in the crisis of 2001 was a sign of a 
crisis of representation that has not been resolved. The state has recovered some authority 
as an economic actor; but attitudes to political elites remain much more ambiguous.      
 
Post-neoliberal governance: challenges ahead 
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 The extreme crisis of governance that opened in 2001 and 2002 is over. The Kirchners 
have been able to manage the two principal governance challenges, namely social 
desperation on a scale that threatened to bring down the political system and the need for 
a new macroeconomic matrix. As a result, a partial but still unstable new political 
economy has emerged; but the cost has been an extraordinary accumulation of executive 
power that sometimes risks falling into (semi-democratic) authoritarianism. Growth has 
been steady at almost 9 per cent annually since 2003. But, with the euphoria of recovery 
over, attention is increasingly focusing on the tendency towards state interventionism in 
taxation, price setting and other economic policies, and a policy-making style which 
relies to an excessive degree on the figure of the President. As a result, the challenges of 
democracy building are far from over with the demise of neoliberalism in Argentina (see 
Grugel 2009).  
 
There is little doubt of the success of the post-crisis governments in reasserting the 
command and capacity of the state in the new political economy. Effective and well-
targeted policies combined with a nationalist rhetoric reflected the urgent need to manage 
the crisis in a way that was sensitive to popular needs. Yet, effective policies after crisis 
do not equal sustainability over the long term. The first depends upon the rapid 
introduction of crisis-resolving strategies; the second on the institutionalization of a 
coherent and consensual programme for governance over the longer term. The reassertion 
of a new political economy, as in many other countries, requires a greater autonomy of 
the government from dominant economic groups (Haggard and Kaufman 1992). Yet in 
Argentina’s current political economy, this has led to restricted political participation in 
negotiations and decision-making that has resulted in measures that curtail the power of 
opposition groups. There is, consequently, a growing conflict with one of the main 
sources of income for the state: the agro-export sector. Increasingly important because of 
record commodity prices worldwide and a favourable exchange rate, export groups have 
been identified as those that should bear the cost of increasing state revenue through 
higher taxation. The decision to raise taxes to 20 per cent of export values, in March 
2008, together with rising inflation, led to unprecedented strikes, roadblocks and protests 
by the agro-industrial sector. This, in turn, meant food shortages and boycotts in the 
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 cities; and it contributed to rising class conflict and increasingly inflexible positions over 
questions of income distribution. Argentine politics is beginning to reflect a historic 
division between the nationalistic stance of the government, appealing to the pueblo, and 
an opposition alliance based around farmers and the urban middle class. If these 
differences harden, the result is likely to be stalemate in governance terms. In short, the 
dilemma of how to structure political power and to reconstitute political authority is far 
from over.  
 
There are other issues that have the potential to derail the new political economy. On one 
hand, there is the apparently ‘technical’ debate about how to finance social development 
– in the government's view the answer seems to be via increasing tax on exports, in a way 
that is similar to policies adopted immediately after the 2001 crisis but at a higher rate. 
As we have seen, this opens up a range of social tensions that are not easily managed. Yet 
this is probably less contentious than the option of increasing taxation on income and 
wealth. On the other hand, there is a ‘political’ debate about what nationalism currently 
means as a political economic project. The role of the state and the long-running struggle 
between landowners and the central government – since the time of the first Peronist 
government in the mid-1940s – over who is in charge of the political economy of the 
country, suggests the emergence of a new axis of conflict. Beyond the contextual 
character of ‘distributional struggles’, this suggests a degree of weakness in the capacity 
of the state to deliver an alternative project in post-neoliberal Argentina. Political and 
economic consolidation and social stabilization in the long run involve managing the 
distributional game between growth, production and inclusion. This has been a historic 
challenge in Argentina and is particularly acute in a society that is still struggling with 
high levels of poverty, extreme poverty and job informality (see table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2. Poverty and Extreme Poverty in Argentina, 2001- 2007 (Percentage of 
population) 
Year 
Poverty 
 
Extreme
poverty 
May 2001 35.9 11.6 
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 Oct 2001 38.3 13.6 
May 2002 53.0 24.8 
Oct 2002 57.5 27.5 
May 2003 54.7 26.3 
2nd semester 2003 47.8 20.5 
1st semester 2004 44.3 17.0 
2nd semester 2004 40.2 15.0 
1st semester 2005 38.5 13.6 
2nd semester 2005 33.8 12.2 
1st semester 2006 31.4 11.2 
2nd semester 2006 26.4 8.7 
2nd semester 2007 20.6 5.9 
Source: 
http://www.indec.mecon.gov.ar/nuevaweb/cuadros/74/grafpobreza1_ephcontinua.xls 
 
Overall then, the extent to which policies of ‘open-economy nationalism’ are turning into 
a consolidated, effective post-neoliberal project of consensual development is unclear. 
The post-crisis appeal to nationalism relied symbolically on the deployment of elements 
of ‘old’ Peronism and a sentimental attachment to the nation that were lost during the 
neoliberal years. But the sustainability of this strategy will depend on whether the new 
policies can resolve the legacy of poverty and exclusion from the years of neoliberalism, 
as well as managing class tensions with rural producers. Finding a new way to tackle 
these questions and embedding new policies institutionally are the most pressing tasks for 
government.  
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Mission (Im)possible? Getting CCTs to Break the Intergenerational Poverty Cycle. 
Lessons from Mexico and El Salvador  
Ana Patricia Silva 
 
During the last three decades, Latin America has gone through different economic development 
periods which have affected its political and social dynamics. As a response to these challenging 
conditions, the state has undertaken diverse social policy measures in order to protect the most 
vulnerable groups of population. One of the new strategies in order to fight against poverty, to 
foster social inclusion and to overcome inequalities is the conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programmes. 
CCT programmes have come to dominate the social protection sector in Latin America over 
the last ten years. At this moment almost all countries in the region are implementing such a 
programme or are in various stages of discussion on the benefits of implementing programmes of 
this type. CCTs are as well increasingly being promoted as best practice in the social sector for 
developing countries in other parts of the world, and have spurred debates over the relative merit of 
cash- versus food-based transfers. CCTs have the two-folded objective of combining long-run 
human capital development with short-term poverty alleviation and most of the programmes have 
established monitoring and evaluation systems in order to check if the programmes are achieving 
their goals.  
The objective of this paper is to analyse to which extend are CCT programmes in Latin 
America achieving their goal of helping people living in extreme poverty to get out of the 
intergenerational poverty cycle and to develop their own capacities. Using as case studies the 
“Oportunidades” programme in Mexico and the El Salvador’s programme “Red Solidaria”, the 
paper argues that CCTs are a useful tool in the anti-poverty efforts. However, the paper warns that 
CCT programmes are not a panacea against poverty and social exclusion and that their limitations 
should be addressed by creating other strategies which focus on more comprehensive policy 
reforms such as the creation of productive options, temporary employment programmes, access to 
micro-credits and micro-entrepreneurial opportunities, among others. 
In order to achieve its objectives, the paper is organised in the following order. In the first 
section, the theoretical framework will be given, based on the concept of conditional cash transfer 
programmes and their implementation in Latin America. In the second and third sections, the 
Oportunidades and Red Solidaria programmes will be portrayed, stating their background, 
objectives, components, and main characteristics. In the fourth section, an analysis of CCTs 
effectiveness will be undertaken. Finally, in the last section, the conclusions will be drawn.  
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1. CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES IN LATIN AMERICA 
In the beginning of the development efforts in the 1960s, poverty alleviation programmes were 
focusing on a universal approach to poverty fighting. Men and women living in poverty were 
approached by undifferentiated social policies and the problems of gender inequality were not being 
directly addressed. However, the 1990s went through significant shifts in thinking and practice 
around anti-poverty policy. Delivery mechanisms moved away from general food price subsidies 
toward more targeted ways of social safety nets and micro-credit programmes. Coverage also 
narrowed from universal benefits to targeted transfers, reflecting a hegemonic neo-liberal obsession 
with efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
Programmes that make cash transfers conditional on investment in human capital need to be 
judged in the context of a new approach to social protection. During the 1980s, the social 
consequences of economic crises and structural adjustment programmes, especially in Latin 
America, led to a debate about the rationality of existing safety nets. The result of this debate was 
that instead of concentrating so much on short-term poverty reduction, social protection systems 
shifted towards a risk management approach aimed at enhancing human capital and defeating 
poverty in the longer term. Within this current, conditional transfer programmes were born from the 
concept of social protection as human capital investment. Their premise is that the reproduction of 
poverty across generations is due to a lack of investment in human capital, and they seek to foster 
this investment by attaching conditions to transfers, while at the same time combating short-term 
poverty (Villatoro 2005:84). 
According to the social risk management approach (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000), 
individuals, households and communities are exposed to multiple risks. Poverty means greater 
vulnerability, since the poor have little access to suitable risk management instruments and are ill-
placed to cope with crises. The mechanisms most used by poor families to deal with economic 
shocks are informal strategies (i.e. taking their children out of school) whose inefficiency results in 
an irreversible loss of human capital and perpetuation of the intergenerational cycle of poverty. 
Social protection measures based on conditional cash transfers are human capital investments that 
enhance access to basic services and prevent the use of strategies with adverse long-term 
consequences, benefiting in this fashion people living in structural poverty, those just above the 
extreme poverty line1, and groups with special needs. 
Following this argument, from the mid-90s onwards the provision of conditional cash 
transfer programmes emerged in the development agenda of Latin America as a fairly popular 
                                                 
1 In this case this refers to people who between 1 and 2 USD/day. 
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policy trend. These programmes consist in the provision of money subsidies to targeted households 
living in extreme poverty, provided they assure school attendance of their children and attend 
periodic health check-ups and health-related activities2. These programmes’ innovation is their 
capacity to address demand-side constraints for structural poverty reduction, through an incentive 
scheme which combines the short term objectives of safety nets with the long term goal of building 
human capital and breaking the vicious circle of poverty traps. 
Conditional cash transfer programmes are targeted to households living in extreme poverty, 
linked to the acceptance of certain co-responsibilities (conditions) to foster the human capital of the 
beneficiaries. These programmes have a double effect within the effort of creating a sustainable 
strategy for poverty reduction: they have a component of immediate help and improvement of the 
nutritional consumption and basic goods of the beneficiaries due to the cash transfers, and they have 
a component of structural change, which modifies one of the main causes of poverty: the lack of 
human capital. The medium- and long-term consequences of CCTs allow the development of the 
beneficiaries’ capabilities and break the tendency to school desertion, malnutrition and preventable 
diseases which affects the life and income possibilities of the poorest households. 
Conditional cash transfer programmes have received substantial support from the 
international community and are highlighted as one of the best practices of social protection in 
Latin America, and their appeal has to do with their potential to tackle key issues in the perpetuation 
of poverty and their fit into the current mainstream discourse on poverty reduction, as well as their 
capacity to respond to two interrelated problems: the failure of universal social policies to reach the 
poor (especially in the areas of education, health and nutrition) and the failure of the social 
protection systems in place to provide effective cushion mechanisms during crises, especially for 
those working in the informal economy sector and those not covered by any other public social 
protection scheme. 
 
2. PROGRESA - OPORTUNIDADES 
In 1994 presidential elections were held in Mexico and Ernesto Zedillo, from the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)3, was elected. The beginning of his administration was marked 
by a terrible economic crisis which started in December 1994. In the midst of the economic turmoil, 
Zedillo and his political group did not want to be related to the ex-president Carlos Salinas, or to his 
                                                 
2 This includes the attendance to conferences on health-related issues, such as HIV/AIDS, pregnancy care, 
STDs, etc. 
3 Institutional Revolutionary Party. 
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social and economic policies. Therefore, Pronasol4 was slowly removed, and due to economic 
difficulties and political vulnerability, there was a vacuum in the national social policy during the 
first three years of his administration, which was deepened by a governmental controversy. 
This controversy regarded the social policy and had arisen due to a clash in the political 
elite, which resulted in two groups which were pursuing different approaches of social policy. The 
first group, the so-called “social reformers”, wanted to continue the universalistic social policy 
approach of Pronasol and the second one, the so-called “technocrats”, headed by Santiago Levy, 
wanted to implement much targeted ways of poverty alleviation and were based on the ideas of 
improving human capital, in order to help individuals to get out of poverty. Since this debate was in 
the centre of the political elite, the social policy virtually stopped from 1994 to 1997 and there was 
a rupture in the Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (Sedesol)5, until 1997 when finally the technocrats 
won and the Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (Progresa)6 was created, following a 
targeted way of poverty alleviation (Valencia and Aguirre 1998). 
The main objective of Progresa was to increase the basic capabilities of families living in 
extreme poverty, through the promotion of education, health and nutrition, and to support their 
access to goods and services that could help them develop skills and break the intergenerational 
poverty circle. Progresa started the era of extremely targeted poverty alleviation programmes in 
Mexico and was working based on targeted cash and food transfers delivered to the female head of 
families in extreme rural poverty, on the human capital approach and on the new element of co-
responsibility (conditionality)7. This new approach in the anti-poverty agenda followed from some 
of the internal problems encountered during Pronasol8, as well as from a change in the international 
anti-poverty agenda, which switched from a universalistic approach to another one based on more 
targeted interventions9. 
                                                 
4 National Programme for Solidarity. It was President Salinas’s main social development strategy based on a 
social capital approach to poverty alleviation. 
5 Ministry for Social Development.  
6 Programme for Education, Health and Nutrition. 
7 Co-responsibility means that in order to get social programmes’ benefits, families in extreme poverty need 
to follow certain requirements imposed by the government, for example, they need to send all their children to 
school, take them to regular nutrition and health check-ups and participate in educational health seminars held 
by the local health centres.  
8 It has been argued that president Salinas used Pronasol as a key political strategy. Resources were to be 
targeted not only by the degree of poverty, but also to areas of high political opposition. In this way, the 
president sought to legitimise the government and turn back the opposition threat (Kurtz 2005).     
9 In ideological terms, a commitment to neo-liberalism meant a rethinking of state-society relations that would 
result in changes to the regime of social provision. As efficiency criteria began to govern state action and an 
emphasis on market price signals became axiomatic, anti-poverty policies were pushed in a more targeted and 
means-tested direction. It has also been suggested that the creation of this neo-liberal form of social welfare 
was, in the Mexican case, largely an external imposition, linked to the implementation of liberal economic 
policies and propelled politically by the IMF and the WB (Kurtz 2005).  
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Progresa was a transfer-based poverty alleviation programme which worked by giving 
nutritional and educative support and cash transfers. The female head of the families in extreme 
rural poverty could receive nutritional supplements for their children, money to buy food, and 
scholarships for the education of each of their children attending school between the third level of 
elementary school and the third year of high school10; and the scholarships received would be larger 
for girls between the first and the third year of high school to compensate the gender inequalities of 
the country. However, in order to receive this aid, the beneficiaries needed to commit themselves to 
attending regular health check-ups and to sending all their children to the school. Where these 
conditionalities were not adhered to, the family would stop receiving the support of the programme 
(Valencia and Aguirre 1998). 
In 2000 Vicente Fox, from the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN)11, became the first elected 
president from an opposition party after seventy one years of rule of the PRI. This situation meant a 
dramatic change in the politics of the Mexican state, and controversy arose about what kind of 
social policy would be created, or if the previous scheme would be followed. From 2000 to 2002, 
Progresa kept working in the regular way, and in 2002 it changed its name to Programme for 
Human Development Opportunities (Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades). The 
decision of changing Progresa’s name came from the desire of the new president to show that the 
programme was now run by the PAN, and also to make apparent the new characteristics 
implemented in the programme (i.e. expansion to semi-urban and urban areas, scholarships given to 
children until the last year of secondary school). 
Oportunidades is based on the principles that targeted aid produces better results than an 
universal provision of aid, that gender inequality needs to be approached and that the investment in 
human capital is the best way to help poor people overcome poverty, hand-in-hand with the 
economic development of the country. Alongside these guidelines, the Mexican government 
developed a new definition of poverty, which was meant to help designing better anti-poverty 
measures. This new definition of poverty was created in 2001 by the Comité Técnico para la 
Medición de la Pobreza12 (Technical Committee for Poverty Measurement), and includes three 
poverty categories based on the income level of the population: nutritional poverty (pobreza 
alimentaria), capabilities poverty (pobreza de capacidades) and conditions poverty (pobreza de 
patrimonio). 
                                                 
10 The age range of the children benefited by the programme was between the 9 years-old and the 15 years-
old.  
11 Party for National Action. 
12 The new definition of poverty was created because the government wanted to have official poverty data that 
could be used as a guideline to plan the social policy, design social programmes and evaluate their efficacy.     
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The nutritional poverty is considered to be when the household’s income is not enough to 
cover the nutritional needs of the members of the family13, and it is equivalent to 15.4 Mexican 
Pesos (MXN) per day per person (pdpp) in rural areas and 20.9 MXN pdpp in urban areas14, and in 
2000, 24.2% of the total population of the country was living under this poverty line. The 
capabilities poverty is considered when the household’s income is not enough to cover the 
nutritional, educational and health needs, which was in 2000 18.9 MXN pdpp in rural areas and 
24.7 MXN pdpp in urban areas15, and in 2000, 31.9% of the population was living under the 
capabilities poverty line. Finally, the conditions poverty is considered when the household’s income 
is not enough to cover the nutritional, educational and health needs, and a basic consumption of 
clothes, housing and public transportation. This meant less than 28.1 MXN pdpp in rural areas and 
41.8 MXN pdpp in urban areas16, and in 2000, 53.7% (approx. 53 million of people) of the 
population was living under this kind of poverty (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 2003). 
Oportunidades started to work on the 6th of March 2002, based on the objective of 
increasing, by means of targeted aid, the capabilities of people living in extreme poverty (nutritional 
poverty), and of promoting their access to education and health, and to a better nutrition, with the 
main goal of building their human capital, so they could break the intergenerational poverty cycle17. 
The targeted aid is given in form of cash transfers (money for food and scholarships) and food 
transfers (nutritional supplements) directly to the female head of the family. The programme is also 
based on increasing scholarships given to children and young people going to school between the 
third year of elementary school and the last year of secondary school (high school). These 
scholarships have a gender approach and give more money to girls than to boys after the elementary 
school to compensate the inequality of opportunities that girls face, in order to promote gender 
equality18. 
                                                 
13 This index is measured by the ability of the household to buy a “canasta alimentaria básica” (basic 
nutritional basket), which includes cereals, meat, milk, eggs, oil, potatoes, beans, vegetables and fruits. This 
basic basket is set by the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH), which is 
implemented by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI).   
14 These amounts were calculated for the year 2000, and the equivalent in American Dollars (USD) was 1.63 
USD in rural areas and 2.2 USD in urban areas. 
15 In 2000 these amounts were 2 USD in rural areas and 2.6 USD in urban areas.  
16 In 2000 these amounts were 2.97 USD in rural areas and 4.42 USD in urban areas.  
17 This “poverty circle” is understood as a “vicious circle” of under-nourishment, high morbidity and low 
education which prevents the poor from developing their “productive potential”, condemning them to living a 
life of poverty, generation after generation.  
18 Traditionally, families living in poverty prefer to support the education of their male children, because they 
think that they will need to work and support their own family some day. At the same time, they make girls 
stay at home and help with the domestic work, based on the idea that they will eventually get married and will 
be supported by their husbands.  
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The poverty reduction stream of Oportunidades can be linked to its emphasis on improving 
beneficiaries’ nutrition, health and education standards. This is seen as a long-term effort to 
improve the human capital of the poor, and the empowerment of poor women, in order to raise their 
productivity and their income-generating potential, and in this fashion, to allow them to escape 
poverty through their own efforts in a sustainable way. 
The target population of the programme are families living in rural, semi-rural and urban 
localities with a high degree of extreme poverty. The selection of the Oportunidades beneficiaries is 
determined by a three-step process: 1) localities are selected according to geographic targeting 
which considers their relative marginality, 2) extensive household surveys are conducted in the 
chosen localities to gather data on a variety of welfare indicators, and 3) the selected poorest 
families decide if they wish to be incorporated to the programme to receive the aid and accept to 
follow some co-responsibilities. The co-responsibilities include the beneficiaries’ obligation to 
ensure 1) their children’s school attendance, 2) attendance to regular health check-ups and 3) 
attendance to health seminars. After this process, the families receive aid for three years, and after 
that period if they are still in extreme poverty, they can receive the aid for three more years. 
In general, the programme works based on transfers given to the selected beneficiaries in order 
to ensure the achievement of their basic capabilities in the short-term by allowing them to gain 
command of a minimum package of commodities and services (mainly food, health care and 
education). These transfers are: 
- Monthly cash allowances given to the families of children attending from the third to the 
sixth grade of primary schools or from the first to the sixth grade of secondary school (high 
school). The amount of the scholarships increases as the education level advances and is 
higher for girls in secondary school, to reverse the gender bias in education19. An amount 
for school materials is also given to each child20. 
                                                 
19 For the second semester of 2007 the amount of this aid is as follows:  
-For boys and girls in elementary school: 3rd grade-125 MXN, 4th grade-145 MXN, 5th grade-185 MXN, 6th 
grade-250 MXN. 
-For boys in secondary school: 1st grade-360 MXN, 2nd grade-385 MXN, 3rd grade-405 MXN, 4th grade- 610 
MXN, 5th grade- 655 MXN, 6th grade- 695 MXN.  
For girls in secondary school: 1st grade-385 MXN, 2nd grade-425 MXN, 3rd grade-465 MXN, 4th grade-700 
MXN, 5th grade-745 MXN, 6th grade 790 MXN (Oportunidades 2007). 
20 For the second semester of 2007 the amount of this aid is:  
-For boys and girls in elementary school: $165 MXN for the first semester of the academic year and $85 
MXN for the second semester of the academic year (Oportunidades 2007). 
-For boys and girls in secondary school: $310 MXN for the whole academic year. 
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- Monthly cash allowances to contribute to the improvement of the families’ food 
consumption21. 
- Nutrition supplements given to all children between 4 months and 2 years, to 
undernourished children between 2 and 5 years, and to pregnant and lactating women. 
- Monthly cash allowances for old people (adultos mayores) over 70-years-old22. 
- A one-time allowance given to young people who finish the secondary school before the 
age of 22, in order to encourage them to finish the secondary school and to give them a 
financial basis to start their adult life23. 
These transfers are given on a monthly basis to the female head of the family as a way to 
avoiding the gender bias of intra-household distribution of food and other commodities. There is 
also a maximum level of cash transfers that a single family is allowed to receive, in order to avoid 
the creation of dependency on public aid and not to discourage the self-improvement efforts of the 
individuals24. 
Oportunidades gives cash and food transfers directly to women because its planning is 
based on research that suggests the fact that resources handled by women have potentially more 
probabilities of impacting in a positive way children’s nutrition and health levels than those handled 
by men. Also, the gendered nature of the transfers is based on the idea that women’s empowerment 
is fostered when they have more control over resources (Adato 2004:350). 
Following the gender approach, another key element of the programme is the participation 
of women in educational seminars on different topics regarding health, nutrition, family planning 
and hygiene. The attendance to these seminars is one of the elements of the co-responsibility that 
families accept to follow in order to get the aid. These seminars help to educate women regarding 
their own health and their children’s health. Other seminars’ topics, such as sexuality, domestic 
violence, pregnancy, gender and health, and HIV/AIDS, help them to be more aware of their rights 
as women and of the need to be responsible for their own bodies and decisions. 
 
 
                                                 
21 For the second semester of 2007, this aid is 185 MXN for nutritional support and $50 MXN for energetic 
support (Oportunidades 2007).  
22 For the second semester of 2007 the amount of this aid is $260 MXN per old person. 
23 For the second semester of 2007 the amount of this aid varied between 995 MXN and 3318 MXN, 
according to the amount of accumulated points by each student.  
(http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/htmls/3trim07SHCP.pdf). 
24 For the second semester of 2007, the maximum amount that a family could receive per month including 
education and food help is 1190 MXN (108.473USD) if it has children in elementary school, or 1980 MXN 
(180.484 USD) if it has children in secondary school. In the families with old people, the maximum amount 
increases by $260 per old person. In November 2007 the currency exchange rate was 10.9705 MXN for 1 
USD (Oportunidades 2007). 
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3. RED SOLIDARIA PROGRAMME IN EL SALVADOR 
Red Solidaria is the main government programme targeted at the poorest population of El Salvador. 
It started to work in 2005 in 32 communities, based on conditional cash transfers and as part of the 
national social strategy for poverty reduction. The Programme is designed to be an integrated, 
multi-sectorial strategy that attends demand and supply simultaneously, with three main guidelines: 
1. Family Solidarity Network 
Conditional cash transfers paid to the female head of the family, provided they follow 
certain co-responsibilities including sending primary school-aged children to school, 
completing a number of preventive health and nutrition measures (i.e. immunisation, child-
growth monitoring, etc.) 
2. Network of Basic Services 
Its objective is to complement and enhance the efficacy of the CCT programme by 
strengthening basic education, health, and nutritional services. 
3. Family Sustainability Network 
This consists of small scale productive projects and micro-credit programmes to support 
poor agricultural producers in 100 municipalities to increase their economic productivity 
and incomes, to diversify their income sources, and to improve their economic 
management. 
Red Solidaria’s design traces its origins to the government plan for 2004-2009 of President 
Antonio Elias Saca, a candidate of the right-wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA). 
Such plan outlined the creation of a social safety net for the country’s most vulnerable population. 
Interestingly, the government plan of the leftist Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación 
Nacional (FMLN) –the other strong contesting party in the 2004 elections- mentioned, as well, 
under its educational priorities the establishment of cash transfers to combat school drop-outs, low 
rates of school attendance and child labour (Britto 2007). 
 The programme’s conceptual design took place between 2004 and the beginning of 2005 
and the Red was officially launched by a presidential decree in March 200525. This legal document 
lays the foundations of Red Solidaria, in terms of objectives, duration, assigned resources and 
institutional coordination. It states that the programme’s objective is to assist extremely poor 
families through: 1) child and maternal health and nutrition, 2) basic education, and 3) drinking 
water, sanitation supply, electricity and roads to the poorest rural communities of the country. The 
programme’s components are described as tools to broaden the opportunities of the disadvantaged 
population in order to improve their economic and social condition.  
                                                 
25 Executive Decree n.11, March 4th, 2005, modified by Executive Decree n.42, May 16th, 2005. 
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 The programme’s duration coincides with the presidential term and the coverage goals are 
the 100 country’s poorest municipalities, as identified by the national poverty map. Resources for 
all three components of the programme are estimated to be approximately 50 USD million per year. 
The Social Investment Fund for Local Development (FISDL) is appointed as the implementing 
agency of the Red, but the programme’s technical and political coordination is placed under the 
Technical Secretariat of the Presidency and a Directive Council involving several government 
organisations. 
 The programme is based on the human capital approach and its objective is the medium- 
and long-term improvement of the living conditions of extremely poor rural families through 
integrated interventions that give priority to the poorest municipalities.  
 The rural emphasis of the programme is another of its distinctive features. The rationale for 
this emphasis is related to the poverty profile of El Salvador, which documents the 
disproportionately disadvantaged situation of the rural population, not only in terms of income 
poverty but also in terms of access to health, education, other basic services and infrastructure. 
According to World Bank estimates, the national poverty headcount fell from 64% to 37%, and 
extreme poverty fell from 31% to 15% during 1991-2003. But 50% of rural Salvadorans still 
remained below the poverty line in 2002 and 24.5% were extremely poor. In urban areas these 
figures were 28.5% and 9% respectively. Similarly, while basic education enrolment rates were 
close to 90% in urban areas, they were only 80% in rural areas. Differentials in access to safe water, 
adequate sanitation and electricity were even more striking (Britto 2007). 
 The design of Red Solidaria’s CCT programme emerged from a poverty and a social safety 
net assessment sponsored by the World Bank. These assessments highlighted the need for creating 
an integrated social strategy focusing on: a) strengthening human capital, mostly through increasing 
education levels and providing access to basic health services to all, b) strengthening people’s 
access to markets and services by improving the supply of drinking water, sanitation services and 
roads in rural communities, and c) assisting and protecting the poorest and most vulnerable 
population, by means of a coherent, coordinated and well-targeted social safety net. 
 The cash transfers provided by Red Solidaria comprise a health stipend for families with 
pregnant women and children under 5 years old and an education scholarship for families with 
children from 5 to 15 years old who have not completed the 6th grade (second cycle of basic 
education). Each stipend is worth 15 USD per month per family, but a family cap applies to those 
entitled to both, i.e. 10 USD per month for each, totalling a maximum of 20 USD per family.   
 As most CCTs implemented elsewhere, Red Solidaria addresses its transfers primarily to 
the mother or another female family member who is in charge of children’s care. But the 
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programme also includes a co-responsible beneficiary, usually the partner of the main female 
beneficiary or another person appointment by the family, who can withdraw the transfers in case the 
main beneficiary does not have her own identity card (required to actually collect the stipend) or 
cannot be there in person during payment events.  
  
4. CCTS’ IMPACT ON POVERTY REDUCTION  
Oportunidades was the first social programme in Mexico to carry out a rigorous independent 
evaluation of programme impacts that included randomly assigned treatment and control groups. 
Given the size and scope of the programme, programme officials emphasised the importance of 
accurate, credible data as a strategy to measure effectiveness and to try to ensure that the 
Programme would survive government changes. As part of the idea of having external evaluations, 
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) conducted the evaluations, along with 
independent scholars and economists.  
 Important positive impacts were reported in school enrolment, health clinic attendance, and 
nutrition. In the case of education, the largest impacts were reported on children who enter 
secondary school, where impacts represent a percentage increase of enrolment over 20% for girls 
and 10% for boys. Significant health and nutrition effects were also reported. Oportunidades 
children 1-5 years old have a 12% lower incidence of illness than non-Oportunidades children. 
Additionally, data suggest that Oportunidades has had large impact on increasing child growth and 
in reducing child stunting. Apart from the quantitative evaluations, qualitative evaluations have also 
been undertaken, which evaluate the degree of women’s empowerment as a result of the 
programme, as well as intra-familiar and intra-communitarian relations, etc.  
 Regarding the broader poverty levels, the results of the simulated impact of Oportunidades’ 
cash transfers show that Oportunidades interventions reduced the number of people with income 
levels below the poverty line by about 10%. The depth of poverty is reduced by 30%, and the 
severity index is reduced by 45%. For comparison, an untargeted transfer is found to reduce the 
depth of poverty by 28% and the severity of poverty by 36%. Given that these indicators put greater 
weight on the poorest of the poor, the simulation results suggest that Oportunidades’ largest 
reduction in poverty is being achieved in the poorest population (IFPRI 2002).     
In the case of the Red Solidaria programme, which is still relatively new, it is hard to give 
specific results in many areas, however, some of the main results so far are: school enrolment has 
increased in 23% in pre-school, 6% in elementary school in grades 1st-3rd and 9% in grades 4th-6th; 
children health check-ups have increased in a 47% and maternal health check-ups have increased in 
a 42% (Britto 2007). 
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A common criticism of CCT programmes is the almost exclusive focus on human capital 
accumulation for children, which takes years –sometimes a generation- to develop. These 
programmes tend to ignore building human capital or productive capacity for adults who are past 
school age, and the accumulation of productive capital for the here and now: that is, capital, such as 
land or non-agricultural assets, which would have both long- and short-term effects on poverty 
alleviation. Through CCTs children will be better prepared for the labour market when they are 
older, but productive investment of the transfer would allow the family to sustain the impact of the 
cash transfers, which cannot continue indefinitely.  
 While it is not clear whether human capital goals and productive capital accumulation 
should co-exist within the same programme, the design could benefit from considering what role 
cash transfers can play in this regard. There would be some merit in considering how to maximise 
the indirect productive effect of CCT programmes, and minimise constraints, when designing the 
programme. At a broader level, CCTs in rural areas constitute a substantial infusion of liquidity 
among poor households and their communities. The poverty alleviation and development impact 
could be maximised by better considering the local economic context in which households and their 
communities operate. 
 As previously mentioned, one of the two objectives of CCT programmes is reducing the 
incidence and depth of poverty. The theoretical impetus for the design of these programmes is long-
term reduction in poverty, but, primarily for political reasons, reductions in the current or short-term 
incidence of poverty are frequently stated as policy objectives. While it is relatively easy to find 
increases in beneficiary welfare, actually linking changes in the national incidence of poverty with 
expenditures on CCT programmes is difficult, as many other factors –particularly economic 
growth- play a determinant role. An economic turndown can obscure any improvements in the 
overall incidence of poverty, even though beneficiaries of the programme are better-off than if they 
had not received the programme.   
 In the area of the impact of the CCTs on poverty reduction, there is a very limited set of 
indicators that can be used to measure the true impact that directly relates to the stated objectives of 
these programmes. The first objective of ameliorating short-term poverty can be measured by 
caloric consumption, etc. However, the second objective –to improve human capital development 
and thus break the intergenerational poverty cycle- cannot be measured in the short run, although 
current nutritional status and cognitive achievement might be good current indicators of the 
potential for eventual human capital accumulation and lifetime earnings26.    
                                                 
26 Early childhood nutrition has been shown to be an important determinant of later schooling outcomes, 
which in turn are important determinants of earnings and social mobility.  
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 The evaluation work on human capital investment has focused on outcomes such as school 
enrolment, health check-ups for growth monitoring and vaccinations. These have shown significant 
increases, although there are some nuances in the results. The degree to which these increased 
outcomes translate into later life impacts as intended by the programmes depends on factors outside 
the programmes themselves, such as the quality of supply-side services, access to higher levels of 
schooling and employment opportunities. This implies that CCTs by themselves cannot be expected 
to reduce inequality and overall levels of poverty; efforts must continue to be applied to ensuring 
quality delivery of social services and an environment that fosters economic growth. One further 
complication is that, in the long term, increasing human capital in rural areas may foment national 
and international migration in search of employment opportunities, and thus lure past beneficiaries 
out of the scope of follow-up surveys (Handa and Davis 2006).    
 CCTs have as well some indirect impacts. The large scale of financial resources moved by 
CCTs, as well as conditionality on behaviour has the potential to influence other aspects of the 
household, community and even region. Some of these impacts have been documented, and include 
changes in attitudes and intra-household decision making, spill-over effects on non-beneficiaries, 
reduced international migration in the short term, and spending on productive activities that has the 
potential for generating multiplier effects on income.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Within the short span of ten years, CCT programmes have become the social protection/social 
safety-net intervention of choice in Latin America, and are increasingly being locked as an example 
to emulate in other parts of the developing world.  
CCTs have the two-folded objective of combining long-run human capital development 
with short-term poverty alleviation; however, the question of whether or not they can achieve the 
human capital development and in this fashion help the extreme poor to break the intergenerational 
poverty cycle is hard to answer accurately.  
A question that may still require attention is that the exclusive focus on human capital 
accumulation by the younger generation misses the broader context of poverty alleviation 
programmes within rural development. This is exhibited on a number of different levels. First, 
CCTs in general miss the opportunity for maximising synergies with agricultural and non-
agricultural productive activities at the household level, and conversely, the rural household’s 
participation in certain types of economic activities may blunt programme impact. Second, ignoring 
the human capital accumulation of parents (with the exception of health) and asset accumulation 
within their economic activities weakens the household-level sustainability of the transfers beyond 
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the time when either the transfers have been terminated and/or the children have left home. Third, 
CCTs in most instances represent a substantial influx of financial resources into marginalised, and 
often isolated, communities. As well, little attention has been paid in terms of how to maximise 
their impact on local economic development.   
However, CCT programmes have shown considerable achievements under a variety of 
circumstances. They are at the forefront of a new thinking on social protection, which re-examines 
the presumed trade-off between equity and efficiency by considering the long-term social and 
economic costs of uninsured risks and unmitigated inequalities and the potential role of safety nets 
in addressing these issues. By providing incentives to parents and enabling them to invest in the 
long-term human capital development of their children, they have promise for addressing issues of 
deep-seated exclusion and the intergenerational transmission of poverty. 
 By introducing modernisations in their operation, including adopting unified beneficiary 
registries, credibly enforcing poverty targeting and conditionalities, and using evaluations in a 
strategic way, these programmes have introduced many innovations in social assistance policies. In 
countries such as Mexico and El Salvador, due to strong political support from the highest levels, 
they have been used to promote transparency in social policy and counter legacies of paternalism 
and clientelism. 
CCTs are contributing to social inclusion in several complementary ways: recognising and 
explicitly targeting the poor, focusing on children and delivering transfers to women, and changing 
social accountability relationships between beneficiaries, service providers and local and central 
governments. As well, providing cash helps protect livelihoods, because affected people can avoid 
resorting to negative coping strategies (such as eating seeds or selling livestock or assets) in order to 
cover their essential needs. Cash also helps disaster-affected people to recover their livelihoods 
through purchase of essential livelihood assets, services or repayment of loans.  
Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that the provision of cash alone is not always a 
sufficient tool to eliminate poverty and exclusion problems. Cash transfer programmes often need to 
be linked with other strategies that focus on improving infrastructure, market support and the 
availability of services. Cash programmes can also include the distribution of in-kind commodities. 
However, this requires ongoing dialogue with other organisations and with local- and national-level 
authorities. As it can be seen, CCT programmes are not a panacea against social exclusion and their 
limitations should be recognised and addressed by focusing on more comprehensive social policy 
reforms that include, but are no limited to, CCTs, such as the creation of productive options, 
temporary employment programmes, access to micro-credits and micro-entrepreneurial 
opportunities, among others. The question that remains is how to achieve an incentive compatibility 
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of CCTs and other programmes of the development strategy, so that the healthier, better-educated 
young people who benefit from the programmes can get access to productive opportunities. An exit 
strategy is needed which can link the ex-beneficiaries with other development strategies to ensure 
their further progress and prevent them from falling back into the poverty trap. 
CCTs effectiveness may increase by strengthening links to the labour market, shifting the 
balance between their early childhood and school-age components, and making eligibility more 
flexible to include households facing shocks. Within this framework it becomes clear that CCT 
programmes’ objective of fostering long-term investments in human capital can only be achieved 
with the supply of good-quality and accessible health and education services, and with the existence 
of a governmental system that provides the beneficiaries with the possibility to access other social 
programmes of the national development strategy, that could help them to be better integrated 
within their social and economic context, breaking in this fashion the intergenerational poverty 
cycle.  
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 Political longings and institutional belongings in the Peruvian women's 
movement - methodological reflections in early project formulation. 
 
Christina Hee Pedersen, CBIT, Roskilde University. 
 
Abstract 
This presentation contains a number of preliminary ideas for a future research where collective 
methodological approaches will be used to explore what I call 'political longings and institutional 
belongings' in the Peruvian women's movement. I'm at the moment formulating a new research 
project that will draw on memory-work and collective reflection in the exploration of central  
feminist concepts of power, political participation, difference and cultural diversity. The project is 
embedded in a broader research project that will examining  articulations of socio cultural and scio 
economic dominance and understandings of political participation in different organised groups of 
women in Bolivia and Peru.  My part of the project is inspired by 'a fusion' of post-structuralist 
feminist research and action research, and its argument is that both the creation of knowledge and 
the creation of relations during a research process is capable of strengthening collective and 
individual construction of identities, as well as the formulation of political visions for future 
political action in a social movement. I will turn to poststructuralist theories of subjectification to 
understand how questions of social class, race, ethnicity, gender and age are being spoken into 
existence in collective work where old and new stories of the women's movement in Peru are the 
point of departure.   
 
Research context and aims - preliminary thoughts  
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 I plan to go to Peru in November this year to generate the first data. I am interested in exploring 
changes in the discourses of citizenship, multiculturalism and rights in the actual context of 
neoliberal economic developments coupled with the actual somehow new political situation where a 
so called "pink wave" challenge traditional understandings of what Latin America is and what it is 
about to become.  The context of my research is the feminist movement in Peru, where I 
participated as an activist for more than 10 years in the 80és and 90és. I'm interested in the 
participation of women and women's demands in relation to the political agenda of today's Peru. 
  
The project is located at the intersection of narratives, memory, identity and feminist politics and 
will establish one memory workshops with 6 participants from the feminist movement in Peru.  
It is based on poststructuralist theories that understand identity as a site of narrative constructions 
and reconstructions and approaches to feminism and social movements will be that of one interested 
in exploring the intersection between individual or collective identities.  
 
My central research question is how discourses of dominance whether it be in relation to gender, 
class or ethnicity are framed theoretically and politically in today's political agenda. What do the 
conceptual framings of the women participating tell about current institutional belongings and 
political longings in the future and what would be the possible consequences of such framing for 
feminist action?     
In research done from a feminist perspective one aims at involving both the personal, professional 
and political dimensions of a social phenomena and of the research process. The production of data 
will be done by using two different methodological approaches, and they both understand this 
'trinity' as a way of 'measuring' scientific validity: one is Memory Work (Haug et al 1994) or 
Collective Biographies as formulated later by Davies. The other is: Reconstructions and 
208
 Confrontations a method that grew out of my own research carried out in Denmark about 
masculinities and gender sensitive development work in Danish development organisations.  
 
Both methods generate data in a narrative form. I understand experience as something being given 
meaning through narratives. In our narratives about the past we construct a morally loaded and 
coherent identity that not only account for what happened, but tells us about both present and future. 
The wakening up of memories of gender, class and race is not only a recalling of experience, rather 
it is an effective re-experiencing that only becomes possible because it is called into existence 
through a narrative and because the narrative is told to others and rendered importance in the 
present. Doing memory work and narrative reconstructions will be a way of illuminating political 
longings and institutional belongings in feminist political interpretations of today's Peru.  
 
Memorywork 
This method part from the idea, that every memory recalled by a person is a relevant trace in 
exploring what constitute the individual. In this case what will be explored is 'the feminist activist' 
and hereby 'the feminist we'.   The method presupposes that any memory is a relevant route into the 
endeavour of encountering what constitute the self, - and in this case what constitute notions of 
gender, class and race/ethnicity. In the universe of Frigga Haug memories are not interesting as a 
register of data or as autobiographical narratives, they are interesting as procesess of sense making 
in the construction of contemporary social identities (Hadwich in Schatz and Walker 1995: 42). 
 
Central to the methodology is the principle that participants are subjects in the process, not objects. 
The researcher therefore is considered a social being that equally participates actively in processes 
of active subjectification, hence she/he cannot avoid being a subject as well. Haug et al’s principle 
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 of the ‘collapse of subject and object’ confronts and allows at the same time memory-work 
participants with the complexity of moving between the subjectivity of their own experiences, 
emotions and interpretations, and the more distanced and academic processes of collectively 
theorising the meanings of those experiences (Ingleton 2001). 
 
Haugs analytical framework, made up to deconstruct systematically the meaning making processes, 
is very useful because of its systematic procedures and its way of construing and practising 
knowledge production as a collective activity taking place in a specific historical context. Haug 
(1992,1987) considers the experience of individuals a  productive spring board from where the 
formation of theory can take place, and she sees writings and collective reflections as activities 
which contain the potential for producing new consciousness in the individual and in the group. 
Like Lorde (1984) , she states that silence/inarticulateness is a major obstacle to emancipation. It is 
my claim that the creation of collective, rather than individual thinking technologies has a potential 
of generating passion, inspiration, consciousness and political action in processes of analysis and 
mutual learning.    
 
Memories are not interesting as a registration of data in the life worlds of individuals, but as active 
social processes of creation of meaning in actual subjectification. Memory-work reveal in a 
collective process of 'conscientisacion'  through which processes we acquire the social and 
constructed feeling of self. What is important in this context is that the method has an embedded 
and explicit interest in change.  Here a direct line to actions researchcan be drawn and the method 
allows us to discuss the political implications and impact of a certain metodological approach. 
Experiences of political action ( as in the feminist movement) and the very process of meaning 
making is  connected to emotionality . Crawford et al (1992) were drawn towards this methodology 
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 because ‘We have found a voice to articulate our disquiet with traditional psychological treatments 
of topics like emotion’(1992:1). 
 
My experience with memory-work confirms that the method is capable of uncovering important 
dimensions of processes through which we make sense of the social and construct feelings of self. 
At the same time the method integrate an explicit wish for change of dominant social structures. 
More than anything memory work aims at shortening the distance between theory and human 
experience in ways that not only uncover the process of sense making but also want to add new and 
challenging meanings to it.  
 
Reconstructions and Confrontations  
The second method will be called Reconstructions and Confrontations. In the mid 80és I carried out 
interview with 6 women about their experiences of and with race, class and gender in Peru. The 
interviews are 1 1/2 - 2 hour long biographical accounts filled with stories of inclusion and 
exclusion, joy, pain and hopes in relation to institutions, relations, work and education. I want to 
reconstruct these stories into small stories and use them as a material to work with in guided 
dialogue and cooperative inquiry with the same group of feminist with whom I will do memory 
work.   This method is still in the process of developing theoretical and methodological arguments.  
 
Exporting methodological innovation?  
With these two methodological approaches as points of departure one could ask if what I plan to do 
is not an ethnocentric wish to expand my experience with thinking technologies developed 
elsewhere and not relevant into a Latin American context. Let me argue why methodological 
innovation holds an important potential as a change catalyst.  In contemporary western 
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 poststructuralist feminist research an articulated interest and a growing practice of exploring 
methodological bids to the claim of knowledge as contingent and contextual can be found (among 
others Haraway 1991, Lykke 2003, Søndergård 1999, Markussen  2003, Hee Pedersen and 
Gunnarson 2004, Hee Pedersen and Ravn Olesen 2006). In Europe and the US the poststructuralist 
turn has inspired new innovative methodological ideas, not necessarily radically divergent from 
former methodological thoughts in sociological research, but nevertheless, what Haavind (2000) 
calls 'a new linguistic rope' has been taken on and much stronger meta-theoretical manifestations 
and argumentations can be found in relation to methodology. The poststructuralist effort  to disturb 
well known conventions and cultural worked-in habits still constitute a fundamental challenge to 
knowledge production and will if taken seriously produce new analytical practices (Haavind 
2000:15). In this new design, I plan to explore if this knowledge claim can be given validity in a 
Latin American research context. Is it so that my own experience with methodological innovations 
and experiments carried out in Danish organisational contexts focusing on gender and 
communication could enter a dialogue with contemporary methodological approaches in Peruvian 
research, and therefore contribute to common knowledge production? My knowledge of Peruvian 
realities in relation to the women's movement is limited to the 1980és and 1990és. In this new 
project I want to explore if the new institutional configurations and political articulations in Peru 
(and other Latin-American realities) when it comes to gender, ethnicity and concepts of 
multiculturalism can be approached in ways that potentially clarify visions and norms of the 
feminist agenda in Peru of the new millennium.  I plan to draw on the approaches of memory work 
and narrative reconstruction as a way of illuminating political longings and institutional belongings 
in feminist political articulations of today's Peru and consequently their contribution to democracy. 
 
Methodology - more than a practical tool 
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 There is a tendency to view methodology as a mere way of answering the question: What to do and 
how. Drawing on the Danish social psychologist Dorte Marie Søndergaard (1996, 2004, 200) I find 
it important to make a distinction between the meta- theoretical perspective to which 'methodology' 
belongs on the one hand and 'method' on the other. A thinking technology is not to be reduced to a 
methodological fix (Staunæs 2001:56-57) applied exclusively to give the researcher what she needs. 
That is; data. As social researchers our methodologies should bear a living connection to both our 
ontological and epistemological positionings. As a poststructuralist I would therefore talk about 
'productions of empirical data' and 'productions of analysis', not of 'collection of data' and 
'findings/results'. This also implies that I would not be able to ignore the scientist as producer and 
subject (Søndergård 1996:53, Savin-Baden 2004, Hee Pedersen and Ravn Olesen forthcomming). 
As both Bradbury and Reason (2001) and Gergen (2003) point to we should as social researchers in 
our experimentation with new methodological approaches be aware of not embracing any creative 
methods, as an end in itself. A method should always hold a relationship to the methodological and 
would I suggest the political stand of ones work.1  I will here after refer to method as procedures or 
the sequential framings of a number of actions realised by participating individuals in a research 
process, - procedures suggested for the concrete process of production of either empirical data or 
analysis. As such I view both methods outlined in this text. 
 
Knowledge production as relational 
The decision to engage in memory work in Peru is part of an endeavour to travel around our ways 
of producing scientific knowledge. I aim primarily at encouraging other researchers to explore 
human dialogues, mediated by texts, as a way to launch consciousness about the socio-cultural 
                                                 
1 Vicky Singleton talks about the political positionings of the researcher doing feminist research in these terms: "We 
have to try to balance these theoretical commitments with a political and moral commitment to non oppressive values, 
to ensuring a voice for women and to highlighting women's oppression. That is, the relationship between feminism and 
postmodernism often seems to be characterised by ambivalence that can cause discomfort.   
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 impact of sense making processes and at the same time establish research relations characterised by 
engagement, curiosity and interest in 'the different other'' among participants in a research process.  
Research should make a difference. It should be able to create what Frigga Haug et.al  way back in 
the 80és named political consciousness. Knowledge creation and relationship creation can be seen 
as a cris-cross between participants involved in research processes. They are relational realities both 
fluid and complex. The production of knowledge often takes place in the context of collaborative 
practices and/or collaborative reflection related to these practices, either directly afterwards or later, 
after specific acts have taken place (Schön 1983). Knowledge arising between individuals is 
frequently embodied and can be difficult to verbalise (Merlau Ponty 1969, Bourdieu 1997, Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus 1986, Callewaert 1997). Very often accounts of this collective process are written out 
of scientific texts (Hee Pedersen 2007, Savin-Baden 2004).  Gergen (2003) connect this 
phenomenon to the lack of a language with which to talk  He points out, the western world possess 
“an enormous rich vocabulary to objectify states of the individual mind but relatively few terms that 
bring into reality the relationship among persons. [...] There is so much to be said about relational 
realities but simultaneously impoverishments of language in which to say it.” The challenge of 
establishing a research setting where explorative and reflexive work about gender class and race can 
be done is related to a methodological handling of how to systematise and treat dialogues that 
unfold within and move research processes. This involves providing meaning to and developing 
linguistic and analytical tools for understanding research’s relational and procedural dimensions.  
 
Memory work as experimental writing 
What the concrete experimental writings, as in memory work allow us to do is to interweave 
research interests, methodological approaches and personal life stories and thereby leading to new 
insights about the cultural naturalisations and political strategies through which gender and other 
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 structures of social categories are produced. We will enter dialogues  about how gender, class and 
ethnicity are given meaning at the individual level and collective level both in the political practices 
and in the discourses of the contexts of data production. 
 
As mentioned the project parts from the presumption that the very practice of positioning oneself 
both in a historical context and within the actual present of the women's movement should be 
understood as a narrative construction of one’s own temporary and provisional identity. We will in 
the group through dialogue formulate a question about socio cultural and socio economic diversity 
that will motivate the concrete writings of the stories of the past. 
 
The method suggests that the writing be done in the “third person” because this form of distancing 
and historization paradoxically results in more accurateness and care in presenting one’s own 
experiences. These texts are then examined (ideally by the women who have written them,  
making them then both subjects and objects of their research) by using discourse analysis. The  
focus in the analysis is on the ways each individual position herself in relation to dominant  
discourses and ideologies- both in relation to mainstream public narratives about diversity and in 
relation to their political and cultural contexts - and how their desires and fantasies are involved in 
these. 
 
When it comes to analysis of the texts Haug's framework invite the group to follow clearly defined 
steps on a well defined analytic track. In meeting the requirements of each step, the group carry out 
a collective deconstruction of the written text, beginning with trying to reach a consensus as to the 
message of the author and his or her everyday life philosophies, actions and emotions, 
interests/wishes, and, additionally, the actions and emotions/interests/wishes of others present in the 
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 text. Then you see if you can find noticeable, surprising dimensions in the text (language, 
contradictions, silences, and so on). Finally the overall constructions of self, others and the meaning 
of the scene emerge and are collectively elaborated upon through discussion and reflection. (See 
scheme in Haug 1984; Schatz and Walker 2000:45) 
 
The creation of knowledge as creation of relations 
My central argument for suggesting collective methodologies is  that processes of dialogue contain 
the potential of enlightening or qualifying both relations and reflection.  In his article Action 
research and orders of democracy Kenneth Gergen lays out some premises of a constructionist 
orientation to action research, linking the two traditions emerging logics and outlining a relational 
orientation to the creation of meaning and its subsequent consequences for the view on democracy 
in research relations.   He state that the challenge of sustaining life giving traditions has been sadly 
neglected in research and he explains it partly by its situated-ness in the cultural arena to be found 
far from traditional academic scholarship (Gergen 2003:39-40). I suggest that a gender analysis be 
quite adequate to understand this historical process of ‘othering’ the relational collective, normative 
and caring aspects of research.   
 
Kristiansen and Bloch-Poulsen have produced a fine formulation in which the dialogical aspect is 
connected to questions of caring for one another within a relationship. They define the dialogue as 
“an exploratory conversation in which the partners jointly strive to achieve a better understanding or 
to become wiser together. It is characterized by sharing, daring and caring. Sharing means that all 
partners are willing to share their knowledge with everyone else. Daring means that they are willing 
to run a risk and question their own and others’ basic assumptions or self-referentiality. Caring 
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 means that the exploratory mood is based on an honest and forth right intent towards others” 
(Kristiansen and Bloch-Poulsen 2004:373). 
 
Mutual learning and formulation of longings and belongings primarily takes place via action and 
within a relationship, a concept that is central to Action Research, a body of research that has 
inspired my work. Without changing practice no learning will take place as it was formulated by 
Lewin in 1946. To be in a relationship and to insist on the dialogical take for granted, as Kristiansen 
and Bloch-Poulsen note, a contribution and desire on the part of both parties to work collectively to 
attain “better understanding or to become wiser together.” Both parties need to want to work with 
one another.  
 
Experimental writing is a practice-oriented way of approaching an examination of topic through 
collaboration. In experimental writing, the effects of processes of legitimacy and social recognition 
present themselves in a rather embodied manner, while the author writes up her text. The writer 
will, in her effort to materialise ideas through experimental writings, touch the normative borders 
produced by the field of knowledge within which she moves. She writes herself as a professional 
and an activist and she will in her writing relate to what is considered 'good and bad' in her field and 
therefore write 'social legitimacy' without necessarily being aware of it. It is about crossing borders 
and breaking silences, as referred to earlier in this paper: "The fact that we are here and that I speak 
these words is an attempt to break that silence and bridge some of those differences between us, for 
it is not differences which immobilize us, but silence. And there are so many silences to be broken 
(Lorde 1984:275). To work with texts in collaborative inquiry seems to require bravery. It is to dare 
to enter a messy building-site as your body leads you to where you think you could find something 
meaningful (Foucault 1969). Then when you find something 'at the building-site' you bring it out 
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 into the light, into your analysis. Get out your little brush and make the piece emerge little by little, 
so you can approach it and look at it together and make sense of it, now tangible as it is spoken into 
words and meaning is being attached to it. Haug describes the process of examining the text, this 
archaeological work, as a training to be a detective: 
 
"Silence is another way of coming to terms with the unacceptable. In people's memories it appears 
as an absence or a rupture. The recognition that these silences must be investigated and that the 
attempt must be made to propose theories to explain them was of great importance to the women's 
movement. After all, we have been so accustomed for so long to being absent from history that in 
our thoughts and speech we tend to collude in ignoring the sheer existence of women. To hear what 
has not been said, to see things that have not been displayed, requires a kind of detective training." 
(Haug 1992: 25) 
 
My hope is that the experimental writing represented in this paper as Memory Work and 
Reconstructions and Confrontation will allow the involved women in my new project to interweave 
research positions, methodological approaches and personal life stories and thus produce insights 
about the political longings of the Peruvian feminist movement and insights about the meaning of 
the institutional belongings.    I also hope that these explorations will bring new insights about how 
socio cultural and socio economic categories intersect and have consequences in the lives of people.  
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 FACING THE DILEMMA: URUGUAY IN BETWEEN MERCOSUR AND THE US* 
 
Isabel Clemente PhD 
 
Introduction 
In 2006, Uruguay seemed to be about leaving the South American bloc to enter into a 
“special relationship” with the United States. The possibility of a dramatic change of 
foreign policy caused commotion in the Left, both political and societal, spreading fears of 
a break in the bonds between the government and the organisations that had made possible 
the electoral victory of 2004.  
 
The governing coalition, an alliance made up of parties and groups founded in 1971, 
resented the effects of the divergent viewpoints existing within the government while the 
opposition appeared united in a single bloc. The fact that Frente Amplio is a coalition 
caused that the political debate on the different options –Mercosur or the US –included a 
partisan dimension. 
 
This paper examines the Uruguayan resistance to the project for a free trade agreement with 
the US and the eventual failure of this project focusing both on state and civil society 
actors. 
 
The foreign policy of the centre-of-left government 
 
In March 2005, the inauguration of the first centre-of-left government in Uruguayan history 
was prepared by an intensive discussion on the set of policies that would be implemented 
had the Frente Amplio obtained the majority in the presidential elections of October 2004. 
Debates in workshops and special committees provided the basis for the documents 
submitted to the party conference in 2003 and after their approval they set the framework of 
the electoral platform and the political campaign in 2004.1  
 
Regarding the international insertion of Uruguay and the new foreign policy, the main 
guidelines were presented in a document that the then presidential candidate Tabaré 
Vázquez read at a session in a seminar organised with the support of the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation.2 The central idea presiding over the formulation of the foreign policy of the 
Frente Amplio government was that regional integration was crucial for the general 
insertion of Uruguay in the international system and that strengthening and improving 
participation in Mercosur should be the Uruguayan path in international relations. 
Commitment to international law and multilateralism, autonomy in foreign policy design 
and implementation, South-South cooperation were the core ideas in the programme. 
 
                                                 
* Paper presented at the Conference “New Latin American Development Strategies in a Changing 
International Economic and Political Context” in Aålborg University, Denmark, May 20-22, 2008. 
1 Clemente, Isabel, “La política exterior del primer gobierno de izquierda en Uruguay” in Nordic Journal of 
Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Vol. XXXV: 1-2 (2004), pp. 323-351. 
2 El Uruguay Integrado. 
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 Vázquez’s speech at his ascent to office the 1st March 2005 focused on foreign policy 
explaining in detail principles and lines of policy. He emphasised the importance of the 
non-intervention and non-interference principle, the priority assigned to development and 
regional integration and the rejection of every form of violence and terrorism. In a second 
speech the president announced the first measures which included the reestablishment of 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, incorporation into the group of 20 countries acting inside 
the World Trade Organisation to promote fair rules of trade, agreements of cooperation 
with Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia, China, and Argentina, and the creation of a new 
department at the Ministry of Foreign Relations to co-ordinate with the Uruguayan 
communities residing abroad. 
 
Relations with the United States were not among the priorities in the programme and the 
position towards the initiative for the creation of a free trade area of the Americas (ALCA) 
followed the lines of the rest of the Mercosur countries: to strengthen the regional bloc first, 
then advance towards a South American union and start negotiations with the United States 
afterwards. This scheme in three steps did not coincide with the views of those advocating a 
bilateral free trade agreement with the United States, which had been repeatedly but 
unsuccessfully promoted by former president Jorge Batlle.  
 
However, short before the general elections of October 2004 the Batlle administration 
concluded the negotiation of a treaty with the United States for the reciprocal protection of 
investments that included some provisions on services trade usually contemplated in the 
free trade agreements already concluded by the US with other countries. Although Tabaré 
Vázquez denounced this decision as interference in the action of the forthcoming 
government, this fact set a precedent that influenced the political process regarding the 
binational relations. 
 
  
The challenge of a Free Trade Agreement with the US 
 
The first question to examine is how the initiative to negotiate a bilateral free trade 
agreement with the US entered the international agenda of Uruguay despite the explicit 
guidelines of the government programme. In the absence of research over US participation 
in the setting of the agenda, it is not possible to assess the degree of their involvement in 
the emergence of this issue in the Uruguayan political scene. Therefore, the analysis here 
deals only with the policy-making process in Uruguay focusing on domestic politics actors. 
 
The first hints of a free trade agreement appeared during the period of transition extending 
from 31st October to the inauguration of the Vázquez administration on the 1st of March 
2005 in the form of news and commentaries in papers and magazines. However, the main 
question in the bilateral agenda was the ratification of the treaty on investments protection. 
The object of the visits the US ambassador Silverstein paid to the President elect and his 
staff was to urge a favourable decision even though Vázquez had expressed his 
disagreement with the content of the treaty and the procedures adopted in the negotiation 
which had excluded any consultation with the Frente Amplio leader and potential president 
of the republic. Moreover, an internal memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Relations 
pointed at various articles in that treaty which contradicted certain principles and 
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 definitions of Uruguayan interests. After a laborious negotiation culminating in some 
changes in the text and efforts applied to secure the discipline of all Frente Amplio 
members of the Senate, the treaty was finally ratified in December 2005.3 
 
Even before this process ended, the idea of a free trade agreement gathered increasing 
support. Besides the “traditional” parties (those that have ruled the country since 
Independence, the Partido Colorado and the Partido Nacional) and the tiny Partido 
Independiente, a new alliance emerged. It was made up of the group headed by the Minister 
of Economy and Finances, Danilo Astori (Asamblea Uruguay), the Minister of Industry, 
Mining and Energy, the private sector organised in the powerful Chambers of commerce 
and industry, influential offices of lawyers, media such as El País, El Observador and 
Búsqueda, and consultants working at research centres. Among the latter, CINVE played a 
leading role in shaping the opinion in favour of a closer commercial relation with the US.4 
 
The economist Gabriel Oddone of CINVE considered that the agreement with Mexico had 
marked a turning point in the policy of international insertion of Uruguay because it 
intended to diversify the risks of international insertion integrating Uruguay in various 
economic areas and protecting the country from the recurrent disorders affecting its 
neighbours.5 Oddone thought that neither Brazil nor Argentina were in capacity to reinforce 
Mercosur and the best Uruguay could do was to follow the example of Chile. 
 
Within the government there were contrasting views being the Minister for Foreign 
Relations the most vocal opponent to the project of the bilateral free trade agreement, 
accompanied by other cabinet members among them the Minister for Social Development. 
Those contrasting views were replicated within the Frente Amplio, with a majority 
opposing even the idea of negotiating a treaty with the US that could imply the separation 
of Uruguay from Mercosur. However, the problems affecting the regional bloc and the 
critical views of members of the Uruguayan government on the policies of Brazil and 
Argentina towards their smaller partners played a part in the support that the project for a 
treaty with the US gathered in the political milieu while depriving the other party of solid 
arguments to defend the priority of regional integration. The “failure of Mercosur” became 
a leitmotif in the discourse of the friends of a free trade agreement with the US. 
 
The approval of the treaty for investments protection was traumatic for the Left, 
particularly at the level of grassroots organisations and at the Senate, with the Communist 
Party playing the role of voicing the radical opinion against even the modified version that 
had been negotiated by the Minister for Foreign Relations. When this process was over and 
in the middle of the summer holidays, in the usually calm month of January, suddenly the 
subject of a free trade agreement appeared in the front-page of the weekly Búsqueda, the 
most articulate expression of the Uruguayan business community, in the form of an 
interview with the Minister of Economy and Finances Danilo Astori.6 The minister 
                                                 
3 “Transcriptions from Iberoamericana’s First Conference, ‘Uruguay in the Time of the Broad Front’”, Nordic 
Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Vol. XXV:2, pp. 164-172. 
4 See Lorenzo, Fernando and Marcel Vaillant, Mercosur and the Creation of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, Washigton: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005. 
5 Brecha, August 4th, 2006. 
6 Búsqueda, Jan. 5th, 2006. 
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 declared that Uruguay should start considering negotiating an agreement of free trade with 
the US in 2006.  
 
A debate among cabinet members and leaders of the governing coalition Frente Amplio 
followed this declaration, without the President letting know his opinion. The main 
contradictor of Astori was the Minister for Foreign Relations Reinaldo Gargano. Gargano 
maintained that a bilateral treaty of trade with the US was not on the agenda and that there 
was an explicit resolution of the last party conference (in December 2003) against ALCA 
and the free trade agreements following the same pattern. Moreover, he pointed to article 
32 of the Treaty of 1991 which did not permit that a member of the bloc conclude bilateral 
trade agreements without the consent of the other signatories to the treaty. 
 
Eleven days elapsed from the interview in Búsqueda up to the first cabinet meeting of the 
year. The spokesperson selected to inform the press of the proceedings of that body was 
Gargano, a fact that journalists interpreted as a sign that he had got the backing of the 
President. He told the press that the idea of a treaty of free trade had been cast aside and 
that the position of the President was against such a compromise with the US. Government 
sources informed the press that the argument of Tabaré Vázquez was based in three main 
ideas: the above-mentioned article 32, the resolution of the Frente Amplio conference of 
2003 which he read in its full text during his intervention, and a resolution of the US 
Congress excluding 300 goods (some of which coincided with the main Uruguayan 
exports) from any trade negotiation with other countries.7 However the President accepted 
that the option of a future negotiation remained open in case those circumstances changed 
although he said that the Frente Amplio should consider the question. 
 
Anyway the government decided to activate a Commission for bilateral trade with the US 
that had been organised in 1992 but actually never worked too much having had just four 
meetings up to 2002. The perception prevailing in left-wing media like Brecha was that the 
government was ready to change the policy towards Mercosur following the example of 
Chile, and thus changing the status of Uruguay from full member of the regional bloc to 
associate member.8 Militants and leaders of Frente Amplio noticed as a sign of a change in 
the views over Latin America the cancellation of a presidential visit to Bolivia to attend the 
inauguration of Evo Morales. This gesture was interpreted as sign of taking distances from 
the “populist axis” led by Venezuela. 
 
A declaration of the Socialist Party on the 13th of January 2005 confirmed the line of policy 
defined in the Government programme, backed the conduct of foreign relations by Minister 
Gargano and reasserted the policy of regional integration as the milestone of the strategy of 
the government international relations. It also defended the position adopted by Mercosur 
in the global negotiation to combat trade barriers affecting food exports.9 On the 25th of 
March, the Plenario Nacional, the highest level of decision in the FA issued a document on 
                                                 
7 Both the Minister Gargano and the President probably meant the decision N° 3200 of the Consejo del 
Mercado Común (CMC), an organism of Mercosur, and not the Treaty of Asunción. I owe this observation to 
Roberto Porzecanski, PhD Candidate at The Fletcher School, Tufts University. 
8 “Un no con posibilidades de sí” Brecha, Jan. 22nd. 2006, p. 9. 
9 In www.ps.org.uy 
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 the policy of international insertion. During his stay in Caracas, the president was adamant 
in stating that no bilateral free trade agreement was on the agenda of Uruguay. 
 
From a different perspective, the daily La República, close to the Minister of Economy, 
discussed the dilemma in the editorial of the 22nd of January in the following terms: trade is 
a question of interest, not ideology. A free trade agreement could be a solution for some 
productive sectors and a treaty of free trade would not affect sovereignty. 
 
The Minister for Industry, Mining and Energy Jorge Lepra was a staunch defender of the 
project of bilateral treaty and a consistent ally of Minister Astori. Without a background in 
leftist militancy (he allegedly did not vote for the Frente Amplio) and a long career in 
Texaco, his curriculum vitae was for a long time on the homepage of the US embassy. 
Some days after the interview in Búsqueda he publicly supported the initiative of his 
colleague of Economy and Finances: in an interview with Radio Sarandí, he argued that the 
US was the most important client of Uruguayan exports. He admitted that it was necessary 
to consult the partners in Mercosur but said that Uruguay should exert its right to trade with 
all the countries in the world. Some observers interpreted the exposure of Lepra to the 
media as an attempt to position himself as Minister of Foreign Relations, particularly when 
rumours of resignation of Gargano spread. Lepra played a crucial role in establishing links 
between politicians and businessmen. 
 
Lepra was highly critical of Mercosur in his public declarations and a defender of 
increasing relations with the US. He insisted on the fact that the US has displaced Mercosur 
as the main market for Uruguayan exports: in three years trade with the US rose from 7% to 
26%.10 The agreement with Mexico had brought about an enormous increase in Uruguayan 
exports and it would be plausible a similar effect from a free trade agreement with the US. 
Lepra alluded to the President as fully identified with the initiative. In the first weeks of 
March 2006, Lepra had a series of meetings in Washington and Miami. He participated in a 
session of the Council of the Americas: there he explained that Tabaré Vázquez wanted to 
strengthen commercial relations with the US. He also had meetings with Secretary of Trade 
Gutiérrez and undersecretary for the affairs of the Western Hemisphere Walter Bastian in 
the company of the Uruguayan ambassador in Washington Carlos Gianelli. Lepra presided 
the first meeting of the Bilateral Commission for trade in April 3 and 4, 2006 in 
Washington together with Everett Eissenstat of the US Trade Department. Senior members 
of the ministries of Agriculture and Foreign Relations attended the meeting too. In Lepra’s 
opinion, the treaty for the protection of investments had paved the way for a bilateral treaty 
of trade. 
 
The great expectation behind the alternative of the free trade agreement was the access to 
the US market. The main difficulty resided in service trade, intellectual property rights and 
state purchases. Chambers supporting the free trade agreement were led by the Rural 
Association –a lobby assembling the most powerful landowners –the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Chamber of Industry11 and the Mercantile Chamber of Products of the 
                                                 
10 La Juventud, May 17th 1006, p. 8 
11 Cámara de Industrias del Uruguay, Análisis de los Eventuales Impactos para la Industria Derivados de la 
Firma de un TLC con Estados Unidos, in www.ciu.com.uy 
226
 Country.12 Pressing for time grew: the expiration of the trade promotion authority (the fast 
track) in July 12, 2007 created great excitement among the defenders of the agreement. The 
media were strongly receptive to the matter:  broadcasters in Sarandí and Espectador, 
writers at El Observador daily insisted on the need to accelerate the decision-making 
process. 
 
In May, Tabaré Vazquez visited Washington to meet George W. Bush. He had previously 
met Condoleezza Rice in Santiago de Chile in March on the occasion of the inauguration of 
Michelle Bachelet. Vázquez presented a paper at the Council of the Americas. David 
Rockefeller praised Tabaré Vázquez for his leadership in extricating his country out of 
economic decay. Rice also congratulated Vázquez and declared that free trade was key to 
combat poverty and inequality. In his turn, Vázquez announced the desire of his 
government to perfect the rules on commerce in the same way used with investments, along 
the lines of the treaty approved in December 2005. He described the problems of Mercosur 
but said that the intention was to solve them and added that the conflict with Argentina was 
part of the problem. Vázquez made clear that the Uruguayan engagement with Mercosur 
did not exclude bilateral relations with other countries. Vázquez explained that the interest 
of Uruguay was to improve the access to the US market for meat, textiles, milk and 
software. He also took the occasion to criticise authoritarianism and protectionism.13 
 
On the 4th of May the meeting with George W. Bush took place. Vázquez announced his 
determination to explore different ways to increase commercial relations with the US: an 
appendix to the treaty of investments, a last generation agreement or an arrangement at the 
World Trade Organisation. He told Bush that Mercosur in its present state was not good for 
small countries. A plan to prepare the meeting in October was set. 
 
In the press conference that followed the presidential meeting Tabaré Vázquez informed 
that he had told Bush that Uruguay would not abandon Mercosur but would insist on its 
right to work to diversify its foreign markets. He announced that the Ambassador in 
Washington Mr Gianelli would head the Uruguayan staff responsible for preparing the 
meeting of October. The president admitted that a free trade agreement was an option and 
mentioned as a precedent the treaty concluded with Mexico. As to the deadline of the fast 
track, Vázquez declared that if the bilateral trade was the choice, it would be necessary to 
accelerate the political timing. Finally, Vázquez had an interview with the Voice of the 
Americas before leaving for Montevideo. He insisted on his argument about Mercosur and 
that a free trade agreement was an alternative among others. 
 
The results of the presidential meetings in Washington produced different reactions in 
Uruguay. Senator Couriel, a critic of the Minister for Economy and Finances, elaborated an 
interpretation of Vázquez’s declarations concluding that he had not spoken of negotiating a 
free trade agreement. He argued that the treaty of 1991 did not allow Uruguay to enter into 
such an agreement. US subsidies were the main obstacle to free trade with Uruguay and the 
list of 300 products that would require special authorization from the US Congress in any 
                                                 
12 Brecha. Detrás de los Números, May 5th, 2006, p. V. 
13 Full text in www.presidencia.gub.uy  
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 eventual trade negotiation included all the exports Uruguay wished to sell to the US. 14 But 
this analysis was not enough to dispel the consternation of militants who saw their political 
project at risk. Lack of communication between members of government and the governing 
coalition did not help. 
 
The Minister for Foreign Relations persisted in denying any negotiation for a trade 
agreement with the US but maintained his argument that the focus in Uruguay-US relations 
was to increase the access for Uruguayan exports in the US market, either by broadening 
quotas or reducing non-tariff barriers. He declared that if the intention of the government 
was to leave Mercosur there should be a debate inside the regional bloc. In case the 
decision was to abandon the policy of integration he would resign. He pointed to the leaders 
of the opposition, former presidents Julio María Sanguinetti and Luis Alberto Lacalle who 
had criticised Gargano for having blocked the project for a free trade agreement, that during 
their respective administrations no effort had been made neither to negotiate the much 
desired Free Trade Agreement nor to increase Uruguayan exports as the Frente Amplio 
government had done since March 2005.15 
 
By that time, the role of the media was crucial in spreading rumours about the imminent 
departure of Uruguay from Mercosur. La República traced a declaration from the former 
leader of Frente Amplio General Líber Seregni who had said, at a seminar organised in 
2002 by the Centre for Strategic Studies 1815, that the policy of integration did not mean a 
closed bloc but a basis to include all Latin American countries and be able to negotiate with 
the US and Europe. And this goal did not exclude bilateral agreements.16 
 
The editorial of El Observador of 26th August 2006 illustrated this trend of opinion: an 
agreement of free trade is not only a political but also a technical issue. It pointed to 
Gargano as the head of the opposition and said that the President had already made his 
election. The editorial said that the advantages for Uruguay were clear: access to the 
biggest market in the planet. It also recognised some problems: US requirements in 
intellectual property rights exceeded those of the World Trade Organisation; US asked for 
the same treatment for national firms and US firms.  The writer also accepted that the 
pharmaceutical industry would be the loser. 
 
La República17 informed that the staff heading the “delicate strategy” in US-Uruguay trade 
relations knew exactly that a Free Trade Agreement was the goal. The editor of the 
Economy section, Jorge Jauri, assessed the different scenarios and found that the principal 
risks could arise from regional obstacles and opposition inside the governing coalition. He 
concluded that authoritarianism was inevitable in this kind of negotiation, possibly meaning 
no consultation with, and even no information on the details to, Frente Amplio. 
 
                                                 
14 “Couriel: Bush y Vázquez no hablaron de TLC”, La Juventud, May 7, 2005, p. 10. 
15 “Gargano: si se negocia un TLC con los Estados Unidos ‘dejo de ser Canciller’”, La República, May 0, 
2006, p.3. 
16 La República, May 9, 2006,p. 3. 
17 “Los espesos problemas de la convergencia hacia el TLC”, La República, May 16th, 2006, p. 11. 
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 At the Frente Amplio, from February to August there were distressing debates in the 
grassroots organisations as well as in the top committees of the coalition. The subject was 
transferred to the Plenario Nacional that considered the case in various meetings before 
issuing a statement clearly excluding the project of bilateral treaty of trade.18 
 
The Mesa Política in the usual meeting of Mondays considered on the 8th of May the results 
of Vázquez’s visit to the US. The president of the coalition, Jorge Brovetto informed that 
the government desired that international agreements were not the object of ideological 
debate. Clearly opposing the free trade agreement were the Communist Party and the 
Movement 26th March. Brovetto informed that the government would take care not to 
interfere with Uruguayan membership of Mercosur. The coalition decided to promote a 
debate on Brovetto’s report. At the Senate, Senator Baraibar, a member of the political 
group led by Astori and president of the senatorial committee on foreign affairs, explained 
that the US would advance in the negotiation as much as Uruguay wished, and the 
government would avoid risking the position of Uruguay in Mercosur. 
 
Senator Enrique Rubio, leader of Vertiente Artiguista, another group in the governing 
coalition, took a different path. He declared that the regional bloc was the only way for a 
balanced negotiation with international actors. He quoted a report by Carlos Abin in 2004 
stating that the international insertion of the progressive government should obey some 
principles: reality to recognise the world as it is, sovereignty, non intervention, self 
determination and integration understood as the legacy from Artigas. Rubio concluded that 
the best course of action was to preserve the integrity of Mercosur while developing 
multiple bilateralism. The best possible result in relation to the US would be to expand 
quotas and improve conditions for the access to the US market.19 
 
In August 9th a conference on “Uruguay in the Global Economy” was convened by the 
Council of the Americas and the Uruguay-US Chamber of Commerce. The presenters 
included the President, the Ministers Astori, Lepra and Gargano, Everett Eissenstat for the 
US department of Trade and various representatives of the private sector (Standard and 
Poors, Microsoft and US firms established in Uruguay). Also the former ambassador of 
Chile in Washington and negotiator of the free trade agreement of his country with the US 
was invited. Outstanding politicians were in the audience among whom the leaders of the 
opposition former presidents Julio María Sanguinetti and Luis Alberto Lacalle, Senator 
Jorge Larrañaga, diplomats and businessmen. 
 
The inaugural speech by the president of the Uruguay-US chamber of commerce directly 
addressed the point of the free trade agreement and urged the government to carry out 
negotiations to achieve what he described as a “stupendous highway for commerce, 
investment and services”. Then was the turn of the President. He invited all the political 
parties to help solve the question of international insertion because it was a matter of 
national interest and not a question involving only the governing party. Globalisation is 
irreversible, the president said, and it is ambivalent about the results: it offers opportunities 
                                                 
18 Frente Amplio, Análisis político en el marco de Uruguay integrado al Mundo. Documento aprobado or el 
Plenario Nacional del Frente Amplio el 15 de julio de 2006. 
19 La República, May 9, 2006. Last page. 
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 and risks at the same time. The policy of trade could not be designed separately from the 
general policy of development with social justice. Commercial relations should not be 
examined from an ideological standpoint. From this framework, Uruguay was considering 
the policy of regional integration and international insertion. Vázquez highlighted 
Uruguayan involvement with Mercosur but said the results of the regional bloc for Uruguay 
had been unsatisfactory. He stated his government’s determination to work to redouble 
efforts to revert Mercosur decay but in the meantime, Uruguay should work to improve the 
access to other markets for national exports. For him there was no contradiction between 
staying in Mercosur and promoting international insertion. It would be an irresponsible 
attitude to neglect the prospects for better insertion in the world. The fact that the US was 
the main market for Uruguay meant that there was a way to follow by and the government 
was decided to go ahead with pragmatism so far as it would be possible. The president 
defined trade agreements as just tools, whatever the acronym they had. He ended by an 
appeal to History as the definitive judgement on the results of the conference: the final 
sentence of his speech was the starting point of a controversy that followed for a time. He 
said that the “train of History” passes only once. History does not go back, does not stop 
and does not repeat itself. 
 
Danilo Astori developed the subject of Mercosur difficulties and argued that there was no 
contradiction between regional integration and international insertion. A commercial 
opening by means of a bilateral agreement with a country outside the bloc would reduce the 
asymmetries within it. The Minister said that Mercosur had been inefficient in easing the 
access to the global market; it had an unbalanced distribution of costs and benefits and had 
not advanced towards coordination of macroeconomic policies. Asymmetries among state 
members had grown instead of diminishing. Considering the project for a free trade 
agreement he explained that the ratification of the treaty for the protection of investments 
had prepared the ground because investments generally was an issue in any trade 
agreement. Astori explained the audience the argument that Uruguay would present to his 
partners in Mercosur: Mercosur’s failure to achieve the goals of the 1991 treaty, namely 
coordination of macroeconomic policies, access to markets and end of discrimination 
against small countries. Diplomatic representatives of Mercosur countries were thus duly 
informed of the strategy of the Minister. 
 
Lepra seconded Astori and dedicated his speech to emphasise the importance of a free trade 
agreement for Uruguay and the exceptionally favourable circumstances of the moment. He 
repeated several times that there would not be a second opportunity. He declared that all the 
industrialists were for the agreement because they expected improving conditions of trade 
with the US. He considered that industry was vulnerable to uncertainties regarding the rate 
of exchange, a problem he saw particularly acute in Mercosur. Access to the US market 
would help increase quality and technological innovation. He concurred with the president 
in the uniqueness of the moment saying that it was a “historic” opportunity. Not to seize 
such an opportunity would be irresponsible he repeated along his speech.20 
 
Adding to the railway metaphors, the president of the US firm Sabre said that “the train” 
was now in Uruguay and everybody should get in. 
                                                 
20 “‘No habrá dos oportunidades’ advirtió Lepra” La República, August 10, 2005, p. 4. 
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The lonely voice of Gargano dissented from that chorus. He argued that free trade meant 
neither subsidies nor trade barriers and as long as they persisted it would be a fiction to 
present any prospect of agreement under the rubric of free trade without solving first the 
problems of subsidies and barriers to free trade. He strongly insisted on the compromise to 
respect the programme approved by the citizens in the general elections. The best way to 
improve commercial relations with the US was an agreement in the World Trade 
Organisation abolishing barriers discriminating against developing countries. Uruguay 
should protect the most vulnerable productive sectors. After his intervention and at a 
meeting with the press, Gargano explained that he was against a free trade agreement 
similar to that negotiated between the US and Peru because it contained stipulations on 
intellectual property rights that contradicted Uruguayan interest in developing technological 
innovation. Gargano said that the work before the meeting in October would be framed by 
the recognition of the asymmetries existing between the two economies and guided by the 
principle of equity. A son of a worker in the national railways, he too clang to the metaphor 
but warned against the risk of been crushed by the train and added that he would rather get 
in a train with a definite destination. He prophetically announced there would be no free 
trade agreement. 
 
The political parties in the opposition welcomed the new approach of the government to 
US-Uruguay relations. Former president Sanguinetti declared that Tabaré Vázquez had 
buried an old prejudice. Sergio Abreu, former minister for foreign relations in the 
government of the National Party (1990-1995) joined the president in warning that “the 
train of History passes only once”. Senator Larrañaga, president of the National Party, 
pointed that the president’s speech confirmed that a free trade agreement with the US was 
indeed on the agenda. 
 
All the opposition leaders sharply criticised Gargano’s declaration. Several political actors 
raised their voices to ask for his removal. Abreu and Larrañaga considered that such a 
difference of views inside the government would weaken the bargaining power of Uruguay. 
The president of the Independent Party said that Gargano dedicated his speech to present an 
inventory of obstacles undermining the project for free trade. On the contrary, Astori and 
Lepra were universally applauded from the ranks of the opposition. 
 
The president of the Chamber of Commerce, Julio Lacarte Muró, a veteran in trade 
negotiations since the 1940s characterised the presidential speech as a very positive 
presentation clearly putting forward the goals and the plans to achieve them. He believed 
that a free trade agreement would not affect Uruguayan industry but would induce new 
forms of production. 
 
The media concurred in full support for the treaty with the US: articles inserted in 
Busqueda, El Observador, El País, interviews in Radio Sarandí, El Espectador expressed 
the same opinion shared with the leftist paper La República. Only the weekly Brecha 
presented critical views on the matter: from January to September it published articles 
highlighting the negative effects of the change in foreign policy and interviews with the 
opponents to the agreement. 
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 Inside the Frente Amplio, the MPP (the movement for popular participation, a group led by 
former guerrilla leaders of the National Liberation Movement “Tupamaros”) defined the 
position about the treaty in a conference in June 4 and 5.21 Leaders of this group let know 
their position earlier. One of them, under-secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture Ernesto 
Agazzi declared that MPP was for strengthening Mercosur and participating in the 
negotiations at the Doha Round together with the G-20, which Uruguay had joined on the 
1st of March 2005. Uruguay should side with the developing countries. Agazzi explained 
that the experience of trade of rice was not encouraging about the US intentions. He was to 
sue the US for damages and unlawful competition in the case of rice exports to Brazil.22 
 
“Compromiso Frenteamplista” a group inside the coalition was against the bilateral 
agreement as well. They considered that there was an explicit resolution of the Frente 
Amplio Conference in 2003 against ALCA and the trade agreements framed in that 
scheme.23 
 
At the Frente Amplio, grassroots organizations started plans for mobilisation. Debates in 
committees and organisms of coordination produced documents and declarations. A call for 
an extraordinary conference to confirm the guidelines of foreign policy set in the 
government programme gathered increasing support. The militancy perceived that the 
coalition leadership was hesitating and perhaps afraid of contradicting the president. 
Militants of Partido Comunista, Partido Socialista and MPP covered the walls of 
Montevideo with graffitis against the treaty with the US. 
 
Gargano was very active in the attack on the project for a free trade agreement delivering 
lectures and attending press interviews. He consistently argued that to conclude such an 
agreement would lead to a rupture of Uruguay from Mercosur. In a paper he presented at a 
meeting of ADM (a forum of business and marketing) on the 25th of May he maintained 
that the fact that the US had become the main market for Uruguayan meat was due to a 
temporary favourable juncture caused by the suspension of Canadian exports due to the 
BCG disease. He stated that to leave Mercosur was contrary to the history of Frente 
Amplio.  The integration of Uruguay in the regional bloc provided the country with a basis 
for negotiating in better conditions than acting alone. To negotiate a commercial agreement 
with a country outside Mercosur required the authorisation of the bloc. Gargano confessed 
he was ready to conclude a treaty with the US provided that quotas and subsidies were 
abolished and the authorization from Mercosur was conceded. Leaving Mercosur would be 
a disaster for Uruguay: the consequences would be the loss of a market representing 23% of 
Uruguayan exports paying 0 tariff. In case of leaving Mercosur they would pay tariffs up to 
40%. That was the problem. 24 
 
                                                 
21 “MPP discute estrategia política a seguir en el futuro y busca consensos internos”, La República, May 23, 
2006,p. 5. 
22 “Agazzi: ‘nosotros apostamos al fortalecimiento del Mercosur’” La Juventud, Jan. 11, 2006, p.6. 
23 La República, 18 August, 2006. 
24 “Un plan de emergencia al año nos cuestan las exportaciones a USA”, La Juventud, May 27, 2006, pp. 6-7. 
See also the interview “Gargano: no amagamos, hicimos”, En Perspectiva, www.espectador.com, June 26, 
2006. 
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 José Manuel Quijano, director of the COMISEC (a special commission on Mercosur inside 
the department of planning –OPP), led the intellectual work to confront the free trade 
agreement project. Two documents presented the results of the analysis, research and 
prospective.25 The press echoed this position. Quijano summarised the argument in both 
documents for Brecha explaining the effects of the project of treaty on services, intellectual 
property rights and state purchases.26 He presented a critical view on the agreement 
concluded between the US and Peru, the model chosen for Uruguay.  
 
Quijano anticipated negative perspectives for Uruguay because of bad timing, negative 
effects on the relations between Uruguay and its neighbours since a bilateral trade 
agreement was not compatible with Mercosur; there would be no substantive advantages 
but negative effects on the future economic development: particularly small firms would be 
affected. As the Doha Round had not yet ended it was not good idea to start bilateral trade 
negotiations because Uruguay could probably be in position of making excessive 
concessions and thus reducing the bargaining power for the future. Finally, the regulations 
on intellectual property rights usually included in US trade negotiations could have 
negative consequences for Uruguayan projects of technological innovation: they would 
“threaten national innovation”. 
 
Differences between Ministers provided a political opportunity that the opposition leaders 
would not miss. They promoted a joint hearing to question both Astori and Gargano on the 
goals and content of foreign policy. The session was due for the 22nd August. Senator 
Larrañaga would lead the questioning. 
 
To avoid further noise, the President had ordered his ministers to keep silent on the free 
trade agreement project taking up he himself the role of the sole speaker on the matter. The 
National Party leader ridiculed this decision saying that it amounted to a coup d’État. But 
Parliament could speak and therefore the opposition chose this arena to challenge the 
government. Several leaders voiced calls for the dismissal of the minister for foreign 
relations. Gargano received the support from various groups inside the Frente Amplio and 
from his Socialist Party.  
 
Frente Amplio designed the strategy to deal with the double hearing at the Senate: a 
meeting of members of Parliament, the two ministers and the president of the coalition took 
place. Twenty-four hours before the session the President invited all the political leaders at 
a meeting to explain the policy of trade.27 Majority of Frente Amplio in both houses of 
Parliament deprived the opposition of any chance of success. 
 
                                                 
25 Enseñanzas del MERCOSUR y preocupaciones en relación a la negociación de un tratado de libre 
comercio con Estados Unidos, by Gabriel Papa and José Manuel Quijano with the collaboration of Rodrigo 
Arocena and Gabriel Valente. Aspectos de la inserción internacional del Uruguay. Análisis y reflexiones. By 
José Manuel Quijano with the collaboration of Rodrigo Arocena, Eleazar Deleón, Joaquín Etchevers, Liliana 
Pagglianno, Gabriel Papa and Gabriel Valente. 
26 “Cosas que es  bueno saber sobre un TLC”, Brecha, August 4th, 2006. Interview with En perspectiva, 
Tuesday 15th August 2006. “Quijano: ‘El TLC es perjudicial para los sectores de punta en Uruguay’”, in 
Rumbos.ur, August 31, 2006, pp. 12-13. 
27 “Frente Amplio acordó estrategia ante interpelación,” La República, 18 August, 2006. 
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 The resistance of civil society 
 
The student union of the national university (FEUU) had an extraordinary conference on 
the 20th of May 2006. The question of the bilateral treaty with the US was on the agenda 
and the students discussed the connections between that project and the strategy to create a 
free trade area of the Americas, which had been rejected at the summit in Mar del Plata in 
December 2005. The final declaration confirmed the position against US imperialism and 
condemned the policy aimed at dividing Latin America. It stated that the projected treaty of 
trade would seriously affect the economic sovereignty of Uruguay and would disrupt the 
unity in Mercosur, would make impossible the programme of development with social 
justice and Latin American integration. They referred to Artigas’s project of union and 
independence.28 
 
The labour movement also rejected the free trade treaty and declared itself in a state of 
alert. In a communiqué addressed to public opinion, the PIT-CNT ratified Mercosur as the 
best strategy for international insertion in the medium and long run. They said that the 
construction of a regional bloc with an agenda for negotiating plans for investment in the 
productive sector, infrastructure and access to foreign markets was crucial to revert 
conditions of dependence. They also considered Mercosur as a geopolitical strategy in a 
world system organised in blocs. Belonging to a regional bloc would make possible for 
Uruguay to negotiate from a better position, particularly in multilateral institutions. The 
labour movement said that the idea of Latin American union was an aspiration of the 19th 
century leaders but it was frustrated by the hegemonic powers of the time. They declared 
that the labour movement rejected bilateral treaties of trade as complementary strategies of 
the free trade area for the Americas project. They pointed that US policy of trade with Latin 
American countries had already caused the dissolution of the once solid Andean bloc and 
manifested their disagreement with the decision of the Uruguayan government to choose 
the free trade agreement option. The urged the government to adopt a clear definition of the 
strategy in foreign policy and to create an instance for dialogue and debate on that question. 
They announced that they would contact members of the ministry of foreign relations and 
the presidency to obtain information on the evolution of that question.29 
 
The Cuesta-Duarte Institute, the think tank of the PIT-CNT presented a draft of report on 
the subject of the projected treaty with the US.30 This document considered the reasons 
invoked in favour of that agreement and stated that the fact that the US was the main client 
of Uruguay in the last two years was not enough to justify the decision. The writers pointed 
out that Uruguayan exports to the US were primary goods while exports to Mercosur were 
mainly goods with value added. They thought that before entering into any negotiation 
Uruguay should decide which was the national strategy for international insertion and 
assess whether the free trade agreement was consistent with the goals in economic policy. 
They dissented from the argument that presented the project of treaty as compatible with 
                                                 
28 “FEUU rechaza firma de TLC con EEUU”, La Juventud, May 23rd, 2006, p. 2. 
29 “El PIT-CNT rechaza el TLC y sus variantes”, La Juventud, May 10, 2006, p. 10. 
30 Informe del Instituto Cuesta Duarte sobre TLC, (June 4th, 2006) in 
www.comisionporlasoberania.org/files/Informe%20del%20Instituto%20Cuesta%20Duarte%20sobre%20TLC
.pdf  
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 Mercosur because there was a fundamental contradiction between the bilateral project and 
the common trade policy of the bloc and its common tariff system. The case of the treaty 
with Mexico was not a valid precedent because the other partners in Mercosur were 
interested in negotiating a similar agreement with Mexico. The document also dismissed 
the argument on failure of Mercosur showing that it was the principal market for 
manufactured goods. Finally, the analysis of the projected agreement should go farther than 
economic considerations: the report concluded that Uruguay was too small to justify the 
strategy of the US only in trade reasons or access to the Uruguayan market. The report 
concluded that the main reason behind the initiative was to break Mercosur unity. 
 
On the 10th August, a day after the president delivered his momentous speech, in the 
evening and despite the rain, a demonstration in a central square in Montevideo –Plaza 
Cagancha –took place. The convenors were PIT-CNT, FEUU, FUCVAM (the Federation of 
cooperatives of house building by means of mutual aid) and the organisation of pensionists 
together with representatives of the Communist Party, Socialist Party and the Party for the 
Victory of the People. The central point of this activity was the reading of a declaration 
against the projected free trade agreement. It read that Uruguay was under the threat of an 
imperial plan aimed at imposing the influence of the US on Latin America. The declaration 
said that Uruguay had been targeted in order to annihilate the process of Latin American 
integration: after the defeat of ALCA the new strategy of the US government was the 
negotiation of bilateral free trade agreements and the choice of Uruguay was due to one 
strategic reason, to destroy Mercosur.31 
 
Moreover, the declaration remembered that the Plenario Nacional, the highest level of 
decision in Frente Amplio, had recently approved almost unanimously a resolution 
rejecting the proposal of a bilateral treaty with the US because it was contrary to the goals 
proclaimed in the programme of government of development of the productive sectors. The 
leaders attending the meeting declared that they had not heard the president speech when 
interviewed by journalists. The socialist leader Chifflet praised the position adopted by the 
Minister for Foreign Relations as clear and consistent with the ideals of the heroes of 
independence.32 
 
The national entrepreneurs most affected in case the agreement was finally concluded were 
involved in the chemical industry, especially in the production of plastics and 
pharmaceuticals. The president of the Association of the Plastic Industry declared that to 
abandon Mercosur would be a disaster for their sector because it heavily depended from the 
neighbouring countries as clients of their products and suppliers of raw materials needed in 
the industrial process. The president of the Association of medium size and small 
companies was much worried because the projects of joint venture with companies in 
Brazil and Argentina would be at risk particularly in the sectors of software and wood 
processing. Another matter of concern for the association was the policy of government 
purchases included in all the agreements already negotiated with the US because they 
would surely be left out of competition by US firms. Finally the Association of 
                                                 
31 Comisión Nacional en defensa de la soberanía, Lanzamiento de la campaña contra un TLC con los Estados 
Unidos. September 9, 2006. 
32 “Protesta contra ‘proyecto imperial’ de EEUU”, La República, August 10, 2006, p. 7. 
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 Pharmaceutical Industry members were deeply concerned about the intellectual property 
provisions usually included in US trade negotiations and already included in the treaties 
with Central America and Peru.33 A document produced by the association of laboratories 
said that the agreements of free trade already negotiated by the US left no margin for 
manoeuvre for the governments to carry out policies of health and limited the opportunities 
for the national industry of pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals.34 
 
By the time the debate on the scenario for pharmaceuticals was going on, a resolution 
approved by the assembly of the World Health Organisation in June provided the 
opponents of the free trade agreement of new arguments: the organisation declared that 
health and medicines were issues of the highest priority and urged the governments of the 
192 state members to work in support of research aimed at the production of drugs in 
response to the needs of vulnerable populations and developing countries. The Assembly 
decided to examine the question of intellectual property rights from the perspective of 
access to health for all. The terms relative to medicines included in the treaties negotiated 
by the US had been a subject of debate during the World Health Organisation assembly. 
 
The Uruguayan Chamber of Software saw no advantages in an eventual free trade 
agreement: in fact, they estimated that they would sell less because Uruguay was not yet 
well positioned as a supplier of services and competition with US firms was not possible 
because of regulations on visas.35 
 
The Universidad de la República became a forum for debates on the new policy the 
government appeared to be carrying out. Particularly at the Institute of Economics there 
was a great variety of arguments. Economist Gabriela Mordecki considered that the free 
trade agreement would prolong the traditional model of production based in the rural 
economy. Regional integration had been crucial for increasing manufactures exports. 
Gustavo Bittencourt, of the same Institute, considered that the intellectual property 
provision was the most dangerous aspect in the agreement as well as the liberalization in 
the market of services, telecommunication, and energy. The Society for the advancement of 
science and technology (SUPCYT) called the attention to the attachments usually included 
in free trade negotiations with the US. The institute of research Clemente Estable 
manifested their concern with the intellectual property rights in the context of the 
asymmetries between Uruguay and the US. 
 
On the 22nd of September, a group of outstanding scholars, independent intellectuals and 
journalists issued a declaration manifesting deep concern about the consequences for 
Uruguay of a bilateral trade agreement with the US. Their intention was to contribute to a 
better decision-making process. The text started by stating that foreign policy should be 
predictable and consistent and its implementation must be carried out with transparency but 
in the case of the ongoing negotiations on a question so relevant for Uruguayan future, it 
had been dealt with contradictions and diverging signs in the official discourse. The writers 
                                                 
33 “Los mercados y el modelo productivo. Cuál inserción, para qué país”, Brecha. Detrás de los Números, 
August 4, 2006, p.II. 
34 “Poco margen de maniobra”, Rumbos.ur, August 31, p. 8. 
35 Rumbos.ur, August 31st, 2006, p. 9. 
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 said that the government seemed to head towards a free trade agreement without adequate 
information and a systematic analysis of the implications of the measure it was about to 
take. The Uruguayan society had not received any convincing explanation of such a radical 
change in the international insertion strategy defended during the presidential campaign of 
2004 and ratified at the summit of December 2005 in Mar del Plata. Moreover, an 
agreement of free trade was not only about trade as it also involved questions of the utmost 
importance for the US like intellectual property rights, services, competition, labour and 
environment regulations, but it excluded issues vital for Uruguay such as US subsidies on 
agriculture. A free trade agreement could affect the design of the economic policy and 
change the goals set in the government planning. A matter of particular concern was the 
problem of the pharmaceutical industry and the effect that the agreement would have on the 
cost of medicines for the people. The final paragraph said that Uruguay was at a crossroads 
and its future would depend on the course of action to be taken.36 
 
The debate showed a complex balance between ideological, strategic and pragmatic 
arguments. Latin Americanism and the ideal of a Latin American union as it was first 
conceived in the aftermath of Independence, the legacy of Latin American thinkers like 
Martí, Mariátegui, Vivián Trías and anti-imperialism were combined with geopolitical 
analysis on the position of Uruguay in South America and the strategic reasons for 
remaining as a member of Mercosur, the new approach to development as a process 
resulting from knowledge and research, and a more pragmatic approach that pointed at the 
economic benefits for productive sectors directly connected with the market of Mercosur 
countries. These ideas were present in different degrees in the resistant position. 
 
The decision 
 
On the 28th of September, at a press conference after a meeting with seven ministers, the 
president announced the decision over the course of action of the government regarding the 
commercial relations with the United States. In fact it was a statement of foreign policy. He 
started by pointing out that as the goal of his government was to improve those relations, 
the first step had been to explore different ways and two commissions were working in that 
direction: the bilateral commission and a committee made up of representatives of several 
ministries.37 By the end of the previous week, on the 22nd of September, the Uruguayan 
government had received a proposal from the US Department of Trade to negotiate before 
the deadline of the trade promotion authority in 2007 an agreement similar to the treaty 
recently concluded with Peru. The president explained that he had declined the offer for 
two reasons: first, there was no possibility for negotiation as there was only one option, the 
so-called “formato Perú” which amounted to an imposition, and second, the timing before 
the expiration of the fast track was too short to make possible a thorough analysis of the 
content and implications of the trade agreement. He added that he informed the US 
government that the Uruguayan government was ready to explore other ways and that the 
Department of Trade in their communication of Monday 25th proposed to enter into a Trade 
and Investment Framework Agreement. Vázquez informed that it involved the creation of a 
                                                 
36 Ante la eventual firma de un Tratado de Libre Comercio con los Estados Unidos, September 22nd, 2006. 
37 This state body was the CIACEX,  Comisión Interministerial en Asuntos de Comercio Exterior. 
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 special binational commission to examine the access of some Uruguayan products in the 
US market. The US had treaties of this kind with Cambodia and certain African countries. 
 
This decision was communicated at a time when relations with the neighbouring countries 
were in difficulties and after the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Brazil had let know their 
position on the bilateral free trade agreement as contrary to the treaty of Asunción. Well-
informed observers assign a great importance to the influence of such a powerful partner as 
Brazil. Indeed the president answered at his press conference that the TIFA was not 
contradictory with the Mercosur tariff and quoted the opinion of Celso Amorim. But this 
section concentrates only in internal factors and the role played by the Brazilian diplomacy 
deserves a research that exceeds the purpose of this paper. 
 
The opposition reacted with anger at this presidential announcement. The change from the 
Perú model to the format of Africa and Cambodia appeared a downgrading status for many, 
even to the leftist La Juventud.38 El Pais, a passionate advocate of strengthening relations 
with the US, dedicated the issues of the 29th and 30th of September to examine the decision-
making process that had led the president to abandon the idea of a bilateral agreement, 
under a general headline evoking “Vazquez’s railways”. The paper attributed the decision 
to the president alone and explained that the main goal had been to comply with the radical 
wing inside the governing coalition in an attempt to stop growing opposition to the idea of 
a free trade agreement. Drawing on “confidential sources” the paper said that the president 
had consulted only two persons, the ambassador in Washington and his private secretary Dr 
Gonzalo Fernandez.39 According to this analysis, the winner had been Gargano and the 
radical Left, particularly the alliance of “Marxist political parties” –an old obsession of the 
paper –together with the hardliners inside the Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP). 
El País believed –quoting well-informed sources – that the start of mobilisation by the 
whole structure of Frente Amplio had been taken into account by the president in his 
analysis of the political situation to adopt a position that secured governance. Additional 
factors leading to the presidential decision were, according to El País, the mobilisation of 
the labour movement and the incoming internal elections in Frente Amplio. The president 
had carefully considered the campaign against the treaty by the Communist Party and the 
Socialist Party, the fact that delegates of grassroots organisations –the Comités de Base –
had succeeded in obtaining in two successive national plenums of Frente Amplio 
resolutions clearly opposing a free trade agreement and the almost complete isolation of the 
group headed by Danilo Astori inside the coalition.40 A few days before the presidential 
decision the Vertiente Artiguista made public the position against the project of agreement 
and Senator Baraibar at a press interview sharply criticised the Perú-US treaty.41 
 
In fact at the press conference the president replied to a journalist who was inquiring on the 
political reasons behind the decision that he thought there had been too much debate over 
                                                 
38 “Gobierno resolvió rechazar el “modelo peruano” y firmar un acuerdo de tipo “africano” o “camboyano””, 
La Juventud, September 29th, 2006, p. 7. 
39 “El tren de Vázquez”, El País, September 29th, pp. 11-12, and September 30th, pp. 8-9. 
40 “Línea dura primó en el gobierno para inclinar opción de Vázquez”, El País, September 30th, 2006, p. 8. 
41 “Vertiente Artiguista: Un TLC no sería lo más conveniente”, En Perspectiva, www.espectador.com 
September 25, 2006. “Baráibar: si la base es el TLC con Perú, no habrá fast track”, En Perspectiva, 
September 26, 2006. 
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 scenarios without sound information on what could really happen. He recalled that his 
declarations always pointed out that the government would go “as far as possible” without 
“ideological barriers” but did not seem to perceive that this elliptical language did not help 
to convince people except for those used to religious faith. 
 
At the Partido Nacional former president Luis Alberto Lacalle expressed the strongest 
criticisms: he declared that the government had not been serious about the commercial 
relations with the US and regretted that Uruguay had missed a “historic opportunity”. In his 
opinion, the government lacked vision and was myopic about Mercosur. His minister for 
foreign relations and responsible for the negotiations of the treaty of 1991, Sergio Abreu 
was more cautious: he considered that the decision amounted to a step leading to a free 
trade agreement. However, he thought that the TIFA was not relevant because it was not a 
forum for negotiations. He concurred with the opposition leaders in that the decision should 
be understood as a means to avoid a crisis inside the coalition in power. Senator Larrañaga 
said that the president lacked audacity and chose the most timid and easiest solution. 
 
In the Partido Colorado the reactions were stronger. The former minister for Economy and 
Finances Isaac Alfie expressed devastating criticisms. Although he accepted that TIFA 
could be a previous measure for a future treaty of free trade he considered that at the 
moment it represented “almost nothing” and lamented that Uruguay had “missed the train”. 
He added that the bargaining position of Uruguay within Mercosur had been seriously 
damaged because of the repeated declarations of Danilo Astori criticising the bloc, even to 
the extent of letting know his opinions at the summits he attended in capacity of member of 
the Uruguayan government. Former president Jorge Batlle went farther and said that the 
winners had been Lula, Kirchner and Chavez. 
 
The Chambers of Industry and Commerce, the Rural Association and the Union of 
Exporters manifested their surprise and disappointment. The Chamber of Industry 
expressed their frustration in strong declarations.42 
 
Leaders of the Partido Comunista, Partido Socialista and Vertiente Artiguista manifested 
their accord with the line of policy chosen by the president. The Communist senator 
Eduardo Lorier said that the debates carried out by the civil society and the mobilisation of 
popular organisations had played an essential role in the decision made by the president. 
The Socialist representative Roberto Conde characterised the resolution as an intellectual 
triumph of Frente Amplio. Senator Enrique Rubio, leader of Vertiente Artiguista, 
highlighted that the position of the president was entirely consistent with the foreign policy 
towards the Latin American region. On the other side, representatives of Asamblea 
Uruguay like Carlos Varela and Enrique Pintado, in an attempt to minimise the defeat, 
declared that the decision of the president only confirmed the trust they had always had in 
the president’s ability to have a vision on the future of Uruguay43. Pintado attributed 
Astori’s belligerency against Mercosur to special tactics for negotiation particularly with 
                                                 
42 “Industriales molestos se reunirán con el gobierno”, El País, September 30th, 2006, p. 9. 
43 “El Presidente logró descomprimir resistencia interna del oficialismo”, El País, September 29th, 2006, p. 
12. 
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 Brazil.44 But the radical left understood the decision as a tactical move in order to prepare 
for a new advancement towards the free trade agreement. 
 
The Labour movement issued a declaration that celebrated the announcement made by the 
president. They considered that the decision had been positive and well meditated. Some 
leaders felt that their position had been heard by the president but invited the militants to 
remain vigilant of the new process that would start with the meetings for the trade and 
investments framework agreement. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
From January to September 2006 the policy for the international insertion of Uruguay was 
at the centre of an intense political debate. The dilemma ended with a decision that 
confirmed the programme of government. The analysis of the process leading to that 
decision demonstrates the strength and intellectual potentialities of the Uruguayan civil 
society, particularly its capacity to elaborate convincing arguments and articulate joint 
action. 
 
However, this analysis is not complete: many confidential sources are not yet available and 
any conclusion is preliminary. To establish to what extent the resistance of civil society was 
the main factor explaining the decision on the free trade agreement with the US requires a 
programme of research on the relations of Uruguay with the Mercosur countries, 
particularly with Brazil, and on the bilateral relations between Brazil and the US. These 
dimensions were beyond the scope of this paper but will surely attract the attention of 
social sciences researchers. 
 
Comparisons between Uruguay and other Latin American countries would cast light on the 
general subject of Latin American attitudes towards the economic relations between Latin 
America and the US. Costa Rica had a plebiscite before the Congress met to ratify the US-
Central America free trade agreement. Uruguay, a country with a well-established tradition 
of referendums and plebiscites, this time solved the question otherwise. 
  
                                                 
44 Lecture by Pintado at a Comité de Base in Peñarol, October 2006. 
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 Interpreting Property Rights from Below: The case of  the Procede Program, Mexico 
Kirsten Appendini, El Colegio de México, Mexico 
 
Since economic liberalization in the mid-eighties, Mexico has followed neoliberal 
policy prescriptions by international development agencies, mainly IMF and the World 
Bank, and increasingly aimed at integrating the Mexican economy with USA –and 
Canada, which succeeded formally with the signing of NAFTA in 1994. Unlike other 
Latin American countries, Mexico has not revised this position. As for rural Mexico, 
fifteen years of NAFTA and  profound legislative and policy reforms  aimed at 
restructuring agriculture on arguments of  international competitiveness and attracting 
investment in high value crops (fruits and vegetables, mainly for exports),  has had mixed 
results.1  
One of the major reforms towards the countryside was the 1992 reform of the 
Constitutional Article 27 which rules property rights over land and natural resources and 
water within the nation. This reform aimed at transforming the agrarian structure and the 
rights of the peasantry to land -which was institutionalized in Article 27 as a result of the 
Mexican Revolution and ruled land distribution from 1917 to 1992. The aim of reforming 
rural property rights was to lift the individual property restrictions on land distributed 
under agrarian reform and hence incorporate half of Mexico’s rural land into the private 
land market. This was to enable a restructuring of rural property in favor of economically 
viable farming units, give incentives to investment and productivity, hence reactivating 
agricultural growth, international competitiveness,   and thus, enhance the rural economy.   
Reforming agrarian law meant a major impact on the Mexican peasantry, 
including indigenous population. For over seventy years, land distribution had been at the 
core of agrarian policy and though the agrarian discourse had weakened by the 1980’s, 
the demand of peasants to land was still vibrant in some regions, such as the Chiapas 
EZL revolt reminded the country –and the world- on the same day NAFTA was enforced 
the 1st of January, 1994.     
                                                 
1 There is a vast literature on the agricultural impact of liberalization and policy reform (Appendini, 2001; 
Romero and  Puyana, 2008). 
241
 Property rights theory proposes that secure property rights will enhance 
investment and productivity in agriculture, and underline privatization as the most 
efficient tenure; hence this position was on the early agenda of international development 
agencies. Emphasis on privatization   was later revised by the World Bank as in many 
parts of the world, collective property proved to be a viable institutional setting in 
specific contexts (Balland and Platteau, 1996; Deininger and Binswanger, 1999; 
Deininger and Feder, 2002; Ostrom, 1998, 1999; Platteau, 2000; Hvalkof, et.al., 2007). 
Common property over land and other natural resource thus became an important 
issue in the property rights debate and in development policy issues. On the ground, this 
also linked to the discussion of indigenous rights and the role of local institutions in 
managing common resources.   
 In the current debate, secure property rights under different tenure regimes 
(private, collective) is a key issue, while the orthodox assumption formerly argued for in 
favor of private property, persists. Land regularization programs that define and certify 
property rights are expected to promote:  
¾ The development of a land market: with efficient allocation 
of land and natural resource,  
¾ access to credit, as titling can be used as credit collateral, 
¾ enhance investment, productivity and agricultural growth 
¾ enhance the income and welfare of rural families 
This paper addresses the impact of a land certification program Procede 
(Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidale y Titulación de Solares) carried out as 
part of the 1992 agrarian reforms in Mexico.2 It will focus on indigenous population and 
common lands3 as a response to the interest of international agenda on indigenous rights 
and the issue of recognizing collective rights on the lands of indigenous communities 
(OIT, 1989).4 The discussion of the Mexico case, differs from other Latin American 
                                                 
2 The reforms were part of the structural reforms for the agricultural sector as part of  neoliberal policies.  
3 We refer to land where indigenous population predominate and not to ‘las tierras de los grupos de 
población indígena’ as used in other Latin American countries, due to the particular agrarian history  in 
Mexico. 
4 This paper is based on the Document Estudio de Gabinete sobre los impactos del programa Procede en 
ejidos y comunidades con población indíegena en México by Kirsten Appendini in collaboration with 
Gabriela Torres, written for NORDECO/IDB. 
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 Countries because of the particular agrarian history and the integration policy of 
indigenous population, hence until recently there was no special status for indigenous 
population, with the exception of Oaxaca.5 
The paper is based on secondary data and literature review. A difficulty in 
analyzing the impact of reforms and secure property rights on land where indigenous 
population predominate is due to the fact that data at the national level is not presented by 
ethnicity. The information presented is based approximations of statistical data available 
and on the review of case studies. 
 
1992 agrarian reform and indigenous population  
Rural property regimes in Mexico are of three categories: private property, ejido 
property and property held by comunidades. The two later are often referred to as social 
property. Table 1 shows the distribution of property in Mexico and underlines the 
importance of social property.  
The 1992 reform of agrarian legislation (Article 27) declared an end to land 
distribution and gave more flexible and broader property rights to ejidatarios. The ejido 
assembly was invested with autonomy and no longer dependent on federal authorities in 
everyday governance of the ejido. The assembly by voting can now decide on changing 
the internal regulations about land. That is, to allow ejidatarios to sell or lease individual 
plots, and other land transfers, and as for the ejido as a whole, to change the use of 
common lands (tierras de uso común), associated with outside capital. All of these 
transfers and association with third parties were prohibited under former legislation. In 
the case of comunidades, the law is more restrictive because individual plots are not titled 
to the comunero.  
 
                                                 
5 In the mayority of the Oaxaca municipios, authorities are elected according to local costums (usos y 
costumbres). The electoral rights of the publos indígenas de Oaxaca were recognized by local law 
(Renovación de Ayuntamientos en Municipios que Electoralmente se Rigen por Normas de Derecho 
Consuetudinario”). In 1998 the law on Ley de Derechos de los Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas de 
Oaxaca” was enforced. http://www.eumed.net/libros/2005/rgj-coi/1j.htm 
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         Table 1. Mexico. Agrarian structure, 2005 
Tipo de 
Propiedad 
 
Núcleos 
Agrarios 
Sujetos con derecho 
agrario/Propietario  
Superficie 
(miles de hectáreas) 
% 
Superficie 
Ejidos* 27,469 3,236,234 84,569 42.9 
   Con población 
indígena 
5,562 Nd 13,801  (7.0) 
Comunidades*  2,157    608,367 16,858   8.7 
   Con población 
indígena 
1,268   Nd 8,823 (4.5) 
Colonias grícolas 
y ganaderas 
   650     62,346   3,848   1.9 
Propiedades 
privada 
0 1,606,573 73,216  37.2 
Terrenos 
Nacionales 
0    144,000   7,200     3.6 
Otros** 0       35,313 11,116     5.7 
Total 30,748    196,718        100.0 
       * Incluye únicamente superficie entregada por la ejecución de resoluciones presidenciales. 
       ** Incluye cuerpos de agua, zonas federales, parques nacionales, reservas ecológicas, urbanos, baldíos    
            y otros.         
       Fuente: Registro Agrario Nacional,  2005;  Para datos sobre población indígena: Robles y Concheiro, 2004: cuadro 
3:29 
 
The main difference between ejidos and comunidades is that the comunidad keeps 
its total areas, with plots and common lands as a collective unity. Plots are not allowed to 
be sold or leased nor transferred by inheritance. But as far as common lands, the 
comunero assembly may also decide the use and association for exploiting common 
lands.  
Most important of all, in both ejidos and comunidades, the assembly can decide 
whether to change property regime, that is an ejido can opt to become private property 
with complete property rights for each member, a comunidad may decide to change to the 
ejido regime, which thus opens the way to private lands held under social property 
regimes.   
It is important to underline that the 1992 reforms of agrarian law was carried out 
in a broader context of constitutional reforms that affected indigenous people. In 1991 
Congress had ratified the ILO convention on pueblos indígenas y tribales  and in 1992, 
introduced reforms to constitucional Article 4 in which the Mexican state recognizes that 
« La nación mexicana tiene una composición pluricultural » stating that « la ley 
protegerá y promoverá el desarrollo de sus lenguas, culturas, usos, costumbres recursos 
y formas especificas de organizaciones social…’ (Constitución Política, 1996:22). 
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 However this has only given a symbolic recognition to ethnic diversity of the country. 
There has been no further regulations related, and indigenous people as such, have no 
formal representation at federal level (Recondo 2002 :181). Also, there is no relation of 
Article 4 with the reforms of Article 27 except for a phrase saying « la ley protegerá la 
integridad de las tierras de los grupos indígenas » (Fraction VII). Overall, according to  
indigenous organizations, there is a contradictions between this article which recognizes 
the rights of indigenous people and the reforms of article 27 which allows for the 
privatization of land, part of the indigenous identity. As for the comunidades, agrarian 
law makes little specific mention of this specific form of tenure: referring in chapter V in 
general the same legal dispositions aplicable to the ejidos will apply to the comunidades, 
unless being contradictory with the same chapter.  
Following legislative reform, the next task in order to implement secure property 
rights was to certify the present rights of  ejidos and comuneros in land under social 
tenure. In the seventy years of land distribution there was no national registration of land 
rights nor land cadastre, except for the ejido census (every 10 years) and often land 
transactions -by inheritance or cession of rights within ejidos or comunidades- were not 
updated.6 The PROCEDE program (Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales y 
Titulación de Solares) was established in 1993 (sponsored by the World Bank) in order to 
regularize property rigths in social tenure. PROCEDE  established the boundaries of the 
ejidos and comunidades, and within the communities, the boundaries and use of land 
such as individual plots, lands for common usage (tierras de uso común) such as grazing 
lands, forests, and others, land destined for the residential  nucleus and other collective 
‘urban’ use. The program also confirmed the legal title as ejidatario or comunero as well 
as the legal status of other adult members of the community such as posesionarios and 
avecindados (see box 1) and in case of dispute mediated or channeled disputes to the 
official institutions responsible for attending agrarian conflicts.7 
                                                 
6 The Secretaria de Reforma Agraria controlled the legal and organizacional matters of ejidos and 
comunidades. Each ejido and comunidad in the country has a file in the Secretaria with the documents 
attaining to land distribution, rights and other matters of organization. But this information was not 
aggregated in a national data base, until 1993 when the Registro Agrario Nacional was established as part  
of the new institutional setting within the reforms. 
7 La Procuraduría Agraria and Tribunales Agrarios. 
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 Ejidos and comunidades entered the program on a voluntary basis from 1993 to 
November 2006, at the close of the program 95% of ejidos and comunidades had been 
certified and 4.5 million peasants benefited. 
              
Recuadro 1. Formas de propiedad rural en México 
Propiedad privada o pequeña propiedad rural. Derechos de propiedad de dominio pleno. La 
pequeña propiedad es limitada en su extensión por la Ley Agraria.i 
Ejidos. Son los núcleos agrarios que se constituyen a partir de la Ley Agraria de 1915 que se 
eleva a rango constitucional en el Artículo 27 de la Constitución en 1917. La forma de acceso a la 
tierra, agua y bosques es mediante la ‘dotación’, ampliación y creación de nuevos centros de 
población ejidal. 
Comunidades. Son los núcleos agrarios que conservaron sus tierras o en que las tierras fueron 
restituidas por la Ley Agraria. Tienen su origen en las tierras otorgados por la Corona española a 
los pueblos indígenas. 
 
Sujetos agrarios del sector social:  
Ejidatarios. Hombres y mujeres titulares de derechos ejidales (art.12 Ley Agraria). Para ser 
ejidatario o ejidataria se requiere ser de nacionalidad mexicana, mayor de edad y campesino. 
Comunero.  Aquellos hombres y mujeres que han decidido organizarse en régimen de comunidad 
(Art. 98 Ley Agraria). El derecho de membresía es por nacimiento. Se otorga la membresía a la 
mayoría de edad y cuando se cumple con las obligaciones de un comunero establecidos por la 
comunidad. En este sentido las comunidades tienen una mayor autonomía que los ejidos. 
Posesionario. Son las personas que viven en el ejido pero no tienen derechos ejidales. La 
asamblea puede reconocer y legalizar sus derechos a un lote para la vivienda y dado el caso, de 
una parcela de cultivo, pero no tienen voz ni voto en la asamblea.  
Avecindado. Mexicanos mayores de edad que no poseen tierra y que han residido por un año o 
más en el núcleo de población ejidal y han sido reconocidos por la asamblea ejidal o el tribunal 
agrario (art. 13 Ley Agraria) 
 Fuente: Procuraduría Agraria, 1993. 
 
Within social property in Mexico, there are two forms of access to land: 
individual plots for farming and collective (land held collectively). Comunidades is 
collective property and in the case of farming plots these may be assigned by the 
comunidad assembly but rights are not titled individually to the comunero. Within ejidos 
and comunidades lands assigned for other than farming use, are common lands (tierras de 
uso común) for which all ejidos and comuneros have access such as grazing lands, 
forests, an others. These lands are collectively managed and the local assembly set the 
rules of access.  
Indigenous populations are often associated with common or collective lands, 
however in Mexico this is not straightforward. Though the origin of comunidades traces 
back to colonial times when the Crown of Spain gave lands to the Indians under common 
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 tenure system, these lands underwent complex changes from independence on. With 
agrarian reform after the 1910 Revolution, many indigenous groups were not able to 
prove their rights to the lands they held in the Colonia, and were given land as ejidos.8 In 
time, demographic and social factors blurred the different ethnic origins in many regions, 
as indigenous groups mixed with mestizos and integrated into the peasant population. 
This was also part of the integration policy under postrevolutionary nationalism. This in 
part explains why in Mexico tenure status and ethnicity do not necessarily correspond. 
This is only the case of Oaxaca.  For example, in Chiapas were a high part of the 
population is indigenous, most communities are ejidos.               
         In order to relate tenure and ethnicity based on oficial data, it is necessary to 
clarify that in México, indigenous population is defined by language and self 
identification (see box 2).  
 
Recuadro 2. Población indígena en México 
Los censos oficiales definen como indígena a aquella persona que habla una de las lenguas 
indígenas que existen en México. Un estudio de CONAPO con el PNUD  (2002) agregó al criterio 
de hablante de lengua indígena, la auto identificación de las personas se definen como 
perteneciente a un grupo étnico.  
De ahí que en México haya:  
7 millones de personas que hablan una lengua indígena  
12.7 millones de personas que hablan una lengua indígena o aunque no hablan una lengua 
indígena se identifican como pertenecientes a un grupo étnico 
 Fuente: Procuraduría Agraria, 2002        
En México there are 6,830 agrarian communities (ejidos and comunidades) with 
indigenous population which accounts for 23% of the total. At present, 81% de agrarian 
communities with indigenous population are ejidos and 18.6% are comunidades. 
However, within comunidades, indigenous population account for 52.3% of the acreage 
as compared to 16.3% of ejido land and 7.4% of land under private property tenure 
(Robles y Concheiro, 2004:29). The importance of indigenous population on 
comunidades land explains why ethnic groups are important in regions with forest 
                                                 
8 During the 19th century, indigenous communities were disposed of their communal lands under liberal 
laws. Many people became peones on the hacienda and so entire pueblos disappeared. In order to have land 
by restitution of communal lands, the original legal title (Colonial) is required. As a result, many 
indigenous groups were given land under ejido tenure. This was a faster process, especially at the peak of  
land distribution in the 1930’s. However the legal status of ejido, meant a loss of autonomy as the 
relationship of the ejido with the state was interlocked with the institutionalization of the peasantry under 
the PRI regimes (Torres-Mazuera, 2008). 
247
 resources, -50% of agrarian communities regions with rainforests are predominantly 
indigenous in other forest regions, 29% of communities are indigenous (Robles y 
Concheiro, 2004; CONAPO/PNUD,   Robles, 2000). 
Poverty and marginalization describe most of the indigenous communities. 86% 
of these populations live in municipios defined by official poverty indexes as highly 
marginalized, this is the case in the status of  Oaxaca, Chiapas y Guerrero (Rello y 
Saavedra, 2007) and 59 % of the municipios with indigenous population are net  
expulsores of labor due to lack of opportunities (Gálvez, 2005).  
 
    Box  3. Indigenous population and land 
¾ About 9% of Mexico’s population is indigenous 
¾ 19.9% of ejidos are indigenous  
¾ 58.6% of  comunidades are indigenous 
¾ 16.3% of total ejido acreage are in indigenous ejidos 
¾ 52% of total comunidades acreage are indigenous 
¾ 7.4% of private property is in hands of indigenous populations 
¾ 54% of agrarian communities on rainforest lands are indigenous 
¾ 28% of agrarian communites with forest resources are indigenous 
Source: Robles y Concheiro, 2004  
 
Lands for common use (tierras de uso común) 
I will now turn to the other category of land held collectively within ejidos and 
comunidades, in order to relate ethnicity with the management of common resources. In 
ejidos and comunidades, lands destined for common use are lands which have not been 
plotted out and assigned individually to ejidatarios and comuneros. These lands are 
usually not suitable for farming, and are mainly for grazing, forests, deposits of gravel 
and other construction materials, mining resources or destined for tourism, such as 
beaches. Common lands are also a reserve of land and in time much has been 
incorporated into farming due to population growth and land scarcity.  
According to the 2007 ejido census tierras de uso común account for 65.4 % in 
ejidos and  comunidades; in 2003, they represented 73%. 
 
Cuadro 2. Importancia relativa de las tierras de uso común, 2003 
Tenencia % de  tierras uso 
común y 
parceladas 
%  de tierras sólo 
en uso común 
% de tierras sólo 
parceladas 
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 Comunidades 45.6 41.3 13 
Ejidos 62.2 7.3 29.9 
Fuente: Procuraduría Agraria, Dirección General de Estudios y Publicaciones, 2003. 
 
This shows that common land is relatively more important in communities where 
indigenous population predominates. The following data confirms this: 
 According to a survey done by CONAPO/PNUD in 481 municipios with indigenous 
population:  
¾ 53% of indigenous communities have grazing lanas 
¾ 75% have forest lands 
¾ 7% have rainforest lands 
      Also: 
¾ Four out of five communities with rainforests are indigenous 
¾ 75% of forest lands are located within indigenous communities 
In sum: 
9 Indigenous populations hold land under ejido, comunidad and private 
tenure,  
9 Land is held both as individual plots as in common (uso común), 
9 Agrarian communities with indigenous population allocate a larger 
percent of land to tierras de uso común, as compared to ejidos, 
9 tierras de uso común exploited collectively are forests, rainforests, 
minerals and construction materials,  
9 Forests and rainforest resources are concentrated en communities with 
indigenous population 
 
PROCEDE: A land regularization program 
As mentioned above, Procede was a land regularization program with the 
objective of establishing secure property rights to ejidos and comunidades, as well as the 
individual rights of its members, providing title of ejido rights and list of comuneros.  
Land regulation turned out to be long and complex process. There were usually 
backlogs in registration of members, transfers by inheritance –and disputes among family 
members- changes in the use of common lands, etc. as well as dispute on boundaries 
between ejidos, comunidades and private property. In comunidades, norms based on 
costums (usos y constumbres) were to be respected which at times contravened the law, 
as mentioned above.  
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 At the end of the program, as shown, most of ejido land but much less of 
comunidades land had been certified. In fact, only 25 % of the area in comunidades had 
been certified compared to  71.2% in ejidales (Table 3 ).   
 
Cuadro 3. Resultados de Procede 
Regimen de 
propiedad Total
Núcleos 
certificados
% 
certificado
Superficie 
total 
(millones 
Superficie 
certificada 
(millones 
% 
certificada
Beneficiad
os
Total 30305* 28,749 94.9 105.1 66.5 63.3 4,526,036
Ejidos 27786* 27,001 97.2 86.9 61.9 71.2 4,011,367
Comunidades 2519* 1748 69.4 18.1 4.6 25.3 514,669
* Datos VIII Censo Ejidal 2001
Fuente: VIII Censo Ejidal 2001, INEGI, 2003, y CD Estadisticas Agrarias 2007, Procuraduria Agraria.  
 
PROCEDE in the comunidades 
            I now turn to the results of Procede in the comunidades in order to 
approximate it’s effects on indigenous populations. As already mentioned, this does not 
cover all the groups (the largest percentage is in ejidos) but because indigenous 
populations predominate within comunidades, and because there is no cross statistical 
data neither provided by the census or Procede results, specifically related to ethnicity, 
this is an entry point to the subject of our analysis.  
Procede began it’s program in comunidades in 1998, after several years of 
experience with ejidos. The tasks were limited to measuring the boundaries of the 
comunidad and to establish the list of people recognized by the community as comunero 
with the associated rights (padrón de comuneros).9 
Procede often had difficulty in entering the comunidades and convincing local 
authorities and other members of accepting the Program. This may be due to the long 
history of conflicts in the past and present memory of comunidades, which sometimes 
goes back to colonial times and to conflicts of land restitution in postrevolutionary days. 
                                                 
9 This is the list of people who are entitle to be members of the comunidad ‘comuneros’, the right to be a 
member or comunero is established according to the norms of each comunidad, for example being adult 
and having complied to the rights and obligations established, such as occupying an administrative or 
religious cargo. In some case women are excluded to membership. Rights are such as access to a plot of 
farming land, access to common lands and resources and obligations are to participate in the assembly, and 
in collective works, comply with social, political and religious obligations and with the established rules of 
the comunidad. 
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 The explanations vary according to regions and comunidades, to the ethnic composition 
and to the agrarian and economic history in each region. There is however no agreement 
in literature as to relate conflict with the presence of indigenous population. Some 
scholars deny this, showing how Procede has advanced in some indigenous regions and 
not in others: A study by Conapo/PNUD (2004), comprehending 481 municipios with 
predominantly indigenous population underline the difficulty to implement Procede. In 
2004 34% of indigenous agrarian communities had rejected Procede and had not been 
certified, whether comunidades or ejidos. Other authors state that the little interest in 
Procede in communities can be explained on account of comuneros are more inclined to 
defend collective tenure, are not interested in promoting individual rights that may 
threaten the individual control over plots (Ramírez, (2001).  
 Oaxaca, Chiapas y Guerrero, which comprehend high percentages of indigenous 
population show very different data for PROCEDE.  In Oaxaca ejidos 53.2% of land has 
been certified, as well as 50.3% in Chiapas and 57.3 in Guerrero. In the case of 
communities the data is 12.5% in Oaxaca,  36.1% in Chiapas and 26.3% in Guerrero. The 
low success of the Program in comunidades is evident.10 
          I will now comment on the changes and importance of tierras de uso común 
in communities with indigenous population, and the effects of Procede. As above, this is 
an approximation because of the lack of aggregate data on tenure and ethnicity.  
          As already mentioned, the resources on common lands (tierras de uso 
comun) are pasture, the forests, construction materials and minerals. Forest resources are 
the most important as an economically potential resource and from an environmental 
perspective.  
        According to the above mentioned study by Robles y Concheiro (2004) no 
substancial differences were found between communities with indigenous population and 
others, as far as the use and access to tierras de uso común. 
      One of the main outcomes of Procede has been on land distribution, not through a 
newly created land market, as expected by property rights theory and policy designers, 
but by twisting the implementation of Procede at the local level according to the needs 
and demands of peasant population. As a result, rather than land transfers such as sales 
                                                 
10 INEGI, Censo ejidal 2001 and Procuraduría Agraria, 2007. 
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 and leasing of land associated with a ‘modern’ economy, people used Procede to reassign 
land use and distribute land within the communities.    
According to 2007 ejido census data, only 4.4% of social property had been 
converted to private property, and 7.0% of certified social property is reported as 
privatized by the 2007 ejido census (INEGI, 2008). However, the 2007 data shows that in 
states with indigenous populations, the percentage of land transferred to private property 
(dominio pleno) is much higher than the national average. One hypothesis is that in the 
cases of Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca were certification is low, the process was more 
targeted to commercial lands, as may also be the case in Quintana Roo and Yucatán were 
lands have been destined for tourism. Surveys and case studies, confirm that leasing of 
land shows to have been more important, particularly in regions of commercial 
agriculture. (Janvry de, et.al., 1997;  Procuraduría Agraria, 1998). The 2007 ejido census 
only offers preliminary broad results which refer to the incidence of land transaction by 
communities: 66% of ejidos and comunidades report land transaction within their 
communities, only 28% report transactions with agents not belonging to the community, 
with low percentages in states with indigenous populations.  
Cuadro 4. PROCEDE en Estados con Predominancia de Población Indígena 
   
Entidad Federativa % 
Población 
HLI 
Superficie 
total (miles 
de ha) 
Superficie 
Certificada 
% Superficie Superficie 
dominio 
% Dominio 
Pleno/sup 
certificada 
 
(miles de 
ha)  
 
Certificada/Total 
pleno (miles de 
ha)  
       
Oaxaca 35.3 8621 1676 19.4 401 23.9  
Yucatán  33.5 2,311 1497 64.8 298 19.9  
Chiapas 26.1 4,442 1758 39.6 249 14.2  
Quintana Roo  19.3 2,886 1980 68.6 403 20.3   
Hidalgo  15.5 1,068 706 66.1 22 3.1  
Guerrero  14.2 5,003 2354 47.1 279 11.8  
Total Estados con 
predominancia indígena 
  24,331 9,971 41.0 1652.0 16.5
 
Total Nacional 670.00% 105,949 66,464 62.7 4658.0 7.0  
Fuente: Información RAN 2005 y 2007. Para Superficie en Dominio Pleno datos de INEGI, Censo Agropecuario 2007   
 
Let us now turn to the changes that have taken place in land use and the 
fragmentation of agricultural plots.            
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 First, in spite of the decreasing importance of agriculture in the Mexican economy 
and the fall in employment during the reform period and aftermath, the number of people 
with agrarian rights in ejidos and communities has increased.  According to the 2007 
ejido census there are now 5.6 million people with rights to land: 4.2 million  ejidatarios 
and comuneros and  1.4 million posesionarios, of these 4.5 million have access to a plot 
of  individual land. 11 
The area occupied by ejidos and comunidades increased by 2.6 million hectares 
from from 1991 to 2007 (2.6%) and the overall tenure structure of rural property has not 
changed, social property accounts for  51.8 % of land property in Mexico ( as compared 
to 49.7% according to the 1970 agricultural census).  
It is important to underline that the category of posesionario was legalized by the 
1992 reforms and refers to individuals who have right to a plot but not to the title of 
ejidatario o comunero. 12 This category comprehends by large, sons and to a less extend, 
daughters of ejidatarios and comuneros, they represent a group of peasants formerly 
excluded mainly because of land scarcity for distribution under former agrarian reform 
lands. As a consequence of the 1992 law, the restructuring of land tenure did not 
‘modernize’ but gave way for furthering ‘peasant’ agrarian structure. This was more so in 
Central and Southern Mexico where subsistence agriculture predominates.  
As a consequence land use was change and land was fragmented. Procede was the 
instrument to formally change the use of land. In the process of certification many ejido 
assemblies decided to incorporate part or all of the common lands into agricultural use 
and distribute it as individual plots, hence drawing marginal agricultural lands such as 
those used for grazing into cropping.13  
Between 1991 and 2007 there was a 21 % increase in the acreage of land divided 
into individual plots. At the same time the decrease in common lands between 1991 and   
2007  was 6.8%. This was at the expense on grazing lands.  
                                                 
11 There are another million avecindados that have no access to productive land, but live in the residential 
areas of communities and are entitled to a plot for housing.  
12 That is the property rights of a posesionario are restricted as they only have right to a plot, but not to 
common lands nor to voting in the assembly. 
13 The law protects forest lands from agricultural activities and individual division. However in practice, 
this disposition may not be obeyed and case studies confirm cases of the communities to deforestate in 
order to convert these lands to cropping, and even to oblige Procede officers to certify land usage and plot 
titles. 
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 Census data also confirms the fragmentation of land, as average number of 
hectares in individual plots has decreased slightly and average access to common lands 
by individual has gone from 21 to 15. (see Table 5). 
 Cuadro 5. Superficie por destino en ejidos y comunidades 1991, 2001 y 2007.
Ejidos y 
comunidades
Ejidatarios o 
comuneros*
Superficie total 
(HA)
Superficie 
parcelada (HA)
Sup. 
parcelada/su
p Total
Sup. 
parcelada/s
ujeto
Sup.no parcelada 
de uso común 
(HA)**
Sup. no 
parcelada/Sup 
total
Sup. no 
parcelada/s
ujeto
1991
Total 29,983 3,523,636 103,290,099 27,797,605 26.9 7.9 75,492,494 73.1 21.4
Ejidos 27,410 2,714,285 85,078,468 nd
Comunidades 2,573 809,351 18,211,631 nd
2001
Total 30,305 3,873,054 105,052,370 34436975 32.8 8.90 70,329,037 66.9 18.1
Ejidos 27,786 2,824,989 86,906,402 nd
Comunidades 2,519 1,048,065 18,145,968 nd
2007
Total 31,518 4,501,872 105,949,097 33,631,740 31.7 7.4 70,667,399 66.7 15.7
* Para 1991, 2001 se refiere a número de ejidatarios y comuneros con parcela individual. En 2007 se agregan 1,109699 posesionarios con parcela individual.
**Incluye superficie no parcelada de uso colectivo y no parecelada de uso común
Fuente: INEGI, 1994, Censo ejidal 1991; INEGI, 2003, Censo ejidal, 2001; INEGI, Censo Ejidal 2007, resultados preliminares.  
 
Unfortunately, as mentioned, data for indigenous ejidos and comunidades is not 
available, but there are no reasons that the trends should be any different. More so, land is 
part of the livelihoods and identity of indigenous populations, also as marginalized 
communities, opportunities for non-agricultural employment and migration are more 
difficult to access, and hence land as the basis of livelihood is vital. For example, a study 
focusing on the early effects of the agrarian reforms showed that ethnicity was associated 
with poverty, and that region, farm size, labor market and migration networks are 
inversely correlated with ethnicity (Janvry, de et. al.,1997).   
Case studies also confirm the fragmentation of land and change of land use.  As 
Procede passed through ejidos and comunidades, officials legalized existing situations, as 
for example when ejidatarios already had fragmented land and assigned plots to their 
sons (daughters), or ejidatarios took the opportunity to fragment and legalize plots in the 
name of the future heirs. Hence Procede prompted the subdivision of land and the 
incorporation of common lands into marginalized subsistence activities.    
In the regions with predominantly subsistence agriculture, the shift from common 
lands to agriculture and individual plots is due to demographic pressure and the 
continuing demand for land which is still the main resource for poor rural populations, 
but also due to the search for social justice –as was the now out-dated agrarian discourse 
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 under distributive agrarian reform ((Appendini y De Luca, 2006; Concheiro y Diego, 
2004; PA, 2003; Quesnel, 2003; Rivera, 2001; Velásquez, 2003).  
 But not all modifications of land usage and fragmentation of land within 
communities has been due to demand for land as a productive resource. Land and having 
a title has also given new meaning to land. Such as  residential use  and a resource to be 
negotiated as an inheritance. For example, in a indigenous Mazahua community in the 
Toluca Valley where I did fieldwork, many ejidatarios and their families were engaged in 
non-farm activities, living in a densely populated and well connected region with access 
to urban labor markets. In this community, as others in the region, a plot of land also has 
become important for building a house, especially for the younger generation. This has 
also facilitated women’s access to land, as they are now contributing to the household 
income in non-farm activities and hence begin to reclaim equal rights as heirs vis a vis 
males. Land may also be used as an asset of negotiation, for example when elders assure 
their old-age care with the siblings who commit to this task (Appendini and De Luca, 
2006; Larralde, 2008; Quesnel, 2003; Torres-Mazuera, 2008).   
As for other economic effects of land regulation proponed by property rights 
theory and policy makers, there is little to be said. The scarce evidence produced by 
research underlines that Procede has not had an economic impact in the venue of access 
to credit, investment and hence productivity and economic growth and welfare for rural 
families.  
The 1994-1997 World Bank (2001) study based on a survey, found a slight 
income effect among households in certified ejidos versus non certified, but this was 
associated with non-farm income and interpreted as an outcome of flexibility, allowing 
ejidatarios to sell or lease land and take advantage of better income opportunities (which 
is not obvious from the data on land transfers, mentioned above).  
Access to credit, and important issue for property rights economists, since titles 
may be used as credit collateral, has not been released for ejido and comuneros. In fact, it 
is non-existent since the financial crisis of 1995, when many private farmers went into 
bankruptcy, private bank in agricultural credit has been banned for over a decade and 
only initiating again for private entrepreneurs. Whatever access to credit provided for the 
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 ejidos and comunidades, it is through government program, mainly poverty alleviation 
programs and are not associated with property titles. 14 
Linked to capital resources is the allowance for ejidos and comunidades to enter 
into joint ventures with third parties, under the 1992 law. Ejidos and comunidades were 
to become partners with capital, as they provide the land, its resources and labor, and 
outsiders provide capital. But this seems not to have had much success either. The case of 
lands with forest resources allows for a more specific comment on the impacts of Procede 
on the collective management of such resources: 
The impacts of secure property rights on collective resource management, such as 
forest and environmental reserves, is a question that poses indigenous populations as key 
actors.  In Mexico, 80% of forest areas are located in ejidos and comunidades and 40% of 
lumber output is controlled by community organizations. In these areas, the effects of the 
1992 reforms interact with the reform of the forestry law and regulations on environment 
and conservation, which means a more complex institutional framework. The 1992 agrarian 
law on one hand protected the rights of ejidatarios and comuneros over their lands, and 
prohibited the sale and the fragmentation of land and individual assignment in forest areas, 
but on the other it allowed for joint ventures with outside capital, also the rights to resources 
can be ceded for 30 years. This has in some cases lead to ambiguity in decision making and 
management within communities. Also, the fact that the right to land is under one law and 
the management of natural resources is under another (environmental) has led to conflict 
concerning rights that in practice are limited by environmental restrictions (Klooster, 1999; 
Muñoz, 2003; Taylor, 2005).  
There are important examples of successful cases of collective forest management, 
especially in Oaxaca and Michoacán.15 These projects underline the importance of 
attending to and respecting traditional uses of territory and the existing community 
organization. However,  land regulation through Procede is not mentioned as a relevant 
variable to understand the development of forestry nor as a condition to access credit or 
technology (Bray, Merino-Pérez and Barry, 2005; Merino, 2001).  The successful 
                                                 
14 Some of these programs  when for productive purposes, may require membership in an association and as 
such linked to the status of ejidatario or comunero, but this is not different from pre-1992 access to 
government programs.  
15 Promoted by SEMANAT programs and financed by the World Bank.  
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 forestry enterprise are attributed to the access to different development programs and the 
communities historical experience with productive organization, dating back to the 
1980’s regulations, when collective resources were handed over to communities. In other 
words, to social capital. 
However without the support from specific government programs and financial 
help, there are strong incentives to change the use of forest land to agriculture and 
livestock, and assigned the land individually (Martínez and Braña, 2004). Though this is 
against agrarian law, there are documented cases showing that Procede has been obliged 
to legalize such changes when the local assembly has insisted this was the will of the 
community.    
Research referring to the specific problems of indigenous populations in areas of 
collective resources, such as forests, has given much attention to the conflicts that emerge 
when property rights are unclear and overlap (for example, the case of the Reserva de la 
Biosfera de Montes Azules).  Human rights abuse, violence and constant conflicts are of 
concern in general, a fact that explains why in some regions in which collective resources 
are important, such as Chiapas,  Procede has not been accepted by communities’ 
  
As small scale agriculture devoted to food staples and other basic crops has 
declined for the past two decades, there has been little incentives for investment, hence  
demand for  agricultural lands, especially in rainfed and marginal areas is not an issue for 
capital and investment and partly explains the lack of a developing land market that 
would link ejido lands to privatization and dynamic economic activities.    
In the case of indigenous ejidos and comunidades there is good reason to assume 
that they share the strategies and effects of the Procede program, with the ejidatarios and 
comuneros in general. In sum, to have appropriated the program to gain access to land for 
them and their families as a resource for subsistence agriculture, as well as residence for 
the aging ejido and comunero populations as well as for their non-farm employed off-
spring, and to maintain their livelihoods and identity as rural and indigenous peoples. In 
this context, the right to land seems to remain well alive in peasant memory, even as we 
are entering the 21st century.  
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 Tenure Security or social security 
PRIVATIZATION OF LAND AND INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA1: 
 
Søren Hvalkof 
Abstract  
This working paper summarizes the discussions and findings of a recent study of the impacts of 
contemporary land privatization processes and individual titling programs affecting indigenous 
communities in Latin America, with particular emphasis on indigenous economies and 
production systems. The study was informed by case studies from Peru, Bolivia and Honduras 
and Mexico, with the main focus on the indigenous peasant societies of the highlands, where 
individualization schemes apply. The neoliberal policies of the 1990s promoted market based 
legal and administrative reforms, with a strong emphasis on developing a dynamic land market 
that would eventually have an impact on indigenous communal land tenure systems, whether they 
were the direct target or not. From the present study it can be seen that there are significant 
contradictions between indigenous communal land arrangements and tenure systems, and the 
market-based land and agricultural policy reforms being promoted by the multilateral donor 
agencies. In the conventional economic development discourse land tenure security is considered 
a prerequisite for economic growth. The study shows, however, that in relation to indigenous 
communities the question of tenure security is much more complex and closely related to the 
security of social reproduction, safeguarding of communal control and of the communal 
decision-making authority. It shows that privatization and individualization of land tenure per se 
has not generated the expected results. 
 
 
1 This paper is also published as a DIIS Working Paper, 2008 
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1. Introduction 
This paper summarizes the findings of a recent land tenure policy study carried out for the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) of the impacts of land privatization processes and individual 
titling programs affecting indigenous communities in Latin America, with particular emphasis on 
indigenous economies and production systems.   
The study “Land Privatization, Titling, and Indigenous Communities in Latin America,” was carried out 
between 2006 and 2007 by a team of three Danish consultants, Aage Jørgensen, Thomas Skielboe 
and the author (Hvalkof et. al. 2008), on the basis of three empirical country case studies in 
Bolivia, Peru, and Honduras respectively and a desk study of a the land reform process Mexico. 2 
Each country had its own team of skilled Latin American consultants and scholars, elaborating a 
detailed country report of each case. (cf. annex 1)  The main comparative study was submitted to 
the IDB in early December 2007, a presentation workshop was held in Washington, D.C. in July 
2008 and revised version of the main report and the country studies finalized in September same 
year. It is the intention, however, that the study reports will be published by the IDB as an edited 
volume.    
2. Historical context  
A neo-liberal land reform paradigm emerged when the Washington Consensus still governed 
development policy during the late 1990s, before the Argentinean economy accelerated its 
descent (1999-2002) and eventual collapse, supporting a growing critique of the neo-liberal 
structural adjustment policies (cf. Birdsall and de la Torre 2001, de Ferranti and Ody 2006, de 
Soto 2000). In the pro-market discourse  emerging, state-led agricultural and land reforms were 
seen as highly inefficient and counter-productive to economic development, and the great land 
reforms that took place in several Latin American countries in the 1950s, 60s and 70s were 
aggressively criticized for being coercive and expropriatory, distorting land price formation, being 
not demand but supply driven, making way for inefficient users or non-interested beneficiaries, 
 
2 The study was executed under contract with the IDB by the Danish consultancy company NORDECO. The 
author was “borrowed’ from the Danish Institute for International Development, and worked as team leader and 
anchor person on the study.  The study is a sequel to an earlier study: “Land Titling and Indigenous Peoples”, carried 
out by the Indigenous Peoples and Community Development Unit of the IDB’s Sustainable Development 
Department in 1999 
262
being state-centralized, slowly implemented and undermining private investments and land 
markets... to name but a few common points in the pro-market criticism of state-led land reform 
processes. The neo-liberal answer to this was land privatization, individualization and allotment, 
allowing land markets to develop, claimed to foster more productive land use, better access to 
financial markets and credits, increased employment and thus improved living standards for the 
rural poor.3 
Prompted by these ideas and promises, several of the countries in the region liberalized their 
indigenous collective land tenure arrangements, opening them to privatization and 
individualization, a process that had already started “spontaneously” as collective indigenous 
landholding were increasingly being put under pressure by a series of different processes. 
Furthermore, land tenure regularization models in the region had not seriously taken customary 
land tenure practices into account, which were merely seen as static systems, relicts of feudal 
regimes that were now standing in the way of modernization and liberal agricultural development. 
Historically, indigenous peoples have had to choose between two models: collective or private 
individual property.  Indigenous customary laws establish a variety of land access and 
management rules that differ from region to region according to cultural tradition, adaptation to 
the ecological landscape and local historiography, and which do not easily correspond to planned 
blueprints for private or formalized collective land tenure models.  
The liberalization of land tenure was followed up by the multilateral development banks 
supporting several large scale land privatization and cadastre programs, most noticeably in Peru 
and Mexico, some of which are still active. It is the empirical foundation of the mentioned neo-
liberal suppositions in the context of indigenous communities our impact study wanted to 
challenge (Deininger and Binswanger 1999).  
3. The study 
As mentioned the study covers Bolivia, Peru, Honduras and Mexico, reviewing cases of land 
privatization and titling programs and assessing their impact on  
i. credit access through the development of mortgage markets;  
 
3 The empirical basis of several of these criticisms has been questioned by several scholars and some have argued 
that the large state-driven land reforms of the first half of the 20th century were in fact quite efficient at redistributing 
property and reforming the agricultural sector, e.g. Saturnino M. Borras 2005. 
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ii. land markets; and  
iii. improvements in living standards. 
Additionally, the study has identified the scope of social capital-related impacts on customary law, 
governance and food security, and specifically on;  
iv. cultural land-use management;  
v. access rights to natural resources;  
vi. inheritance rights;   
vii. women’s access to land;  
viii. traditional production and exchange systems (traditional economy); and  
ix. communal control and decision-making processes. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this working paper to discuss the selection criteria of the countries, the 
case studies and the methodology in any detail, but a few general traits merits attention: In the 
first place, it is important to look for cases and places where such individualization processes are 
relevant at all, and secondly, of course, where such processes have de facto taken place. This 
excludes the vast majority of tropical lowland indigenous communities in the Amazon and most 
tropical forest areas of South and Central America, including humid coastal zones. This can quite 
easily explained by the character of the tropical forest production systems (cf. Plant and Hvalkof 
2001; and Hvalkof 2006), but we will have to skip that for now. In the tropical lowlands typically, 
the concept of the collective territorial rights of indigenous groups or communal tenure of larger 
areas has been applied, and to our knowledge no systematic attempt at privatizing or 
individualizing such communally titled areas has been made, although exceptions do exist.  
One of the more aggressive of these is the recent attempt (2008) by the Peruvian President Alan 
García and his government by decree to issue a package of several legislations targeting 
indigenous communities, and particularly opening for privatization and colonization of titled 
indigenous community territories in the Amazon, and free access for extractivist enterprises. The 
implementation of these laws will have disastrous effect on tropical forest environments, 
indigenous production systems and not least lead to violent conflicts between community 
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members and encroaching settlers, land speculators and logging entrepreneurs.4  
What can be seen in many tropical regions, particularly in colonization frontiers (often referred to 
as the “agricultural frontier”, which is a misnomer (cf. Hvalkof 2008)) is that aggressive 
colonization and titling programs targeting neighboring non-indigenous beneficiaries may also 
have a notable impact on the indigenous tenure system and governance. 
The present study has thus primarily focused on the indigenous peasant societies of the Andean 
highlands of Bolivia and Peru, and indigenous peasant societies in Mexico. However, to 
exemplify the indirect impact of large non-indigenous development projects on neighboring 
indigenous communities, a case study from Garífuna communities in the coastal lowlands of 
Honduras was included.   
• The case study from Peru was undertaken in five Quechua peasant communities in the 
District of Pucyura, Anta Province, which is situated in Cusco department.  
• In Bolivia, the case study took place on the Altiplano, in seven Aymara peasant 
communities in the municipality of Sica Sica, in Aroma Province, department of La Paz. 
• In Honduras, two case studies were undertaken: one in the Garífuna communities of 
Tornabé and San Juan, on the Atlantic coast, and the other in San Francisco de Opalaca, a 
Lenca municipality in the Western region of the country. 
 
In Peru the survey included 216 households, in Bolivia 220 households, and in Honduras 58 
households in the Lenca region5. In the case of Mexico, a desk study was produced on the basis 
of existing studies on the impact of the 1992 constitutional reform and the 1993 PROCEDE land 
reform program in Mexico. It was considered essential to compare the experiences from the 
present case studies with those from the Mexican ejido reform program, which has been one of 
the most thorough, targeting communal peasant communal landownership. 
 
4 The laws were passed as presidential decrees, (D.L. 1015 and D.L 1073) circumventing the normal democratic 
legislative procedures in the congress, using special powers given to the president in the context of free trade 
agreement negotiations with the U.S., as a pretext. This attack on communal landownership and control, led to 
widespread mobilizations and protest from indigenous organizations, NGOs and other civil society actors, and the 
decrees were rejected by broad majority vote in the congress, and act which President has refused to acknowledge, 
although he admits that applying such measures in the Amazon was an error as it originally was intended to target 
peasant Andean communities (sic.). 
5 During the field study, we found that it was not possible to undertake a household survey in the two Garífuna 
communities due to an ongoing conflict related to the IDB-supported tourism project.  
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In spite of many structural similarities, the empirical reality in all four areas is very different and 
there has never been any uniform, extensive privatization process of indigenous collective 
territories in the four countries. Only Mexico and Peru have recently carried out large-scale land 
reforms involving privatization of indigenous communal lands. In consequence, the aim of the 
study has not been to make a full quantifiable comparative study in the strictest “statistical” sense 
of the term, but rather to analyze, compare and discuss the findings from the four areas, and 
describe and illustrate indigenous experiences of both collective and individual land titling. While 
the cases reveal the complexity and diversity of experiences, they also point to common patterns 
and solutions. (Detailed descriptions can be found in the full IDB study report, Hvalkof et. al. 
2008) 
4. Findings and conclusions 
A. THE AMBIGUITY OF THE STATE 
It is evident, both from the present country studies and from the complementary literature on 
indigenous tenure issues, that the indigenous peoples and communities and their organizations 
have a very ambiguous relationship with the State. Although the role of the State over time has 
changed, along with its policies, there is a deep-rooted mistrust of the State and its institutions, 
and an entrenched suspicion towards new policies and programs targeting the indigenous 
communities and, particularly, their land rights and tenure situation. This mistrust is of course 
based on notoriously bad experiences throughout modern history with the implementation of 
land policies in general. Either the policies aimed at dissolving communal tenure resulting in loss 
of territory and control or, when agrarian reform legislation was eventually supposed to benefit 
the indigenous peasantry, it was often not implemented, as in the case of Bolivia, or implemented 
at a pace that took decades, as in the case of Peru, or it ended up being privatized through 
different market-related maneuvers, or the legislation was so unclear and badly regulated that it 
left crucial questions of land administration and decision-making power open to venturesome 
interpretation, generating latent local conflicts as in the cases of Honduras and Mexico. There are 
innumerable versions of the same story of bad governance and hidden agendas, always with the 
result of the poor indigenous peoples being left carrying the can.  
On the other hand, indigenous communities and organizations also have great expectations of 
the State and its institutions, anticipating that sound policies will eventually be developed in favor 
of the indigenous populations and extended to the indigenous poor to improve their situation. 
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The fact that the State does not seem to recognize indigenous peoples’ special situations does not 
mean that the indigenous peoples do not recognize the State.  
This ambiguity becomes crystal clear when indigenous communities and organizations appeal to 
national governments to safeguard indigenous rights and implement legislation and reforms that 
would improve their tenure security. In the absence of adequate state institutions and policy 
guidelines, indigenous communities have for many years had to rely on their own customary 
systems of governance and tenure regulations and, have in fact, very loyally attempted to adapt 
and modify their traditional customary systems to new legal structures introduced by 
governments often more concerned with legal pettifogging.  
The indigenous communities and organizations have recognized that they need the State to 
guarantee their territorial and socio-cultural integrity, now constitutional rights in several “multi- 
or pluri-cultural” states. So, although indigenous communities and their organizations may seem 
to be in accord with neoliberal arguments regarding the inflated and incompetent bureaucracy 
and (cost) inefficient state obstructing the development of decentralized competitive markets, 
they are at the same time fierce defenders of strong State regulations and efficient control 
institutions safeguarding their rights and equal access to land and financial and productive 
resources and, as such, absolutely against de-regularizing the State and its instruments. 
B. INDIVIDUAL VS. COLLECTIVE LAND TITLES 
The study unquestionably reveals that the problem of formalizing land tenure in indigenous 
communities is not a simple choice between collective vs. individual land rights. At least, not 
when it comes to the majority of peasant societies, whereas in the case of indigenous horticultural 
societies in tropical forest economies, allotment and individual titling is entirely contradictory to a 
sustainable indigenous production system (cf. Plant and Hvalkof 2001). For the very same reason 
the study concentrated on indigenous societies where individual allotment and privatization has 
been an ongoing process. 
In all of the cases studied in the three countries, there were both communal titles and individual 
(family) allotment present in different forms simultaneously. The same is extensively documented 
in the Mexican country study too. In most of the communities studied there were de facto 
allotments to individual families inside the communal territories and, sometimes, even formalized 
individual titles as in Peru and, in others such as Bolivia, there were competing community 
models whereby some communities had only communal titles (but still distributed specific lots to 
specific families internally) while others had opted for allotting the entire communal territory, as 
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in the case of the ex-haciendas in Bolivia, although they still maintained the community as the 
governing and decision-making body.  
It is quite clear that there is an interest among many community members in acquiring an 
individual land title, an extra tenure security, but it is equally obvious that they at the same time 
are acknowledging the communal title as legitimate and, not least, the community authorities as a 
lawful governing body at par with any State institution. Individual land titling is thus seen rather 
as a complement to already existing communal and customary tenure arrangements, and not 
necessarily as an alternative. The conventional economic discourse on how to alter a skewed rural 
development has as a premise that tenure security is the key to liberating the economic dynamic 
(Deininger 2003, Ellickson 1993) but, as we have seen in the study, it is definitely not the silver 
bullet that kills the monster of economic stagnation in rural areas. 
All communities, disregarding their different tenure arrangements, whether collective or 
individual, have unequivocally given higher priority to the reproduction and safeguarding of 
communal control and the decision-making authority. It therefore seems quite evident that the 
key parameter, rather than tenure security, is social security, in the broad sense of the term. As 
long as the State continues to demonstrate that it is both unable and uninterested in guaranteeing 
any form of social security to the indigenous communities, closing agricultural extension services, 
giving up market guarantees etc., radically downsizing the presence of public service institutions, 
then there are no alternatives to la comunidad. It is the community that guarantees its members 
access to productive land, it is the community that regulates access to natural resources, and it is 
the community that reconfirms the social recognition of its members, the cultural identity, and 
gives meaning and social cohesion. The State cannot give such guarantees to the indigenous 
peoples. On the contrary, it has placed its integrity in the market, a market which is controlled by 
totally alien forces and interests. This will not convince any averagely intelligent human being. 
You cannot pawn your future on such a market without guarantees. Particularly not if you are 
poor, indigenous and of another world of logic. History has shown that the State is not 
trustworthy, and legislation alone will not do the trick, nor isolated land tenure reforms. 
C. ACCESS TO CREDITS 
All country studies showed there was a general interest in accessing appropriate credit options 
among the community members. A majority of the people interviewed would like to invest in 
improvements in their production if possible. It was also clear that the lack of mortgage 
possibilities, due to a lack of individual land titles, was used by lenders to justify the absence of 
lending options. But, at the same time, there was a general fear among the community members 
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of incurring debt, particularly if their land was used as collateral in any institutionalized form. The 
history of debt bondage to local hacienda owners and other patrons is still quite vivid in people’s 
memories of not so distant times, and the understandable aversion to risk losing the land you 
have struggled for over generations shows that even where families have obtained individual 
titles, as in the case of Peru, only a fraction use such titles as collateral in loans and credits.  
One reason is, of course, that there are very few rural credit institutions in general that will work 
with indigenous communities, but also that the type of credits and loans sought are very small 
and short-term production credits, in which even the term micro-finance seems a big word. In 
the Peruvian case, which is the most prosperous region of the three study areas, and where some 
communities have succeeded in individualizing a part of the most productive communal lands, 
the credits were typically used for converting cash crop production on one plot into the 
production of guinea pigs, i.e. adapting to market fluctuations and changing demands. We are 
talking on a scale of few hundred dollars at the most. Such a scale will never justify the 
transaction costs of a real certified mortgage procedure. Both here and in cases from the other 
country studies, when people indicate that they have used their title as guarantee, it is almost 
never a real mortgage in the official sense, processed in the registry of deeds with the title as 
collateral. Most often the individual title is merely used as a kind of proof or pledge that the land, 
as a means of production, is available and at hand, rendering it probable that the lender is capable 
of producing sufficient surplus to pay back the credit or loan (see also Deininger 2003: 28-29).  
In all communities studied there was a great interest and desire in alternative credit institutions 
and development banks, in the small sense of the word, developing adequate financial 
instruments tailored to the small-scale indigenous producer, who will never turn into a 
prosperous capitalist agribusiness enterprise but who is hard-working and has the potential for 
growth, which all adds up, particularly with additional technical assistance and innovative niche 
productions. The studies from all four countries revealed that privatization of land tenure and 
individual titles do not resolve the credit problem. This requires the involvement of several other 
sectors. Again, the multilateral development banks could be at the forefront of developing such 
financial instruments and credit products specially tailored to tackling the problem of small-scale 
production credits for indigenous and similar rural communities. As argued above, it is 
improbable that individualization of land tenure will in any way solve the fundamental problem 
of credits and investments. Hence, the development of financial models that dissociate rural 
credits from land tenure arrangements should be considered, seeking other forms of guarantees 
and security of the investment. Here it would also be relevant to begin thinking about cultural 
and social capital as spheres of collateral interest. Financial innovation is much needed, and cross-
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disciplinary inputs necessary, but this must take its starting point in the communal reality and 
specific relations of production. 
D. LAND MARKETS 
One of the central theses in liberal land reform is that a thorough privatization process, with 
demarcation and individual allotment, cadastre and registry, and issue of official title documents, 
will rapidly lead to the generation of a transparent land market and land rental dynamic which, if 
supported with proper institutional services, will engender more efficient land use and 
productivity, and growing investments, all in an upward spiral. This may be the ideal case in rural 
settings where individual tenure already exists in different informal structures, but it can be said 
with certainty that this is not the case in settings dominated by indigenous communities and 
customary systems of tenure control. Generally speaking, in all three case studies, no open and 
booming land markets have developed. Similar observations on the effects of market friendly 
reforms have been made in Honduras and Nicaragua by other scholars (Boucher et. al. 2005). It 
could be argued that this is obvious in the Honduran case, where individual sales and tenure 
arrangements are prohibited for communal lands, except for internal sales and rental agreements 
between community members. 
But in the other end on the continuum we find the Peruvian case from Cusco, a rural zone with 
productive lands, irrigation systems, good road infrastructure, market access and a growing 
economy, - and with the most recent allotments and privatization program actively involved. 
Nonetheless, only a limited and incipient land market has emerged there. The most noticeable 
effect is higher prices for land with a title, meaning that improved tenure security is seen as an 
asset. But in the Cusco case study there is an external conditioning factor that may be the 
underlying determinant of this tendency, namely a booming tourist industry with increased 
interest in buying land for tourist infrastructure investments and holiday cottages, generating an 
increasing land speculation that disregards the title status. However, the relatively low density of 
individual allotments in the area and other factors impeding the development of an open land 
market keep the transaction costs so high that it most often is not feasible to enter into formal 
transactions. 
While this could be explained as an atypical case, the Mexican country study clearly indicates that 
this is in fact the general pattern. Even the very comprehensive PROCEDE program has not 
succeeded in creating efficient and transparent land markets. What seems to be the case in all 
countries is that there has been an increase in informal and internal transactions in the 
communities, and in the ejidos in the case of Mexico. In the Bolivian case, 90% of all land 
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transactions were internal community sales, mostly related to the expansion of the dairy industry 
in the area. On the other hand, internal land rentals and land access agreements based on 
sharecropping are widespread in all areas studied. These are all informal systems as seen from the 
perspective of the State, and yet from the local point of view they are well-established systems of 
land access and distribution, sanctioned by the “communal society”.  
In general, the formal titling process seems to boost internal and informal rental transactions, not 
always however with a positive result, as commons and marginal lands in several cases have been 
seized to allotment. In Mexico the commons, often marginal grazing lands, have in many cases 
been apprehended by the ejido authorities for allotment to agricultural purposes, putting pressure 
on the ecosystems and increasing the population of the agrarian unit. Several studies show that a 
widespread land fragmentation has taken place in the ejidos as part of the PROCEDE process.   
The conclusion is that formalized land markets and rental systems have not evolved, despite land 
ordering and private titling, but that local communities relate to the processes in innovative and 
reinterpretive ways, again attempting to benefit to a maximum from the situation while 
maintaining communal control.  
It is evident that indigenous communal tenure systems, and internal markets and rental 
arrangements, are much more persistent than originally anticipated by the agrarian economists 
behind the privatization campaigns. However, communal tenure systems are also skewed in terms 
of access for all community members, with internal differentiation between poor and less poor 
community members becoming more visible, particularly when privatization programs change 
external market relations and pricing. Again the IDB, along with other involved institutional 
partners, may consider focusing on the development of the internal rental and transfer 
transaction systems, attempting to develop the existing customary system on their own premises 
by introducing equity criteria for all community members. As we have seen in several of the case 
studies, there is a call for a more equal land distribution inside the communities and a 
democratization of their decision-making processes. 
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E. IMPACTS ON PRODUCTION AND HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY6 
One main driver behind individual titling initiatives is that it will help to create positive impacts 
on agricultural production and individual household economies. The general expectation is that 
secure tenure will be an incentive for the owner to increase his/her investments and innovation 
in the titled plot. 
The Peruvian sample found that 83.5% of the households interviewed said that investments in 
land that had been titled had not increased. (Agreda and Mendieta 2007: 39). The study also 
found that the impact of titling on innovation and production changes was not significant and 
that the title itself was not the main determinant of these decisions. The opinion of 80% of the 
comuneros  was that the level of innovation remains the same as before titling. These results are 
consistent with the perception of little impact of the title in relation to the intensity of use of the 
titled plots, where 79.8% believed that level of use remained the same as before the title. It is also 
consistent with the perception of a low impact on yield and income from the titled plots. 71.6% 
of those polled believed that the yield from titled plots had remained unchanged and 73.4% 
stated that revenues remained the same. Thus the titling itself was not sufficient to bring about an 
increase in investment, production or household income. 
Likewise, the study found that there was no significant difference between the investments of 
those ejidatarios or comuneros  with a title and those without. In the survey, 90.8% of the comuneros 
with a title believed that the titling had not generated significant changes in the production 
portfolio. The same scenario is also evident in Mexico. Here a World Bank study (2001), (also cf. 
Appendini and Torres 2007)  found that there was a slightly higher level of economic income in 
Mexican ejidos that had been titled through the PROCEDE program than in non-titled ejidos. The 
study also found a significant relationship between households with a land title and non-farm 
activities. However, there was no significant relationship between the possession of a land title 
and income from agricultural activities. 
In general, non-farm activities are important for the rural population in Mexico. A recent study 
noted that 45% of producers in ejidos titled by PROCEDE did not consider agriculture as their 
main activity, while the 55% who responded that agriculture was their main source of income 
also listed a second occupation. (Appendini and Torres 2007: 32).  These figures reflect the 
 
6 There are no baseline data for the case studies which would permit to measure in detail economic changes in 
household economy and living standards before and after a titling program. The information and data in this section 
has mainly been collected through household interviews. 
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different strategies that rural families have to use to generate household income. In many cases 
agriculture is not sufficient to cover food security needs and household income will be 
supplemented through migratory work or other means of income. 
F. EXCLUSION, FRAGMENTATION AND PROLETARIZATION 
The conception of the indigenous community as reflected in conventional liberal land reform 
papers and privatization campaigns is as ambiguous as the indigenous relationship with the State. 
On the one hand communal tenure and control systems are seen as archaic, anachronistic relicts, 
impeding the economic progress and well-being of community members, doomed to extinction 
and, on the other, the structural adjustment policies are also rooted in an ideology that 
acknowledges the rights of indigenous peoples, and the right to choose a different lifestyle, 
particularly if it is self-sufficient, autonomous and does not stand in the way of the construction 
of the minimal State. It is thus accepted that the State should protect such different social 
formations, islands in the sea of modern capitalism, patiently awaiting such times when this 
phenomenon will eventually dissolve as reason triumphs. The land privatization option is seen 
merely as an incentive to subscribe to such change.  
But it did not work like that. The indigenous systems not only survived but even adapted, 
developed and propagated. The constant demand for the establishment of new communities or 
to expand existing community lands proves this. However, the legal option for indigenous people 
is that they are either members of a community and hence must refrain from desires for 
individual tenure security, or they can join the market and be the happy landowner of an 
individual plot, renouncing their communal membership and mentality. But they cannot do both, 
which is seen as a contradiction in terms. The equation is something like: either you are an Indian 
with the right to remain under the yoke of communalism or you must renounce your identity and 
become one of us in the market of individual opportunity. 
This kind of either-or condition is particularly evident in Peruvian legislation, where it is possible 
to privatize the peasant communities or parts thereof, and put them up for sale on the market, 
but the indigenous community members themselves are not allowed to buy their own privatized 
land, as long as they are members of the community. They must renounce their community 
membership first (as if it were a sports club). On the other hand, if the community decides to go 
along with an allotment of communal lands, there is no problem in selling it to third party 
mestizos or whichever outsider may be interested.  
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The message in this perverted legislation is that if you want to participate in the national economy 
and receive support, you must give up being indigenous. Such a mechanism of ethnically defined 
exclusion is highly discriminatory, bordering on racism, and is to be condemned. This is the 
operational basis of the famous PETT program in Peru, fully funded and supported by the IDB.7 
In Honduras, we witness the extreme poverty in which many Garífuna community members are 
kept, preventing them from being able to participate in the new local economic boom induced by 
IDB-supported tourist development projects. The communities have been offered the 
opportunity to be partners and invest in the tourist development projects but, so far, the financial 
requirements are unrealistic, given the subsistence basis of the community economy. Here, a new 
distorted reality is being constructed, putting enormous pressure on the local Garífuna 
communities, which have few options to choose from. For many individuals, the attempt to cope 
with market forces fails, and they end up as proletarized individuals, often as peons on what was 
once their own land. (cf. Travieso 2007) 
Another well-known problem resulting from the individualizing of tenure in and around 
communities is the process of land fragmentation, the minifundización, a problem which is 
particularly conspicuous in the Bolivian Altiplano. Here, it is not a result of Bank financed land 
ordering projects but a spontaneous process of individualization; we could say, however, the 
result of not focusing on the development of communal systems as an alternative to individual 
privatization (cf. Péres 2007). 
The problem is definitely accelerated by the increase in individual tenure arrangements in 
combination with low productivity and underemployment, resulting in massive labor migration 
towards the urban centers and the tropical lowlands, creating new social and ecological problems 
at “both ends”. Where communal tenure control is maintained this tendency is less prominent, 
but the pressure to allot is generally on the increase. 
A new aspect of this process revolves around changes in the age and gender structure of the 
communities, whereby it is mostly the young men who migrate and move away. However, we 
also witness an increasing number of underutilized plots owned by absentee landowners, living 
away in urban settings or in the colonization frontiers to the east. The importance and effects of 
 
7 The mentioned newly decreed legislations in Peru (see footnote 3), the D.L 1015 and the D.L 1073 opening for the 
possibility of privatizing communal lands, eventually will change this double bind situation, and allow the community 
members to become individual owners of former community lands. However, the procedures for such transactions 
are yet not regulated. 
274
these new nexuses between the community and members living outside and far away from 
community life, still having claims to community lands, is generally neglected in the land reform 
programs, and much more emphasis should be put on understanding the dynamics and effects of 
these relationships. It is well-known from studies of indigenous peasant migrations to the US that 
remittances play a considerable role in local economies (and consequently the national economy) 
and that the communal control system, on the other hand, is being extended to the US urban 
environment, reproducing the cultural capital of the communal systems and maintaining the 
social responsibilities and duties of the migrant community members (e.g. Trans 2006).8 
A similar process is taking place inside the countries too, as the communities struggle to maintain 
control and survive by adapting to the new conditions, thus attempting to optimize social 
security. The exchange of services and goods between the community and its urban diaspora is 
an aspect that should be given much more scrutiny, again proving that focusing on the entire 
system of communal life may prove much more rewarding when looking for new development 
options for the rural poor, rather than focusing on isolated tenure relations. 
G. GENDER RELATIONS AND WOMEN’S ACCESS TO LAND 
Statistics show huge gender-based differences in access to key productive resources such as land 
in Latin America. In a study of five countries where gender-aggregated data was available, the 
results show that women comprise between 11 and 27% of land owners (Deere and Leon 2002). 
There seems to be a positive relationship between women’s land rights and household income. A 
correlation of women’s land rights and household income in Nicaragua and Honduras found 
indications that, in cases where women have either individual or joint rights to land, the 
household income is significantly higher than in households where women have no formal claims 
to land. (Katz 2002). Land rights can also give women a stronger position inside the household. 
A recent review (Baranyi et. al. 2004)  of land reforms in Latin America pointed to evidence from 
Africa and Asia, where women with land rights have a stronger say in the intra-household 
allocation of resources. Land rights have also been associated with women’s empowerment, by 
enhancing their bargaining position both with husband and children (Deere and Léon 2001), and 
other positive results such as greater household expenditure on food and healthcare as well as 
children’s schooling, agricultural productivity and diversification of household income-generating 
activities (Baranyi et. al. 2004).  
 
8 This system has also long been common among migrants in European cities (cf. Philpot 1968) 
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With regard to women’s formal rights to land in the present study, all four countries acknowledge 
the equal rights of men and women to inherit and own land. Notwithstanding, the analysis show, 
that the first generation land reform programs had a pronounced male bias whereas the recent 
reform packages introduced in several Latin American countries have succeeded in gaining a 
somewhat more balanced outcome between men and women when it comes to landownership 
and titling, through bilateral inheritance legislation. However, there still seems to be a strong male 
dominance in land allocations and inheritance in indigenous peasant communities. This was the 
case in nearly all of the present case studies apart from the Garífuna communities, where there is 
a traditional matrifocal organizational pattern. 
The Peruvian case study found that indigenous women experience both exclusion and fewer 
rights to land. Only around 10% of the households in the survey had a female head, and most of 
these belonged to the poorest households. Moreover, women often felt that they receive less 
attention from communal authorities when resolving conflicts related to land. A generalized 
problem in all indigenous communities is women’s lack of personal identification papers, i.e. not 
being registered as Peruvian citizens, thus not having voting rights or the possibility of inheriting 
or owning anything in formal legal terms. This is also expressed in the lack of registration of 
women’s names on titles and other land possession documents, exacerbating the exclusion of 
women. Most women expressed an interest in formalizing their inheritance rights, based on their 
interest in securing their children’s future. 
In the Bolivian case, the majority in the survey (70%) had obtained their land through 
inheritance. Traditionally, many families have followed the practice of having the last-born son 
(ultimogeniture) inherit the land and this custom continues into the present, very much confirming 
the trend towards an absolute male bias in customary tenure arrangements. The interviews 
revealed that families also let their other sons inherit land and other types of property such as 
cattle, again excluding their daughters. A similar gender-biased development can be observed in 
Mexico. The 1992 PROCEDE reform introduced free choice so that the ejido land holder now 
can choose who will inherit his land. The inheritor will not necessarily have to be a family 
member. These changes make women more vulnerable since their father or husband may now 
exclude them from access to land, and a general male bias in rural society reinforces this 
tendency. 
In this context, a new phenomenon of “feminization of the rural population” has been observed 
in the Bolivian case, related to the emigration of the young male population. Women and 
children are increasingly left behind to take care of production and the daily life of the 
communities. Having to undertake more responsibilities and double functions, the indigenous 
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women are thus carrying the heaviest burden of failed land policies. This tendency becomes 
particularly distorted when it is considered that women are also not allowed to inherit according 
to customary interpretations of the land legislation, and cannot participate in national political life 
due to deficient personal identification documents. 
The gender situation in all case studies, including Mexico, once again corroborates the 
observations made in all other aspects that land reform programs have generally chosen to 
neglect the potential of communal arrangements. This must be addressed and developed to make 
it more compatible with contemporary rural development possibilities, instead of isolating and 
freezing it in time, leaving it to its own fate to survive. The gender approach must take the local 
community structures and local communal arrangements into account. In a gender approach, it is 
vitally important to take the local development possibilities of existing communal arrangements 
as a starting point, and these must at the same time be seen as a dynamic part of the 
contemporary rural reality and development and not as archaic and static structures, as so often 
perceived in tenure programs. 
5. Summa summarum:  From tenure security to 
social security  
A trend running through all the country case studies in this study is that the focus on land tenure 
security as a stand alone premise for the development of the economies of the indigenous rural 
poor may be false, or at least insufficient. Tenure security is undoubtedly a very important aspect 
of any rural development process, and the theme has been at the centre of numerous social 
conflicts since the Spanish Conquest of the Americas but tenure security, and particularly 
individual tenure security, is not the panacea that will cure all ills in a rural setting dominated by 
indigenous communities.  
The function of the community itself must be understood. The indigenous community is the only 
social institution that can and will guarantee the rights and access to land and resources of its 
members. The community is the social security system of the rural poor. During the presentation 
of the survey results to a group of community members in Anta, Peru, an elderly gentleman, 
living outside the community on his own private lot but still an active member of the community 
(sic.) stood up and emphasized to the Danish consultant that the community was much more 
than the land title: 
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“It is our life, our culture, our forefathers, our language. It is the future of our children. We will never abandon the 
community, titles or no titles.”  
And this is where the short circuit of the conventional land reform rationale is to be found: 
equating communal tenure with the community per se. This is also why individualizing and 
privatizing tenure in rural areas does not make the communal control system disappear and 
consequently does not make the free market relations develop as a prerequisite for the expected 
investment capitalization and growth. As long as the State is not capable of establishing and 
guaranteeing sufficient social security for its people - social security in the most inclusive and 
multifaceted sense of the term – these people will establish alternative systems to the State, and 
here the indigenous community is one of the oldest, most renowned and well-tested institutions, 
with all the required functions and instruments at hand.  It is thus also evidently logical, that 
when the State downsizes it public services and does away with its institutions, while at the same 
time launching large-scale land privatization programs as has been the case in Mexico and Peru 
without any ability to follow up or initiate all the economic, financial and technical extensions 
required to warrant the investments and the productivity increases expected, the community as 
an innate institution will be boosted and take over control.  
The community is much more than the sum of the people.  It is also capable of subsuming and 
absorbing individual tenure systems, particularly when individuality, expressed as single families 
detached from the collective, appears as the weakest and most vulnerable of all possible social 
organizations, and particularly for indigenous individuals in societies imbued with ethno-racist 
connotations. 
The challenge now to any land reform initiative is to acknowledge the central importance of la 
comunidad and make it the focal point of any future initiatives, developing its potential and 
improving its functions and capabilities. This requires the State to assume its role of service 
provider and act as guarantor of the cultural, social and economic integrity of the indigenous 
community and its peoples, and that the focus of land reform shifts from tenure security to social 
security. But again, this calls for the presence of the State, with well-functioning and attendant 
institutions, and certainly not its withdrawal and substitution with the moral indifference of 
savage market mechanisms.  
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Abstract 
In the mid-1990’s Bolivia introduced a “good governance” reform: the reform on 
Participación popular (popular participation). This reform was meant to include formerly 
excluded groups of the population in the Bolivian State. The paper will discuss the division 
between civil society and State. In this example from the Potosí department in southern 
Bolivia it seems like the State and civil society in some way have “merged”. The state seems 
eager to include indigenous social organisation in the state structure by introducing new 
reforms which co-opt original organisations in the state administration. And further more the 
State seemed dependent on NGO’s in introducing the new reforms. The paper will discuss the 
notions of “local social organisations” “state” and “civil society” and their inter relations. In 
this case one NGO and the role of this NGO in introducing the reform of popular participation 
will be at the centre of the discussion. 
 
Introduction 
This paper focuses on social organisations and the “spaces1” which are available for these 
organisations in decentralisation and democratisation processes in Bolivia, especially the 
spaces available for former excluded groups in the social interface between state and civil 
society and local organisations. Social interface is by Long is defined as: Acritical points of 
intersection between different social systems, fields or levels of social order where structural 
discontinuities, based upon differences of normative value and social interest, are most likely 
to be found [...] Such discontinuities are characterized by discrepancies in values, interests, 
knowledge and power. Interfaces typically occur at points where different, and often 
conflicting, lifeworlds or social fields intersect@ (1989:1-2). 
 
                                                 
1 “The spatial metaphors that pepper contemporary development discourse speak to the growing interest in 
involving people more directly in processes of development” (Cornwall, 2002:2) 
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  The discussions will be located to the relation between an NGO, the state and local actors, 
especially village councils. As stated by Lewis: “NGOs remain a dominant force in the 
contemporary world, in relation to a broad range of areas that include development, 
globalisation, human rights and conflict. NGOs need to be studied both in their own right and 
as a keyhole into wider processes such as privatization, state transformation and changing 
gender relations (Lewis, 2007: 375). Here I will focus not so much on the NGO as a dominant 
force but rather on the processes of state transformation and participation and the position of 
one NGO in southern rural Bolivia. The notion of space – or “invited spaces” as formulated 
by Cornwall is important to include here: [..] the primary emphasis seems to be on relocating 
the poor within the prevailing order: bringing them in, finding them a place, lending them 
opportunities, empowering them, inviting them to participate’ (Cornwall, 2002:3). This 
version of participation has been prevalent in Bolivia, but recently a more ‘active’ 
participation has occurred, the participation which takes its point of departure in rights. “This 
turn to rights recasts “the people” or “the poor” as neither passive beneficiaries nor consumers 
empowered to make choices, but as agents: the ‘makers and shapers’ of their own 
development (Cornwall, 2002:16) 
During the 1990s Bolivia went through a reform process which opened up spaces for social 
inclusion of formerly marginalised groups of the Bolivian population, especially the 
indigenous people. The reforms included a land reform, a decentralisation and 
democratisation reform (participación popular), an educational reform and a privatisation 
reform. 
In introducing the popular participation reform, the government depended heavily on NGOs 
in the distribution of information about the reform in the rural areas. These areas had not been 
included in the state administration since there were no formal channels of communication to 
the villages which are scattered around in the Bolivian territory. NGOs were thus in a way 
“co-opted” by the state administration in this process. Or maybe a new relation between 
donors, state and NGO was created, which could be explained by the notion “Dostango”: 
“The term draws attention to particular relational issues between states, organisations and 
civil societies, and the ever-changing institutional, financial and conceptual interactions that 
takes place between DOnor, STAtes and NGOs in time and place” (Tvedt, 2007: 41). The 
paper does not intend to describe the work of a single NGO, but rather try to relate the 
interactions between state, NGO and local actors.  
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 The reforms of decentralisation and popular participation were primarily directed at a social 
(or political) inclusion of formerly marginalised groups. Not much was done in terms of an 
economical inclusion.  
In this connection, social inclusion means that formerly marginalised groups now have 
possibilities of participating in elections of municipal and national governments. In this 
connection they have been invited to participate by way of state reforms seeking to empower 
marginalised groups. The NGO’s have played a crucial role in this empowerment process. 
Until recently it was not possible for many people in the rural areas to vote, since they lacked 
identification papers, which are needed to be able to vote. Obtaining birth certificate for 
example, meant that people had to travel to the place they were born to get the papers. This 
has been an obstacle for many since there is much poverty in rural areas, and people could not 
afford to travel. This has been part of the reason behind the success of the political system in 
Bolivia previously in excluding certain groups of the Bolivian population from power. It has 
changed now, indigenous people are now well represented in parliament and Bolivia has its 
first indigenous president, Evo Morales. Presently civil rights are being granted to all 
Bolivians. When it comes to economical inclusion not much has happened. Land distribution 
is still very unequal, despite attempts to better the situation for many rural poor. Infrastructure 
is weak and access to markets is difficult for a great part of the rural population. The informal 
sector in the cities is large, and many people are partly or full-time unemployed leading to a 
considerable poverty rate in Bolivia. The argument here is that perhaps social inclusion will 
over time create improvement for poverty alleviation in Bolivia, but without an economical 
inclusion directed at Bolivia’s poor, this might not happen in the near future. 
 
Background 
The processes of decentralisation in Latin America have intensified during the last 20 years 
(Booth, 2004, ICHRP, 2005)). International aid agencies and economic reformers have 
stressed the importance of decentralisation and good governance programs as means to 
deconstruct the centralist state found in many Latin American countries and thereby reducing 
the administrative inefficiencies of the administrations (Willis et al., 1999). The decentral-
isation can be regarded as a tool for development, since decentralisation could empower the 
poor and marginalised part of the population (Jütting et al., 2004). This notion of participation 
regards the state as an actor seeking to include disempowered groups by empowering them. 
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In Bolivia the poor are to be found, for the larger part, among the indigenous rural population 
and urban migrants from rural areas. 
Until 1994 there were hardly any municipal governments in the rural areas, only the larger 
cities were divided in municipalities and as such receiving funds from the central 
administration. Most rural areas were marginalised, both because of missing infra structure in 
rural areas and because no state funds were redirected to the rural areas. 
 
In 1952 Bolivia experienced a revolution and former rulers consisting of mine- and hacienda 
owners were overthrown. The state nationalised the income generating industries - first and 
foremost the mines. The Bolivian state became very centralised and focused primarily on 
nationalised industries and big cities. An agrarian reform was passed in 1953, but after this 
the prospect of development and progress in the rural areas was left behind by the Bolivian 
state. No new reforms to spur economic development reached the rural areas (Antezana, 1992; 
Crabtree, 2005). 
 
The one-sided economical and political practice of staking on only mining- and other 
industries by the Bolivian state brought about serious problems, when the prices on Bolivia’s 
most important export-good; tin, dropped drastically on the world market in 1985. The 
increased poverty and social disorder following the economical collapse made the IMF and 
other donors initiate a structural adjustment programme in Bolivia. The presence of external 
donors combined with a pressure from the Bolivian population and a political wish for 
changes, fostered several reforms2 in the beginning of the 1990s, among these the law on 
Participación Popular - a decentralisation and democratisation reform which established 
municipalities all over rural Bolivia3.  
The rural areas of Bolivia have played a minor role in the state’s economical development 
after the 1952 revolution, due to the above mentioned nationalised mining industry (Malloy, 
                                                 
2.   Among these are an education reform, an agrarian reform (INRA), a law of privatisation, an 
education reform, and an alteration of the constitution admitting that Bolivia is a pluricultural and 
multiethnic society. More than 50% of the population is indigenous. 
3   In connection with the implementation of the popular participation reform, donors were very active 
in registrering the rural population and helping them to obtain formal papers in order to making it 
possible to vote for municipal elections. This has meant an inclusion of the indigenous rural 
population in the new municipalities, and in many municipalities they are represented as council 
members. 
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 1989). Once the agrarian reform of 1953 redistributed land as individual owned plots to 
former workers on the haciendas, these areas, and the rest of rural Bolivia, have played a 
minor economical role in the state. The majority of the rural population is indigenous.4 
 
As a consequence of the marginalised rural areas, some have described Bolivia as a ‘weakly 
integrated territory’ (Vilas, 1997). This signifies that politics, development and economic 
growth only occurred in specific areas of the Bolivian territory, mostly the big cities5. Apart 
from this economical exclusion of the rural population, a cultural exclusion took place as 
well. The ‘campesinos’ (peasants) were by city people and rural elites regarded as primitive 
people (Cusicanqui, 1990; Rockefeller, 1998), who were not part of the ‘modern’ Bolivian 
state. Seeing the indigenous population as backwards, and as an obstacle to the modernizing 
process is not a Bolivian phenomenon only. Many Latin American countries have had the 
mono-cultural nation-state as a model for the modernisation process. Only during the last 
fifteen years the discourse on the multi-cultural society has gradually influenced the political 
agenda of many Latin American states (Ströbele-Gregor, 1994; Brysk, 2000).  
 
Participation 
In 1994, the Bolivian constitution was altered to acknowledge, that Bolivia is a multiethnic 
and multi-cultural society. This acknowledgement of the indigenous population is also part of 
the law on Participación Popular: “The present law acknowledges, promotes and consolidates 
the process of popular participation, allowing the indigenous population, the peasant 
population and the neighbourhood associations [in cities], respectively to enter the juridical, 
political and economical life of the country” (Ley de Participación Popular, artículo 1, own 
translation). According to the law-text Participación Popular should change former politics of 
exclusion and marginalisation of the rural areas. What is very important for the new 
municipalities is the redistribution of the state’s funds to the municipal level. 20% of the 
state’s income must be redistributed to the municipalities. Of this amount, 15 % can be used 
for administration and 85 % must be spent on projects in the municipality. 
 
                                                 
4. The groups of indigenous people come to a 71% or 85% of the population, depending on the 
definition used. See Ströbele-Gregor, 1994:106. 
5.  And the agroindustrial areas of the Santa Cruz Department. 
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 The law on popular participation intended to present solutions to the conflict between “the 
principles of representative democracy and the “corporative” articulation of the interests of 
functional groups, by giving greater expression to interests defined in territorial rather than 
functional terms; and attempting to marrying the principles of representative and participatory 
democracy” (Booth, 2004:23). This was supposed to happen by having on the one side 
municipal authorities elected on the basis of registered political parties and also offering 
authority to Comités de Vigilancia (vigilance committees), which are representing local social 
organisations like for example village councils with their tradition for representative and 
direct democracy. The vigilance committees was a new construction in the municipalities, it 
did not exist before the reform was implemented. Many villages in Andean Bolivia, for 
example, have been governed by a village council, where decisions have been made in 
consensus. Every position (“cargo”) from being announcer of meetings, head of different 
tasks (for ex. irrigation), to head of the village council are taken by male members of the 
village in rotation and for a certain period only , so that everybody gets to fill each position at 
least once. These village councils have successfully ruled in local areas marginalised by the 
state, and it is these types of social organisations and ways of ruling, the popular participation 
reform intended to include by way of vigilance committees in the reform process. 
The vigilance committees are an “artificial” construction, though, which is supposed to 
function apart from village councils, and villagers are supposed to elect representatives for the 
vigilance committees. The people in the villages have not taken up the use of the vigilance 
committees, since they have had their village councils, and it would perhaps have made more 
sense to include the heads of the village councils (using the existing social organisations in 
the reform) instead of creating a completely new form of organisation. Thus the vigilance 
committees have not been functioning well, allowing for national political parties and local 
elites to maintain power in many new municipalities and being able to determine the local, 
municipal policies without much attention to the indigenous grass root organisations (Booth, 
2004) 
Bolivian administration has been severely affected by corruption and transparency is missing 
at all levels. One of the means to avoid this corruption on the local level could be the social 
control by the vigilance committee, which is meant to represent the people of the municipality 
and their social organisations, as mentioned above (Ministerio de Desarrollo, 1998). The 
vigilance committees can propose projects to the municipal councils. Ideally the vigilance 
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 committee must take part in the municipal planning and thereby heighten the representation of 
the inhabitants and grass root organisations of the municipality. Furthermore the committee 
must revise the budgets of the municipal government. The committee’s tasks are supposed to 
add transparency and accountability to the municipal government and administration. This is 
not obtained in many municipalities yet. One reason is that the people in the communities, 
who join the vigilance committee do not have the capacities to control municipal budgets.  
NGOs are assisting local communities in the communication and collaboration with the 
municipality, but as a consequence of this lack of local capacity “national political parties 
have maintained much of their power to dictate local arrangements. Despite any challenges, 
coalition politics and horse-trading of the spoils of office are alive and well at the basis of 
local as well as national politics in Bolivia” (Booth, 2004:24). The invited space was 
introduced by the state to be filled by empowered subjects at the local level. But as we have 
seen, the vigilance committees were an artificial entity, which had no ‘meaning’ for the local 
population. A change is slowly happening as new actors emerge at the local level. Taking the 
law on popular population at face value, indigenous people started to act according to the law, 
but outside the “invited spaces” (vigilance committees etc.) to take part in the participation 
process. The notions to explain this change could be from ‘civil society’ which contains 
‘passive’ users of state proposals to ‘citizens’ which contain actors in and with participation – 
on one’s own terms. The following example shows how indigenous people started to use the 
possibilities built in the reform ‘participación popular’, which in fact required citizen 
participation in local governance (Cornwall, 2002: 14).  
Some political parties try to help indigenous people being elected to municipal governments. 
This way indigenous people may increase their social inclusion by actively taking part in the 
municipal governance: 
 
Doña Josefina, who was in 1998 elected from the one of the ayllus in the area 6 to enter the 
municipal council of Uncía (Norte de Potosí)7, chose to run for the municipal elections and 
being only formally connected to a political party. The practise of the political parties has 
been to seek the potential political candidates among the rural population, and offer them a 
                                                 
6 Social organisation in Andean areas, which are dating back before the conquest. This social organisation is 
closely linked to cultivation of land in the Andean area, which often requires special indigenous knowledge and 
technology. Cultivating steep mountain slopes required manpower and organisation, which is included in the 
ayllu structure. 
7 Fieldwork in Norte de Potosí, october, 2000 
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 place on the list of the political party and later trying to gain influence by way of the 
indigenous representative in the municipal council. Since the only way to be elected is on a 
list of a political party, the potential local candidates do not have much choice. The major 
parties offer a place near the bottom of the list, where the candidates from the ayllus have 
almost no chance of being elected (Crabtree, 2005). Some parties, though, have opened their 
list to local candidates, for example the parties NFR (Nueva Fuerza Republicana) and MAS 
(Movimiento al Socialismo). Doña Josefina was elected on the list of NFR. She did her 
campaign on foot, dressed in her traditional clothes and taking an indigenous band with her. 
This way she did as stated as one of the aims of the popular participation reform; “allowing 
the indigenous population, the peasant population and the neighbourhood associations [in 
cities], respectively to enter the juridical, political and economical life of the country” (Ley de 
Participación Popular). She entered the political life on her own terms and distanced herself 
from political parties, which had until then been elitist and excluding the indigenous 
population. 
Doña Josefina has during her time in the municipal council felt the ‘urban/rural gap’ that 
exists in Bolivia. The people of the urban centres have been used to being able to dominate 
the rural areas – the ayllus – for centuries and changing these practises is not easy. 
Furthermore she has felt a ‘double’ discrimination being a woman and indigenous. . 
Therefore, even though Doña Josefina achieved election to the municipal council, this does 
not always include immediate access to power structures locally.  But things are changing and 
today indigenous people act more like citizens taking part actively in participation and 
decentralization processes. Indigenous people have gained seats in many rural municipalities. 
 
The former failure to include the majority of the indigenous rural population was part of the 
reason why rebellions and uprisings by social and grass root organisations have so strongly 
been expressing dissatisfaction with former elite political decisions. The lack of inclusion and 
transparency seem to have spurred mass demonstrations from all parts of Bolivian civil 
society, and these uprisings formed the background for the election of the present-day 
president, Evo Morales.  
The question is, however, whether the law on Participation Popular in fact serves its purpose, 
when we regard it from the level of the villages. There are several indications of this not being 
the fact. For rural dwellers the solution to various practical needs has been for the villages to 
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 deal with these themselves. With reference to an electrification project, one villager says: 
‘The village asked to have a project of electrification but until now the municipality has not 
met its obligations. For us nothing has changed with Participación Popular, we have always 
ourselves dealt with things. Our fathers and grandfathers gave contributions and participated 
in faenas (mutual work). We still do the same if we want something done in the community’. 
 
The different social patterns existing on different levels of the Bolivian society, makes it dif-
ficult to grasp the overall implementation process and its effects on all levels. The law on 
Participación Popular states in the law text the inclusion of the indigenous, rural population as 
one of its objectives, as cited above. But the practice of some political parties in the 
implementation of the law indicates that what was actually occurring in the municipalities was 
sometimes an exclusion of the indigenous population. The question is whether NGOs had a 
role to play in bettering the participation of indigenous people on the local level. One could 
suspect some NGO’s filling the role of ‘gatekeepers’. “Spaces fostered as a way of amplifying 
marginalised voices may end up being filled by gatekeepers, who speak for but not with those 
they represent” (Cornwall, 2002: 8) 
As stated in the introduction, the main interest in this paper is the social interface of different 
actors on the local level: communities, state, donors and NGOs. In principle the reform of 
popular participation was a tool to include formerly excluded groups, but it seems like the 
State is lacking the ability to fully include the population in the communities, since there are 
no lines of communication between state and community. The ‘invited spaces’ were hard to 
fill out. Here the NGOs have helped as mediators between state, municipalities and donors. 
Donors are following this process of decentralisation closely, and have partly been involved 
in the introduction of popular participation by stressing the need for good governance, 
including a focus on indigenous rights, transparency etc. 
In the Potosí department in southern Bolivia the NGO ISALP has been doing an extensive job 
of including communities in the process and implementation of popular participation by 
spreading information about the reform and helping villages to formulate project proposals to 
the municipalities. 
 
Good governance 
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 Good governance can be seen in a conditionality perspective, where the notion of good 
governance is representing an act of ‘disciplining democracy’ (Abrahamsen, 2002). In Bolivia 
the reforms of popular participation and decentralisation were introduced after strong 
recommendations from international donors (Booth 2004). Since Bolivia has had an 
oligarchic party system for many years (Crabtree, 2005), power was concentrated around a 
small elite. Bolivia inherited a centralist system of rule from the Spanish colonial rule, where 
the predominance of state structure over civil society prevails. The capital of La Paz is the 
centre of all government institutions, and due to Bolivia’s difficult geography, the government 
and limited civil services have had difficulties in penetrating the state’s territory. This element 
of rule from the capital city, with very limited efforts to extend government or devolve 
significant authority to the regions has persisted until recent decades (Booth, 2004:15). As 
mentioned above, the political system in Bolivia has been elitist and political parties have 
been driven by patronage (Malloy, 1989) with formation of coalitions on the basis of post-
election horse-trading rather than ideological sympathy or political agreement. (Gamarra & 
Malloy, 1995). 
 
The practice and culture of the political parties in Bolivia today also originate from the 
national revolution of 1952. Most political parties in Bolivia today were created during or 
after the revolution. The ruling party after 1952, MNR8, nationalised the country’s major 
assets: The mines and major industries. Thus the MNR over time created a state, where the 
ruling political party had sovereign power over the states= assets (Malloy 1989). The 
government introduced a ‘redistributive policy’ directing money to the party supporters 
(Lavaud, 1998, Crabtree, 2005) which was put into practice by using channels through the 
party and the workers union9. A number of jobs were created in the public administration and 
industries. In the nationalised mines, for example, the number of workers rose from 28.973 in 
1952 to 36.558 in 1956 (Lavaud, 1998:46). And in the state administration a large number of 
jobs became available to the persons who were loyal to the party in power. 
 
                                                 
8.  MNR: Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement). MNR started 
as a revolutionary movement and transformed into a political party after the revolution. 
9.  The workers union was created by the MNR in the years after the revolution. Later this union 
transformed into the current COB (Central Obrero Boliviano). 
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 This ‘redistribution of national resources’ from the oligarchic mine and hacienda owner ruled 
state to the revolutionary state created a patron-client relation between the revolutionary 
government leaders and their supporters (Booth, 2004, Crabtree, 2005). The state and its 
government changed from a revolutionary state (the 1952 revolution) to a state governed by 
political ‘patrónes’ who redistributed the state’s assets to their clients by way of jobs and 
other advantages. The main reason for this to occur was the relatively poor development of 
the Bolivian industrial and agricultural sector. There was hardly any economic progress in the 
country aside from the nationalised industries.10 This had damaging effects on the possibilities 
for the rural areas to make economical progress, since these rural areas (outside the Santa 
Cruz region) were economically marginalised in the state ruled by the political patrónes, who 
did not support the indigenous rural population. 
 
The post 1952 political practices created a system, where a separation of fiscal and political 
duties is difficult to accomplish. As a consequence, the ruling political party could secure its 
followers jobs and advantages. It also meant, that when the government changed from one 
party to another after an election, the country’s administrative personnel changed, since all 
public employees were replaced by clients of the new government. Extraction of the state’s 
funds and a patron-client system in the civil service has been the result of the processes and 
relations between state and political parties since 1952. The consequences of this are serious 
for the possibilities of performing ‘good governance’ in Bolivia today, from the national to 
the municipal level. The intended outcome of the popular participation reform from the 
government’s (and international donors’) point of view was to implement a new form of 
governance in the rural areas, i.e. by creating new municipalities 
There is good reason to contest the notion of good governance (Rosebury, 2001). The central 
themes within good governance (democracy, anti-corruption and transparency) are agreed on 
as significant when introducing good governance (Moore & Robinson, 1994; IMF, 1997; 
Hout 2002,; Hood & Heald, 2006). Other elements do not seem as fixed - for example 
privatization and focus on market economy as such. Under neoliberal “hegemony’ within 
international policies (Kohl, 2006), privatization is seen as an important instrument for good 
governance. In Bolivia a privatization reform was introduced in 1994. This was at the same 
                                                 
10. In 1952 the mines represented more than 80% of the states income. Before the revolution 70% of 
the cultivable land was owned by haciendas. (Mesa et al. 1994:495).  
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 time as the decentralisation and democratisation reforms were introduced, so one could argue 
that privatisation and good governance reforms go hand in hand in Bolivia. On the other hand 
one could also argue that good governance is a prerequisite for privatisation (Haarstad & 
Andersson, forthcoming), since a good investment climate calls for a stable civil society 
without social unrest. Good governance and poverty alleviation are not easily obtained in 
rural Bolivia where power structure has been elitist and centralised by the state. NGOs in 
Bolivia have taken part in the inclusion of civil society in the reform process by helping 
disseminating knowledge of the new reforms and assisting the communities in formulating 
projects to be supported by the new municipal governments. 
 
NGO’s in Bolivia 
In the southern rural part of Bolivia many communities are located far from roads and not 
easily accessible. Spreading knowledge in the 1990s about new reforms depended heavily on 
NGOs which were there already working with the communities. My own fieldwork in a 
municipality in the Potosí department in 1998-1999 showed that there was little knowledge of 
the new reforms among the rural population, especially among the women who were taking 
care of their houses and fields, while their husbands often worked as migrant workers in 
Bolivia’s bigger cities or in neighbouring countries. Village leaders, who had contact with 
NGOs and who had participated in the courses held by these NGOs had some knowledge of 
the reforms. But the lack of knowledge at that time was a problem for the rural population, 
since they could not participate in the municipal elections the way they were supposed to.  
More knowledge about the reforms has been spread, and presently most of the rural 
population participates actively in the local democracy. Power structures are beginning to 
change at local level and municipalities have now some participation of indigenous people in 
the municipal councils. 
ISALP11 was one of the NGOs that were working together with state and departmental 
administrations in disseminating knowledge about democratisation at the local level. This 
NGO already had established collaboration with a Danish NGO and with Danida, the Danish 
                                                 
11 Investigación Social y Asesoramiento Legal Potosí 
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 development assistance organisation. Since the Bolivian state, Danida and northern NGOs 
supported spreading of information of new laws, ISALP and other local NGOs were some of 
the key-actors in this process. The question is therefore whether the state could have 
introduced the reforms without the help of the NGOs in distributing information and assisting 
in the implementation.  
Today money is decentralised from the state to departments and municipalities. But many 
areas, for example in the department of Potosí, are still marginalised, and projects do not 
reach all communities. Furthermore there is a lack of capacity in the rural municipalities 
regarding people who are skilled to taking part in local government - for example in the 
process of making POAs (Plan operativo annual/annual plan), which are required by the state 
in order to redistribute money to the municipalities. Both in communities and in 
municipalities NGOs are working to fill the knowledge gap and helping formulating projects. 
Communities do not receive money for projects unless they send an application to the 
municipality. And since communities often do not posses the knowledge of how to formally 
write an application, the help from an NGO is of value to the local population. Also as 
mentioned, many small municipalities have difficulties in making the POAs which are needed 
to receive money from department and State, and also here NGOs are helping. 
To sum up, the reform of participación popular and the decentralisation reform would not 
work in many municipalities without the help of NGOs. This is not unusual in developing 
states (Opoku-Mensah et al., 2007). In weak states poverty and social exclusion are common 
for rural populations. Civil society organisations with a relation to the state administration are 
almost non-existent even though a variety of local organisations exist. These local 
organisations, like the ayllu and village councils, have managed governance at the local level, 
but the relation to the departmental or state levels have not been formalised.  
Bolivia has been a major receiver of foreign aid since the mid-1980’s where the country’s 
economy failed severely, and a large number of NGOs have emerged. These NGOs have been 
supported both by Northern NGOs and state development organisations (like the Danish 
Danida). The work of these NGOs has mainly expressed foreign donor interests, but in the 
1990s the reform process in Bolivia created a new role for the NGOs working in rural areas as 
mediators between state and communities in implementing the popular participation reform. 
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I have mentioned a connection between neoliberalism and reforms of good governance in 
developing countries. In Bolivia there seems to be a close relation between the two. Both the 
privatization and the democratisation reforms were implemented in the mid-1990s as a part of 
a bigger reform process. Good governance and privatization could be dependent on each 
other12. In order to create the best conditions for neoliberal policies – like privatization – it is 
crucial that civil society is accepting the reforms. In Bolivia there has been social unrest and 
protests as a consequence of the privatization reform (Kohl, 1994). Since foreign direct 
investment has been a policy since the first neoliberal reforms of the Paz Estenssorro 
government in 1985, it has been of increasing importance that this social unrest could be 
curbed in order to create the best conditions for foreign investment. The reforms of 
decentralisation, democratisation, land and education can in this connection be regarded as 
tools of creating social stability because their main aim is a social inclusion of marginalised 
groups. They could be regarded as progressive, enhancing good governance and participation. 
But “enhancing citizenship participation requires more than inviting or inducing people to 
participate. And it calls for more than simply making spaces available for people to express 
their needs and exercises in gathering ‘voices’” (Cornwall, 2002:28). The question is, whether 
it is ‘enough’ for the state to introduce possibilities for participation, if people do not have the 
possibility of becoming agents. Their not being agents at present is connected to the fact that 
in Bolivia we see a social inclusion, but economical inclusion is missing for a broader part of 
the population. 
Therefore reforms can be seen as directly supporting neo-liberal policies because they do not 
incorporate an economic inclusion for the marginalised groups. No tax reforms have been 
introduced. The land reform is not fully including the big estates of the tropical parts of 
Bolivia, where a minority owns a majority of the land. So the reforms of popular participation 
and decentralisation have created social inclusion – and this has been with the help of NGOs, 
but the economical inclusion is still missing. 
Conclusion 
                                                 
12. Haarstad & Andersson, forthcoming 
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 Has popular participation opened an (invited) space for participation by local organisations 
and actors? Seen from the local level in the Potosí department formerly marginalised 
indigenous communities do seem to have obtained formal rights to participate in local 
governance by way of the municipal councils, and thereby a possibility of combating poverty 
at the local level. But one thing is formal rights. What is needed in the rural areas of Bolivia is 
capacity building among the population, since the lack of knowledge on many levels seem to 
be the greatest obstacle to developing the rural areas. 
Good governance and participation, and thus a form of inclusion of formerly marginalised 
groups, are central notions in current development aid. NGOs have an essential role to play in 
implementing this at the local level in Bolivia if they can avoid the role of “gate-keeper”. The 
question is whether good governance and participation are useful in poverty alleviation, if 
they stand alone. If no economic reforms directed at some form of rural development (easier 
access to markets, infrastructure, introduction of new technologies) are introduced, 
participation in municipal governments may be of minor interest and use for local rural 
populations and their social organisations. 
Regarding state transformation, the NGOs in Bolivia have played a key role in implementing 
new reforms on local level. The relation between donors, state and NGOs has been close in 
this case, since donors and NGOs have played an active role in implementing Bolivian state 
reforms and thus fulfilling an invited space for civil society organisations in line with state 
policies.. NGOs have thus not been opposing the state in this case but have rather been 
supporting the reforms coming from the state and at the same time they have supported local 
communities in their attempt to take part in the new processes. They have operated as 
mediators in the social interface in the “crtitcal points of intersection between different social 
systems” as stated by Long (1989: 1-2) 
In conclusion the answer to the question must be both a yes – and a no. Good governance and 
participation do enforce empowerment and capacity building in including marginalised 
groups – social inclusion. And in a longer time span this might lead to poverty alleviation. 
But if good governance and participation are not linked to economic reforms benefiting the 
rural poor, and thus not initiating an economical inclusion, alleviating poverty in Bolivia’s 
rural areas is not just around the corner.  
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Conclusion  
Vibeke Andersson & Steen Fryba Christensen 
 
The conference: ”New Latin American Development Strategies in a Changing International 
Economic and Political Context” focused on two general lines of inquiry with regard to new Latin 
American development strategies. One line focused on the significance of the international context 
for development strategies, while the other line focused on state-society relations and their impact 
on development strategies. The objective with this approach was to assure cross-disciplinary 
dialogue and to engage in discussions on current development strategies in Latin America with 
inspiration from different perspectives and levels of analysis. 
The conference’s objective of addressing and discussing current Latin American development 
strategies from various disciplines and perspectives as well as from different angles and 
backgrounds in order to create debates amongst participants with this varied inspiration was 
fulfilled. The conference identified some core themes that could be emphasized in future 
conferences on current Latin American development strategies. One core theme is that the current 
international context is changing significantly with a shift in the international balance of economic 
power. At the same time, Latin American countries are experiencing a positive economic context 
that has decreased their external economic vulnerability. This opens up for new opportunities for 
new international alliances and more autonomous development strategies in Latin America in the 
future. With regard to the state-society dimension, the state has been weakened in its function of 
providing public services and social security in a number of countries. On the other hand there are 
some promising examples of countries (Mexico and Brazil) where poverty oriented programs based 
on conditional cash transfers have had some successes. These two themes could be explored further 
in future conferences. It was discussed at the end of the conference in which context this should 
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happen and there was some support for the idea that it would be important to promote more 
collaboration between Latin American research environments in order to make joint conferences. 
No concrete steps were taken in this direction at the conference, but there was a general interest 
amongst the Nordic participants.   
 
The conference attracted nearly 30 participants plus students and staff from AAU. Participants were 
mainly from academic circles, a few practitioners participated as well as the Bolivian ambassador 
and the Central Bank director from Venezuela. The academic participants represented a number of 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Great Britain, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Mexico, Canada and the United States) which made fertile ground for creating international 
contacts and fruitful discussions. 
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